The Essential Gauḍapāda

Written in Kannada by Swāmi Satchidānandendra Saraswati

Translated By D.B. Gangolli

Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya Holenarsipur, Hassan - 573 211 Karnataka, INDIA.
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About The Author

His Holiness Paramahamsa Sri Sri Satchidānandendra Saraswati Swām ji, the founder of Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya and author of over 200 reputed works on Advaita in Kannada, Sanskrit and English, blessed the earth with his presence for 96 useful and rich years (1880-1975).

His works are characterised by vast and deep scholarship, clear and precise perception and an attractive and lively style. His authentic interpretation of Śańkara has been greatly recognized by both the East and the West. He was not just a rare and accomplished individual but a mighty and magnificent institution.

About The Book

Shri Gaudapāda has established by taking as his central authoritative source the Māndūkya Upanishad, which though smallest in size (only 12 Mantras or verses) among all the Upanishads yet the most famous one, the following profound Siddhānta by means of logic fully in consonance with Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience): "On the support of Anubhava of Avasthātraya or three states of consciousness, Atman of all of us is verily Ajādvaya Brahman alone which is Nityaniravastha or eternally devoid of any state; That alone is the Paramartha satya" Further, he has not only clarified as to what exactly is the wide difference between the predominantly perverted logic - orinted Vijñānavādis and Shūnyavāda, on the one hand, and Vedanta on the other, but also has convinced all true seekers about the facts that : (a) Vain logic can never stand its ground all through; (b) all the devices adopted by the logically- oriented Darshanas or schools of philosophy are all meant for the worship (Ārādhana) of Paramātman. **PUBLISHER**

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

This treatise, which is the second of 'The Essential....' series, the first being 'The Essential Adi Sankara', is a faithful translation of Śri Satchidānanadendra Saraswati Swāmīji's Kannada gem of "Śri Gaudapāda Hridaya" into English for the benefit of those true seakers who do not have the facility of understanding this regional language. This is yet another prestigious book published by our Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Holenarsipur, Hassan District, Karnataka - 573211 with a view to propagating the pristine pure Śānkara Vedānta, cleansed of the alien doctrines interpoalated into the renowned Vedantic titerature of the original Śankara Bhāshyas. Śri Gaudapada, who was the grand-preceptor of Sri Sankara, had written a solitary treatise called - 'Mandukya Kārikās" which are based on the shortest Upanishad, Māndūkya, comprising a mere 12 mantras. This terse Upanishad is utilizing one of the most important and the subtlest methodologies based on the axiom of Superimposition and Rescission, and the very fact that Śri Gaudapāda chose this brief Upanishad to write his elaborates commentary vouches for the importance and prominence that is given by all spiritual preceptors. It would not, for that reason, be an exaggeration if it is stated that whosoever masters this principal methodology adopted subtly by these illus-Āchāryas and as explained and elucidated by our Śri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swāmiji of revered memory, can never miss the real purport behind the gemine teachings of this ancient school of non-dualism, Advaita Vedānta.

We are confident that this treatise translated by Śri D. B. Gangolli, an ardent follower of Śri Śwāmiji, will benefit all those who patiently study this book and adopt a way of life in consonance with these profound tenets.

1st November 1997 Holenarasipur. Chairman
Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya
(Public Charitable Trust)

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Errata: Through inadvertence several errors have crept in. The errata is given at the end. The inconvenience is deeply regretted.

FOREWORD

Upanishads are an unparallelled treasure of supreme spiritual wisdom. Of all the Upanishads the Vedas include, the Māṇḍūkya has a distinct place of excellence and charm. Philosophy intends to probe into existence and knowledge and unearth the ultimate source of both. In other Upanishads the external objective existence is the subject of enquiry, whereas Māṇḍūkya presents a distinct difference, which makes it brief but compulsive.

The text of Māṇḍūkya Upanishad consists of twelve mantras in which the seventh stands paramount. It describes the Ultimate Reality, Brahman, to be the supra - consciousness, distinct from all the other levels of consciousness normally accessible to us. This supra - consciousness is described as "Śantam Śivam and Advaitam. This is the Ātma and this indeed is to be known" spells out the mantra.

To illustrate and explain the process of Sādhana the Upanishad esents the monosyllable Ōm, relating its three component sylbles A, U and M to the three states of man's awareness, wakefulness (Jāgrat), dream (Svapna) and deep sleep (Sushupti).

The Upanishad's revelations have their own exclusive sanctity and are to be honoured and accepted outright. But whatever the Upanishads present are not without reason and verification. In fact, the entire gamut of Upanishads aim at inculcating in the seeker his own personal testimony for which a full 'Sādhana' is laid down. But scriptural pronouncements, supported by one's own direct experience cannot be without the stamp of reason or 'Yukti'. Only when all the three - 'Śruti', 'Yukti' and 'Anukhava' (scriptures, reason and direct experience) blend well the findings become final and unassailable.

Assigning reason or 'Yukti' its supreme place in the field of religion and spiritual life, Sri Gauḍapāda presents three sections of Kārikā - Vaitathya, Advaita and Alātaśānti. By these he first proves, on the basis of relentless reason, the unauthentic, illu sive character of the objectivity of our experience. He then

establi shed the nondual nature of existence as well as consciousness and finally disposes of all possible arguments against these findings.

The Prakaraṇas of Sri Gauḍapāda are held with as much esteem and sanctity as the Upanishadic mantras themselves. Unlike in other parts of the world, in this blessed country the philosophers are always ascetics and sages, proving thereby that their philosophical effort is not at all an intellectual pursuit but a full-fledged religio- spiritual mission with the sole aim of realizing the Supreme Reality and thereby fulfilling the main purpose of human life on this earth.

Is the objective existence around us true and absolute in nature and purpose? Or is it merely a subject of perception alone? This is the basic question the Kārikās pose and discuss. Perception is the outcome of the 'perceiving process'. And 'perceiving' is a process which proceeds from the 'perceiver'. There cannot be an 'action' except when the 'actor' is first there. An 'action' is a phase of expression of the 'actor'. An 'actor' becomes so only when the 'action' proceeds. Before the action proceeded, one cannot think of any actor at all. The twins of 'actor and action' emerge at one stroke. Dissociated from 'action', the 'actor' becomes inconceivable. Something distinct from 'actorhood' and 'action' has thus to be thought of, as the Eternal Presence.

The objective world, or objectivity, around us, however huge and imposing it may be, is not a full-fledged or absolute perception, the Kārikā sets forth. For the duration and condition in which the external objects are perceived, consitute only a part of our life and consciousness. We are conscious of the world, but only during our wakeful state. Wakeful state by itself does not complete or exhaust our consciousness, either its potential or expression. Besides wakefulness (Jāgrat), we have two more distinct states. One is the dream (Svapna) and the other the deep sleep (Sushupti).

Sushupti or deep sleep is an undisturbed, unbroken long enough state, which does extend to several hours of the day - nearly or more than one third of the day. It can extend even

beyond. The same 'I' which remains wakeful and thereby perceives through the senses the objective world, withdraws itself into 'Sushupti', to drop all wakeful perceptions altogether. How can a perception be held true, if it is subsequently nullified like this? The 'I' brings in sleep all by itself, independently, uncomprehending anything else, even the body, mind and intelligence. Besides this deep sleep, we have also the solely inward dream state, which, whenever it transpires, succeeds sleep. The dream state brings in altogether a new world, new objects, new values and new responses. Thus the dream state fully contradicts and invalidates wakefulness.

Should not the rational man evaluate the objective world, taking his stand on all the three states together? Instantly, objectivity proves itself to be unauthentic and illusory. What is then the ground or substratum of this illusion? If the whole existence around us falls as illusory, its substratum has necessarily to be not anywhere outside, but solely inside. The very 'I', which undergoes all by itself the three of wakefulness, deep sleep and dream, and which endures alike in all of them, can alone be and is the substratum for all the states. Everything the 'I' produces and perceives is illusory but the 'I' itself is not.

That the Self of the Upanishads which the entire Vedas extol is the only source of creation and is the Ultimate Reality, is what the Kārikās argue out and establish. The scriptural Upanishad thus derives a confirmation and enrichment in the hands of the Kārikā.

Swāmi Sacchidānanda Saraswati, a staunch and loyal Śaṅkarite, has written elaborately bringing forth the essential content and message of Sri Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and the excellent reasoning set forth there. This work rendered in a regional language has now been made available to larger audience in an international medium by Śri D. B. Gangolli, who has authored a free translation of Swāmi Sacchidānanda Saraswati's original composition. By this a large scope is thrown open by the author which will make Swāmi Sacchidānanda Saraswati's thoughts available to the world over.

These days when the Upanishadic, Epic and philosophical

thoughts constituing Vedānta are sought more and more by thinkers and students in the world, Śri Gangolli's effort at publishing this book is quite timely and beneficial. One can hope that his efforts will be properly rewarded and enough of reading and introspection will take place in the field of Upanishadic thoughot, especially the distinguished Māṇḍūkyōpanishad and Sri Gauḍapāda's Kārikā on it.

Māṇḍūkya Upanishad is incomplete without Gauḍapādakārikā and proper understanding of the Kārikā will no doubt make the seeker unshakeable in his spiritual pursuit and the realization of the Self.

Trissur Nārāyaṇāshrama Tapōvanam 18.06.97 Swāmi Bhoomānanada Tirtha

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Soon after 'The Essential Adi Sankara' was published in 1991 by the Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Thyāgarājanagar, Bangalore - 28, the idea of publishing the second of this 'Essential' series, viz. 'The Essential Gaudapāda' was mooted. Although the translation of this magnum opus in Kannada by the erudite pen of Śii Śatchidānandendra Saraswati Swāmiji, of revered memory, was completed by me early in 1993, the publication was put off owing to several causes beyond my control. However, by God's benign grace, I have succeeded to overcome all hurdles and hindrances - most of them could not even be anticipated and now this gem of Vedantic science is in the hands of the readers. It is hoped that this will also be well-received by the connoisseurs and seekers alike just as its predecessor Essential Ādi Śankara'. It will also be in the fitness of things to complete this endeavour of propagating the pristine pure Advita Vedānta as expounded by a line illustrious preceptors like Veda Vyāsa (Bādarāyaṇa), Gaudapāda, Śankara and Sureshwara who belonged to a time-honowed traditional school of Advaita philosophy. And hence now I have mooted to publish in the near future two more texts of this series to bring it up-to-date, viz, 'The Essential Sureshwara' and 'The Essential Satchidananda'.

It is quite well-known in Vedāntic circles all over our country that Shri Gauḍapādāchārya was the grand-preceptor of Shri Śaṅkarāchāryā, and barring the fomer's 'Kārikas', (commentaries) on the Māṇḍūkyōpanishad there are no other authentic works which are extant in his name. Although Adi Śaṅkara's Prasthāna Traya Bhāshyas have become world-famous and are exhaustive in their exposition of almost all the rudiments as well as the subleties of the unique traditional (Sampradayic) methodologies handed down over the ages from the teacher to the taught, Shri Gauḍapāda's Kārikas, numbering a mere 215 divided into four chapters (Prakaranas), project the same traditional teachings in a terse and trite verse form. And unless the ardent student takes recourse to the expert guidance of Ādi Śaṅkara's edifying

and enlightening Bhāshyas, he finds it almost impossible to discern the hidden import of the Kārikas. The traditional methodology of teaching was by word of mouth from the preceptor to the pupil in a discursive manner and only the initiated pupils with a pure heart and incisive intelligence could divine and intuit the subtle truths.

The fact that Shri Śaṅkara in a verse acknowledged Shri Gauḍapāda as a Knowledgeable teacher of Advaita Vedānta belonging to his line of traditional (Samprādāyic) preceptors as well as the fact that Shri Śaṅkara has written an exhaustive and extensive Bhāshya on these extant and most ancient (for, no other authentic or authoritative work on Advaita Vedānta by way of an explanatory Prakaraṇa Grantha is available, barring the Śrutis, the Smṛitis and the Brahma Sūtras - going together by the popular name of Prasthana Trayi) work.

It being so, it is unfortunate that some Vedantins belonging to an alien group and modern scholars with a pronounced sense of an academical study but not trained or prepared to accept even the word of Shri Sankara have raised all kinds of doubts with regard to Shri Gaudapāda's identity or whereabouts and have opined that Māndūkya is a recent work passing muster as an ancient Upanishad, the author being Shri Gaudapāda. Further, some of these academicians have, quite audaciously too gone to the extent of nick-naming not only Shri Gaudapada but also his faithful glossator Shri Sankara as 'Pracchanna Bauddhas', meaning psuedo-Buddhists marauding as Advaita Vedāntins. This they have done on the mere but flimsy reason that the former has literally, sometimes even bodily, borrowed Buddhistic terms and verses and have adapted them to suit their own whimsical theories or tenets. Suffice it to say that all these are wild, unsustainable charges and can easily be dismissed as idiosyncrasies of academicians for each and every such allegation can be disproved (and have been repeated by Shri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swami, of Adhyātma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipur - of revered memory) quite convincingly. For more details in this regard the students or seekers are requested to read 'Māṇḍūkya Rahasya Vivrutihi' in Sanskrit, (with an exhaustive English Introduction by the Swāmiji) published by the Kāryālaya.

But here is this context some relevant and important details regarding Shri Gaudapāda, his works and contributions to Vedānta will be mentioned so as to remove any misconceptions that one might have had because of such false propaganda by the academicians as well as proponents of philosophy opposed to Vedānta.

1. MĀŅDŪKYŌPANISHAD

Among the Upanishads that belong to the Atharva Veda, Shri Sankarāchārya has written his Bhāshyas only on three of them, viz. Mundaka, Prashna and Māndūkya. Among the three nay, among all those Upanishads which Shri Sankara has chosen to write his commentaries on - Māndūkya is the smallest. Even so, Shri Sankara has described it as "सर्ववेदान्तसारसङ्ग्रहः" (the quintessence of the tenets of all Upanishads). Since Shri Gaudapādāchārya's commentary in the form of 'Kārikās' is also written on this Upanishad, we can say - from the standpoint of history of Vedantic lore - that this diminutive Upanishad has a unique importance of its own. With regard to the question -'To which part of Atharva Veda does this Upanishad belong?' - it is not possible to determine, as there is no clinching evidence available. In this regard, Shri Sankara has not stated anything whatsoever in his Bhāshya. Since the lone methodology of Avasthāthraya (the three states of Consciousness) is to be found in this Upanishad through which the Ultimate Reality is determined and expounded, there is a high probability of surmising it to belong to the Āraņyaka of that Veda.

2. VARIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT THE AUTHOR OF THESE MĀNDŪKYA KĀRIKĀS

Although Shri Śańkarācharya has written a Bhāshya on the Upanishad as well as explanations for the Kārikās, he has not expressed that he has written his Bhāshya predominantly by himself on the Upanishad; on the other hand, he has given all the predominance to the Kārikās which undertake the task of explaining the Upanishad. As at present, the Kārikās are divided into four *Prakaraṇas* (Chapters) called - Āgama, Vaitathya, Advaita and Alātashānti. More than the previous Prakaraṇa, the next one contains a higher number of Kārikās in that order. In the first among them, viz. Āgama Prakaraṇa, as at

present, 29 Kārikās are to be found in groups divided and interspersed between the Upanishadic Mantras. But the remaining three Prakaranas are independent in their forms. The last and the biggest, viz. Alātashānti Prakaraṇa, comprising 100 verses or Kārikās, contains invocatory verses both at the beginning and at the end. It being so, there are all kinds of opinions among the scholars with regard to the authorship both in the matter of the Upanishad and the Prakaraṇas.

First and foremost, many Advaitins opine that all these four Prakaraņas are written by Shri Gaudapāda, who was the grand preceptor of Shri Sankara. Secondly, Shri Madhwāchārya (the founder of the Dvaita school of Vedanta) has acknowledged that - (i) Agama Prakarana is not at all 'Pourusheya' (of human origin); (ii) the Mantras, which are seen (heard by sages, who are Brahmajñānis, when they are in commune with the Ultimate Reality) are exemplified in the Upanishad for the purposes of determining Self-Knowledge; (iii) both the Māndūkyōpanishad and the Kārikās are together the Śruti alone. The German scholar, Deussen, opines that together with these four Prakaranas the Māndūkya Upanishad is one whole work written by Shri Gaudapāda. Prof. S.N. Dasgupta, M.A. Ph.D, and many other modern scholars have declared that - (a) Among Shri Gaudapāda's Prakaranas - especially the fourth one - many Prakriyās (methodologies) found in Buddhistic texts are to be seen; (b) since Shri Gaudapāda came into the picture only after the famous Buddhist teachers like Ashwaghōsha, Nagārjuna, Asanga, Vasubandhu etc., we have to perforce surmise that he too, in all probability, was a Buddhist, or else, he was a preceptor who had a great respect towards Buddha's teachings. Among these four different opinions of various groups of scholars, the last three seem to be mere speculations, for each one of them cannot stand the test of reasonable deliberation.

IT IS NOT PROPER TO SAY THAT ĀGAMA PRAKARAŅA IS ŚRUTI

Let us first deliberate upon the reason or evidence forwarded by Shri Madhwāchārya to conclude that the Kārikās belonging to the Āgama Prakaraṇa are part and parcel of the Upanishad only. The authoritative sources that Shri Madhwāchārya has adduced in support of his assertion are: (i) A text

called 'Brahmatarka'; (ii) Garuda Purāna - of which the first treatise is not available now. No other Āchārya has referred to or mentioned about these works. Since there is every possibility of any number of new verses being added or interpolated, every now and then, in mythological treatises (Purāṇas), before we accept to consider Garuda Purana to be an authoritative evidence for the present topic we have to perforce examine whether any other Acharya has acknowledged these Karikas to be the Upanishad or not. But no one worth the name before Madhwāchārya has assumed in that manner, and there is nothing to prove this conjecture! On the other hand, Shri Sankarāchārya has clearly expressed that he is undertaking to write commentaries on the four Prakaranas (1, 3); his direct disciple, Shri Sureshwarāchārya, has exemplified two Kārikās from the Āgama Prakaraņa in his own treatise on Vedantic tenets called 'Naishkarmya Siddhi' and has mentioned that they are written by Shri Gaudapāda. Even among the post-Madhwāchārya Advaita Vedāntins, some have opined that Agama Prakarana is Śruti (scripture); but they have not substantiated their statements by adducing any authoritative source or evidence. It is not possible to surmise as to what is Shri Rāmānujāchārya's opinion in this matter; one Kuranārāyaņa, who is a well-known follower of that Acharya, has endorsed the viewpoint of Madhwāchārya alone. It being so, it has to be perforce concluded that to affirm that - "Agama Prakarana is the Upanishad" - we have not so far come across any reliable, trustworthy evidence.

THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE IN THE THEORY THAT MĀŅDŪKYŌPANISHAD IS GAUŅAPĀDA'S TREATISE

Secondly, the Western scholar, Deussen, has imagined that - (a) to say that Shri Śaṅkara had believed Māṇḍūkyōpanishad to be an Upanishad there is no evidence; (b) Gauḍapāda himself might have written that part of the treatise. For this surmise of his, the two logical devices which are his mainstay are: (i) In the Bhāshya sentence - 'वेदान्तार्थसारसङ्ग्रहभूतिमदं प्रकरणचतुष्टयम् ओमित्येकाक्षरिमदं इति आरम्यते' - there is an indication to suggest that Māṇḍūkya is included in the four Prakaraṇas; (ii) Shri Śaṅkara has not quoted or exemplified Māṇḍūkya as Śruti (scriptural text) anywhere at all. But, at the same time, Śaṅkara having

exemplified Māndūkya as Gaudapāda's work also is not to be seen anywhere. In the sentence, which Deussen has illustrated, it is also possible to interpret it to mean - "The four-some Prakarana treatise beginning with the (Upanishad)" - also. Shri Sankara has quoted one Kārikā of Āgama Prakarana (1-16) as also one Kārikā from Advaita Prakarana (3-15) (to be an authoritative statement by those who know the traditional method of teaching) in Sūtra Bhāshya (1-4-14; 2-1-9). If it were true that just as the verses quoted, like 'अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति' - (meaning, here in this context these verses are there) - the Upanishad too had been written by Gaudapāda himself, then in that event, there is no scope whatsoever to divine the cause (reason) for the prose portion, which is to be commented upon, being brief, whereas the poetry portion, which is the commentary (elucidatory), being elaborate; just as there is in vogue a practice, among the authors of Sanskrit literature, of writing the prose portion elaborately and abridging the same matter in poetry - there is no contrary practice to be seen anywhere. [It is not possible even for those who assert that - "Both the prose portion and the Agama Prakarana are, together, the Upanishad itself" - to adduce a convincing reason for the verses quoted here to be so elaborate. For, the system that is seen in the Upanishads is quite contrary to this]. In addition to all this, Shri Sureshwara, who is a direct disciple of Shri Sankara having vociferously called Māṇḍūkya a Śruti is to be seen in his Brihadāraņyaka Vārtika (3-8-26). It being so, there is no hurdle or difficulty whatsoever to be seen in believing or assuming that - "Māṇdūkya is a Śruti; the four Prakaraņas of Āgama, Vaitathya etc. are together the work of one and the same author."

THE THEORY THAT GAUDAPADA WAS A BUDDHIST IS A FALLACY

An author by name Ānandagiri, who has written a sub-commentary on Māṇḍūkyōpanishad Bhāshya as also on the commentary on the Kārikās, has mentioned that he has written a sub-commentary on the Gauḍapādīya Bhāshya (of Śaṅkara). He has further stated that - "Māṇḍūkya is a Śruti" - "Prakaraṇa-chatushṭaya is the resultant fruit of the Vidyā that Shri Gauḍapādā-chārya earned as a boon by invoking Nārāyaṇa (Shri Vishṇu)". It is quite evident here that this traditional legend must have been

invariably there in vogue even prior to Anandagiri. Even so, another Western thinker, Wallaser, has opined that because there are a few verses (Kārikās) in Alātashānti Prakaraņa which are the replicas of certain verses found in the treatise - "Tarkajwāla" - written by a Buddhist by name - 'Bhāvaviveka' - the statement that there existed an author by name - 'Gaudapada' - is itself ridden with doubts. It is already mentioned that Prof. Surendra Nath Dasgupta has opined that Gaudapada had respect or adoration for Buddhistic methodologies. It is not clearly known as to what exact supporting evidence there is for this modern scholar to discard or refute what Sureshwara and others have very clearly declared that - "The Kārikās are verily the work of Gaudapāda." It is not possible for us to disregard or disrespect what Sankara has eulogized and remembered at the end of his Bhāshya viz. that (Gaudapāda) was his 'Paramaguru' (grand-preceptor). It is quite probable for a doubt of the type - 'Whether the author of the Kārikās had a name - Gaudapāda - or not ?' - to arise; for, as he hailed from a region by name - 'Gaudadesha' - he might have been quite popular and called by the name - 'Gaudapāda'. But especially the difference or distinction that exists between the philosophical teachings of the Kārikākāra and the Buddhists is not so very unclear or obscure as to be neglected or disregarded. Because of the facts:- (a) In the Alātashānti Prakaraṇa Gauḍapāda has profusely and predominantly used Buddhistic logical devices to refute the doctrines of other schools; (b) he has utilized several Buddhistic technical terms found in their treatises - even some indiscreet or unwary people of our country too have called the Kārikākāra 'Pracchannabouddha' (meaning, pseudo-Buddhist).

Therefore, here is an arduous attempt by Shri Satchidā-nandendra Saraswati Swamiji, of revered memory, to totally wipe out any traces of doubt that in the methodology of Māṇḍūkya Kārikās there is a dubious blending or mixture of Buddhistic teachings, but at the same time, with a view to helping Tattwajijñasus (genuine seekers of the Ultimate Reality of the Self) discern and divine the unique and extra-ordinary methodology that is implicit in Vedāntic texts of this type, the salient topics of this treatise have been divided under various heads and briefly described hereunder.

ĀGAMA PRAKARAŅA

Because in this Chapter the traditional methodology of propounding the Absolute Reality is adopted and followed in order to explain Māṇdūkyōpanishad, this Prakaraṇa has earned this name. In this Chapter there exists an exposition of the method of Avasthātraya (the three states of Consciousness). The waking $\bar{A}tman$ (Self) is called 'Vishwa', meaning, $\bar{A}tman$ who has the entire gross world of duality perceived in the waking as His Upādhi (adjunct); the dreaming Ātman is called 'Taijasa', meaning, the Self who has the entire subtle world seen in the dream as His Upādhi; the deep sleep Ātman is called 'Prājña' or 'Avyākrita', meaning, Ātman who is the very cause for the entire universe. Thus one and one Atman alone is appearing in three different forms (1-1). Because in each of these Avasthās the entire Jñeyarāshi (gamut of things that can be known objectively) is hidden or implicit, these Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are called Ātman's 'Pādas' (quarters). But the Paramārtharūpa (Absolute, Ultimate form) of Atman is extremely different or distinct from all these three forms (1-10 to 1-15). All these three forms are the Asatya (false) forms appearing in Atman due to Anādi Māyā (beginningless illusion); they do not exist in reality (1-16). Because this Atmatattwa (Absolute, Transcendental Reality of Self) is devoid of $V\bar{a}chya$ (that object which can be named by speech) and Vāchaka (that subject which pronounces the named by speech) Bhāvas (concepts), this Reality is being called 'Omkāra' and 'Atman'. The essence of teaching of the Agama Prakarana is: 'This Omkāra or Ātman is Shiva (the ultimate personified Truth which is auspicious, benign) alone, who is Prapañchōpashama (devoid of the world of duality) - (1-24 to 29). Because this very methodology of Avasthātraya is taken up for the purposes of drawing conclusions in the fourth and last Chapter of Alatashānti Prakaraņa (4-57 to 90), it becomes established that the subject-matter for both these Prakaranas is one and the same. This Prakriyā (methodology) which succeeds in establishing Atmavāda (the doctrine of the innermost Self) through the three universal experiences of the three Avasthās (viz. waking, dream and deep sleep) is not acceptable in the least to the Buddhists.

VAITATHYA PRAKARANA

In this Chapter, after expounding and establishing the truth that both the Avasthās of waking and dream are identical in all respects (2-1 to 10), it has been demonstrated effectively that all Dvaita (duality) is Kalpita (imagined, misconceived) in Ātman alone (2-11 to 38). This tenet also which propounds that - 'Ātman is the Adhishṭhāna (substratum) for Prapañchādhyāsa (the misconception or delusion of the world of duality)' - is totally opposed to the Buddhistic 'Nairatmyavāda (theory of essencelessness of our own Being as Self or, in short, Nihilism)'.

ADVAITA PRAKARAŅA

In this Chapter first the Jātabrahmavāda (theory of Brahman being born or having birth) of certain proponents - who used to argue that - 'Brahman is born in the forms of Chetana (sentient) and Achetana (insentient) beings; the Jivas attain Brahmaswarūpa (the essential nature of the ultimate Reality) by means of Upāsana (meditation) - is refuted and then the (Vedāntic) teaching that -'The creation that is indicated in the Sruti is merely an Upāya (device, plan) to teach the Aikya (unity, identity) of Jiva (transmigratory soul) and Paramātman (the Supreme Self) - (3-10 to 27). The Swamata (the traditional philosophy of Advaita Vedānta of his own school) which is of the Satkāryarupa [nature of propagation of the tenet that 'Sat' (the Reality) Itself as the cause or substratum appears as an effect] is clarified (3-27, 28) by expounding the Vedantic teaching - "Brahman may, by virtue of $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion), be born in the form of the world of duality; but Asat (unreal thing) can never be born either in reality or through Māyā." "If one cognizes or Intuits that - 'Ātman alone is Satya (the Ultimate Reality)' - the mind becomes (or is rendered) Amanas (no-mind)" - this tenet is demonstrated (3-29 to 39). Further, it has been instructed that Madhyamadhikāris (practitioners who belong to the middle-grade qualifications) also can cognize this Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) by means of Manonigraha (an Intuitive method of giving up one's innate identification with his inner instrument of Mind in its entirety) - (3-40 to 46). Thus this Prakarana - which, in truth, firmly establishes Advaita (non-dualism) by deliberating on Śrutyartha (the tenets of the Upanishads) and by Yukti (logical devices

based on Intuitive Experiences); and after refuting by clear-cut, unambiguous statements the fallacious doctrine of Asatkāryavāda (the doctrinaire theory that Asat or unreal thing itself is born), which acknowledges Sadvivartavāda (the Vedāntic tenet of Sat or Ultimate Reality of Brahman or Ātman Itself appears to have been born as the world of duality and the Jīvas living in it) - can never be acceptable to any Buddhist whosoever he may be.

ALĀTASHĀNTI PRAKARAŅA

The Abheda (non-difference) among Jñatru (the knower), Jñeya (the object to be known), Jñāna (the knowledge) concepts or categories has been expounded in this Prakarana in a subtle and serene manner both in the Upakrama (introductory part or preamble of the treatise) and the *Upasamhāra* (conclusive part) portions (4-1, 4-99). Because the Dvaitins are arguing one against the other among themselves and since there is no possibility whatsoever of one's logical devices being accepted by any opponent, all Dvaita philosophies are Mithyā (false or fallacious); whereas, the Advaita philosophy, which expounds that - "Paramārtha (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality beyond all empirical dealings, concepts or categories as It is beyond time, space and causation) is not opposed to anything whatsoever" (3-17, 18), that was briefly propounded in Advaita Prakarana - is itself being described here in detail and thereby the Ajātivāda (the Vedāntic tenet of Brahman or Ātman is devoid of birth) is firmly established (4-2 to 23). First, the doctrines of Vaibhāsikasoutrāntika (the school of Realism among the Buddhists), who believe in the reality of the external things or objects, are refuted from the viewpoint of the Vijñānavadins (the school of Idealism among the Buddhists), who acknowledge only the internal mental concepts or ideas to be real (4-25 to 27) and, then by their own method of dialectics their Vijnanavada is refuted (4-28); finally the Vedantic method of Ajativada is elaborately expounded (4-29 onwards). It is never possible for anyone - whosoever he may be - to build up or show any relationship between the Buddhistic 'Pratityasamutpada' (dependent origination), which propounds that $Avidy\bar{a}$ (ignorance) and other concomitant categories are born one from the other, and the Vedantic 'Ajativada' (theory

of no birth or creation), which establishes that for Advitiya $\bar{A}tman$ (non-dual Self) there is no birth whatsoever from the Paramārtha (Absolute) viewpoint.

Those present-day research scholars who have reckoned a similarity of methodologies between the Mandukya Karikas and the Buddhistic texts have not evidently taken into consideration the commentary of Shri Śankarācharya. It is quite plausible for logical-minded people to question in the manner - "Knowingly or unknowingly, the Bhāshyakāra might have interpreted the Kārikās in a totally different manner, is it not?" It is for the sake of removing the doubts of such people alone, without taking recourse to or depending upon the Bhāshya, but merely on the examination of the Gaudapada Karikas alone it was convincingly proved above that there is no relationship or similarity whatsoever between the methodologies of the Kārikās and of the Buddhistic treatises. Especially if one discerns the teachings of the Bhāshyakāra (i.e. Shri Sankara), the bare fact that - 'The Kārikās have, in truth, championed the cause of the Vedāntic Prasthānatraya methodology alone' - becomes crystal clear. It is true that at certain places there is an apparent similarity between the words used in the Kārikās and the Buddhistic texts; but, there is no similarity of meaning of those words at all. Just as Bādarāyaṇāchārya (the author of Vedānta Sūtras) has in his Sūtras used words like 'Pradhāna', 'Pratyaksha', 'Anumāna' which are technical terms belonging to alien schools of philosophy - so as to suit the Vedāntic methodology, Gaudapāda too has utilized Buddhists' technical terms with a different meaning altogether to suit Vedāntic tenets.

Since in this Prakaraṇa it is to be found that first by means of the Buddhistic logical devices the doctrines of other disputants are refuted and then 'entrapping', as it were, Buddhists too by their own logical device their doctrines are also refuted - in certain contexts of this type certain Buddhistic logical devices being seen is not surprising or contradictory. We need not discuss or deliberate upon the controversial topic - 'Whether Ashwaghosha, Nagarjuna and such other Buddhists lived before or after Gauḍapāda.' Even those who affirm that Gauḍapāda himself came later than those Buddhist scholars will be constrained to give their consent to the above-mentioned conclusion. For, it is not possible

for anyone to assert that, while an opponent's argument is being refuted, merely on the count that his technical terms as also his logical devices are utilized in the deliberations or discussions, it does not at all amount to accepting the opponent's argument or doctrine.

IS ALĀTASHĀNTI PRAKARAŅA AN INDEPENDENT TREATISE ?

Some scholars have imagined or inferred - on the ground that in the beginning and at the end of this Prakarana there are invocatory verses and the profuse usage of Buddhistic terminology and logical devices - that this Prakarana is a separate independent treatise by itself without having any relationship whatsoever with the preceding three Chapters. The shallowness of this theory also becomes clear by virtue of the above-mentioned logical devices. Śańkara has called this Prakaraņa 'Śāstra' (scripture) - (4-1, 4-100). But merely on that count it cannot be affirmed that this Chapter is in itself a separate text; if it is asserted in that manner, then it becomes contradictory to Sankara's own promise or proclamation made at the beginning that he would write a Bhāshya to all four Prakaraņas. Hence, just as the 15th chapter of Bhagavadgita is said to be 'Śāstra' with the implicit meaning of 'the essence of Gitāśāstra' (15-20), in the same manner here too this Prakarana, which signifies the very essence of the Śāstra of the form of Māndūkyōpanishad, is called by Śankara, the Bhāshyakāra, 'Śāstra' - thus we have to reckon. Since it is already mentioned that the tenets which are expounded in the other three Chapters are themselves being conclusively established in this last Prakarana, let us stop this consideration here.

FOR THE BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHY TOO THE UPANISHAD ALONE IS THE ORIGIN

If we thoroughly and deeply observe, it will have to be inferred that for the Buddhistic philosophy to spread out and be propagated on the strength of logical devices the Upanishad itself is responsible in a circuitous manner. For; among the Buddhists in the beginning there were no canonical texts which were predominantly logical in their approach; they were mainly instructing about - 'Dvādashanidāna or Bhavachakra', 'Shila',

'Samādhi', 'Prajñā' - only. In fact, their extra-ordinary tenet (theory) is that Atman does not exist. Even so, after the first century A.D. the logical device of refuting the existence of the world of duality (Prapañchanirākaraņa Yukti) became strong among them. The reason for this is: A Brahmin by name 'Ashwaghōsha' was defeated in a logical contest and was 'converted' to Buddhism; he evolved a new Siddhānta (philosophical tenet) called 'Tathāta'. He argued in the manner - 'In all of us there are two parts - (i) one part as the Samsāri or transmigratory existence and (ii) 'Bhūtatathāta' (meaning, that entity which exists as it is) another part; Samsāra is Asatya (false, unreal); 'Tathāta' is having an essential nature which cannot be said to be Satya (real) or Asatya (unreal).' It need not be pointed out as to how near or close is this tenet of his to the Upanishadic theory of 'Kutasthanirvishesha Atman'. However, after Ashwaghōsha his theory did not gain strength. In Buddhistic texts like 'Lankavatara' etc. although this very doctrine called by a different name of 'Tathagatagabhan' is signified, therein it has been very clearly stated that - 'This doctrine or theory is instructed as a first lesson to ignorant people who believe that 'Atman' exists, but it is not absolutely true.' Let it be so. All the logicians who came after Ashwaghosha went on strengthening the 'Prapañchanirākaraṇavāda' (theory of refuting the real existence of the world of duality or diversity). Especially, scholars like Nagārjuna, Chandrakirti etc. conjoined new logical arguments to further strengthen this doctrinaire theory. Anyway, between the twin theories of 'Brahmasatyatwa' and 'Jaganmithyātwa' found in the Upanishads, the second one, viz. Jaganmithyatwa (the falsity of the world of duality) became firm and ensconced through the Buddhists. Because they did not acknowledge the Upanishadic lore as Pramāņa (authoritative source), among them the principal doctrine which expounds Brahmasatyatwa (the Absolute Reality of Brahman) paled off without being given any encouragement or support.

The Buddhists are adepts in expounding the *Prapañcha-nirākaranavāda* (theory of negating the reality of the world of duality). In answering the question - "When the world of duality is very clearly perceptible and is in our experience to be real, how at all can it be said that it does not exist?" - the Buddhists

raise all kinds of surmises or conjectures about the world of duality which the uninitiated, ignorant people say that it is in their experience and then they demonstrate that these conjectures or concepts cannot survive the onslaught of logic. This method is their main dialectical device. In fact, Shri Gaudapādacharya has utilized this very device in the Alātashānti Prakaraṇa and by means of that dialectical exercise he has turned the tables on the Buddhists, so to speak, by refuting their methodology also. He has refuted the whole gamut of theories propounding the reality of dualism and thereby demonstrated the greatness and glory of Vaidikatarka (logic used in all the scriptural texts). Those well-known research scholars who do not know this secret are afflicted by a delusion which prompts them to believe that in Vedānta there is an admixture of Buddhistic tenets.

ŚANKARA'S BHĀSHYA ON THE KĀRIKĀS

It has already been intimated that since Gaudapāda's Kārikās are quite ancient there is every scope to get deluded to believe that one part of them is the Upanishad and the other part is a Buddhistic Prakarana. It is quite certain that had there not been any Bhāshya written by Śankara on this Prakarana-chatushtaya (the four Chapters) it would have been very difficult for Vedantins also to discern the reality or veracity of this secret. For, we find sufficient support in Shri Sureshwarāchārya's 'Brihadāranyakabhāshya Vārtika' to prove or establish the fact that - "Some socalled Vedāntins prior to Śańkara were actually commenting on this treatise (i.e. Māndūkya Kārikā) - which expounds predominantly Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) alone as Vastutantra (to be cognized as it is in esse and not to be conceived or imagined) - as if it is Upāsanāpara (meant for purposes of meditation)." In this Vārtika, the opinions of those who had believed the 38th verse of the Vaitathya Prakarana and the 46th verse of the Advaita Prakarana to be Jñānābhyāsapara (meant for repetition of the Intuitive Knowledge) and were quoting them for this purpose (Bri. Vā. 4-4-887, 888) have been refuted. Even to this day it is to be seen that among Advaitins themselves there exist several bizarre differences of opinion as far as the Vedānta Siddhānta is concerned. It being so, it becomes quite essential here in this context to bring to the notice of the readers certain

important topics which are implicit in the Kārikābhāshya. By this the Jijñāsus (true, sincere seekers), who wish to discern the profound teaching of genuine Vedāntic Siddhānta (final spiritual teachings) that are implicit in the Kārikās are sure to benefit a great deal.

IS ADVAITA (NON-DUALISM) ŚĀSTRASIDDHA (ESTABLISHED ON THE SUPPORT OR BASIS OF SCRIPTURES) OR TARKASIDDHA (BASED ON LOGIC) ?

In Vedanta the essence of the entire universe is called 'Brahman'; the Vedānta Siddhānta - as a philosophical system - teaches that - "Brahman is the Atman (Self) of all of us; It is Advitiya (non-dual) and is Nirvishesha (devoid of any attributes whatosever)." The Vedāntins say that this Siddhānta is known from the Upanishads alone and it cannot be known either by Pratyaksha Pramāṇa (perception as a valid means of knowledge) or Anumāna Pramāna (inference as a valid means of knowledge). In order to signify that Brahman can be known only from the $S\bar{a}stra$ (scriptural text) of the form of Upanishads the special term "Oupanishada" (the adjectival form of Upanishad) is used in the Śruti (scriptural text); whereas in the Brahmasūtras the special term of $\hat{S}astra\ Y\bar{o}ni$ (the scriptures being the womb or birth place) is used. All this appears to the predominantly logical-minded or highly rational people of this modern science age to be a contradiction. These logical-minded people opine: "For those who believe in the Vedas, Brahman may be Śāstraika Vedya (that which can be known only from the Sastras); but can Buddhists and such others - who do not have any faith in the authoritativeness of the Vedas - accept this tenet? No. For this reason, Gaudapāda relied on the Vedaprāmāņya (Vedas as the authoritative, canonical texts) and signified the Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality of Brahman) in the Agama Prakarana and then for the sake of those who do not believe in that (i.e. Vedaprāmānya) he has established his Siddhānta in the remaining three Prakaranas exclusively (merely) on Yukti (logical devices). Shri Sankara also has written like that alone."

If we deeply observe, it would appear that this queer opinion is formulated because these so-called 'rational people' have not meticulously examined and properly deliberated upon Śańkara Bhāshya, as also they have not discerned the basic nature of the

Pramāṇatarkas (logical systems which rely on the valid means of knowledge) and their mutual differences and distinctions. For, Śaṅkara's vehement statements to the effect that he has estab lished Advaita by means of both Śruti and Yukti are to be found in the Kārikābhāshya of all the four Prakaraṇas; for example:

- (१) प्रथमं प्रकरणम् आगमप्रधानम् ।
- (२) आगममात्रं तत् । तत्र उपपत्त्यापि द्वैतस्य वैतथ्यं शक्यते अवधारियतुम् इति द्वितीयं प्रकरणम् आरम्यते ।
- (३) अद्वैतं किमागममात्रेण प्रतिपत्तव्यम्, आहोस्वित् तर्केणापि इति ? अत आह -शक्यते तर्केणापि ज्ञातुम् । तत् कथम् इति अद्वैतप्रकरणम् आरम्यते ।
- (४) शास्त्रोपपत्तिभ्याम् अवधारितत्वात् अद्वयात्मदर्शनं सम्यग्दर्शनम् । तद्वाह्मत्वात् मिथ्यादर्शनम् अन्यत् ।
- (५) ओंकारिनर्णयद्वारेण आगमतः प्रतिज्ञातस्य अद्वैतस्य बाह्यविषयभेदवैतथ्याच्च सिद्धस्य, पुनः अद्वैते शास्त्रयुक्तिभ्यां साक्षात् निर्घारितस्य "एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यम्" (३-४८) इति उपसंहारः कृतः अन्ते । तस्यैतस्य आगमार्थस्य अद्वैतदर्शनस्य प्रतिपक्षभूताः द्वैतिनः वैनाशिकाश्च ।

Here above in the fifth sentence we should keep in mind the conclusion drawn by saying - "Advaita Darshana is $\overline{A}gam\overline{a}rtha$ (the prime purport of the Śāstra) alone"; for, although Advaita or non-dualism is established by means of Yukti, for it, in the main, $\overline{A}gama$ (Śāstra) alone is $Pram\overline{a}na$ (authoritative source) - this fact becomes clarified by this statement. Not merely in the first $\overline{A}gama$ Prakarana but in the remaining three Prakaranas too (2-31; 3-11, 12; 4-90) Upanishads have been quoted. It is also quite reasonable that in the last three Prakaranas - which are predominantly logical in their treatment and approach - Yukti has been given a higher place or importance.

It should not be objected in the manner - "If one argues by assuming Śāstrapramāṇa, how at all can the Siddhānta become acceptable to the rest of the disputants?" For, here there is no occasion whatsoever for believing the Śruti sentence to be a *Pramāṇa* (valid source of knowledge). Although in the Karma Kāṇḍa (the ritualistic portion of the Vedic lore) such a circumstance arises, since the *Vastubōdhakavākyas* (sentences which teach or expound the really real, Absolute Entity of Ātman or Brahman) of the Jñāna Kānda give rise to *Jñāna* (Intuitive Knowledge) alone which is *Vastvanusāri* (in consonance with the

Ultimate Reality in esse) no one - whosoever he or she may be - can ever possibly refute or negate It. One may ask - "If so, where is the need for Tarka (logic)?" The Naiyāyikas (exponents of Nyāyas or axiomatic science) proclaim that one should accept an Anubhava (experience) born out of a Pramāņa only after its veracity and validity are examined and investigated thoroughly by means of Tarka. Hence just as that experience (knowledge) which accrues from using Pramāṇas like the Pratyaksha (perception), Anumāna (inference) etc. is examined or investigated by means of Tarka and then only we accept a principle to be universal, in the same manner that knowledge which accrues from the Āgamapramāņa (valid source of Śāstra or scripture) is also to be examined and explored by means of logical devices and only then to determine the truth is quite reasonable. Śāstra is Bōdhaka (that which instructs, teaches), while Tarka is Shōdhaka (exploratory, investigatory). For that reason alone Shri Sankara has written in his remaining Bhāshyas also that - "What is established on the strength of $\bar{A}gama$ (Sastra) and Upapatti (logical device) itself eventually becomes sustainable as Paramārtha (Absolute Reality)."

THE MANNER IN WHICH ŚĀSTRA SIGNIFIES OR EXPOUNDS THE PARAMĀRTHA

The answer that Shri Sankara has given to the question -"How does the Sastra (scripture) signify or expound Brahman (the Absolute Reality) which is of the essential nature of $\bar{A}tman$ (Self) ?" - is highly sutble and profound, needing a great deal of deliberative analysis. Since there is no cause giving rise to any function of speech in Brahman, it is not possible at all to signify It by means of speech. Hence, through signifying in the manner - "In It there does not exist any special feature or attribute which appears due to misconception" - the Sāstra expounds It. Due to, Avasthātraya (the three states of Consciousness, viz., waking, dream and deep sleep) the qualities like Antahprajñatwa (internal awareness) etc. are Kalpita (imagined, misconceived) in Ātman. By sublating or rescinding this superimposition (Adhyārōpa) alone the $\bar{A}tmaswar\bar{u}pa$ (the essential nature of the innermost, Absolute Self) has perforce to be signified; the purport behind the rescission or abrogation in this fashien is to signify, denote that Atman is Avasthātrayātīta

(beyond the ken or purview of the three states Consciousness) alone and not to indicate that Atman is one having a separate and distinct Avasthā (state of Consciousness) called Turiya (fourth comparatively to the three referred to as universal experiences). In fact, because Advaita (non-dual Reality) is the very Self (i.e. core of Being) of the Jijnasu (the ardent seeker) and is verily the Aspada (substratum, support) for the whole gamut of Dvaitavikalpas (imagined phenomena of duality) which are Adhyasta (superimposed on Atman) - just as the rope is the substratum for the snake imagined or misconceived due to Bhrānti (delusion) - by abrogating or sublating what is Adhyārōpita (superimposed) alone, Advaita Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of non-dual Self) invariably and unfailingly accrues. Since Atmaswarupa is contiguous with all Vikalpas (imagined phenomena), there is no need whatsoever for a Pratyaya (mental concept having the stamp of certainty or conviction) of Ātmaswarūpa to accrue or arise afresh. If the Sāstra denotes or depicts that such and such a Dharma (quality or special attribute) does not exist in Atman, it does not at all thereby entertain an opinion or motive to indicate that an 'opposite' or contra of that Dharma exists in Atman. For, any Dharma whatsoever existing eternally in Atman is never to be found.

Hence, the fuction of the Śāstra is exclusively to rescind or abrogate the Ajñāna (ignorance) pertaining to Ātman. Let it be any Pramāņa (valid means of knowledge) - its function lies exclusively in removing, abrogating the Ajnana with regard to the Prameya (the object of knowledge); but to believe that in addition to this, another function of objectifying the Prameya and illumining it - subsists for it is fallacious indeed; because the knowledge or cognition of an object accrues spontaneously and automatically, so to speak, by virtue of Ajñānanāsha (sublation of ignorance), it is not a Pramāṇaphala (fruit, resultant produced by valid means). Therefore, Paramārtha Tattwajñāna (the Intuitive Knowledge of the Absolute, Transcendental Reality of the Self) accrues merely by Anarthaprapañchanivritti (abrogation or rescission of the world of duality, which is the cause for all mundane miseries and mishaps) which are $\bar{A}r\bar{o}pita$ (superimposed) on Ātman; and for this purpose neither any Pramāṇāntara (other valid means) called 'Sākshātkāra' (materialization or actualization

of an esoteric experience) nor any Sādhanāntara (other spiritual practice or discipline) of the type of Prasankhyāna (repetition of an exercise) etc. is needed whatsoever.

THE AJÑĀNA THAT IS RESCINDED BY ŚĀSTRAIC JÑĀNA

Ajñāna (ignorance) is of two kinds; (a) an insensate and indolent sleep in which the Tattwa (the Ultimate Reality) is not known at all; (b) a dubious, delusory dream in which all things or phenomena are misconceived (1-15). 'Agrahana' meaning, not knowing or cognizing, is the cause for Anyathāgrahana (erroneously knowing or misconceiving) - (1-15). In Sushupti (deep sleep state) the cause alone exists, while in the waking and dream states both the cause and the effects exist; but in Turiya who is devoid of Avasthātraya (the three states of Consciousness), meaning, the Shuddhātman (Pure, Absolute Self), both these do not exist (1-11, 14) To believe that both these (i.e. Agrahana and Anyathāgrahana) exist in Ātman is Viparyāsa (misconception), Bhrānti (delusion) - (1-15). All these above tenets are very clearly written in both the Gaudapada Karikas and Śankara's Bhāshya on them. Even so, such an indubitable and unmistakable statement the present-day Vyākhyānakāras (post-Sankara sub-commentators) have misconstrued in the manner: (a) Kāraņājñāna means 'Mūlāvidyā' - a particular Āvaraņavishesha (a special feature of engulfing or covering). Because it has been propounded in the Kārikās that -(1) 'Agrahana' means not knowing the Tattwa or Absolute Reality of the Self; (ii) since it is the cause for the Visheshajñāna (knowledge of various manifest phenomena) of the waking and dream, this Agrahana is being called 'Kāraṇāvidyā' (the causal ignorance in a potential or seed form) in deep sleep. In the Shuddhātman (Pure, Absolute Self) called 'Turiya' also this Agrahana exists; but due to that there is no possibility whatsoever of Anyathājñāna (misconception, erroneous knowledge) arising - not in the least - it is not, really speaking, Kāraņāvidyā (1-13). Hence, in the Kārikās there is not even an iota of scope for this fallacious Mūlāvidyāvāda (theory of the substantiality of the causal ignorance).

Further, in some Vyākhyānas (sub-commentaries) it is found that Avyākṛitanāmarūpabija (the unmanifested seed form of names and forms), which has to be perforce conceived to be the cause

for the manifest appearances of names and forms of the world of duality, is itself called 'Māyā' (illusion) and Mūlāvidyā (the substantial causal ignorance). But since in the Bhāshya sentences like - 'अविद्याकृतनामरूपमायास्वरूपेण' and 'अविद्याकृतमायाबीजोत्पन्नानाम्' - it has been clearly stated that Māyā, which is the Bīja (seed form or cause) for names and forms, is itself said to be Avidyākṛita (brought about by ignorance), it evolves that - "Māyā itself is Adhyasta (misconceived)" - and hence it will not be in accordance or consonance with the Bhāshya to assert that - "Māyā is Mūlāvidyā which is the substantial cause for Adhyāsa (misconception)." Therefore, in this manner too it becomes fully established that in the Kārikā Bhāshya there is no scope whatsoever for the theory of Mūlāvidyā.

AJĀTIVĀDA (THE DOCTRINE OF BIRTHLESSNESS)

The doctrine that -"Atman is, in the Absolute sense, Janmādivikārarahita (devoid of changes or mutations like birth, growth, death etc); as also He is Prapañchōpashama (devoid of the world of duality)" - is called 'Ajātivāda' in Vedāntic parlance. In Māndūkya this doctrine alone has been propounded as its ultimate purport. To the doubt of the type - "The world of duality comprising sentient and insentient phenomena is appearing in Atman to all of us, is it not? What will be its fate?" - the solution that - "The entire world that appears to us is - just like a dream - Mithyā (false, unreal); in the Absolute sense, all this is verily Atman alone" - was provided in the Vaitathya Prakarana. In the Upanishad - just like Vaishwanarātman (Ātman having the waking as an adjunct is called by this name) - for Taijasātman (Atman having the dream as an adjunct) too it has been taught that there are Saptāngas (seven limbs or parts, macrocosmical in their proportions or magnitude) and Ekōnavimśatimukhas (19 doorways, microcosmically speaking) and this aspect itself - it can be inferred - has been explained in detail in that second Prakarana.

For the doubt that - "In other Śrutis it has been propounded that the Jīvas (transmigratory souls) are born out of Brahman and by Upāsana (meditation) they attain Brahma Sāyujya (merger with Brahman), how come this contradiction?" - a consolation has been provided in the Advaita Prakaraṇa. Just as the empty

space $(\bar{A}k\bar{a}sa)$ due to adjuncts like an earthen pot etc. appears to have been born, in the same manner Jivas too - due to their adjuncts of the forms of the body, the senses, the mind etc. appear to have been born. Just as, in truth, the empty space itself is the 'essence' of adjuncts like the earthen pot etc., these Upādhis (adjuncts) of the body, the senses etc. also are verily Atman alone. Since the body, the senses etc. in their respective forms are - just like the dream body, senses etc. - Mithyā (false, unreal) alone, to conclude that Atman is Advitiya (non-dual), Aja (birthless), Niśprapañcha (devoid of the world of duality) there is no impediment or difficulty whatsoever. In fact, the Sristi (creation) that has been propounded in the Śrutis is this Māyikasristi (illusory creation) alone. For the Sruti there is no Paramatātparya (the ultimate or absolute purport of teaching) in propounding 'Srisți'; it is merely an Upāya (device) utilized to help discern Atman's Ekatwa (non-dualism, oneness of the Self) but not to teach that Dvaita (duality) is Satya (real). For this reason alone, in the Srutis $\bar{A}tmaikatwa$ (non-dualism of the Self) is eulogized, praised - whereas Nānātwa (manifoldness) is decried, refuted. Upāsana and its resultant fruit of Brahmasāyujya have been taught in the Srutis for the sake of those Adhikāris (qualified practitioners) entertaining Avidyādristi (the viewpoint of ignorance), as they are not able to cognize the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality of the Self); hence, for the Ajātivāda which the Sruti propounds as its ultimate purport there is no danger or damage caused.

Here an objection of the type -"Proponents of other schools of philosophy like Sānkhyans, Kaṇādas (Vaisheshikas or proponents of Vedic Atomic theory), Jains and Buddhists etc. have also expounded the Paramārtha (the Ultimate Reality) by means of Yukti (logical devices), is it not? Now, this Vaidikavāda (theory taught by the Vedic lore) which propounds that - 'Ātman is Aja (birthless), Nishprapañcha (deviod of the world of duality)' - is opposed to their philosophical doctrines, is it not?" - may arise. It is true that the other disputants accept the theory of cause and effect, but as regards the topic - "How is the effect born from the cause? What are the essential natures of 'cause' and its 'effect'?"- they are not unanimous in their theories; on the other hand, they are mutually opposed to one another. Not only

that, the defects that the proponent of one school points out in the doctrines of a rival group are insoluble or irrefutable; from this itself, the fact that Ajātivāda is correct gets evolved. But the satisfactory solution that - "To the Advaita philosophy - which propounds that all duality is born only magically or illusorily and that birth in itself is not *Paramārtha* or absolutely real - no brand of dualism whatsoever can possibly be antagonistic" - is depicted in the Advaita Prakaraṇa in brief and in the Alātashānti Prakaraṇa in detail. For all these reasons, both in the Kārikās and the Bhāshya it has been fully established that 'Ajātivāda' is irrefutable.

THE REALITY BEHIND PRĀTIBHĀSIKAVASTUS (ILLUSORY PHENOMENA)

It has been propounded both in the Kārikās and the Bhāshya (1-16, 17; 2-2; 3-19, 24, 27) that - "In the Ajātivāda, the tenet that - 'Neither the Jivas nor the Jadavastus (gross things) are born at all' - is Paramārtha (Absolutely real); that they are 'born' is Māyika (illusory)" - is it not? In order to elucidate this theory they have adduced illustrations of the rope-snake etc. Here in this context - we have already indicated - the Vyākhyānaprasthāna (post-Sureshwara school) has interpreted 'Māyā' as Mūlāvidyā. The followers of that school have adapted and utilized this universally acknowledged illustration in a distorted, bizarre manner in propounding their new doctrinaire, dogmatic theory called - 'Anirvachaniya Padārthōtpatti' (the birth of a thing which is indescribable or indefinable as real or unreal) to render it highly controversial. Their opinion is: "The Prātibhāsika Vastus (illusory objects) like the rope-snake etc. are the Parinama (transformations, metamorphoses) of Avidyā (ignorance) which is called 'Tulavidya' or 'Pallava Vidya'. By virtue of this illustration alone the doctrine that the world of duality is Māyika, meaning, Mūlāvidyāpariņāmi (that which is transformed by means of Mūlāvidyā or a substantial causal Avidyā or ignorance) is established."

For this doctrine there is not even an iota of support either in the Kārikā or the Bhāshya. In the Kārikā it is written: "Just as people misconceive a rope to be a snake or a streak of water etc. because they have not cognized it as a rope - Ātman also

is misconceived in various ways. Just as when people determine that - 'It is a rope alone' - and there exists that rope alone, similarly from the Nishchayadrishti (viewpoint of conviction and determination) Ātman alone exists" - (2-17, 18). In the Bhāshya there are sentences of the type - "The imagined snake misconceived in the rope due to Bhrānti (delusion) does not really exist and by virtue of Viveka (discrimination) it does not vanish"; "The rope-snake etc. which are the misconceptions of the mind do not merge in the rope etc. nor are they born from the rope etc."; "Just as the conglomerations of the earthen pot etc. are born from that very $Ak\bar{a}sha$ (empty space), in the same way from Paramātman (Supreme Self), who is analogous to Akāsha, the gross conglomerations like Prithivi (earth) etc. as also the internal conglomerations within us which are Karyakāranarūpa (of the forms of effect and cause) are misconceived to have been born just like the rope-snake." If we examine these sentences, it can be emphatically and affirmatively said that neither in the mind of the Kārikākāra nor of the Bhāshyakāra there was even an iota of this wild imagination of Prātibhāsika Utpatti (birth of an illusory object). Even during the time the rope-snake etc. are imagined (misconceived) in the rope etc. and they appear, at that moment too, in reality, the rope-snake etc. are not born (physically); in the same manner, even if it is said that - 'From Atman the world of duality, is born' - it is - just like the rope-snake - merely an appearance alone. This alone is the purport of teaching of the Sruti (2-31 - its Bhāshya; 4-42 - its Bhāshya; 4-49 - its Bhāshya). Even the statement that - 'Ātman is Aja' is not made from the Paramārthadrishţi (viewpoint of the Absolute Truth); for, Vedāntins first assume the Avidyādrishţi (viewpoint of ignorant people) to the effect that there exist objects or things which have birth, and on the basis of this viewpoint alone they propound that - "Atman is Aja; He does not have birth just like the other objects or things." Therefore, from the Paramārthadrishti - 'Ātman is not Aja; He is Nirvisheshachinmātra (Pure, Absolute Consciousness without any special attributes) devoid of any Dharma whatsoever' - and this tenet alone is the essence of Ajātivāda that has been proclaimed both in the Kārikās and the Bhāshya.

THE OBJECTION AGAINST MĀYĀVĀDA

For those who are totally immersed, as it were, in *Dvaita-satyatwabuddhi* (innate belief that duality is Absolutely real) - it is very difficult to trust that *Prapañcha* (the external gross world of duality) is *Vitatha* (false), *Mithyā* (unreal), *Māyika* (illusory) - as propounded in the Kārikās and the Bhāshya. The logical argument that - "If everything is Mithyā, then what is said to be Mithyā also is rendered Mithyā and thereby it amounts to saying that everything is verily Satya alone" - is being always forwarded by such rabid Dvaitins. God only knows why it does not flash to their mind that - "If everything is accepted to be Mithyā, then the defect, that they point out, also is rendered to be Mithyā" - ? Further, somehow it has not been discerned by them that the concepts - "Everything is Mithyā" and "What is called 'Mithyā' is also Mithyā" - are **not** mutually opposed ones.

There is yet another objection raised by Dvaitins against Māyāvāda. That is strengthened and presented in recent times by the late Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, and it says: "The opinion that - everything is Mithyā - runs in and through all Gaudapādas' works like warp and woof. A logician bent upon refutation, for the heck of it, may opine that - 'But, the Sastra - which propounds that a Mithyā Jīva, in order to evade a Mithyābandhana (false bondage) which exists in a Mithyā Prapañcha (false world) and to attain a Mithyārūpa Paramapurushārtha (the ultimate goal of all human existence which is itself Mithya), is carrying on Sādhana - itself (i.e. the Śāstra) may be Mithyā'." This refutation is not at all a new one. For this both Gaudapada and Sankara have given an answer (1-18 - its Bhāshya) - viz. "The concepts like Sastra and Shishya etc. are assumed tentatively for the purposes of spiritual instruction alone, but they are not at all Paramārtha."

But Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, without taking into consideration this answer, has formulated a 'Siddhānta' of his own and has, in the process, expressed an alien opinion which renders the Kārikā Bhāshya Siddhānta itself topsy-turvy, so to speak: "Between the theory which propounds that - 'It is an inscrutable secret as to how the Nirvikāra Paramārtha without changing Its Svabhāva appears in the form of the Jagat' - and the theory that

- 'The entire universe is a mere mirage', which refutes the existence of the world, there is a great difference." Neither the Kārikākāra nor the Bhāshyakāra had believed that the sentence - which smacks of timidity - to the effect - "It is an inscrutable secret as to how the Paramartha appears in the form of the world of duality" - is acceptable to Tattwa Śāstra; it is quite evident that such an opinion suggestive of the person's weak-mindedness is of no utility whatsoever for the seekers of Paramapurushārtha. (a) It is in everyone's experience that the waking world exists in the waking only and not in the dream or in the deep sleep; (b) the truth that Atman exists in all the three Avasthas as He is without undergoing any change or mutations whatsoever is also Anubhavagamya (discernible by virtue of Intuition). Barring these two experiences, no other Padartha (entity) exists whatsoever and hence the Jagat (world of duality) is Mithya, a false appearance that appears in Atman; those people who do not have the Pūrņadrishți (the comprehensive, plenary viewpoint of the Absolute Reality) are dealing with Atman Himself as the world of duality and not that Atman has got transformed into the world form - this Siddhanta in consonance with Intuitive Experience gets evolved. If this excellent, profound Shroutatarka (a logical method enunciated in the Srutis themselves) is branded as 'an inscrutable secret' by those who cannot digest and divine it, then genuine Vedantins may show some compassion and a sense of pity towards their this lack of discrimination; what else can they do?

Dr. Radhakrishnan has expressed a Virōdhābhāsa (a contradictory negative feeling that one begets in his workaday transactions if he follows the Māyāvāda), in the following manner: "It is not possible at all for those who take part in the competitive sport called 'life' to do so by believing that this sport is a mere show or appearance, and the prizes or presents that we win here are mere zeroes; everyday saying that - 'No object exists really, there is no value whatsoever for anything' - and keeping those very objects with us, we have perforce to carry on our daily transactions - this aspect is the prime defect that exists in this theory." To say that the whole universe in which we live is a 'competition' and that we are engaged and engrossed in this competitive sport with the objective of achieving prizes may be

an acceptable statement to the people brought up in the Western civilization which keeps its competitive transactions as its front-line motto and which is predominantly guided by empirical sciences. But it is not in keeping with our Indian culture and ethos which are predominantly spiritual in their approach to life.

Although the $K\bar{a}myakarmas$ (actions or rituals done to get a desire fulfilled) which are stipulated in our scriptures are said to yield fruits like heaven etc., even those are decried to be Avarakarmas (low-grade, inferior acts), and then for the sake of those discriminative people who aspire for $Paramapurush\bar{a}rtha$ (the prime purport of human existence) $Karma Y\bar{o}ga$ has been instructed in the Bhagavadgita. If we merely remember this profound teaching, the devil of a desire to acquire prizes in this worldly sport will get bewitched, as it were, and vanish into thin air. It is quite but natural that people full of desires slog for prizes; but that $S\bar{a}stra$ (authoritative text) which encourages and applauds such ambitious people cannot be given the honourable name of a 'Sastra'.

Further, if the Vedantic statement that - "The world of duality is Mithyā" - is interpreted as - "No object really exists; no object has any value whatsoever" - then it amounts to doing a great injustice to this theory. For, when it is said that objects are Mithya, the purport is not that the objects do not have any value at all; it means that they are all, in truth, Brahman (the Absolute Reality) alone. The apparent values that we have conceived when compared to the 'value' of the Transcendental Entity are zeroes indeed. Those people who assert that - "It is impossible for people, who have realized that everything is verily Brahman, to carry out any worldly transaction" - will have to be dubbed as those who have undertaken the task of not only refuting or decrying Gaudapāda's Siddhānta but also the esoteric teachings of Shri Krishna, the Gitāchārya. To those who have meticulously studied the Bhagavadgitā verse - 'ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्महिवः' (Gitā 4-24) and Śańkara's Bhāshya on it will be able to discern the truth that we have expressed here. In the case of those people who have thoroughly understood the Gitopadesha that - "Although Jñanis are performing all Karmas, in reality they are not performing any Karma whatsoever" - the misconception that -

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"By virtue of the Jñānis' empirical transactions, a prime defect attaches itself to the current theory" - will also vanish.

Before concluding this topic we will examine yet another sentence of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan¹: "The world of duality may be an inscrutable secret as well as an indescribable or indefinable phenomenon. But by this the fact that - a distinct Reality, which has subsumed within Itself this world as also which exceeds and is beyond this world, necessarily exists - gets established; but the doctrine that the entire world of duality is a mere dream will never evolve out of it." We have already demonstrated the shallowness of the statement that - "The world is an inscrutable secret." Neither Gaudapāda nor Śankara has argued that the world is a mere dream on the basis of the world being an inscrutable secret. Both of them have established in the Vaitathya Prakarana by virtue of logical devices in consonance with universal experiences that - "Between the dream and the waking, in any manner or aspect, there does not exist any difference or distinction whatsoever." Those who point out a defect or deficiency in Gaudapāda's teaching should perforce show the defects in his logical devices or arguments; at least, they should show as to which is that special feature that exists in the waking but not in the dream. But without fulfilling this task if they merely express that this theory cannot be accepted, it will fizzle out into a mere statement but will not amount to a criticism or contradiction of the Siddhanta.

WITH REGARD TO THE DREAM THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN GAUDAPADA AND ŚANKARA

On the strength of a statement by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya in his Brahmasūtra Bhāshya (2-2-19) to the effect that "Between the waking and the dream, there is Vaidharmya (difference in their natures)" Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and some others have inferred that there is a difference of opinion between Shri Śaṅkara and Shri Gauḍapāda. Shri Kōkileshwara Shāstri has even undertaken the dubious task of showing that to Śaṅkara the distinction between the waking and the dream was acceptable, by distorting

^{1.} The statements of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan that are mentioned here are taken from his book - "Indian Philosophy".

and misinterpreting certain Bhāshya sentences in the Vaitathya Prakarana.

But, if one examines from an unbiassed viewpoint it is not possible at all to point out any difference of opinion between the two traditional Āchāryas. Further, nowhere in the Vaitathya Prakarana Bhāshya or anywhere else (i.e. in any other Prakarana Bhāshyas) Shri Śankara has expressed explicitly that Shri Gaudapāda's opinion is not acceptable to him. In fact, in the Sūtra Bhāshya Shri Śankara has reverentially called Shri Gaudapāda "One who knows the Sampradāya (traditional methodology of dissemination) of Vedāntārtha (the real purport of the scriptures)" - (Sūtra Bhā. 1-4-14, 2-1-9). Hence it has perforce to be interpreted that in the Sūtra Bhāshya the statement to the effect that there exists a difference between the waking and the dream is made only from the Vyavahāradrishti (empirical viewpoint). His own Bhāshya statement - 'अतो वैशेषिकमिदं सन्ध्यस्य मायामात्रत्वम् उदितम्' -(Sūtra Bhā. 3-2-4) purporting to say that - 'The waking, just like the dream, is Māyika indeed' - is in keeping with this interpretation.

THE MANONIGRAHA THAT IS TAUGHT IN ADVAITA PRAKARANA

In this regard many different opinions have arisen among the present-day Vedāntins. Hence it becomes a necessity to examine a little as to what exactly the Kārikākāra and the Bhāshyakāra have stated about this topic.

- (1) "When (the practitioner) does not make any Sankalpa (volition) by virtue of $\bar{A}tmasaty\bar{a}nub\bar{o}dha$ (the spiritual instruction about the Ultimate Reality of the Self), then (his) mind attains a state of 'no-mind'." (K \bar{a} . 3-23).
- (2) "One should cognize the innate nature of the mind which is Nigraha (identification with it is given up) and Nirvikalpa (which is not having or entertaining any concepts whatsoever). The nature of the mind that exists in Sushupti (deep sleep) is different; for, therein the mind gets Laya (merged); but when it is Nigraha it does not get merged." (Kā. 3-34, 35).

Some people have believed that the overall meaning of the above Kārikās is: If the mind is made Nigraha (not grasped or supressed) the Samādhi (Yōgic trance) that accrues has been

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explained here and the Mūlāvidyā that exists in Sushupti does not exist in Samādhi. We have already demonstrated that the Mūlāvidyā vāda is not known to the Kārikākāra or the Bhāshyakāra. The tenet that - "In Sushupti too, just as in Samādhi, the Advaitātma swarūpa (the essential nature of non-dual Self) alone exists" - has been stridently proclaimed in the Kārikā Bhāshya, the Gitā Bhāshya and the Sūtra Bhāshya (2-1-9, 3-2-7). Besides, since this is a Jñāna Prakaraņa (a chapter exclusively dedicated to Self-Knowledge or Intuition) we have to perforce discern it to mean -"Cognizing or Intuiting the Atmasatya (the Absolute Reality of the Self) by means of Viveka (discrimination) and achieving Chittanirōdha (giving up identification with the mind Intuitively) is itself called here by the name 'Nigraha'. Therefore, just like Dvaita (duality, manifoldness) appears to be real as usual when one wakes up from deep sleep, Dvaita when it gets Bādhita (sublated, falsified) by means of Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) it does not at all appear to be real. This alone is the difference that is pointed out here. We should reckon that the subtle distinction that has been depicted between Prājña (the Self with the deep sleep state as His adjunct) and Turiya (the Absolute Self without any attribute or association) in the Agama Prakarana is Itself being delineated here in a variant manner.

Now, let us examine the topic itself that is discussed in the 40th Kārikā of the Advaita Prakarana alone:

(3) "For all Yōgis, Abhaya (fearlessness), Duḥkha Kshaya (complete riddance from misery), Jñāna (Self-Knowledge, Intuition), Akshaya Shānti (peace or quietude that never diminishes) - all these are within the purview of the mind's Nigraha." - (Kā. 3-40).

What is the essential nature of Manonigraha that is taught here? This topic is worth deliberation. For, while explaining this Nigraha in Kārikās 3-42 to 46, an opinion to the effect that - "If the four hurdles, viz. Laya, Vikshepa, Kashāya and Sukhaswāda, are surmounted the mind becomes Brahman (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality)" - is found. Some people describe that it is taught that - here in this context - "(a) Nirvikalpa Samādhi has been taught; (b) to one who has experienced that Samādhi and has woken up, till the Prārabdha Karmas get emaciated a blemish

called 'Ajñāna Lesha or Samskāra' (remnant of ignorance or its latent impression) persists and (c) that after the fall of the mortal coil when the vital force gets merged in Brahman the predominant Mukti (Liberation, Beatitude) called 'Videha Kaivalya' is attained."

But there is no support or substantiation whatsoever for this dogmatic theory either in the Kārikās or Kārikā Bhāshyas or any other remaining Bhāshyas on Prasthānatraya texts. If we reckon that in the sixth chapter of the Gita just as Dhyana Yoga has been taught as an Antarangasādhana (internal spiritual practice) for Jñāna Yōga, here too that very Dhyāna Yōga is being instructed by the name 'Manonigraha' - then for Shri Sankara's opinions expressed in both contexts there will be a complete agreement or reconciliation brought about. This Manonigraha which is instructed for the sake of middle-grade practitioners is not *Upāsana* (meditation) which is *Purushatantra* (within the purview of the wish or will of the practitioner); by examining through Sūkshmadrishti (subtle incisive viewpoint) - just as the evaluation of the worth of a jewel is determined - similarly without dispersing the mind by thinking of mundane objects, without allowing it to get merged (into sleep) by getting fatigued by Atma Chintana (contemplating upon the Self), without getting satisfied merely by the \overline{A} nanda (pleasure, mental happiness) born out of this deep examination - to contemplate upon Ātmaswarūpa with all concentration is itself called 'Manonigraha' as a spiritual practice. This is also called 'Nididhyāsana.' Because Advaita Prakarana itself has been commenced by decrying Upāsana, it becomes established that what is instructed here is Nididhyāsana which is quite different from Upāsana. In calling this Nididhyāsana by the name of 'Upāsana' there is no defect at all; for, even Jñāna (Self-Knowledge, which is Intuitive and not intellectual or mental), being called by the name of 'Upāsana' is to be found in Śrutis and Smritis. But we should not neglect or negate the difference that exists between Upāsana which is a spiritual practice to attain Brahmasāyujya (merger in Brahman) in Lōkāntara (other world after the fall of the mortal coil) and this Upāsana which is said to be the cause for $\overline{A}tmasaty\bar{a}nub\bar{o}dha$ (the spiritual instruction about the Self being the Ultimate Reality) here and now in this very life. For that reason alone, while

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concluding the purport of Advaita Prakaraṇa the Bhāshyakāra has stated: "These Manonigraha etc., creation which is likened to Mṛillōhādi (clay, iron etc.) and Upāsana are said to be Upāya (devices) to help cognize the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality) and not Paramārthasatya (themselves the Absolute Reality)."

THE REFUTATION OF DUALITY THAT IS TO BE FOUND IN THE KĀRIKĀS AND THE BHĀSHYA

Both Gaudapāda and Śankara have refuted here and there the doctrines of Vaisheshikas, Sānkhyans, Buddhists, Jains, Mimāmsakas etc. We have to determine through cautious deliberation as to what is the benefit gained from this refutation. For, just as for the Buddhist Shūnyavādins, Sānkhyans, Vaisheshikas etc. who have necessarily to refute the rival doctrines in order to demonstrate that their own respective doctrine is correct - for Advaitins, there is no such need at all of any refutation. For the Dvaitins (dualists) since duality or manifoldness is real in the absolute sense, even after establishing their Siddhāntas (final spiritual teachings) there remains the task for them to show or prove the rival doctrines to be defective and unsustainable. But from the standpoint of the Advaitins, since all duality is $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ Kalpita (conceived due to illusion) from this Kalpitadvaita (imagined or misconceived duality) there is no harm or danger whatsoever caused for Advaita (3-17, 18); therefore, by virtue of establishing Advaita it amounts to refuting Dvaita. Even so, Dvaita has been separately refuted, the reasons being: (a) Since Dvaita Siddhāntas are mutually contradictory, Dvaitabuddhi (the sense of duality being real) becomes, in its wake, the cause for Rāgadwesha (likes and dislikes) - (3-17 - its Bhāshya); (b) since Advaita is the substrate for all imaginations or concepts, it is always Shivaswarūpa (of the essential nature of auspiciousness of the Lord Almighty) - (2-33 - its Bhāshya) - thus to indicate to the Mumukshus (seekers of Liberation here and now) this has been done; (c) since the Dvaitins have followed the wrong or erroneous viewpoint opposed to the Vedic teachings, in order to indicate that if their philosophies are examined in the proper deliberative method - they are clearly rendered as illogical and untenable - (3-13 - its Bhāshya). This opinion has been signified repeatedly by the Bhäshyakāra in the following sentences:

'विगतदोषैरेव पण्डितैवेंदान्तार्थतत्परै: संन्यासिभिः अयमात्मा द्रष्टुं शक्यः, नान्यैः रागादिकलुषितचेतोभिः स्वपक्षपातिदर्शनैः तार्किकादिभिः इत्यभिप्रायः' - (2-35 - its Bhāshya) - meaning: "Only to Sannyasins who do not have any defects and who are totally dedicated and devoted to Vedāntārtha (the Reality that is expounded in the Upanishadic lore) it is possible for seeing (i.e. cognizing, Intuiting) this Ātman (innermost Self) and not to Tārkikas (logicians) and others whose minds have been disturbed and distracted by (defects like) Rāga (attachment, affinity) etc. and who have presumed only those philosophies which they like and want - this is the purport."

The refutation or decrying of Upāsanas which are stipulated in the Śāstras themselves is for the ultimate purport of indicating the greatness or profundity of Ajātivāda and not with the intention of showing that those Sādhanas are useless in all respects. For that reason alone, both the Kārikākāra and the Bhāshyakāra have expressed that for low and middle-grade practitioners the Śruti, out of compassion, as it were, stipulate Karmas and Upāsanas (3-16); for Shrōtriyas (those who listen to the discourses on Śrutis) with gross intellect Sṛishṭi (creation) has been accepted so as to be quite helpful and convenient for their Sādhanas like Karma etc. (4-42). Seen from this viewpoint, the common Siddhānta of both the Kārikākāra and the Bhāshyakāra is verily - "Dvaita is Vyāvahārikasatya (real from the empirical viewpoint) and Advaita is Paramārthasatya (Absolutely Real)."

This preface has already been a long-drawn one but was felt to be neccessary to root out certain deep-seated misconceptions on the part of preachers and practitioners alike. It need not be gainsaid that in a big treatise of this magnitude many topics, statements, expressions or phrases are repeated ad nauseam irritatingly, disconcertingly; but the subject being highly subtle and esoteric, repetition of certain technical Vedāntic words so as to suit different contexts is more a virtue that a vice. In this regard I crave the indulgence of the readers and request them to bear with me. But before concluding it I have to express my heartfelt gratitude to Sri Swāmi Bhūmānanda Tīrtha, who readily agreed to write a foreword to this magnum opus at short notice and his observation about the book are truly in the nature of a morale-booster to me. I would be failing in my obligatory duty

Preface 33

if I do not record here my sincere thanks to the Trustees of Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Holenarsipur and M/s. L. M. Graphics for all the help rendered by them. If even a few seekers and students benefit by this gem of a text my efferts will be considered to be fruitful.

Holenarsipur 12.11.97

D.B. Gangolli Translator

THE ESSENTIAL GAUDAPĀDA

WHO IS SHRI GAUDAPĀDĀCHĀRYA?

Till today no one knows historically as to who was this Shri Gaudapādāchārya. However, Advaitins while remembering the traditional teachers (Guru Parampara) recite a verse in which it is said that Shri Suka had a disciple by name 'Gaudapāda'. However, Wallaser, a foreign Indologist, has opined that, that name is conceived in keeping with a general traditional convention in the northern parts of the country and that there was no individual by that name. On the strength of two epithets of 'Gauda' and 'Drāvida' used for Shri Gaudapāda and Shri Śankara, respectively, by Shri Sureshwarāchārya, a known direct disciple of the latter in his work, 'Naishkarmyasiddhi', we have to imagine or infer that Shri Gaudapāda was a famous Vedāntin in the region called "Gaudadesha". Dr. Vidhushekhara Bhattācharya has imagined that 'Gauda' was his name and 'Pāda' was an honorific given to him out of veneration. Even in the several 'Sankara Vijayas' now in vogue there is no help coming forth with regard to this name. On the whole, this riddle is not yet solved.

NAME OF THIS PRAKARAŅA

It is said that in some hand-written old manuscripts pertaining to this first Prakaraṇa it is called 'Āgama Shāstra' and the commentary on it, 'Āgama Shāstra Vivaraṇa' (AS. p.231, 234, 236, 244). Although this name of 'Āgama Shāstra' is not in vogue among the Advaitins, Ānandagiri, one of the Ṭikākāra (critical commentator), has mentioned a verse : 'संप्रति ग्रंथप्रणयनप्रयोजन-प्रदर्शनपूर्वकं परमगुरून् आगमशास्त्रसव्याख्यातस्य प्रणेतृत्वेन व्यवस्थितान् प्रणमित' (Māṇḍūkya Bhāshya Pushpika 223), it can be surmised that during this commentator's time this name also was in usage. In these days, it has become a convention to call this text by the popular name of 'Shri Gauḍapāda Kārikās.'

OTHER WORKS BY SHRI GAUDAPĀDA

Some people opine that the Bhāshya or commentary on 'Sānkhya Kārikās, Uttaragitā and a couple of other works have

been written by this Āchārya, but there is no satisfactory evidence to affirm that he is the author since there is a great difference between the style of exposition of the Kārikās and the style evident in these works. Hence, it has to be concluded inevitably that the author of these treatises is not Shri Gauḍa-pādāchārya.

IS MĀṇḍŪKYA UPANISHAD TOO A POURUSHEYA GRANTHA (SCRIPTURE TEXT WRITTEN BY A HUMAN BEING) LIKE ĀGAMA PRAKARAŅA

Although the followers of the traditional method of teaching (Sāmpradāyikas) firmly believe that 'Māṇḍūkya' is an 'Upanishad', some modern research scholars, who have a pronounced proclivity of determining the historical backround by means of inferential and logical deductions alone, have imagined that this is a work of human origin alone. Deussen, a Western scholar on Indology, has opined on the Strength of the Bhāshya excerpt by Shri Śankarāchārya - "वेदान्तार्थसारसंग्रहभूतिमदं प्रकरणचतुष्टयम् 'ओमित्येतदक्षरिमत्यादि' आरभ्यते" - that the phrase - 'ओमित्येतदक्षरम्' - belongs to the main text of the four Prakaraṇas written by the author, Shri Gauḍa pādāchārya.

To substantiate further this above contention of his, Deussen has taken recourse to the argument that Shri Śaṅkarāchārya has not exemplified Māṇḍūkya as a Śruti (Upanishad) anywhere in his Bhāshyas. But as against this argument, neither Shri Śaṅkara has mentioned this part of the Upanishad as a work by Shri Gauḍapāda nor the other Vedāntins belonging to his Sampradāya (tradition) as well as any other acknowledged commentator having opined like that is to be seen anywhere in the whole gamut of Sanskrit literature. Therefore, this influence is to be considered as belonging to the realm of wild imaginations alone.

Late Dr. Vidhushekhara Bhattachārya has written in his "Āgama Shāstra" which he has published in both English (1943) and Sanskrit (1950) languages, that the Kārikās are together the original or first text compiled and that some one has composed, on the strength of some ancient Upanishads, the 'Māṇḍūkyōpanishad' which has become famous in present times as a scriptural text. Further, he has opined that in this Upanishadic portion attempts to systematize the various topics and aspects in

both the Kārikās and the Upanishads, to amend as also add new topics for the purposes of elucidation are to be seen. To show that this opinion too is a figment of sheer imagination it is sufficient if we understand the meaning of the Verse by Shri Sureshwarāchārya in his Bṛihadāraṇyaka Vārtika (a sub-commentary on his preceptor Shri Śaṅkarāchārya's Bhāshya on that Upanishad), viz. "एषोऽन्तर्याप्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययो । माण्ड्केयश्रुतिवच इति स्पष्टमधीयते" (Bṛi. Vā. 3-8-6, p. 1294), in which he has named 'Māṇḍūkya as an 'Upanishad' in very clear unantriguous terms, Not only that; Dr. Bhattāchārya has not shown or exemplified any authoritative and convincing statement to prove his contention that Māṇḍūkya is a recent work. This defect in his theory the readers should discern.

IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ĀGAMA PRAKARAŅA AND THE UPANISHAD

Dr. Bhattāchārya has given two main reasons to substantiate his theory and they are: (1) If Āgama Prakaraṇa is the Commentary on the Māṇḍūkyōpanishad, then what was propounded in the prose portion should have been explained in the Kārikās without exaggeration. But that is not so. (2) It can be discerned that the Kārikās existing originally, the Upanishadic part has been interpolated later only after comparing the prose and poetry portions.

Without giving into these considerations which are purely of academic interest and more an exercise in futility, we should not forget a general counter-argument which can be raised in this regard. First and foremost, the Kārikās are not a commentary, word by word (Anavayakrama) on the Māṇḍūkyōpanishad giving the meaning of each and every word and then determining the purport of the whole sentence. If it were so, Shri Śankarāchārya would not have written his Bhāshyas on the Upanishadic Mantras or verses. Without understanding this important aspect, Dr. Bhaṭṭāchārya has allowed his wild imagination to formulate puerile objections like: 'Why has not the Kārikākāra explained this word?'; 'Why is this word different in the original text and its commentary?' etc. It is not that his objections cannot at all be answered satisfactorily but they are not so important and valid

to be gone into full detail here in this text. We will leave that vain task to academicians.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UPANISHAD AND THE AGAMA PRAKARANA

Any needless controversy raised by modern research scholars or academicians who surmise or contend that Mandukya is a text compiled by an individual in recent times and for the Kārikās the main authoritative source is Brihadāraņyaka Upanishad alone is without any valid evidence worth serious consideration by the true seekers. Suffice it to say that from time immemorial the traditional teachers have taken Māndūkya as one of the principal ten Upanishads selected by Shri Sankara for writing his famous time-honoured Bhashyas. It can be unquivocally asserted that Māndūkya Upanishad has itself served as the original source for Shri Gaudapāda to compile his famous Kārikās; besides, in order to prove that his explanatory commentaries in the form of Kārikās are fully in consonance with all Vedāntas (Upanishads) beyond any shadow of doubt or ambiguity the Acharya has in various contexts quoted and exemplified excerpts from Taittiriya and Brihadaranyaka Upanishads in support of his conclusions and teachings.

DELIBERATION ABOUT OMKĀRA IN THE KĀRIKĀS

Dr. Bhattāchārya has imagined further that: "Only after completing the deliberation on Ātman's 'Pādas' like Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña in the Kārikās (in the 19th Kārikā, to be exact), a comparison has been drawn between Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña (the three Pādas) and Akāra, Ukāra, Makāra (the three Matras). But in the Upanishad (Māṇḍūkya) at the outset itself the description of Ōmkāra has been started. The subject-matter which is the object of a device (Upeya) in the Kārikā is itself, mentioned first and then alone Ōmkāra which is the device has been taken up for deliberation and this is quite reasonable; the author of the prose text, having been influenced by the Chhāndōgya, Taittirīya and other Upanishads, has elevated Ōmkāra to a higher status; because in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad there is no Ōmkāra Upāsana (meditation on Ōmkāra) Shri Gauḍapāda, the author of 'Āgama Shāstra' (meaning, the Kārikās in toto), has not

given the pride of place to Omkāra and has himself added that at the end of the first Prakaraņa (Chapter)."

It need not be gainsaid that all these are wild conjectures akin to an attempt to draw a picture in empty space alone. We have emphasized above the fact that Māṇḍūkya Upanishad alone is the original source for the Kārikās and that in order to bring home the purport or the precepts taught in that Upanishad alone Shri Gaudapāda has independently written the four Prakaraņas. We have already explained that with the introductory remark -'अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति' - 'Here in this context, these Ślōkas (verses or Kārikās) explain this topic" - Shri Gaudapāda has written the Ślokas of the 'Agama Prakarana' so as to agree with the different topics mentioned in the Upanishad as also that there is a very innate coherence between the Upanishad and this first Prakarana in so far as deliberation on certain topics is concerned. In the Kārikās the reason for the deliberation on Ōmkāra being given at the end is not the absence of Omkara Upasana in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad. Not only that, therein it is eulogised that Omkara is the cause for the whole of the Vedas.

In the Māṇḍūkyōpanishad Ōmkārōpāsana (meditation on Ōmkāra) has not been elaborated upon predominantly indeed; similarly, in the Kārikās too Ōmkārōpāsana has not been expounded. Here in the Kārikās Ōmkāra means not merely a word or sound alone; it is verily the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality) beyond the name (Abhidhāna), the named (Abhidheya) as also all mundane transactions (Vyavahāra).

* Take details from M. Up. Manjari.

In truth, the first Prakaraṇa (Chapter) among the four Prakaraṇas written by Shri Gauḍapāda going by the name of 'Āgama Prakaraṇa' has the exclusive purport of determining the essential nature of this Ōmkāra. In the Upanishad for this purpose of determining the subtle meaning of Ōmkāra alone, at the beginning itself Ōmkāra has been taught and then after having expounded that Ōmkāra is nothing but all-Comprehensive and all-pervasive Brahmātma Tattwa (the Absolute Reality of Brahman or Ātman), that very Ātman (Self) alone is taught to be Ōmkāra from the predominant view point of the name and further it is explained that in this context there is no difference whatsoever between the three Pādas (quarters) and the three Mātras (alpha-

bets). In order to elucidate this secret alone in the Kārikās first the Ātma Tattwa or the Ultimate Reality of the Self is determined to be the 'Turīya' (the fourth) and then only the deliberation on Ōmkāra is begun. One can discern beyond any shadow of doubt or ambiguity the essential nature of Ōmkāra in consonance with the Kārikā teaching from the commentaries on 1-26 to 29.

Here in this context, Bhāshyakāra Shri Śaṅkara has commented that in an indirect manner (Avāntara Tātparya) for the sake of middle and low grade Adhikāris (seekers) Ōmkāra Upāsana has been mentioned. The relevant Bhāshya excerpt is to be found in the commentary on the 12th Mantra as follows: "मन्दमध्यमिषयां तु प्रतिपन्नसाधकभावानां सन्मार्गगामिनां संन्यासिनां मात्राणां पादानां च क्लृप्तसामान्यविदां यथावदुपास्यमानः ओंकारो ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तये आलम्भनीभवति" - Meaning: Hence we have also commented on this Kārikā in the same manner. For that reason herein it should be understood that there is no contradiction at all.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF AGAMA PRAKARANA

There are many more topics, which are to be examined and deliberated upon, and which pertain to the methodology of teaching adopted in the Kārikās. They will be taken up while explaining the purports of the next Prakaranas and their respective introductions according to the contexts and relevance. At present for the sake of the seekers (Jijñāsus) remembering the essence of the teachings of the Agama Prakarana we will briefly mention them: (1) Here in this Prakarana in order to enable us to cognize or Intuit the Ultimate Reality of $\overline{A}tman$ (Self) as It is the determination of the essence of Omkara has been carried out in the main. Hence one should not take Omkara to be merely a word or sound; Omkāra is, in truth, the Absolute, Ultimate Reality (Paramārtha Tattwa) which is perennially devoid of the three Avasthas or states of consciousness; which is neither a name (Abhidana) nor the named (Abhideya) and which is devoid of the divisions or distinctions of the Known (Grāhya) or the Knower (Grāhaka). This Reality has been called 'the fourth quarter' (Turiya Pāda) which It is being described through the quarters (Pāda Vivaraņa) and alphabet-less Ōmkāra (Amātra Ōmkāra) while It is being described through the alphabets 'A',

- 'U', 'M'. Both in the seventh and the twelfth Mantras of the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad and in the 'Turiya Kārikās' and the 'Praṇava Kārikās' (which names we have added to these respective Kārikās) this Ōmkāra alone is taught.
- Agama really means By adopting the traditional (Sāmpradāyic) methodology of Superimposition and Rescission (Adhyārōpa Apavāda Nyāya) - to wit, although they are not real in the Ultimate analysis (i.e. from the standpoint of the Pure Consciousness of the Witnessing Self) the three states of Consciousness, viz. the waking, the dream and the deep sleep, which appear to be every one's experiences in the workaday transactions are conceived as if they are really the characteristics or the qualities (Dharmas) of Atman in the forms of three Padas and three Matras, and thereby the seeker is made to realize (Intuit) that that $\overline{A}tman$ (Self) exists and thereafter once he is able to Intuit the Absolute Reality of his own innate Atman or Self in order to dissuade him from really taking the Pādas and the Mātras to be the characteristics or qualities of his Ātman the Shāstra (Upanishad) now rescinds or falsifies them. Thus in a very Intuitive, comprehensive but subtle manner both the Upanishads and the preceptor (Guru) well-versed in the Shāstraic and Sāmpradāyic method of teaching the Transcendental Reality of Atman (Brahman) is taught in its very essence as It is and the genuine seeker comes to Intuit It.

In order to bring home this Chaturtha (the fourth, which is nothing but the Ultimate Reality or Paramārtha) Tattwa, in the Mantra :- "प्रपञ्चोपशमं शांतं शिवमहैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा" - Meaning, "(Those who Know the Ultimate Reality - who have realized the Self in His essential nature) call this non-dual (Advaita), who is devoid of this world of the forms of the states and the ownership of those states, devoid of the name (Abhidāna) and the named (Abhideya) explained above, who is unto Himself peaceful (nay, verily an embodiment of peace or quiescence) and of the very essence of Bliss (Paramānanda Swarūpa) alone - 'the fourth'; That Reality Itself is Ātman". In the Upanishad it has been enunciated that : "अमात्रश्चतुर्थोऽच्यवहार्यः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवो अहैत एवमोंकार आत्मैव" - Meaning : "Ōmkāra which is devoid of the Mātras, the fourth and beyond the reach of Vyavahāra or mundane workaday

dealings, is, in truth, Advaita or non-dual (having nothing else as second to It) indeed, devoid of the world (of duality) of the names of the alphabets and their respective forms, which is auspicious and propitious; thus Omkara is nothing but Atman alone." This teaching alone is established and elucidated in the Turiya Kārikās as well as in the Praņava Kārikās found in the first Āgama Prakaraņa - Ātman is devoid of the Prapañcha (world of duality) of the three Avasthas, meaning He is devoid of Avidyā (ignorance) of the dual forms of Agrahana (non-comprehension or ignorance) and Anyathāgrahaņa (misconception) (1-15). Ōmkārātman is devoid of the world of duality of names (Abhidhana Prapañcharahitaha), meaning Atman alone of the very essence of Absolute Bliss (Paramānanda Swarūpa), devoid of all kinds of divisions." In the Chhāndōgya Upanishad the Upadesha or spiritual teaching expounded in the statement. "ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमिस" meaning, "This alone is the essential nature of all this world of duality, This alone is the Reality (Satyam), This alone is Ātman; That thou art" - is nothing but this teaching alone.

The statement to the effect that - "Prajña is the cause for the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world of duality", thereby superimposing causation, sustenance & dissolution of the world of duality on Atman is done only from the viewpoint of Avidyā alone, and in order to drive home this truth Shri Gaudapādāchārya has written a Kārikā as follows : "अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते । अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥" - meaning: "Jiva is asleep owing to eternal $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion), seeing a dream; when he wakes up to Jñāna or Self-Knowledge (Intuitive experience) attained with the aid of the teaching by the Shāstra or Upanishadic lore and the $\bar{A}ch\bar{a}rya$ (preceptor well-versed in the traditional methodology of teaching), then he cognizes the Ultimate truth that this Atman or Self is Aja (devoid of the Avidya Nidra or sleep called Avidyā or ignorance) which, in turn, is the noncomprehension of the Absolute Reality), is Advaita (one in whom there does never exist any kind of world of duality)." Here in this Kārikā the difference between the viewpoints with regard to the Ultimate Reality of Brahmātman of the Jñānis (Realized souls) and the Ajñānis (common people ignorant of their very

essence of Being as the Self, Atman) in a very clear manner. This very meaning is conveyed in certain other words in the Bhagavadgitā verse: "या निशा सर्वभूतानाम्" (G. 2-69). How to Intuit this Absolute, Ultimate Reality of the Self has been propounded in the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad in the following words: "संविशत्या-त्मनाऽऽत्मानं य एवं वेद" - meaning, "He who Intuits or cognizes (Ātman) will enter or merge into, (become one with) Ātman in the form of Atman"; in the Agama Prakarana this teaching has been condensed in the words: "ओंकारो विदितो येन स मुनिर्नेतरो जनः", meaning: "He who has Intuited Omkara alone is a Muni, the rest are not Munis. To wit, he who Intuits his own Self (Atman) who is devoid of the world of duality (Prapañcharahita), birthless (Aja), non-dual (Advitiya) as He is in essence culminating in Intuitive experience (Anubhava), - he alone is a Muni, meaning he is a holy man (Mahātma) who has attained that non-dual silence (Mouna) of the very essence of Intuitive experience (Anubhava) which is beyond the reach of speech and mind, in truth, which is speech of the speech and mind of the mind.

The really qualified people for Intuiting the essential nature of Reality of Omkara, propounded here, are only those aspirants (Jijñāsus) who have acquired extreme renunciation (Vairāgya Sampannaha). Those Sannyāsins (recluses) with middle-class qualifications are fit for contemplating upon the identity between the Pādas and Mātras of Ōmkāra as Upāsana (meditation), while those Sannyāsins belonging to a lower grade are fit for the Pratikopāsana (meditation on the symbol) of Ōmkāra. Although it can be ascertained from authoritative sources like epics and mythological texts that those Mumukshus or aspirants for Liberation who have not acquired the above-mentioned qualifications also can by remembering divine names like Rāma, Krishņa etc. achieve purification of the mind or Chittashuddhi and thereafter according to each one's capacity attempt to deliberate upon the Ultimate Reality (Tattwa Vichāra), this fact has not been stated here.

In retrospect, thus in the Agama Prakarana the quintessence of the Upanishad has been briefly mentioned. To elaborate upon this teaching on the strength of Shāstra and Yukti and bring

home the subtle teaching alone is the main goal of the next three Prakaraṇas.

(Taken from the Introduction to the other three Prakaraṇas) - [Facts about the Four Prakaraṇas compiled by Gauḍapāda].

It is not possible to reckon from Shri Sankara's Bhashyas that the complete treatise comprising the four Prakaranas authored by Shri Gaudapāda by way of a commentary on Māndūkyopanishad bore one comprehensive name or title. In fact, Shri Sankara has called the treatise 'Prakaranachatushtaya' alone. But the commentator on Shri Sankara's Bhāshya by name 'Ānandagiri', while explaining an invocatory verse by Shri Gaudapada, has stated: "संप्रति ग्रन्थप्रणयनप्रयोजनप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं परमगुरून् आगमशास्त्रव्याख्यातस्य प्रणेतृत्वेन व्यवस्थितान् प्रणमित" - meaning :- "He (Shri Śańkara) salutes his grand-preceptor (Shri Gaudapāda) who was the expounder (Pranetru) of Agama Shāstra after stating the benefit of his commentary (Bhāshya)" -(Māndūkya Bhāshya p. 223). The topic as to who this ānandagiri also has become controversial. For, it has become conventional or traditional to call many famous sub commentaries (Vyākhyānas) or Upanishad Bhāshyas to be those of Anandagiri alone. If the opinions expressed in those commentaries are compared, we get sufficient evidence to conclude that this person by name Anandagiri is not one but many. Let it be anything. We can reasonably believe that during the times of the commentator Anandagiri who wrote his sub-commentary on Māndūkya Bhāshya the Kārikā Grantha (by Shri Gaudapāda) was having the name of 'Agama Shāstrā."

Āgama means a *Pramāṇa* (valid means of Knowledge) of the nature of spiritual instruction which is other than the Pramāṇas like *Pratyaksha* (percepts), *Anumāna* (inference) etc. but which is *Sāmpradāyic* (traditionally handed down from the teacher to the taught). Hence the purport implicit in this name of Āgama is the fact that Shri Gauḍapāda has written this Prakaraṇa Chatushṭaya comprising many *Kārikās* (verses) keeping in mind the Upanishadic teachings alone in a predeminant sense. The fact that the treatise is fīt to be called 'Āgama Shāstra' can be justifiably substantiated only by means of an Intuitive deliberation on the subject-matter of the Prakaraṇas.

For instance: In the first 'Agama Prakarana' the Upanishadic instructions alone are propounded predominantly. Although herein Yukti (logical devices) are utilised to some extent, they are all Gouna (of secondary importance). But though (comparatively speaking) in the next three Prakaranas Yukti alone is given all the predominance, the Upanishads and their teachings have been invariably given their pride of place as the canonical, authoritative sources. The Upanishadic discription of Atman as: "नान्तःप्रज्ञं न बहिष्प्रज्ञं नोभयतः न प्रज्ञानघनं प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम्" meaning : "Ātman, as He is in the dream state, is not internally conscious (Antahprajñam); as in the waking state, He is not externally conscious (Bahishprajñam); as in the deep sleep state, He is not without Consciousness (Aprajñam) - is taken as an authoritative source; further discerning the Upanishadic description of the dream, Ātman, just like the waking Ātman, in similar words like 'Saptānga' or one endowed with seven limbs and 'Ekonavimshati mukhaha' or one having nineteen openings or doorways, Shri Gaudapāda has called both waking and dream states as dream alone; and finally with a view to describing Atman who exists (pervades) in all the three states is in truth without any taint or obligatory relation whatsoever with any of the three states Shri Gaudapāda has depicted 'Turiya' (the fourth one when compared to the three states meaning the witnessing Pure Consciousness alone) with such characteristic features as Ajam (birthless), Anidram (devoid of deep sleep), Asvapnam (devoid of dream), Advaitam (non-dual) in these three Prakaranas. If the fact that the special features of 'अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नम्' (G.K. 1-16, 3-36, 4-81) are mentioned in Agama Prakarana, Advaita Prakarana and Alātashānti Prakarana is remembered, then we can get convinced that this treatise (by Shri Gaudapada) is not only the 'Agama Shāstra' which expounds the real purport of the Upanishads, but also a Shāstra which depicts the 'Sāmpradāyic Siddhānta' or the traditional methodology of teaching the Ultimate Reality as handed down from time immemorial from the Guru to the Shishya indeed. Especially the word 'Advaita' (nondualism) is to be found in all the four Prakaranas.

SHRI GAUDAPĀDA'S SAMPRADĀYA

Treatises on Advaita written prior to the times of Shri

Gaudapada are not available now. His treatises bristle with the technical terms used in Buddhism texts as well as their logical devices (Yuktis). Therefore, some research scholars devoted to finding out the textual teachings of Buddhistic treatises and Shri Gaudapāda's works have imagined that for Advaita Philosophy Buddhism itself is the source. In his book - "History of Indian Philosophy", Shri Dāsgupta has not only surmised that Shri Gaudapāda has borrowed ideas from Buddhistic treatises, but also has gone so far as to allege that Shri Gaudapada was himself a Buddhist! Shri Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, another renowned Indian writer (philosopher) has propounded that in view of the similarity of the technical words used by him and the Buddhistic texts, Shri Gaudapāda has championed the Vijnānavāda (of the Buddhists) alone.' But these contentions are rendered untenable if we observe the fact that Shri Gaudapada has himself expressed the opinion that his tenets are supported by those of ancient (traditional) teachers and this purpose alone he has specified in the Vaitathya Prakarana by statements like "Vedanteshu Vichakshanaihi" (2-31); "Munibhirvedapāragaihi (2-35). In several Śānkara Bhāshyas too (viz. Gitā Bhāshya 13-22, 13-13, 18-50; Bṛihadāraņyaka Bhāshya 2-120 ...) at many places reverential references to amount preceptors well-versed in the Sampradayic methodology of teaching have been made; in the Sūtra Bhāshya (1-1-17, 3-2-21) the teachings of Nirvishesha Brahmavādins (theory of the ultimate Reality of Brahman being deviod of any special features whatsoever) are taken up for discussion and adopted. Because (a) general tenet of Advaita (non-dualism) by various preceptors are referred to and refuted and (b) the Nishprapañcha Brahmavāda or theory of Brahman being devoid of any world of duality is examined and expounded to be Sampradayic in several statements found here and there in the Bhāshyas - it becomes evident that Shri Gaudapada never formulated afresh (or invented) the Ajādvayātmavāda or the theory of Ātman as the ultimate Reality being birthless and non-dual. Besides, from the sub-commentaries on G.K. Bh. 2-32, Bri. Bh. 2-1-20 by Ānandajñāma and from the commentary on 'Samkshepa Shārira' by Madhusūdana Saraswati it is established that ancient preceptors like Brahmānandi, Dravidāchārya erc, were belonging to this school of Advaita philosophy or Sampradaya. Therefore, because

of all these evidences it can be inferred that Shri Gaudapāda's Sampradāya co-existed with other contemporary Advaita schools for a long period of time.

GAUDAPĀDA'S SIDDHĀNTA VS BUDDHISTIC VIJNĀNAVĀDA

The basic source for Buddhistic Siddhanta is Anatmavada. But whether in the ancient or Buddhistic works (a) neither the Intuitive deliberation on Atman who is of the nature of Netinetyātma (not this, not that) as described in the Brihadaranyaka and Shwetāshwatara Upanishads Sarvabhūtastha (who is pervading all things and phenomena) and 'Sākshichaitanya' (witnessing Pure Consciousness) - (b) nor the Intuitive deliberation on the 'Avasthātraya Sākshi' (the Witnessing Consiousness of the three states of Consciousness) as described in the Mandukya, Chandogya and Brihadaranyaka Upanishads have been examined in the least; it being so, how and on what grounds at all can it be sustained to argue that the ultimate Reality of Atman which Shri Gaudapada has propounded (quite in consonance with the Upanishadic and his own traditional school's time-tested spiritual teachings) as 'Ajānidrāswapna has evolved out of either Buddhistic Vijñānavāda or Yōgāchāravāda?

We will be be constrained to conclude that those who argue and allege that there is similarity between Vijñānavāda and Shri Gauḍapādāchārya's Vāda have not taken into their reckoning the contrary or disparity between these two theories. For the benefit of our readers, we will mention here under some verses of Buddhistic teachings and try to depict the striking disparity between the purport impicit in them and the opinions of Shri Gauḍapāda:

(१) अभूतपरिकल्पोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते । शून्यता विद्यते तत्र तस्यामिप स विद्यते ॥

This verse is taken from Maitreyanātha's 'Madhyānta Vibhāga'. The commentator of this text has stated: (non-existent or false decision) necessarily exists. Just as in the Rajju or rope there does not exist Sarpaswabhāva or snake nature whatsoever, but the rope exists in the Rajjuswabhāva or rope nature alone similarly the Vijnāna called Abhūta Parikalpa invariably exists; but in it the categories or concepts of Vishayi or subject and

Vishaya or object especially do not exist; even in the Vishayavishayibhāva Shūnyatwa or void in which both concepts of subject and object do not exist there exists Vijñāna or intellectual Consciousness or awareness?

In the Māṇdūkya Kārikā, Shri Gaudapāda has written:

अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते । द्वयाभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निर्निमित्तो न जायते ।।

Its Purport: Neither the Jivas nor the Chitta (mind) are form; tosay that they exist is mere Mithyābhinivesha (deluded staunch belief). The Vijñānavādins purport is first to demonstrate that Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) alone exists and the repute the doctrine of the Shūnyavādins that everything is Nishswabhāva (of the nature of essencelessness). Shri Gauḍapāda in 4-28: 'तस्पा जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते' has opined that neither the Chitta or mind nor the Jīvas exist apart from Brahman which is Akhaṇḍachaitanya or immutable, importible pure consciousness, can these disparate teachings be reckoned as one and the same? The mind alone exists inside (internally); that alone appears as the external objects - this is the opinion of the Buddhistic Vijñānavādin;

Dijnāga has written in his treatise called - "Ālambana Parikshā";

यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तु बहिर्वदवभासते । सोऽथों विज्ञानरूपत्वात् तत्प्रत्ययतयापि च ।।

- in very clear terms. This opinion is refused in the Sūtra Bhāshya. But Gauḍapādāchārya has stated in his Kārikā 4-67:

उभे ह्यन्योन्यदृश्ये ते किं तदस्तीति चोच्यते । लक्षणाशून्यमुभयं तन्मतेनैव गृह्यते ।। गौ. का. ४-६७

He not only states that both the mind and its perceived object are mutually dependent but also that both the waking and the dream are states of the same kind as also shown that both are Mithyā or false; further he has established that for both these states of consciousness Ātman alone is the substratum. All these facts have been affirmed in the Vaitathya Prākaraṇa.

Vasubandhu, a Yōgāchāra Vijñānavādin, has stated that - "The empirical or waking consciousness (Pratyaksha Buddhi)

might have been like the perceptible knowledge accruing in the dream. When a person becomes conscious in the manner -'I have perceived such and such a thing' - actually there is no Pratyaksha or Perceptible object; Where the external objects too are Kshanika or ephemeral, momentary, then where is the question of any perception? such a dogmatic theory or concept is not to be found anywhere in Gaudapāda Kārikās. In Vasubandhu's opinion people are experiencing a long dream; in the trance (Samādhi) called "Lōkōttarajñāna" people come to cognize that there exists 'Vijnapti' or consciousness alone. But Gaudapāda's opinion is "Both waking and dream are states of consciousness of the same kind; Loukika (waking), Shuddha Loukika (dream) these are not knowledge (Jñānas) of different levels each from the other. Although deep sleep or Sushupti is a state of 'Lōkōttara' (a state in which there is no Vyavahāra or transaction whatsoever) if the waking consiousness to the effect - "All the three states of consciousness are Māyika or magical, illusory" - is attained by one then he cognizes (Intuits) that Advaitatman or non-dual Self who is Aja or unborn, Anidra or devoid of sleep and Aswapna or devoid of dream.

While commenting on Gaudapāda Kāraka 1-16:

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते । अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुद्ध्यते तदा ।।

- Shri Śańkara has explained in this manner, Between Manōnigraha (3-40) that Shri Śańkara (and Gauḍapāda) has mentioned and the Lōkōttarajñāna of Vijñānavādins there does not exist any relationship or similarity whatsoever, and this fact is very clear indeed.

It also becomes quite evident here from the comparative analysis or deliberation carried out by us so far that: "There does not exist any relationship whatsoever between Vijnānavāda and the Vedāntic teaching that - The non-dual pure consciousness (Advaita Chinmātra) which is Ajānidrāswapna or devoid of birth, sleep and dream alone is satya or real".

ALĀTASHĀNTI CHAPTER AND SHŪNYAVĀDA (NIHILISM)

In the fourth and last chapter called 'Alātashānti' Shri Gauḍapāda, folloqing or adopting Avitanyāya also called Vyatireka-

nyāya or aphorism based on dialectic distinction or exclusion, has shown that his own (traditional school of) Advaita Philosophy is fully or undoubtedly established by the numerous aim dialectic squabbles, qrangling between protagonists of Sānkya and Vaisheshika schools, on the one hand, and between the Bālyāstitvavādins or realists and Vijñānavādins or Idealists, on the other. Further, following the same Advaita Siddhānta Shri Gaudapāda has refuted the dogmatic theory propounded by some among the Vedāntins, Viz. Bandha or Bondage and Mōksha or Release, Liberation are Paramārtha or Absolutely real. As we have previously stated, in two Prakaraṇa or chapter too he has unequivocally demonstrated by once again Intuitively exaimning the methodology of the three Avasthās of Jāgrat, Swapna and Sushapti that - "His own teaching his Ajātivāda or theory of non-birth of Ātman is in consonance with Vedāntic spiritual science".

In all these respects although between this chapter and the previous three chapters there exists a relationship of complete agreement, late Shri Vidhushikhāra Bhaṭṭāchārya has been deluded and deceived by the mere fact that in this Alātashānti Prakaraṇa Shri Gauḍapāda has used predominently or rather excesively, Sanskrit words which occur in Buddhistic texts and has misconceived the theory that - "Shri Gauḍapāda's teachings are truly those of Vijñānavādins" in his own English and Sanskrit works called "Āgama Shāstra" published in 1943 and 1950, respectively. The calcutta academician has further quoted many sentences from Buddhistic texts and has vainly endeavoured to prove that - "The Buddhistts have lent on hire, as it were, their theories and themes to Shri Gauḍapāda's treatise (of Māṇdūkya Kārikās)".

Because we have already demonstrated the wide distinction and difference that exists between Vijñānavāda of the Buddhists and 'Brahnātmavāda' which is of the very essence of Kūṭastha Vijñāna, this deliberation on Shri Vidhushakhara Bhaṭṭāchāryas opinion may be stopped.

But another academician date Shri T.R.V. Murthy (formerly of the Benares Hindu University) the another of - 'The central Philosophy of Buddism, without accepting Shri Bhaṭṭācharya's opinion has thought out and projected his own new Siddhānta:

'It is indulitable that the tenets of Mādhyamikas and Yōgāchāras (two schools of Buddhism) have influenced Shri Gaudapāda's Kārikās'. But neither in respect of the language of the first three chapters nor in respect of the methodology adopted for the various topics in there exists anything in the best which is opposed to Vedānta; it is also not to be seen that having accepted the fourth chapter as Vedanta neither the Vedantins nor the Buddhists have illustrated the Kārikās (in this chapter); that fourth chapter must have been written by some unknown Buddhist alone. It cannot at all be stated either that Vedāntins were influenced by Buddhists or that Buddhists have acknowledged any opinion of Vedāntins; for the Sampradāya or traditional methods of teaching of both are different. Therefore, it may be owerred that only the two aspects of Mādhyamikas Paribhāsha or technical terms and Prakriyā or methodology only have been adopted used by the Vedantins.

From one point of view it can be accepted that in this theory there exists a little part of truth. Because the statement to the effect that - 'Alātashānti Prakaraṇa must have been written by some unknown Buddhist' - is merely a figment of imagination, we can discard it.

Because the verses of the previous Prakaranas as well as the methodology of Avasthātraya is exists in this fourth chapter also, it becomes exigent as also expedient to acknowledge it to be a part of the whole treatise alone. Further, the theory propounded by Shri Murthy that - " The distinction of Vyavahāra (empirical, sphered) and Paramārtha (the Transcendental Absolute Reality) did not exist in the Advaita Vedānta nor did Vivartavāda prior to Shri Gaudapāda - is without any proper support or proof. For, we have already demonstrated the truth that the Sampradaya of Shri Sankara's Siddanta did exist even before (the time of Shri Gaudapāda). In order to over that - "There existed in addition to proponents different Advaita Siddhānta, Nirvisheshavādins even before Shri Gaudapāda's time, and with a view to establish the teachings of his own traditional school of practise pure Advaita Vedanta by refuting the tenets of other Advaitins Shri Sankara wrote his Bhāshyas - the Sūtra Bhāshya is sufficient. Even in Shri Sureshwarāchāryas 'Sambandha Vārtika' there is sufficient

support available for this asumption. Therefore it has to be universally and invariably accepted that both these theories of Shri T.R.V. Murthy are without proper support.

Now let us ponder over the question - "Is it possible to detect or discern the 'Nirvisheshavāda' or Absolute, non-dual method of teaching delineated in Vedānta Shāstra without being influenced or induced by Buddhistic teachings?".

In the Upanidhads off and on through the method of refutation of characteristics other than or alone to its own essence of pure being in the manner - "Asthūlam (not gross), Anum (not small)"; "Neti, Neti (Not this, not that) etc. The Tattwa or ultimate reality being described is to be seen. If the Sampradaya Granthas and Āchāryas or traditional (authoritative) texts and preceptors were there, why should not this traditional methodology of teaching be evolved or formulated directly from the Upanishads without any influence of the Buddhists being cast on it? It being so, by adopting a method of negation in the manner - 'Not this, not that' where was the need for Shri Gaudapada to surrender himself is the Buddhists for the purport of finding out the methodology of Intuiting the Absolute Reality (Tattwa)? Instead of this, why could not we surmise that Buddhists themselves borrowed this methodology from the Vedantins? Gautama Buddha had discovered merely the sequential order of Dwadasha Nidana or twelve diagnostic symptions which are evolved on the basis of "Pratitya Samutpāda" or dependent origination (meaning, if one category exists the other one is produced or born) - a cause effect phenomenon (Nimittanainithika Bhāva or Kāryakāraņa Bhāva). It being so, how come among the Mādhyamika Buddhists scholars like Nāgārjuna etc., all of a sudden (to wit, without any extraneous influence) the spiritual philosophy of Nihilism (Naihswābhāvya Siddānta) flashed in the mind? There was no support whatsover of any previous traditional authoritative texts (Sāmpradāyika Granthas) for them! In fact, a less known truth is that Mādhāyamika Buddhists like Nāgārjuna etc. were previously Brahmins (Hindus) and later on became Buddhists. Under the circumstances, having realised the fact that the Upanishadic 'Ekatwavāda' or theory of Monism or Unitary Reality was opposed to 'Anātmavāda' or theory of the world of Reality being real, why cannot it be assumed or surmised that

they shunned the Upanishadic theory and adopted the methodology of 'Dvaita Nishedha' or refutation of duality formed in it to suit their own Siddhānta?" If this question is raised, there need not be any surprise whatsoever. In truth for this kind of a surmise actually there is acknowledgement and support lent by Prog. Dasgupta and others. Further, Prof. T.R.V. Murthy too has accepted this argument that - "Thus just as there exists support for the inference that Vedāntins were influenced by Buddhists, in the same way there equally exists support for the inference that the Mādhyamika Buddhists were influenced by the Upanishadic methodology; it being so, in this matter no decision can be arrived at" (CPB-109) For this reason slone, we have hesitated to accept the theory of those proponents that - "For the fourth Prakaraṇa of Alatashānti (of Shri Gauḍapāda) Nāgārjunas Madhyama Kārikā was the main source".

THE BUDDHISTIC TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

Another thought-provoking topic has remained and that is: "What is the reason for the abundant usage of Buddhistic technical terms (Pāribhāshika Shabda) in Shri Gauḍapāda's Kārikās? In fact, he has even utilized or pressed into service 'Nāgārjuna's unique methodology, called 'Chatushkōti Prakriyā'! What is the plausible reason for this?

Finding out a satisfactory answer to this intriguing question becomes quite necessary and important. To those sagacious people who are capable of divining the plausible cause by Intuitive insight the truth that - "For this too there necessarily is a cause" - cannot but flash. First and foremost, there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that this traditional Āchārya (Shri Gaudapāda) was not fully conversent with or knowledgeable about the Vedāntic technical terminology as, also the profundity and subtlety of the Vedantic 'Prakriya' or traditional methodology. It can safely be avered that in the first three chapters of Shri Gaudapāda's Māndūkya Kārikās neither the Buddhistic terminology nor their methodology exists. This fact has been acknowledged by Prof. T.R.V. Murthy but (unfortunately) with regard to the Alatashanti Prakarana he has erroneously arrived at a conclusion, mainly basing his arguments on the fact that this fourth chapter is bristling with Buddhistic terms and logic or dialectics, that -

"The Alatashānti Prakaraṇa must have been written by some Buddhist only". There is room whatsoever to doubt that due to any dearth or total absence of any Pāribhāshika Shabdas or Prakriyā (in his traditional school of Advaita Vedānta) Shri Gauḍapāda was thus compelled to borrow technical words as well as the methodology from schools alien to Vedic traditions; in truth there might have lurked in his 'heart' some other profound reason than this peurile, immature surmise, and this alone seems to be rational and justifiable. In fact, this is one of the 'essentials' of Shri Gauḍapāda's teachings which has prompted us to name this treatise as - "The essential Gauḍapāda".

The main reasons for Shri Gaudapada using 'Avitanyaya' exclusively in the fourth chapter and propounding his teachings predominently based on dialectious are: Sānkhyās, Vaisheshikas, Bāhyāstitwavādins (Realists) among the Buddhists, Yōgāchāra Vijñānavādins (a school of Buddhism only), - all these were, at least to some extent, Darshanakāras or founders of their respective schools of philosophy who, focussing on their own individual viewpoint, perspective or vision, brought into vogue their respective philosophical methodology; even the Shūnyavādins (among the Buddhists) - championing the cause of Nihilism (Dharma Naihiswābhāvya) on the lone premise of dialection of the form of Vitandavada or perversed or spurious logic, captious criticism, are, in truth, not adopting any methodology of the other Darshanakāras but on the other hand, they are bent upon refuting all the viewpoints taking recourse to their own Vitandavada (Tarka) with a view to establishing Nihilism - are truly Dvaitins obstinately preserting or guarding their own viewpoint.

Now, this main defect of formulating and founding their own schools of philosophy exclusively based on viewpoint, intellectual reasoning and wrangling but totally obivious of the fact that any Reality - if at all it has to be acknowledged as such - has to be Sārvatrika or universal, as also Nitya or eternal (not an entity in time and space) is to be detected initially from this it evolves that merely based on Tarka (logic) or Anumāna (inference) this universal Reality cannot at all be known. It can only be Intuited by the exclusive, unique, Vedāntic method of 'Anubhavānga Tarka' or discriminative reasoning based on Intuitive experience (Anubhava). These teachings belonging to his

own traditional methodology of Advaita Vedānta was fully known by Shri Gauḍapāda and it was handed down to posterity by him and was later fully established and ensconced by in its pristine purity by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya and his direct disciple Shri Sureswarāchārya.

Against this background and the state of affairs prevailing in the spiritual circles we can now discern the fact as to how the great wisdom befitting a true āchārya was demonstrated by Shri Gauḍapāda to meet all the challenges posed by these array of alien schools and scholars who were adepts in dialectics in their own right. Hence in order to show exclusively the truth that - "Owing to their mutual squabbles and disagreement among these Dvaitins or dualists it evolves that all their doctrines are mere Vikalpas or erroneous concepts or theories; further it evolves that for all such Vikalpas that Aja (unborn) Advaita (non-dual) Ātma Tattwa (absolute Reality of self of the essence of pure consciousness) which is the substrate, is Itself the Paramārtha (the Transcendental, ultimate Reality)" - Shri Gauḍapāda has written the fourth chapter in this fashion. This logical methodology is itself called 'Avītanyāya'.

While using this method of dialectics in the fourth (Alātashānti) Prakaraṇa one of his main purposes was: "Because of the main reason that in the Buddhistic philosophy the principal sects who are exponents of dialectics are Vijñānavāda (Idealism) and Shūnyavāda (Nihilism), it can be demonstrated convincingly by means of their own logical devices his own Advaita gets established without any Virōdha or opposition and Vivāda or counter argument". Thus for Shri Gauḍapāda to have utilized the Buddhistic methods of logic this alone was the cause.

Now, the reason for Shri Gaudapāda to have used the Buddhits Paribhāsha is: To make it known that the technical terms that they have used are fully suitable and capable of signifying the more profound Tattwas or truths expounded in Vedānta. How this purpose has been achieved we have shown at varies in the commentaries of the Kārikās. The fact that Vedāntins utilize the Pāribhāshika shabdas or technical terms of other (rival) schools of philosophy with their own different and subtler meaning or indications is clearly revealed by Bādarāyana Sūtras. There cannot be any doubt about this fact being clearly realized by

those who have discerned as to how words like 'Pratyaksha', 'Anumāna', 'Pradhāna', 'Anu' etc. are utilized in the Brahma Sūtras to indicate totally different meaning (to suit Vedāntic teachings).

ĀGAMA TARKAS OF GAUDAPĀDA AND NĀGĀRJUNA

Shri Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntin, while - Shri Nāgārjuna is a Mādhyamika Buddhist; and hence both have exemplified their respective texts as Pramāṇa or authoritative evidence - Shri Gauḍapāda has quoted Upanishads, while Shri Nāgārjuna has mentioned Buddha's sayings in the forms of 'Nikāyas' and 'Sūtras', 'Chandrakeerti, the commentator of the Sūtras, has praised Nāgārjuna in the manner - "Sakalalōkalōkōttara Pravachana Nītaneyārtha Vyākhyāna Nipuṇa". But one special feature: For Gauḍapāda 'Āgama' his traditional authoritative text (Upanishads) alone are most important; hence, he has written his Āgama Prakaraṇa (his first chapter in the form of a commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad) first and only then has followed it up with his three Prakaraṇas, viz. Vaitathya, Advaita and Alātashānti, which are predominantly dialectical in approach and style.

For Nāgārjuna dialectics alone is important; Only after having refuted on the strength of logical devices certain viewpoints he has quoted Buddha's sayings in support of his opinion. The strong profound statements are called: 'Nitārtha' by Buddhists, while Gauḍapāda has called such statements 'Nishchita', 'Yuktiyukta'.

Whereas for Nāgārjuna logic is to be given pre-eminence and the waking state alone is the subject-matter for deliberation. The form or nature of Nāgārjunas logic is to interpret as though Buddha had taught *Pratītya Samutpāda* (dependedt origination) and the *Naishiswābhāvya* (essencelessness) of *Dharmas* (percepts) and accordingly argue out. His Siddhānta or philosophical teaching is: "The Kārya Kāraṇa Bhāva or the cause - effect categories never exist; 'Apratītya Samutpanna Vastu' or an entity or substance which is of dependent origination does, not at all exist; hence a substance that is 'Ashūnya' or not void or without essencelessness does not at all exist" - (Mādhyamika Kārikā 24-19). Whereas for Gauḍapāda the form or nature of logic is only to examine the three states of consciousness viz., waking, dream

and deep sleep with a view to demonstrating the truth that "Advaita or non-duality alone is the Siddhānta or the final spiritual teaching which helps cognize that - (a) Turīyātma or Absolute self who is Avasthātrayātīta or beyond the three states of consciousness alone is the ultimate Reality - as also' (b) Jīva or the transmigratory soul is, in the Absolute Intuitive sense (Paramārtha), Brahman alone". In the ultimate analysis, his Siddhānta is: "That Ajātma Tattwa or Reality of unborn self, devoid of any association (Samparka) with the empirical Kārya Kāraṇa Bhāva or cause effect categories, is Itself the Absolute, ultimate Reality (Paramārtha)"

For Nāgārjuna there is no greater Sādhana or means instruments of action than Tarka or logic; for Gauḍapāda there is no greater Sādhana than Upanishads which teach in accordance or consonance with Anubhava or universal Intuitive experience. According to Nāgārjuna's opinion Naihiswābhāya or void or essenceless alone is Ajāti or devoid of birth or creation, whereas for Gauḍapāda Ajādvitīya Ātman or unborn, non-dual self alone is Ajāti or without birth.

"For the word 'Shunya' not only there is a meaning of 'Naihiswābhāvya' (essencelessness) but also the meaning of 'Buddhyatita Nirvikalpaka Paramārtha' (the ultimate, Absolute Reality, which is non-conceptual and beyond the intellect). 'Prajñā Pāramita', 'Jñānamadvayam', :Tathāgatabhūtakōi', 'Buddhamātru' - all these are the nomenclatures for Paramartha Tattwa or the ultimate reality. Hence to say that 'Shunya' means 'Naihiswābhāvya' it is not proper" - thus T.R.V. Murthy opines. But we have shown in our explanatory dissertation that this opinion is itself not proper. For, (Abhisamayālankārālōka 408-499) - in this sentence since it is very clearly meant that Prajnāpāramita is itself Pratītyasamutpanna, it has been further clarified that it means 'Nihswabhāwa' (essenceless) and 'Māyōpama' (analogous to magic, illusion). In the same text on page 144 it has been proclaimed that - "Nirvanamapi Prativishishtam Dharmakāyamadvaya Jnānaswabhāvam Māyāsupanasamānam Vaddami" - purporting to mean Advayajñāna also is of the essential nature of Māyā, Svapna.

In the same manner, a selected sentence from Di(n)jnagana's work called 'Prajnaparamita a pindartha Nirdesha Grantha' runs

like: "Prajnāpāramitā Jnānamadvayam sā Tathāgataha; Sādhaya tadarthya yōgena Tacchatydam Granthamārgayōho" - Here for the phrase 'Advaya Jñāna' the meaning (Mukhyārtha) and secondary meaning (Gouṇārtha) of the word 'Prajñāpāramita".

When the Buddhists themselves are affirming that 'Advayajñāna' or non-dual knowledge is 'Māyōpama' or analogous to magic, illusion, if one imagines that it signifies Paramartha is not proper and this is very clear. The word 'Bhūtakōṭi' has been used for the 'Dharmakāya' or spiritual body of Tathāgata (Buddha or the realized person); merely on that count Prajñāpāramita cannot mean Paramartha or the ultimate reality; the purpost behind calling it 'Buddhamātru' is not that it is a material cause for anything. In fact, the reason for calling like that is to indicate that if one worships it Buddhatwa or realization is attained. Why say more? All these statements strengthen the doctrine that -"Prajnāpāramita is Nihswabhāva". The Shūnyavādin Buddhists have expounded that - "(Māshyamika Kārikā Vrithi 22-16, P. 162). Thus it is not possible at all for anyone to show or prove any comparison between the Shūnyavāda which preaches that -"Everything is Nihswabhāva or essenceless" and Vedānta which expounds that - "The substratum for all Vikalpas or erroneous mental concepts is Aja (unborn) Advaya (non-dual) Brahma (ultimate reality)"

PARAMĀRTHASATYA AND VYĀVAHĀRIKASATYA

In the opinion of Shri Gauḍapāda, 'Vyāvahārikasatya' means that (apparent) reality or Satya which is Pramāṇa Vedya or known, cognized through a means of knowledge which appears in the waking state. This teaching as also that - "Ātman of the form of Sākshi is himself the Paramārthasatya or Transcendental, ultimate reality" - Both these tenets have been demonstrated in the Sūtra Bhāshya by Shri Śaṅkarāchārya. But in the opinions of Nāgārjuna and other Buddhists "Shūnya is itself Paramārthasatya; all else is Samvṛiti satya - (meaning, that which is believed by common people to be real)".

Kumārila Bhatta in his "Nirālambanavāda" refuted the above Buddhistic theory in the manner - "It is never acceptable if it is said that Samvṛiti is a kind in Reality; if it is Samvṛiti it is not satya, if it is satya then it is not Samvṛiti".

CONCLUSION

Shri Gaudapāda has established by taking as his central authoritative source the Māndūkya Upanishad, which though smallest in size (only 12 Mantras or verses) among all the Upanishads yet the most famous one, the following profound Siddhānta by means of logic fully in consonance with Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience): "On the support of Anubhava of Avasthātraya or three states of consciousness, Ātman of all of us is verily Ajādvaya Brahman alone which is Nityaniravastha or eternally devoid of any state; That alone is the Paramartha satya". Further, he has not only clarified as to what exactly is the wide difference between the predominantly perverted logic orinted Vijnanavadis and Shunyavada, on the one hand, and Vedanta on the other, but also has convinced all true seekers about the facts that: (a) Vain logic can never stand its ground all through; (b) all the devices adopted by the logically-oriented Darshanas or schools of philosophy are all meant for the worship (Ārādhana) of Paramātman, who is propounded in Vedāntic spiritual science as Devadeva or god of all other gods and Iswareshwara or Lord of all other lords.

THE ESSENTIAL GAUDAPĀDA

ĀGAMA PRAKARAŅA

I INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Among those principal ten Upanishads on which Shri Śankara Bhagavatpāda had written his profound commentaries to make them universally familiar Māndūkya is one. Although this Upanishad is the smallest in size among them, in its spiritual contents it is the greatest, nay the most convincing text. In the first place, this Upanishad is, on the pretext of examination of the three states of Consciousness, verily the quintessence of all the Upanishadic lore. Secondly, having been totally fascinated by its profound spiritual teachings Shri Gaudapādāchārya, an exponent belonging to an ancient line of traditional teachers well-yersed in the Vedantic methodology of expounding the Ultimate Reality of Brahman or Atman, wrote this magnificent treatise - comprising 215 verses which have become universally famous as 'Kārikās' divided into four Prakaranas or Chapters - with the sole purport of revealing the secret teachings of this concise Upanishad for the benefit of genuine seekers. To the best of our knowledge, the world teacher, Shri Śańkarāchārya, who was the foremost spiritual preceptor who by revealing the less known, implicit Vedānta Prakriyā (methodology utilized in the Upanishads) which was Sāmpradāyic (traditionally) through his Prasthanatraya Bhashyas and who had helped Jijnāsus (true seekers) to discern the Vedānta Siddhānta, had kept in view the subtle teachings of these Māṇḍūkyōpanishad Kārikās alone as his main treasure trove and inspiration and had rendered this yeoman service to all humanity.

In addition to presenting before the serious students of Vedānta the real purport of Shri Śaṅkara's Bhāshyas on these Kārikās, it is also intended in this treatise to examine thoroughly the various contradictory opinions as also raging controversies that have been spread throughout our country by alien schools and scholars with regard to those spiritual teachings propounded in these Kārikās and then prove the opponents' views as fallacious and ill-found. For this purpose the real

purport of the various Kārikās will be explained and established on the basis of universal Intuitive Experience and logical arguments or devices in consonance with it.

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE FOUR PRAKARANAS

It will be highly beneficial to discern or divine the extraordinarily profound tenets that are implicit in the four Prakaraņas distinctively. The first Prakaraņa is called 'Agama Prakarana'. Because the methodology of teaching (the Vedantic truths) handed down according to the traditional (Sāmpradāyic) line of teachers is revealed on the pretext of writing a commentary on the Upanishad, this Chapter is called 'Agama Prakarana', which is befitting indeed in this regard. Agama means the Upanishad which teaches the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality), as also the traditional methodology of teaching It which is implicit in that Upanishad - both these aspects are called by that name. Although in this Prakarana, Upapattis meaning, the Yuktis (logical arguments or devices) utilized to solve certain doubts that may arise in between the textual verses - are conjoined to the Upanishadic verses, here the Agama alone is important and is given the pride of place and Upapatti is given the second place.

The next Prakarana is Vaitathya Prakarana. 'Vaitathya' means 'not being like that'. Dvaita (duality) - meaning, the world which appears to be full of diversity and is divided into manifold aspects - although it at first sight creates an impression, a belief that it really exists as it appears, when we adopt a Śāstra Drishti and deliberate upon it, we come to realize that - "The world of duality or diversity is 'Vitatha' (that which is not like that), it is a mere false notion or misconception" - this teaching is brought home to our minds in this Prakarana. Because this fact is demonstrated following a logic in consonance with or approved by the Śāstra, this Prakarana is called 'Vaitathya Prakarana'. In this Chapter although Yukti (logical devices) only are given predominance, here too the authoritative support of Śāstra has not been discarded; here too 'Āgama' is invariably being followed or adopted. This fact has to be borne in mind.

The third Chapter is 'Advaita Prakarana'. Because Dvaita is shown to be a mere false appearance it amounts to rendering

Dvaita as not really existing, and it is concluded thereby automatically that Advaita (non-dualism) alone is the Paramārtha (Absolute truth). Even so, in order to remove doubts to the effect - "Like Dvaita why should not Advaita too be false? If it is contended that because Dvaita is opposed to Advaita the former is false, then on the same score because Advaita is opposed to Dvaita, why cannot Advaita too be said to be false?" - this Chapter which establishes the Advaita Satyatwa (the Absolute reality of non-dualism) is begun. Although like the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa here too Yukti alone is given predominance, nevertheless, Āgama is not discarded or neglected. Anyhow, through these first three Prakaraṇas the Advaita spiritual teaching expounded in the Upanishad is fully established adopting the traditional methodology of pedagogics.

Further, the fourth Chapter is called Alātashānti Prakaraņa. A relevant doubt of the type - "Because there exist in this world schools of philosophy (Darshanas) which are opposed to the Vedas, what convincing proof is there to assert that whatever is taught in the Vaidik Upadeshas (Upanishadic, spiritual instructions) alone are the ultimate final verdict? Even those who are not Vaidikas, are also forwarding their respective 'Agamas' meaning, their own respective spiritual preceptors' doctrines - and Yuktis in keeping with them, is it not so?" - may pose itself before us. Solving this doubt, it is affirmed in this Chapter that - "Because those various logical arguments (Yuktis) are mutually opposed to one another, there is no worthwhile essence or substance in them; on the other hand, there is no possibility whatsoever for the Advaita Siddhanta to be opposed to any Darshana - whatsoever it may be - nor is there any possibility of any internal squabbles or contradictions within Advaita itself". Further, it evolves that - "Vedanta Siddhanta can be acknowledged without any apprehensions or inhibitions whatsoever, because it is demonstrated quite convincingly here in this Chapter by means of Yukti that Dvaita is Mithyā (false)". Although in this Prakaraņa mere logical arguments utilizing it is disclosed as to how the remaining Darshanas are mutually opposed to one another, eventually it is proved to the hilt that the Vedantic methodology is opposed to none even from the standpoint of the Agama also. The prudent student should ever remember this fact too.

Thus the first Prakarana, being of the nature of a commentary on the Śruti (Mandūkya Upanishad), is Āgamapradhāna (predominantly Sastraic and traditional in its approach and treatment of the subject matter), while the remaining three Chapters are Tarkapradhāna (predominantly logical or dialectical in approach), because they have invariably and unfailingly utilized that Intuitive logic implicit in the Srutis as also any other empirical forms of dialectics not opposed to that 'Srutyanugrahita Tarka' (logical devices approved by the scriptures). Because all these four Chapters help Intuit or cognize the truths enunciated and expounded by Vedanta Śastra, these Chapters have been called 'Prakaranas' in the spiritual circles. The word 'Prakarana' means any write-up which pertains to any one part or aspect of the Śāstraic teachings and which thereby provides another elucidatory commentary to the Sastraic topic. Here in this context, to expound that Advaita Tattwa (non-dual Reality of Atman or Brahman) is the $\hat{S}\bar{a}str\bar{a}rtha$ (real, ultimate purport of the scriptures) and confirming it by means of Upapatti is the Kāryāntara (extraneous purpose).

I ĀGAMA PRAKARAŅA

We have already stated that the first Chapter called 'Agama Prakaraņa' written by Shri Gaudapādāchārya has been given that name because - (a) He has kept in mind the spiritual teachings of the Māndūkya Upanishad predominantly as his authoritative source for it; (b) in this Chapter he reveals the laditional methodology of teaching adopted by the line of preceptors (from time immemorial) belonging to his Sampradāya (school of philosophy viz. Advaita Vedānta). Hence, it amounts to saying that because in the Upanishad it has been propounded that through the determination of the purport of Omkara the method of cognizing the Ultimate Reality of Atman has been elaborated, the Agama Prakarana has to be understood by following the sequential order of the Upanishad Mantras. For this reason alone, Shri Gaudapāda has taken up the first six Mantras together and with the purport of explaining their teachings, has written the Kārikās pertaining to the Pādatraya (three quarters).

THE FIRST SIX MANTRAS OF THE UPANISHAD ओमित्येतदक्षरिमदग्ं सर्वं तस्योपव्याख्यानं भूतं भवद् भविष्यदिति सर्वमोंकार एव । यच्चान्यत् त्रिकालातीतं तदप्योंकार एव ।।१।। सर्वं ह्येतद् ब्रह्मायमात्मा ब्रह्म सोऽयमात्मा चतुष्पात् ।।२।। जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ता एकोर्नावंशित मुखः स्थूलभुक् वैश्वानरः प्रथमपादः ।।३।। स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्त एकोर्नावंशितमुखः प्रविविक्तभुक् तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः ।।४।। यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन कामं कामयते न कंचन स्वप्नं पश्यित तत् सुषुप्तम् । सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञः तृतीयः पादः ।।५।। एष सर्वेश्वरः एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् ।।६।।

II PĀDATRAYA KĀRIKĀS

अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति -

बिहम्मज्ञो विभुविश्वो ह्यन्तः प्रज्ञस्तु तैजसः । घनप्रज्ञस्तथा प्राज्ञ एक एव त्रिधा स्मृतः ।।१।।

Meaning: (1) "Here these verses exist: The Vibhu (Omnipresent Lord) having the extroverted cognition (consciousness) is Vishwa; One who has the introverted cognition is Taijasa; is verily a (consummate) lump of Consciousness is Prājña. One alone is of these three kinds - thus He is said to be."

THE BHĀSHYAKĀRA'S MANGALA ŚLŌKA

यो विश्वात्मा विविधविषयान् प्राप्य भोगान् स्थविष्ठान् पश्चाच्चान्यान् स्वमतिविभवान् ज्योतिषा स्वेन सूक्ष्मान् । सर्वानेतान् पुनरिप शनैः स्वात्मिन स्थापियत्वा हित्वा सर्वान् विशेषान् विगतगुणगणः पात्वसौ नस्तुरीयः ।।

Commentary: Perhaps, because he has written Bhāshyas to the Māṇḍūkyōpanishad as also to the four Kārikā Prakaraṇas, Shri Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda has here, in this context, written two Maṅgala Ślōkas (invocatory verses at the beginning of the treatise). For this reason, we have utilized the first verse for the Upanishad and the second for the Kārikās. The Bhāshya commentator has raised a doubt that in the fourth part of the second verse there is no 'Vṛittalakshaṇa' (sign of continuity) and has provided a consolatory explanation saying that in it there is 'Gāthalakshaṇa' (sign of a religious verse, but not belonging to any Vedas).

The purport of the Mangala Ślōka: "May the Sarvātma (Self of all) - after having enjoyed the pleasures born out of gross objects, then by means of His Jyōti (Light of Consciousness) having enjoyed the other subtle objects which are spread out or projected by His mind, thereafter slowly sustaining and subsuming all of them in His own essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness and eventually giving up all particular features becomes entirely devoid of the whole gamut of characteristics - may that Turīya (fourth, relatively) protect all of us!". This verse too is akin to the invocatory verse, written prior to the Upanishad commentary, in its purport or meaning. In the first verse itself a little deeper meaning becomes evident. On the whole, the principal meaning of all this is that the Turīyātma mentioned in the Upanishad is Himself Brahman.

In order to explain the meaning of Ātman's three *Pādas* (quarters) Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has written nine Kārikās. The student will do well to reckon the meaning of the Kārikā sentence - "The *Vibhu* who has an extroverted consciousness is *Vishwa*" - to be the same as that of the commentary by Shri Śaṅkara on the third Upanishad Mantra; for the Kārikā sentence - "One with the introverted consciousness is Taijasa" - take the commentary on the fourth Mantra; and for the Kārikā sentence - "Similarly, one who is *Ghanaprajña* (lump of Pure Consciousness) is Prājña" - take the commentary on the fifth Mantra.

The meaning of the Kārikā sentence that - "One alone is said to be of three kinds" - is Although Ātman is non-dual (i.e. One without anything second to Him), those knowledgeable teachers say that - 'He is appearing as of three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña'. For the textual phrase - "Tridhā Sthitaha" - the commentary is: "He appears as if to exist in three kinds"; for the alternative textual phrase (found in another recension) "Tridhā Mataha" - the commentary is: "Although in reality, that is, from the Absolute viewpoint, He is one and one alone, the ignorant people are misconceiving Him to exist in three different kinds."

WHAT IS TO BE COGNIZED BY THE DISTINCTIONS OF VISHWA, TAIJASA AND PRĀJÑA?

For this Shri Sankara has written a sentence the meaning of which is; "Because - (a) all the three states of Consciousness (Avasthās) are being experienced one after another; (b) we are

recognizing Him in the manner - 'He Himself is myself' - by means of memory - it is established that 'Ātman is distinct from the three Avasthās; He is one and one alone (non-dual); He is Shuddha (Pure, Absolute), Asanga (non-attached or unrelated) - this is the purport here; this has to be deduced on the strength of illustrations such as the big fish etc."

Here in this context there are quite a number of topics which are to be discerned and cognized. As per the Bhāshya statement that we remember in the manner: "Avasthās are coming and going one after another; they are three in number; He alone is myself" - although it may at first sight appear to be true, Shri Śankara does not at all have the ultimate intention of conveying this meaning.

To wit: Although it is true that, in general, to all us it appears that the Avasthas are coming and passing away one after another and they are three in number - these Avasthās are not coming one behind another in one common substrate or denomination of time, nor are they appearing to exist one by the side of another in one common space. Therefore, to reckon them to be 'three' in number is wrong. If a clock strikes three sounds to indicate three hours, that flow of time in which the first sound was heard by us, in the same flow of time alone the second and the third sounds are being heard by us. Because we are individuals distinct from the clock we are able to count the sounds of the clock as one, two and three. But here the one flow of time which is the substratum or support for all the three Avasthas does not exist at all ;there is no one who can count them as one, two etc. Anyway, that all the three Avasthas are coming and going in a sequential order is not in our experience at all; the phenomenon that - "I myself who experienced the waking, after waking up, am experiencing this; apart from these two Avasthas I am separate" is not in our experience. Therefore, the statement that - "Atman is having the three Avasthas in a sequential order" - is not in consonance with universal experience.

In the same manner, even the concept that we cognize in the manner - "That person himself is myself" - on the basis of memory is also not acceptable to experience, and this truth is determined only by Intuitive deliberation. To explain, what is

experienced in the past to remember that in one time continuum is called 'Smriti' (memory). For the memory of the type - "This morning I ate some food; but now I am hungry" - which occurs in the evening - there is support of the past experience. It is also quite reasonable if on a Sunday morning to one who has taken his food, in the evening its memory being there; for the one particular period or point of time like 'Sunday' is the support for both the consumption of food and the memory of its consumption. But pertaining to the illustrated (Dārshtrāntika) Ātman, it is not at all like this. Here in this latter case, it is true that a feeling of the type - "I myself, who saw the dream after waking up, am seeing the external world" - to accrue; but there is no time flow or continuum whatsoever which is common to both dream and waking. Besides, it is in the experience of every one of us that in each of these Avasthas, one each but different time continuum exists. The explanation as to how this is to be reckoned will be more elaborately deliberated upon in the commentary on the second Prakarana. In the same way, there is a hitch to say that - "The 'I' of the dream is being reckoned to be the 'I' of the waking". For, the 'I' that 'existed' in the dream is different or distinct from the 'I' of this present waking in so many respects. This fact too will be made very clear in the commentary of the second Prakarana. On the whole, because of the facts that - (a) both the Avasthas do not 'exist' in one and the same time continuum; (b) there is no 'I' which is a common witness to both the states - to assume that there is a 'Pratyabhij \tilde{n} a' (recognition) of the type - "That person (in the dream) alone am I" - is not proper; therefore we can conclude that this opinion too is not the real intention of teaching of the Bhāshyakāra (i.e. Shri Sankara).

In that case, for the sentence which is written by Shri Śańkarācharya what exactly is the ultimate purport? This question will be answered now. The Avasthās can be deliberated upon or considered from two viewpoints. One is a viewpoint which witnesses them on the strength or basis of and in accordance with Anubhava (Intuitive Experience); in fact, this alone is the proper, reasonable one. For, everyone of us will necessarily have to acknowledge the truth - that

'Intuitive Experience has a greater value and validity than memory (Smriti)'. The other viewpoint: Vyavahāra means the phenomena that appears to our mind in the waking and the manner in which we all talk, express or communicate in accordance with that. Because - (a) this viewpoint is common or natural to all (universal) in their 'Avichāra Dasha' (state of non-discrimination or ignorance); (b) it is proper for a person, who wishes to examine these states from the Sastra Drishti (viewpoint of the scriptures or Upanishads), while teaching or expounding the Tattwa (the Ultimate Reality), to do so on the basis or strength of the knowledge which the common run of people have acquired in their Vyavahāra (to wit, the workaday experiences and notions) - to follow and deliberate upon this Vyāvahārik viewpoint alone first becomes quite justifiable. When we observe from this viewpoint, because to all of us (i.e. universally) it appears as though we are all having (experiencing) the three states of Consciousness like waking, dream and deep sleep as also when one among them exists (or in being experienced), no other state exists and it appears as though these three states are coming and going one after another, Shri Sankara has stated, on the basis of this (apparent) regular recurrence or repetition (Paryāya) of three states of Consciousness, that Atman experiences them. Even from this viewpoint, even after these states come and go and when any one of them is being experienced, because our essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness exists as It is, it evolves from this that these states of Consciousness are not part and parcel of Atman's essential nature.

Similarly, each one of us thinks in the manner - "I myself, who saw the dream, am awake"; "I myself, who did not know anything in deep sleep, am now, in the waking, seeing the external world and am cognizing the internal mental condition" - and deducing from these that - "That person, who experienced those dream and deep sleep states, is myself indeed"; each one of us on the strength of memory is recognizing that - "The essence of the previous state is that of the present one alone"; each one of us is believing that - "The states, especially are different and distinct." Even considering from this Vyavahāra Drishti, it evolves that - "Ātman is

separate from the three states of Consciousness." In fact, no one will or does agree if it is said that - 'What one person experiences, another remembers, is it not so?" Therefore, it is to be concluded that - "This Atman who is experiencing the three states one by one and is remembering the previous experience now is one and one alone." In the same way, even though it appears as if that - "He is experiencing these three states" when He wakes up, neither a taint even of the bizarre experiences of the dream nor the ignorance of the deep sleep actually have caused any stain or stigma whatsoever to Atman. Hence, it evolves that - "Atman is Pure." Not only this; the relationship with the waking state is not there in the least for Atman in the other two states. Similarly, the relationship of the dream state is not there in the other two states; the relationship of deep sleep is not there in the other two states; Therefore, in His very essence Atman is Asanga (unattached or unrelated or Absolute, Transcendental). It amounts to saying that just as a plastic emulsion-coated (water-proof) cloth is not soaked or wetted by water, the three states of Consciousness can never taint or touch Atman with any of their characteristics or features.

In this manner, it is the opinion of the Bhāshyakāra (i.e. Shri Sankara) that even when the Vyavahāra Drishti is followed or adopted, what the Sruti has expounded as Atman's essential nature to be like - 'He is transcending or beyond the three states' etc., becomes intelligible or comprehensible. This alone is his purport and not that he has any resolute attachment in persisting to affirm that - (a) the three states of Consciousness have the support of one and the same time continuum; (b) they have the regular recurrence (Paryaya) of appearing one after another; (c) among the states there exists the memory of one in another; (d) this memory is actually of the essential nature of remembrance alone. Just now we need not consider these controversial topics like - (i) Whether the three states have the substratum of time or not? (ii) Whether they are actually occurring one after another or not? (iii) Whether there is any scope or chance of the memory of the dream and the deep sleep states occurring in the waking or not? All these will be taken up for detailed deliberation in the second Chapter or Prakarana.

So far, on the strength of the Vyāvahārika Drishţi it has

been determined that even if we analyse and deliberate upon our Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) it is tantamomt to accepting that - 'Our Atman is beyond (transcendental to) the three states, is One, Pure and unrelated.' If we discern the fact that even the inviolable or infallible Sruti - which is propounding the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality of Atman, Brahman), keeping Sārvatrikānubhava (the universal Intuitive Experience) alone as the basis - is a valid means or proof (Pramāṇa) for this teaching, then it becomes clear that this determination alone is the correct one. For instance, in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad it is stated thus: 'तद्यथा महामत्स्य उभे कूले अनुसञ्चरित पूर्वं च अपरं च एवमेवायं पुरुष एतावुभावन्तावनुसंचरित स्वप्नान्तं च बुद्धान्तं च ॥' (Bri. 4-3-18). Just as a big fish like a whale, without being washed away by the turbulent current of a river, freely, leisurely roams about from one bank to the other, not depending upon either of the banks nor having anything to do with them and thereby we may reckon it to be 'Asanga' (unattached, unrelated); because the mud of either bank has not stuck to the fish, we may also reckon it to be 'Shuddha' (pure, clean) - in the same way, this Atman too, though He appears to enter and experience the waking and the dream states one after the other, He is beyond and is surpassing both of them, remaining pure and untainted by them. Thus on the analogy of this illustration of a big fish the Sruti is teaching us the essential nature of Atman.

In the same vein, there is yet another Śruti: "तद्यथास्मित्राकाशे श्योनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः संहत्य पक्षौ सल्लयायैव ध्रियत एवमेवायं पुरुष एतस्मा अन्ताय धावित यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन कामं कामयते न कंचन स्वप्नं पश्यित ॥", meaning: Just as a falcon or a hawk, after having wandered about in mid-air and getting exhausted, folds up its wings, returns to its nest and enjoys complete rest - in the same way, this Ātman, after having carried out varied transactions either in the waking or in the dream, gets exhausted and then enters into deep sleep alone; therein He does not see anything; desiring anything, He does not slog for attaining it - (Bri. 4-3-19). This Śruti sentence is clarifying the truth that - 'For Ātman the Kāma (desires) and Karma (actions) that are apparently seen to attach themselves in the waking and in the dream are not at all related'. Therefore, the Siddhānta (spirimal philoso-

phy) that we comprehended by following the Vyavahāra Dṛishṭi and examining the three states of Consciousness is established to be correct on the evidence of the Śruti teaching itself.

THE MEANING OF THE NAMES LIKE 'VISHWA' ETC.

It is necessary to determine here the exact meanings of words like Vishwa, Vaishwanara, Taijasa, Prajña - which are used in the Kārikās and the Upanishad. For, in the texts which have become popular these days (like the Tattwaviveka of Panchadashi 17, 24, 29; Siddhantaleshsangraha 92-100 -Choukhāmba; Vedāntasāra pp. 42, 46; 63-64; 69-70) there is in vogue a convention of teaching that - 'Vishwa', 'Taijasa', 'Prājña' are the names for Vyashti Jīva (the individual, microcosmic soul), and in that order they are the selves identifying themselves with waking, dream and deep sleep states, respectively, and 'Vaishwānara', 'Hiranyagarbha', 'Īśwara' are, in that order, the different Samashti (macrocosmic lords of those three states). Besides, the translations of the Hindi text -'Vrittiprabhākara' by Sādhu Nishchaladāsji are very popular in our country. In that text, it has been propounded that the words 'Hiranyagarbha' and 'Virāt' are used to refer to Jiva and Iswara in different contexts and that these references become justifiable, on the basis of 'Shaktivritti' (in the sense of power) to Jiva and 'Gauṇavṛitti' (in the secondary sense) to İśwara. In addition to this, it has been written therin that - "In the" Māṇdūkyōpanishad it has been taught that 'Trividhajivas' (the three types of Jivas) have to be meditated upon as identical (Abhedachintana) with 'Trividha Ishwaras' (three types of Īśwaras)"! Further, it has been mentioned that - "The Māndūkya Vachana has the ultimate or prime purport in teaching mere Abhedachintana alone and not that therein the Tattwa (the Ultimate Reality of Atman) has been taught in consonance with Vastuswarūpa (the essential nature of the Reality as It is in esse)"! (Vri. Pra. pp. 353-355). By these interpretations there is every scope for more confusion being caused in the minds of the Jijñāsus (seekers). For these reasons, it becomes quite necessary here to deliberate upon the real purport behind these Pāribhāshika Shabdas (technical terms).

Can the words - 'Vaishwanara' and 'Hiranyagarbha' -

be used as Jivavāchaka (those signifying the transmigratory soul) ? In the present text of Māndūkya, how are these terms used? - this question let us examine. With regard to this topic Shri Sankara has written in his Brihadaranyaka Bhashya (1-4-6): "Pāpmadāha (destruction of sins, demerits), Bhaya (fear), Arati (absence of pleasure), Janma (rebirth) etc. - because these have been mentioned in the Sruti they have perforce to be said to be Samsārivāchaka (referring to a transmigratory soul) alone; even so, here there is a special feature. The non-dual Paramatman alone exists in the Absolute sense, but He is being dealt with both as a Samsāri due to association with adjuncts and as in His essential nature as Asamsāri; from this point of view, for Paramātman alone these words are used due to association with adjuncts. The dealings of Hiranyagarbha being one and of many forms are also of this nature alone. All the Jivas too, in the same manner, as they appear with adjuncts are Samsāris as also of many or various forms; but from the Paramartha Drishti they are all Paramātman alone. In the case of Hiranyagarbha, especially, because the adjunct is infinitely or exceedingly pure or subtle, He is being called in Śrutis and Smritis 'Parameshwara' alone; He is referred to as 'Samsāri' rarely at some places. For Jivas only - because of their abundance of impurities in their adjuncts, mostly the dealings as Samsāris are many, but from the standpoint of their Nirupādhikarūpa (essential nature devoid of all forms of adjuncts) they are all of the very essence of Paramatman indeed". (Bri. Bh. 1-4-6, its gist).

Secondly, if we deliberate upon the question - "In what manner have these words been used in the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad and in the Āgama Prakaraṇa Kārikās which are of the form or nature of a commentary on it?" - then there does not exist any Pramāṇa (valid evidence) whatsoever to say or conclude: "In Māṇḍūkya Upanishad, an Abhedachintana has been taught between the Vyashṭi Jīvas and Īśwara of Samashṭirūpa". In Māṇḍūkya it has been instructed in the manner - "Ōm - this letter is all this"; "All this is verily Brahman"; "This Ātman is Brahman" - in order to give an explanation of Ōmkāra as also the Brahmātmaikya (the identity between Brahman and Ātman), and further in it there exist sentences which propound that the entire world of duality that appears to all of

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us is verily 'Omkāra' or 'Brahman'; but there are no words like 'Upāsita' (one should meditate), 'Dhyāyet' (one should contemplate) etc., which stipulate by way of an injunction Dhyāna (meditation, contemplation), anywhere in the text. In the case of the Kārikās too, there is no trace of statements like - "Vishwa should be meditated or contemplated upon as Virāț" - to be found anywhere. In his Bhāshyas Shri Sankara has stressed the point that all these four Prakaranas are 'वेदान्तार्थसारसङ्ग्रहः' - meaning, 'The quintessence of the teachings of Vedanta' - indeed, and not that they describe Upāsanas. He has said: The determination of meanings of Omkāra is: "Atmatattwapratipatyupāyabhūtam" - meaning, "It is a device (Upāya) for attaining Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge or Experience) of $\bar{A}tmatattwa$ (the Ultimate Reality of Atman)" and not that either in the Upanishad or in this Prakarana the Pranava Chintana (meditation on Omkāra) has been considered. Even if we realize the meaning of the sentence occurring in Muktikōpanishad: 'माण्ड्क्यमेवमेवालं मुमुक्ष्णां विमुक्तये' -"For: Mumukshus Māndūkya alone is sufficient to enable them to attain Mukti" - we will have to reckon that from time immemorial the opinion that this Upanishad teaches Jñana which is instrumental in attaining Sadyōdmukti (i.e. Liberation in this very life - also called Jivanmukti in Vedantic parlance) has been acknowledged on all hands. Therefore, it is proper to reckon that both the Upanishad and the Kārikā have the one singular purport of teaching the Vastuswarūpa.

Further, if we examine the query - "The word 'Vaishwānara' used in the Upanishad and the word 'Vishwa' used in
the Kārikā - between these two words does one indicate
Samashṭi (macrocosmic aspect) and the other Vyashṭi (microcosmic aspect)?" - to conclude in this manner, we do not find
any support or valid evidence. The word 'Vaishwānara', as used
in the Chāndōgya Upanishad, is the name given to Brahman
alone who is Upāsya (the object of meditation). Shri Śańkara has
stated that the qualifying word 'Saptānga' (endowed with seven
limbs or parts) which is described in the Upanishad, is applicable
or suitable only to Īśwara with proper reasons. While dealing
with the etymological deduction (Vyutpatti) of the word

'Vaishwānara', Shri Śaṅkara has stated : - 'विश्वेषां नराणाम् अनेकघा नयनात् वैश्वानरः' - meaning, "Because He enables all Jīvas to carry on their mundane affairs in various ways, He is called Vaishwānāra"; 'यद् वा विश्वश्च असौ नरश्च इति विश्वानरः ; विश्वानर एव वैश्वानरः ; सर्विपण्डात्माऽनन्यत्वात्' - meaning, "The human being who is Vishwa (the universe) is Vishwānara; to the word 'Vishwānara' itself when the Swārthapratyaya (by virtue of a particular grammatical usage indicating a subjective aspect) it gets converted into 'Vaishwānara'; because He is Abhinna (non-different from all embodied souls, He is called Vaishwānara". Therefore, it becomes definite, certain that the Śruti which has used this word of 'Vaishwānara' does not at all refer to Jīva.

In the case of the Kārikās of Shri Gaudapādāchārya, especially, the word 'Vishwa' is found, but the word 'Vaishwanara' is not found. It is reasonable and proper to expect this teacher, who has undertaken the task of explaining the Upanishad, has indicated the meaning of the word 'Vaishwanara' by the word 'Vishwa'. In the same way, it is proper indeed to reckon that the words 'Taijasa', 'Prājña' are significant terms for Parameshwara alone and not for Jivas. Only then, what has been expounded in the Upanishad as - "Vaishwānara', 'Taijasa' and 'Prājña' are Ātman's three Pādas (quarters)" - fully agrees with what Shri Gaudapāda has explained with all his heart as - "These three are, in fact, indicating one and the same Atman and not that each one refers to one part of Atman" - and further it becomes fully in agreement with the meaning of his statement - 'एक एव त्रिधा स्मृतः', meaning - "Those who are knowledgeable (seers) say that one and the same (Atman) Parameshwara exists three-fold".

In the same way, the word 'Taijasa' as also the word 'Prājña' - both are the same in the Upanishad and the Kārikā. In the Upanishad just like Vaishwānara, Taijasa also is said to be 'Saptānga'. Therefore, therein to interpret 'Taijasa' as the Samashṭirūpa (macrocosmic form) of Īśwara alone is proper. In the Madhubrāhmaṇa of Bṛihadāraṇyaka (2-5) there is a phrase: "यश्चायमस्यां पृथिव्यां तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषः" - meaning, "This Purusha who is existing in the earth and is full of resplendence, and

immortality" and in this manner, while mentioning identity between Ādhidaivika Purusha (tutelary macrocosmic Deity) and Adhyātma Purusha (spiritual microcosmic Being) in every recurrence of the words, because it has been invariably stated by adducing Tejōmāyatwa (abundance of brilliance), meaning - Chinmātratwa (very essence of Pure Consciousness) to both equally, it becomes quite reasonable here in this context also to reckon that - just like the word 'Vaishwānara' - the word 'Taijasa' also has been used as 'Adhidaivapara' (in tutelary macrocosmic aspect) alone. Further, in the Bhāshya on the Upanishad, because it has been stated that - 'For Taijasa (Purusha) a Consciousness which is replete with Vāsana (latent impressions) alone that which is experienced" - we have perforce to reckon that therein the Ātman who is a Witness to the Consciousness of latent impressions is referred to.

Now, with regard to teaching that - "The word 'Prajña' is truly one which signifies Parameshwara" - there does not remain any doubt whatsoever. For, in the remaining part of the sentence itself the Sruti is affirming: "एष सर्वेश्वरः एष सर्वज्ञः", meaning - "He Himself is the omnipresent Being, He Himself is the ommiscient Being" - etc. in clear, unequivocal terms. Besides, the word 'Prajña' is being used at various places in the Brahma (Vedānta) Sūtras (1-4-5.....) as signifying Parameshwara alone. The Bhāshyakāra (Shri Sankara) too has vociferously declared that - 'प्रज्ञप्तिमात्रम् अस्यैवासाधारणं रूपम् इति प्राज्ञः' - meaning, "Because the Pure Consciousness is the extra-ordinary nature of this Purusha alone, He is called Prājña". In the Sūtra Bhāshya too Shri Śańkara has written: 'प्राज्ञः परमेश्वरः, सर्वज्ञत्वलक्षणया प्रज्ञया नित्यमिवयोगात्' -(Sūtra Bh. 1-3-42), meaning - "Prājña means Parameshwara; for, the Consciousness which has the characteristic feature of ommiscience subsists in Him without leaving Him or departing from Him". For these various reasons, we have to dismiss the weird interpretation of many present-day authors of Vedantic texts who say that - "Prājña means Prāyena Ajñaha (one who is abundantly steeped in ignorance)" - and who have wildly imagined that he is the Jiva who is identifying himself as the possessor of deep sleep state - as untenable, being opposed to the Sruti as well as to the Bhāshya.

BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM DETERMINATION OF THE MEANINGS OF NAMES LIKE VISHWA, TAIJASA ETC.

By all such deliberation what is the decisive meaning arrived at? It is: The words 'Vaishwanara', 'Taijasa' and 'Prajña' used in the Sruti are the various forms of macrocosmic aspects of Iswara; and those very forms have been called Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājna, respectively, in the Kārikās too. These Vishwa etc. are not terms signifying Jivas; neither are Vishwa and Vaishwānara are terms signifying Jiva and Īśwara, respectively. Nowhere either in the Upanishad or in the present Karikas the terms like Vishwa, Taijasa etc. are stated to be the names of Vyashti Jivas or microcosmic individual souls. These are verily the names of Parameshwara with adjuncts. The benefit that accrues by determining in this manner is: It will amount to our discerning (the teaching) that - "To the non-dual Parameshwara alone, who is associated with gross, subtle and causal forms of adjuncts, these three different epithets of Virāt or Vaishwānara, Vishwa; Hiranyagarbha; and Prājña or Iśwara who is of the essential nature of Avyākritātma (unmanifested Self), respectively, have been addressed. In the following verses this very opinion alone will be clarified.

THE INTUITIVE EXPERIENCE (ANUBHAVA) OF VISHWA, TAIJASA ETC. EXIST IN THE WAKING STATE TOO

दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजसः । आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थितः ॥२॥

Meaning: In the doorway of the right eye Vishwa, within the mind Taijasa and in the space within the heart Prājña - (thus) in the body He exists in three forms.

It should be remembered here that Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña - these names are not utilized exclusively for the purport of signifying three different Ātmans who are associated with the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. On the other hand, they are specifically utilized to indicate the truth - "One and the same Paramātman, by virtue of His association with adjuncts, has acquired these three distinct forms". This teaching has been clarified in this Kārikā by Shri Gaudapādāchārya. For that reason alone, here the waking state alone has been taken up for consideration.

"Vishwa exists in the doorway of the right eye" - this expression does not at all mean that He has taken a position in the eye. In fact, in various places in the Upanishads (e.g. Brihadāranyaka 5-5-4; Chhāndōgya 4-15-1) it has been stipulated that the practitioner should meditate upon Paramatman as existing in the eye. In that context the literal meaning that - 'Paramatman actually exists in the eye' - is not intended to be conveyed. Let us see what Shri Sankara has stated in his Bhāshya on the Chhāndōgya sentence : 'अक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते निवृत्तचक्षुभिः, ब्रह्मचर्यादिसाधनसंपन्नैः शान्तैर्विवेकिभिः दृष्टेर्द्रष्टा' - meaning : "To those discriminative persons - who have turned their senses within, who have acquired spiritual disciplines like Brahmachārya (celibacy) etc. and who are tranquil in their minds - the Drashtru (seer) of this Drishti (sight), i.e. Atman who witnesses the sight - appears". Therefore, "Vishwa exists in the eyes" - means He illumines directly the cognitive (perceptive) faculty of the eyes by means of His Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness. Although in the Upanishad the statement -"He is endowed with 19 cognitive doorways" has taken into account the remaining senses while describing Vaishwānara, here the mention of only the 'eye' is intended as an Upalakshana (an implication of all five senses); here it should be discerned that He is the Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness) of the cognitive faculties of all the senses. The mention of 'the right eye' is to indicate the fact that in the Vedas mostly the right eye alone is selected; may be, it has been stated in that manner because especially the right eye in people possesses a superior sharpness of sight. In fact, for stipulating by way of an injunction - the Purusha (celestial Being) who exists macrocosmically in the Sun and, microcosmically speaking, the Atman who exists in the right eye - should be meditated upon as one and the same Parameshwara by the name 'Satya' - this alone is the purport. In any case, that Paramātman who is being called 'Vaishwānara' from the macrocosmic view-point is Himself our Atman who is illumining our cognitive consciousness in the senses. Not discerning this truth people in general are misconceiving their own Being divisively in the manner "I am the Jñātru or cognizer who knows the external objects through the means of my senses" - this is the purport of this sentence.

For the sentence - "In the mind He exists as Taijasa" a similar interpretation should be made. Giving up his perception of the external objects through the senses, when he is experiencing happiness and miseries in his mind alone internally, one who is illumining the mental cognition of the form of Vrittis (thoughts, concepts) is verily Atman, is it not? In the case of the cognition of one who is seeing the gross objects with his eyes, actually by virtue of the (internal) mind and the (external) senses conjointly becoming one valid means or medium of knowledge the cognition of the object is accruing; but when happiness and misery and such other psychic phenomena are being experienced by the mind, there is no relationship of the outer senses at all to our cognitive knowledge. Therefore, herein the subtle cognition alone became the object for the Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness). By virtue of this difference in His adjunct Atman Himself is called 'Taijasa' indeed. In addition to this, the microcosmic mind is important for Jiva in his Lingasharira (subtle body); by means of this alone the Jiva begets his fruits according to the nature of his Karmas and has to attain other bodies (in other births) -(Brihadāranyaka 4-4-6). Hiranyagarbha who is endowed with the adjunct of macrocosmic Mind is Manomaya (of the very essence of Mind) - (Bri. 5-6-1). He has to be perforce meditated upon in the mind only. Because this Sākshi alone who is implied by the association with the adjunct of the mind has been called 'Taijasa' in the Upanishad, it is proper to have stated that - "One who exists in the mind is Taijasa".

Now, what is meant by - "In the space of the heart exists Prājña" - is to be considered, is it not so? If the phrase - 'Hridayākāsha' - is to be translated literally, then it has to be interpreted as 'the space existing within the heart' only. Although in the waking both the body and the heart within it are invariably existing, because this expression has been used to explain the present topic of 'Prājña's experience', this meaning or interpretation does not suit. When both the mental transactions of experience (Anubhava) and memory (Smaraṇa) have ceased, the essential nature of Being that exists (subsists) alone is called 'Prājña', is it not so? Just as when in deep sleep there do not exist any mental transactions, Ātman exists in His essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, in the same way in the waking

state too when Ātman exists in the 'Tūshnīmsthiti' (a state wherein there are no mental transactions whatsoever) He actually exists unto His essential nature of Pure, Absolute Chaitanya (Consciousness in esse). Therefore, our calling Him 'Prājña' is rendered to be correct. But how can the statement - 'He exists in the space of the heart' - be justified?

The answer to this query is: Here the word 'Akasha' (space) means Shuddhātman (Pure Ātman) who is exceedingly subtle like space. This convention of using this word 'Akasha' to refer to Paramatman is in vogue in the Upanishadic lore. For example, in the Brihadaranyaka during the debate between Gārgi and Ajātashatru the question that - "When he is asleep where was the Vijnanamaya Purusha?" - (Bri. 2-1-16) - was raised and in answer - 'तदेषां प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानमादायय एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिन् शेते' - meaning, "Taking all these cognitions of the senses along with the distinct knowledge which manifests itself in the Antahkarana (mind), He exists in the space which is within the heart" - it is stated thus. While explaining the meaning of this Sruti sentence, Shri Sankara has written in his Bhāshya thus: 'आकाशशब्देन पर एव स्व आत्मा उच्यते ; तस्मिन् स्वे आत्मिन आकाशे शेते स्वाभाविके असांसारिके' - meaning, "By the word 'Ākāsha' here one's own Paramatman is denoted; he rests in that Akasha called 'Atman' who is his own essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness and devoid of any characteristics of Samsāra (transmigratory existence)". In the following sentence too Shri Śankara has stated: "He exists in mere space - is not its meaning; for, the support of another Sruti sentence from Chhāndōgya, viz. 'My dear, then he has become one with Brahman called 'Sat' - also, will be available for this our interpretation. Discarding the distinct nature brought about by association with the adjunct of Lingasharira (causal body Jivātma), he rests in his essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness which is devoid of any distinct characteristic, and Absolute, Pure; this is the meaning". Therefore, the real meaning of the third sentence of the Kārikā is: "When there do not exist any mental modifications or transactions of the forms of experience and memory (Anubhava-smaranarūpa Manovyāpāra) all of us really (actually) exist in our Hridayākāsha, meaning Paramātma

Swarūpa (the essential nature of Supreme Self)". Vaishwānara who exists in the waking condition, Taijasa who exists in the dream condition and Prājña who exists in the deep sleep condition - the Intuitive Experience of all these three (macrocosmic Beings) invariably exists in our waking experience indeed. "By association with the adjuncts of the senses he is Shārirātma (embodied soul), by association with the adjunct of the mind he is Lingātma (subtle-bodied soul) and when both these adjuncts are absent and he rests in his essential nature of Pure Being without cognizing anything whatsoever he is Sushuptātma - thus even in our waking we are able to recognize or realize" - in this manner if we ratiocinate and try to give up our identification with these microcosmic (Vyashti) adjuncts (Upādhis), then the Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness or Principle, who is implied by these, alone is our essential nature per se. Even the concept that this Sākshi is invariably confined by these cognitions of the body and the senses is also a Bhrānti (delusion) indeed. For, this cognition or Intuition of our Sākshi Chaitanya (Witnessing, Absolute Consciousness) has verily transcended the body and is witnessing the entire universe itself (in the holistic sense). Therefore, if we cognize the fact that the entire waking world (Vishwa) is an adjunct to this Sākshi, then this Atmā who is appearing to exist in our body is Himself 'Vishwa' (Vaishwānara) - it amounts to saying. Just like the microcosmic adjunct of the body (Vyashti Lingopādhi), it we Intuit that the whole gamut of the macrocosmic Mind itself is an adjunct to this Sakshi, then this our Atman Himself, who appears as if being encircled by the subtle adjunct, is verily 'Taijasa' (Hiranyagarbha) - it amounts to saying. In the same way, when Anubhava (experience), Smarana (memory) these adjuncts do not exist whatsoever - although it appears that we do not have any cognitive knowledge whatsoever - then it is tantamount to deducing that - "The Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness) - who directly Intuits or cognizes in the manner - 'No knowledge or experience whatsoever appears' - with the aid of our Nirvikalpānubhava (Pure, Absolute Intuitive Experience) - is Himself the 'Prājña' who is verily our Ātman". Therefore, what we averred that - "One and the same Paramatman exists in three kinds in our waking body" - is also substantiated indeed.

The statement that is made in the first Kārikā to the effect

that - "One and the same Atman exists in three aspects as Vishwa in the waking, Taijasa in the dream and Prājña in deep sleep" - is itself being once again reiterated here in the manner - "In the waking too, in the same manner, to one and the same Person the three types of distinct forms like Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña accrue" - and the reason for this repetition here is intended to instruct the truth that - "Atman begets distinct forms by virtue of His association with adjuncts alone, but in His very essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness there do not arise or come into being these three distinctions whatsoever." There is scope for the common run of people to get deluded in the manner - "First when we are awake our Atman begets a particular form; then when the dream comes we attain another form; thereafter when the deep sleep comes yet another form we acquire" - is it not so? There is no room whatsoever for such a delusion! Atman exists unto Himself as He is in esse. Even if three people imagine in the manner - "This is the Sun who appears through the door of this house" - there do not exist three Suns at all, is it not so? In the same way, Atman Himself does not in the least acquire different forms - being endowed with the adjuncts of the body and the senses in the waking, merely the mind in the dream and a total absence of any cognitive knowledge in the deep sleep. Just as the Sun who supplies light to everyone is one and one alone, Atman who provides (sustains) all the Avasthas by virtue of the Light of His Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) is one and one alone (non-dual). These very same adjuncts can be cognized in the waking too; then in that event, the truth that - "Ātman is one and one alone" - will become all the more clear, evident; and this alone is the purport of the Kārikā.

IS IT PROPER TO SAY THAT IN THE WAKING TOO THE ANUBHAVA OR INTUITIVE EXPERIENCE OF VISHWA ETC. EXISTS?

Here in this context a doubt may arise: If by virtue of being endowed with various adjuncts like waking, dream and deep sleep alone these epithets of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña have been given, then how at all the statement that - 'In the waking state alone the experiences of these three exist' - can be proper? In that event, does it not amount to saying that when the waking state alone is existing the dream and the deep sleep states too exist?

For this, the solution is: Because the true purport behind the above-mentioned explanation has not been discerned, this doubt has raised its head. In fact, by virtue of an association with adjuncts like the senses, the mind and Ajñāna (ignorance) alone the states of waking, dream and deep sleep are appearing as though they are experienced by Atman. All this has been stated from the waking viewpoint alone and not from the viewpoints of the respective states. For, neither in the dream in the manner -"Now I am seeing (experiencing) a dream" nor in the deep sleep in the manner - "Now I am sleeping, am not cognizing anything whatsoever" - anyone ever experiences; in truth, while in the dream one feels in the manner - "I am awake at present" - only, and in deep sleep no feeling whatsoever exists. Therefore, because we are getting the distinctive discrimination or recognition of 'dream' and 'deep sleep' in the waking alone, it amounts to saying that the concepts or feelings of Avasthātraya (three states of Consciousness) are occurring to us in the waking alone. The scrutinies of the types of - "Last night I saw a dream" or "I had deep sleep. I did not have cognition of anything whatsoever" are possible to be carried out in the waking by one who has the distinctive cognition of the body alone. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in the statement made to the effect - "In the body He exists in three kinds". Thus Atman, who is appearing as distinct as one embodied, Himself in His essential nature as the Witnessing Consciousness assumes the macrocosmic forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, in the manner in which it has been so far shown, and that this truth the Upanishad is teaching is the purport of the Kārikā.

THE OBJECTIONS AND SOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE EXAMINATION OF DEEP SLEEP

Here in this context some people who follow the Vyākhyāna Prasthāna (the methodology of the post-Śańkara sub-commentators) have raised a doubt pertaining to the scrutiny that is carried out about deep sleep in waking and their answer to it also is as follows: That the Sākshi who exists in deep sleep is Himself to be found in the dream as well as in the waking is accepted on all hands. What accrues in waking is Smaraṇa (the memory) of the Sākshi, of Sukha and Ajñāna that exist in deep sleep. Memory is a phenomenon which occurs when after the

experience is destroyed, the latent impressions (Samskāra) arise in a different period of time due to a special cause. The memory of the form of - "Then I experienced in such and such a manner" - accrues to us because after Anubhava (the experience) has vanished, now in a different period of time the Samskāra of that experience has arisen in us, is it not so? But what exists in Sushupti is the Sākshi's experience alone. And since there is no destruction whatsoever to the Sākshi, the Anubhava did not vanish at all; then, wherefrom can the Saṃskāra come? If there is no Saṃskāra how at all could the memory accrue?

Thus raising a doubt of this type, what consolation those disputants have suggested is: The experience that accrues in Sushupti is that of 'Ajñana' which exists in that \(\frac{1}{2}\text{vastha}\). [Here in this respect the opinion of these disputants is that "This Ajñāna is not Jñānābhāva (the absence of Jhāna), but a particular type of substantial, positive Anirvachaniyavsdya (indefinable ignorance)]. By virtue of the association with an adjunct of the form of Chidābhāsa (false appearance of Consciousness) that arises in this Ajñāna, the false conceptual experience of the type of Ajñāna, Sukha and Sākshi arises in us. Since that Jñāna is acquired in all the three Avasthas, three different states, by the destruction of a previous particular Ajñāna, the Chidābhāsa that exists in it also gets destroyed and another Ajñānāvasthā (state of ignorance) is caused as well as another Chidabhasa which exists in it. Therefore, by the revival of a particular Samskara born out of the destruction of the respective Chidabhasa in the waking there is every possibility for the memory of those three phenomena, viz., Sākshi, Sukha and Ajñāna to arise.

Neither the doubt nor its solution described so far is to be found, not a wee bit of it, in the Kārikās especially. The Ajñāna that these disputants have conceived has not been signified or suggested anywhere by the Kārikākāra (i.e. Shri Gauḍapāda). Both the phenomena of the Avasthās of Ajñāna getting destroyed and the different Avasthās getting born are indeed, like the imagination of Ajñāna, mere figments of imagination. For, no one ever has the experiences of the type - "In Sushupti I have such and such an experience"; "In the dream it (Avasthā) gets transformed or changed"; "In the waking another form of Avasthā is attained". It need not be gainsaid that Shri Gauḍapāda,

on the strength of the three Avasthās which are in everyone's experience as well as the experiences that accrue to every one in those Avasthās, has convinced us about the Intuitive Experience of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, but he has not mentioned an Avidyā which some disputants have misconceived and which is riddled with raging controversies and has never thereby tried to cause untold and needless difficulties to Jijñāsus (true seekers). The Avidyā (which is conceived by these Vyākhyānakāras) has not been considered or reviewed at all in any Śruti (Upanishad) nor any trace of it can be found in Shri Śańkara's extant Bhāshyas. Hence, giving up the consideration of this wild imaginary doctrine of these disputants here, it is better if we pursue our study of the Kārikā meanings.

In that case, if a question to the effect - "What about the memory of the type - 'In deep sleep I did not know anything' - that accrues in the waking?" - is raised, the answer to it is: This is a mere misconception. For example, merely by the phrase - 'A hare's horns' - although a concept of the type that - 'A particular animal called a 'hare' has horns' - may be formed in the mind, those persons who have actually seen a hare are convinced in the manner - "That animal has no horns at all" - and further they have a steadfast, settled belief of the type - "This phrase is a mere misconception; there is no hare anywhere with any horns as suggested by the phrase." In the same manner, in the case of Sushupti the memory that accrues to us in the waking should be understood. Shri Sureshwarāchārya also has expressed the same opinion in his Brihadāranyaka Vārtika.

न सुषुप्तिगविज्ञानं नाज्ञासिषमिति स्मृतिः कालाद्यव्यवधानत्वात्र ह्यात्मस्थमतीतभाक् । न भूतकालस्पृक् प्रत्यङ्न चागामिस्मृगीक्ष्यते स्वार्थदेशः परार्थोऽथों विकल्पस्तेन स स्मृत ।।

(Bri. Vā. 1-4-300, 301)

The purport of these two Vārtikas is: "In Sushupti there is no experience whatsoever; 'I did not know' - is not at all a memory. For, there is no intervention or interposition of phenomena like time, space, causation etc. therein. It is not possible to say about what exists in Ātman per se that it belongs to past

time, is it not so ? Pratyagātman (the innermost Self) can never possibly touch either past time or future time; for, time also is verily an object for Ātman; that which is Parārtha - like the rope-snake, having been misconceived in another, appears completely being within its control - that phenomenon is stated to be a mere Vikalpa (misconception) appearing in a thing which is Svārtha (a real entity independently existing) like the rope. Therefore, the statement - "I did not know anything therein" - is also a mere Vikalpa indeed.

Thus, it is tantamount to concluding that the scrutiny of the dream and deep sleep states is a particular type of Vikalpa alone that is entertained by virtue of the waking viewpoint only in the waking body alone. In that case, if it is contended that - "It amounts to saying that the deep-seated beliefs like - 'We have dreams; we have deep sleep too' - have no supporting evidence" - we have to give an answer separately. The Śrutis do not - in the ultimate analysis - have the prime intention of teaching that to all of us really, actually the three states accrue. In fact, the ultimate purport of all the Srutis is invariably to expound their unique Siddhānta (final spiritual teaching) of - "Atman does not have any Avastha whatsoever, in reality" - but prior to that, first by assuming tentatively the staunch belief that all of us entertain in the manner - "We all have the states like waking, dream etc." - from the Vyavahāra Drishti (empirical viewpoint) alone and thereafter examining the Avasthānubhavas (universal experiences of the three states) to enable us to Intuit that Atman is devoid of any Avastha. This truth we will further clarify while considering the meaning of the Turiyakārikās. For the time being, this much should be kept in mind: "Vyavahāra" means the *Pratyaya* (cognition) that accrues to us in the waking and the Vyapadesha (utilizing the words) that we do. From this Vyavahāra Drishti, we all have a strong conviction to the effect - "We have the three states of Consciousness like waking, dream and deep sleep" - is it not so ? If we scrutinize the experiences of these states - the experiences that accrue to us within a particular state - we come to Intuit, cognize that: (a) Our Ātman is not distinct as an embodied entity; (b) whatever appears in a particular Avasthā is only an adjunct that is associated with that Atman. On the strength and support

of this Intuitive knowledge alone, Ātman who is in these states has been named 'Vishwa', 'Taijasa' and 'Prājña'. Now if we observe from the *Paramārtha Dṛishṭi* (Absolute viewpoint) - that there is no valid evidence or means of proof to show that dream and deep sleep states occur - is also true indeed. Then, in that event, it is tantamount to concluding that there is no valid proof to assert that there exists a waking state distinctively, separately. For, only when dream and deep sleep phenomena exist, one can say that waking exists, is it not so? If seen in this light, because it amounts to saying - "Ātman is *Nityaniravasthā* (eternally devoid of any states)" - there does not remain any doubt whatsoever. This truth we will further scrutinize and describe while considering Turīyakārikās.

ENJOYMENTS FOR VISHWA ETC.

विश्वो हि स्थूलभुक्तेत्यं तैजसः प्रविविक्तभुक् । आनन्दभुक् तथा प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा भोगं निबोधत ।।३।। स्थूलं तर्पयते विश्वं प्रविविक्तं तु तैजसम् । आनन्दश्च तथा प्राज्ञं त्रिधा तृप्तिं निबोधत ।।४।।

Meaning: Vishwa is eternally an enjoyer (eater) of gross things; Taijasa is the enjoyer of a variety of things, and Prājña is the enjoyer of bliss. Thus know that the enjoyment is of three kinds. The gross (enjoyment) produces satisfaction or satiation to Vishwa, what is various (produces satiation) to Taijasa and bliss produces satiation to the Prājña. Thus know that satiation is of three kinds.

Commentary: Although the meaning of the verses (Kārikās) mentioned here can be known from the explanation of the meanings of words like 'Sthūlabhuk' etc. which are found in the Upanishad, the delineation of the type - "The enjoyment is of three kinds; the satiation is of three kinds" - is not clarified there. For the Bhoktru (enjoyer) of the waking, enjoyment lies in a gross object; for the enjoyer of the dream, enjoyment is of subtle objects and for the enjoyer of the deep sleep, it is Tāmasa Bhōga (slothful, indolent enjoyment born out of Ajñāna or ignorance), is it not so? If we discern here in this context what is explained in the fourth Mantra, viz. the cognition (Prajñā)

itself of these objects is the Bhōjya (enjoyment) for Vishwa, Taijasa etc., then the statement - "Enjoyment is of three kinds, satiation is of three kinds" - becomes meaningful. In all the three Avasthās if Sākshi is one and the same it amounts to saying that the cognition of the appearance of the triad, viz. Bhōktru (enjoyer), Bhōga (enjoyment), Bhōgya (enjoyed object) is verily that of Ātman; to wit, the Intuition or cognition ($Praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$) of the enjoyment or experience of a particular state becomes an object invariably to the light of the nature of Intuitive Experience (Pure Consciousness) of Sākshi, it should perforce be assumed that Atman who is the Witnessing Pure Consciousness is called 'Bhōktru' for courtesy's sake alone. From this it evolves that Trupti (the satiation) that accrues to the respective Bhoktru of that particular Avasthā by enjoying the respective Bhōga is verily Ātman's \overline{A} nandaswar \overline{u} pa (essential nature of Bliss) which manifests itself at the end of any form of action of enjoyment of an object. When the Vritti (mental concept) which arises at the end of an enjoyment is born and disappears, this \bar{A} nanda (Bliss of Atman) manifests Itself spontaneously in the form as Trupti (satiation). Just as the Prajñā (cognition) of the forms of gross object, subtle object etc. is totally an object to the Witnessing Atman, in the same way the Vritti of the form or nature of Trupti that accrues to the Bhōktru is an object to Him only. From this deduction, here it is mentioned that there exist three kinds in Atman's Trupti. That is all.

THE FRUIT ACCRUING FROM JÑĀNA OF BHŌKTŖU AND BHŌGYA

त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोग्यं भोक्ता यश्च प्रकीर्तितः । वेदैतदुभयं यस्तु स भूञ्जानो न लिप्यते ।।५।।

Meaning: The one who cognizes - that which is the $Bh\bar{o}gya$ (the object of enjoyment) in all the three Dhāmas (regions) and that one who is said to be $Bh\bar{o}kta$ (the enjoyer) - both these, even if he enjoys he will not get tainted by it.

Commentary: Here what has been termed as 'Bhōktṛu' (the enjoyer) for courtesy's sake is Paramātman alone who is the Avasthasakshi (Witnessing Consciousness cognizing the three states). The object (of enjoyment) of the forms of Sthūla (gross)

and $S\bar{u}kshma$ (subtle) termed as $Bh\bar{o}gya$ (enjoyed object) also is His only. The Bhoktru is not different, one each for the different states. In the same way, the $Bh\bar{o}ga$ (enjoyed object) too is not different for each state. One and the same Bhoktru - by virtue of the fact that He is having Sthūla Prajnā (gross cognition), $S\bar{u}kshma$ Praj $n\bar{a}$ (subtle cognition) etc. which are objects to Anubhava (Pure Consciousness) - has been given the different epithets like Vishwa, Taijasa etc. That very totality of objects of the nature of names and forms has attained the three different forms as Bhōgya with names like Sthūla, Sūkshma and Ānanda. But in Atman's essential nature of Chaitanya as a result of illumining the respective object (of enjoyment) there does not occur any special feature, change whatsoever. The common people have superimposed upon (misconceived in) Chidātman, who is of the very essence of $S\bar{a}kshi$ (Witnessing Consciousness), the Vishesha (particular characteristic features) that result from the $Bh\bar{o}ga$ (enjoyment) in the $Bh\bar{o}ktrur\bar{u}pa$ (form of the enjoyer) of the empirical region (Vyavahāra). That is all.

Here in this context there lurks a secret tenet. Although on the face of it the meaning of the Kārikā appears to suggest that - "Ātman who is the Bhoktru in all the three Avasthas of Jagrat, Svapna and Sushupti is one and the same; the Vishayaprajnā (cognition of the objects) which is Bhōgya (the enjoyed thing) is also one and the same" - if we observe it Intuitively, in Sushupti there does not exist any distinction of Bhoktru and Bhōgya whatsoever. For, in that state or condition the various knowledges or cognitions have, without being distinct, become one unitary Pure Consciousness to merge in Atman; in the same manner, the \bar{A} nanda (Bliss) which is the object for $Jn\bar{a}$ na (Intuitive Knowledge) has also merged in Atman alone. Hence, the statement that - 'I' in all the three Avasthas the Bhoktru is one and the same, Bhōgya also is one and same' - is, in fact, from the waking state viewpoint. But if we observe Intuitively, it is tantamount to concluding that one and one Atman alone appears as the manifold distinctions of both Bhoktru and Bhogya.

When observed from this viewpoint, to the Jñāni who has realized Intuitively the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality of Ātman), there is no taint whatsoever from $Bh\bar{o}jana$ (enjoyment). For, the $Jñ\bar{a}na$ (Intuitive Knowledge or Experience) of the type - "I am verily

Ātman who is devoid of the divisions or distinctions of Bhōktru and Bhōgya" - has accrued to him. Even when this Jñāna has not accrued, one who has cognized the truth that - "The names and forms which are the Bhogya in the three Avasthas are, in their essence, one and the same" - he too will not be tainted by (the defects or demerits of) Vishaya Bhoga because of his attaining the cognition, Intuition to the effect that - "By dint of the Jñāna, which is of the essential nature of Ātman's Chaitanya, I am enjoying or experiencing the object". Although to the common run of people this Jnana is not there, one who eats his food with the deep feeling or staunch belief of the type - "One and the same Paramātman alone, in the forms of Vaishwānara, Taijasa etc., is the Lord, Master for the Bhogas that accrue in the three Avasthās; I am offering this oblation of the form of this food to Vaishwānara" - to such a Sātvika (one endowed with Satva Guņa or virtuous qualities) there is no taint of any defect or blemish that may exist in the Bhōjya [To wit, Bhōgya means the object of Intuitive Knowledge or Anubhava; Bhōjya means the food that is eaten - this difference in the meaning of the words is mentioned in the Sanskrit grammar. Here in this context the word Bhōjya might have been used to indicate both the meanings: (i) Those who eat their food with chaste feelings do not get tainted; (ii) To Atman who is of the nature of the Witnessing Consciousness all this is verily like Bhōjya food. Some people have, for this reason, conceived of a variant reading like 'Yad Bhōjyam'] - thus a fruit for such a belief can also be imagined for this Kārikā by way of a secondary purport (Avāntara Tātparya).

III ŚŖISHŢI KĀRIKĀS

प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सतामिति विनिश्चयः।

सर्वं जनयति प्राणश्चेतोंऽशून् पुरुषः पृथक् ।।६।।

Meaning: "(Previously) Existing Sarvabhāvas (objects in their entirety) - to them alone is Utpatti (creation or birth), this is certain. The Purusha (Being) called 'Prāṇa' creates everything distinctively, the rays of Chetas (Pure Consciousness) too."

RELATIONSHIP OF THE TEXT

From hereon Kārikās pertaining to the topic of creation will appear. The relationship of this textual portion is: Although the forms of Atman which are appearing to be experiencing the three Avasthās of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti are seemingly different or distinct, all the three are, in reality, not different, distinct. It has already been indicated that the Atman who is illumining all the Avasthas is one and the same. For the purpose of engendering this cognitive knowledge, it has also been demonstrated that the three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña accrue to Atman by virtue of an association with the different adjuncts of the three different Avasthas. In order to clarify the truth that - "Really speaking, these three forms are not different. That Paramatman, of the essence of Prājña who exists in Sushupti, is Himself appearing in these three different forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña" - the Sruti, in the sixth Mantra, is stating - 'एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञः' "This (Atman alone who exists in Sushupti) is Sarveshwara, meaning - Sarvajña."

In this manner it has been described in this Mantra, is it not so? How is this proper? It is but natural for the common people to doubt in the manner: "Because our form of existence in Sushupti is engulfed in ignorance, it is an extremely inferior form". Just as we have believed that in the waking we are different as embodied beings and in the dream we are different being associated with different minds, in the same manner we all have believed that in our Sushupti we are different endowed with different Ajñāna. But the Śruti in order to dislodge this staunch, deep-seated belief among all of us exaggerates, rather exalts, our Swarūpa by teaching that - "In reality, your essential nature is not divided by or different from the Avasthas; in the waking your essential nature of Being is Vaishwānarābhinna (not different from, i.e. identical with, the macrocosmic Being of Vaishwanara), in the dream It is Taijasābhinna (not different from, i.e. identical with, the macrocosmic Being of Taijasa) and in the deep sleep It is Prājñābhinna (identical with the macrocosmic Being of Prājña)".

PRĀJÑA MEANS PARAMESHWARA ALONE

Prājña is the name for Paramātman who is Chidātmaka (of the very essence of Pure Consciousness). In deep sleep our essential nature of Pure Being appears as if It has given up completely Its association with the external adjuncts and has become one with Parameshwara Himself, who is of the very essence of our Paramārthātman (Ātman, the Ultimate Reality). In order to indicate this teaching it is stated in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4-3-21 : 'अयं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्' - meaning: "Since this Vijnānamaya Purusha (self of the nature of intellectual wisdom is embraced by Prājñātma in deep sleep, He remains, exists without cognizing anything, either external or internal". The misconception of the type - "In deep sleep we exist in the dense darkness of Ajñāna or ignorance" - is entertained by all of us quite naturally, is it not so? The ground reality is not like this at all. The Sruti is convincing all of us about the real state of affairs in the manner - "(In deep sleep) all of you exist bereft of any obligation or binding whatsoever of the gross body, senses etc. as also of the subtle mind". In his Bhāshyas Shri Sankara, while explaining the meaning of the words 'Purusha' and 'Prājña' used in the Sruti, says : 'तत्र पुरुषः शारीरः स्यात् । तस्य वेदितृत्वात् । बाह्याभ्यन्तरवेदनाप्रसङ्गे सित तत्प्रतिषेधसंभवात् । प्राज्ञः परमेश्वरः । सर्वज्ञत्वलक्षणया प्रज्ञया नित्यम् अवियोगात् ।। - meaning: "In this sentence 'Purusha' necessarily means Shārīrātma (embodied self); for, he alone is the cognizer. Because there is a possibility of his cognizing what is external and what is internal, it becomes tenable to say that in deep sleep he exists without knowing or cognizing in that manner. Here 'Prājña' means Parameshwara alone; for, the relationship with Prajñā or Consciousness of the essential nature of omniscience (Saravajñatwarūpa) is never leaving Him" - (Sūtra Bhāshya - 1-3-42).

Not merely in deep sleep, but as and when the relationship with an adjunct is disengaged from this Jīva - in all such circumstances, in reality, he (Jīva) becomes one with Parameshwara Himself who is called 'Prājña'. Avasthās (empirical states) like Samādhi, swooning, death etc. are illustrations for this. In those states too this Vijñānātma (embodied self or Jīva) has become

one with Prājña alone. For that reason alone, Brihadāranyaka Upanishad (4-3-35), while describing *Utkrānti* (departure from the body or death), has stated: 'अयं शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढ उत्सर्जन् याति' - meaning : "Just as a fully loaded cart rolls away making screaching noise, in the same way this embodied self, being supported by Prājñātma, traverses making a harsh sound" - from the Vyavahāra Drishti, and 'तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम्' - meaning: "The Jiva merges in Paramātman who is the Paradevatā (transcendental, Absolute deity or divinity" - from the Paramārtha Drishţi. While writing the meaning (purport) of that Sruti, Shri Sankara says: "तदैवं क्रमेण उपसंहते स्वमूलं प्राप्ते च मनिस तत्स्थो जीवोऽपि सुषुप्तकालवत् निमित्तोपसंहारात् उपसंहियमाणः सन् सत्याभिसन्धिपूर्वकम् चेत् उपसंहियते सदेव संपद्यते न पुनर्देहान्तराय सुषुप्तादिव उत्तिष्ठति । यथा लोके सभये देशे वर्तमानः कथञ्चिदिव अभयं देशं प्राप्तः, तद्वत् । इतरस्तु अनात्मज्ञः, तस्मादेव मूलात् सुषुप्तादिव उत्थाय मृत्वा पुनर्देहजालम् आविशति ।।" - (Chh. Bhā. 6-8-6), meaning : "Thus when the $V\bar{a}k$ (speech) merges in the mind, the mind in the *Prāṇa* (vital force), Prāṇa in the Tejas (effulgence, radiance), Tejas in Paramātman in this sequential order if we recede unto ourselves and when the mind (in its entirety) merges in, or becomes one, with its very source of Paramatman, then the Jiva, who existed in that mind, as a result of the sublation or falsification of his adjunct (Upasamhāra of the Upādhi, viz., body, mind, senses) recedes unto (his very source of Paramātman) just as at the time of deep sleep the mind etc. are completely withdrawn. Then 'सत्याभिसन्धिपूर्वक' (with the Intuitive Experience or cognition of the type - 'Now I am becoming one with Sadbrahma' - if he recedes unto his very essence of Being, once again - unlike waking up from deep sleep - he does not wake up with the intention of obtaining another body. This is just like one, who is in a region which is insecure with a multitude of fears; when he reaches a secure place devoid of any fear of danger, he does not return to the former place. But the other person who is not an $\overline{A}tmaj\tilde{n}a$ (knower of the Self) wakes up once again from that very source of Brahman alone just as he has woken from sleep and even after death he gets caught in the net of the body".

In any case, it amounts to concluding that in this manner

in deep sleep all Jivas without having any cognition whatsoever become one with Prājña, meaning Parameshwara. All this has been stated from the Vyavahāra Drishți on the assumption of the knowledge that - "All Jivas beget states like Jāgrat, Svapna, Sushupti, one after another". But in the present context of the Māndūkyōpanishad, Shri Śankara has determined in the manner - "Because Ātman has been called 'Vaishwānara' having been associated with the adjunct of the waking state, 'Hiranyagarbha' having been associated with the adjunct of the dream state and 'Prājña' having been associated with the adjunct of the deep sleep state - the Pratyagātman or innermost Ātman who exists in the respective state is taught to be verily of the essential nature of Vaishwānara, Taijasa etc. indeed" - in his Bhāshya on the occasion of commenting on the qualifying phrase 'Saptānga'. Therefore, Atman of the deep sleep state attaining the form of 'Vaishwanara' who is endowed with the waking state is dealt to be the 'Srishti' or creation alone brought about by Avyākritātman (Ātman who is in the unmanifested seed or causal form). Having followed this principle alone, Shri Gaudapāda, the Kārikākāra, has written the Srishtivākyas. In the Upanishad too in the sixth Mantra it has been stated: "This one alone is Sarveshwara, this one alone is Sarvajña, this one alone is Antaryāmi, this one alone is the Yōni (womb, cause); is He not the cause for Prabhavāpyaya (birth and death) of Bhūtas (empirical entities)?" - Is it not so? From that Adhidaivika Drishti (viewpoint of the tutelary macrocosmic deity or viewpoint of the celestial plane) alone here also in these Kārikās the deliberation on creation has been commenced.

WHAT IS THE PROPRIETY IN CALLING AVYĀKŖITĀTMA PRĀŅA?

In this Kārikā Prājña has been called 'Prāṇa' also, is it not so? How is this proper? By describing here the purport behind the discussion that Shri Śańkara has made with regard to this topic, there is an added advantage. In the Upanishad: "प्राणमेवागप्येति प्राणं चक्षः, प्राणं श्रोत्रं, प्राणं मनः, प्राणो ह्येवैतान् सर्वान् संवृंके" - (Chh. 4-3-3) - meaning: "Vāk (speech), Chakshus (eyes), Shrōṭru (ears), Manas (mind) etc. - all these senses become one with Prāṇa in deep sleep" - because of this Śruti statement, the first

consolatory explanation is that the word 'Prāṇa' also can be addressed to Sushuptātman. But in Sushupti Prāṇa is not manifested at all, is it not so? In truth, Prāṇa Itself is protecting the body of the sleeping person; otherwise, it amounts to saying that there is no difference whatsoever between Sushupti and Maraṇa (death)!

The present Sruti is stating: "In the case of the Sushuptātman He is Avyākrita (in an unmanifested form); from Him alone the world of duality is born". Besides, we can also cognize in our Intuitive Experience the fact that - "The state of Sushupti and the Avyākritasthiti (unmanifested state) of Pralaya (dissolution of the world) are one and the same". To wit, no one ever has or can have the experience of the type - "Sushuptātman exists in such and such a region or space and in such and such a time"; for the Avyākritātman too who exists in Pralaya there does not exist any distinction or division caused by the time and space categories. Therefore, as stated in this Sruti, it is proper to conclude that there does not exist any difference between Sushuptātman and Avyākritātman. It is reasonable indeed to aver that this Atman is called "Prājña". For, 'Prajñā' means Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness). It has already been shown on the valid evidence of Bhāshya that - "Because Sushuptātman illumines this Avasthā (deep sleep) by means of His very essence of Pure Consciousness, it is proper to say that He is called 'Prājña'." It being so, the doubt to the effect - "How is it proper to call Sushuptātman who is unmanifest (Avyākrita) by the word 'Prāṇa' which signifies manifestation?" - remains unanswered. Further, the other doubt that - "How can we reconcile the Sruti statement that - 'All the senses become one with Prana in the Sushupti state' - with our Intuitive Experience?" - also remains as it is unanswered.

The purport of the solution provided by the Bhāshyakāra for these doubts is: Sushupti can be observed from two viewpoints. From the standpoint of those who are seeing a person sleeping, all the senses belonging to the sleeping person have ceased their respective functions and are remaining still; it also appears that $Pr\bar{a}na$ (the vital force) alone as usual is carrying on its functions. Seen from this viewpoint, it amounts to saying that the vital force $(Pr\bar{a}na)$ of the Sushupta (sleeping person) is $Vy\bar{a}krita$ (manifest

alone). But the viewpoint of examining our own states of Consciousness of each one of us subjectively by our own Intuitive Experience standpoint is itself a superior criterion. For, then and then alone we directly Intuit or cognize the experience of the essential nature of our Avasthās. When observed from this Intuitive Experience viewpoint, the experience of the type - "I am an embodied person, I am asleep now; just now, though all my senses are not functioning, even so my Prāṇa alone is carrying on its functions incessantly" - is not there at all for the sleeping person; in fact, then the identification with or ownership of our body, senses, mind etc. is totally extinct. Therefore, it is reasonable indeed to say that even for those who have identification with their bodies Prana is unmanifest in Sushupti. For this reason alone in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (2-1-17) it is stated: "When this person is asleep, taking this consciousness (Vijnāna) of the senses along with his consciousness of the Antahkarana (mind) he remains, exists in *Hridayākāsha* (literally meaning, space within the heart), meaning Paramatman. When he withdraws those Karanas (i.e. Bahihkarana and Antahkarana) he is given the epithet - 'Svapiti' - meaning, existing unto Himself. Then Prāṇa has Grihita (taken over or seized).....". Hence, it amounts to saying verily that - "In the Absolute sense, in Sushupti even the Vyākrita Prāņa (manifest vital force) has become extinct or one with Prājña who is the Avyākritātman". Thus it has also been affirmed in the Koushitakibrahmanopanishad. It has already been mentioned that at the time of death Prana merges in Paramātman, is it not so? Hence, it should necessarily be accepted that therein Prāna remains as Avyākrita alone, is it not so?

THE REASON FOR WAKING UP FROM SUSHUPTI

If a question is now posed to the effect - "Thus if Prāṇa becomes unmanifest alone both in the deep sleep state and death, then how at all can the phenomena of - 'once again waking up and attaining other bodies in future births' - be reconciled?" - then here in this context there is a secret that is to be reckoned. Even when the respective *Upādhis* (adjuncts) exist in the forms of Vaishwānara, Taijasa etc., in reality they all invariably exist totally pervaded or permeated by *Paramātma Chaitanya* (the Pure

Consciousness of the Supreme Self) alone. Just as although a slab of ice is completely pervaded by water alone it is given a separate, distinct name as 'a slab of ice' (in our empirical transactions), in the same manner although all the Upādhis which are of the characteristics of Anatman or not-Self are pervaded by Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) alone, for the sake of those people who are not capable of cognizing, Intuiting this truth all at once, the Sruti keeps on teaching in the manner: First, it accepts the phenomenon of Sopādhikatwa (association with an adjunct) being there from the Adhyāropa Drishti (viewpoint of deliberate superimposition) and then it reveals that the settled belief of the absence of any cognition of a second thing is due to the fact that in universal experiences like deep sleep, death, swoonings etc. everything has become one with the Paramatmaswarūpa. Not knowing this secret the ignorant people believe that in the waking and in the dream the external world appears divided into different forms of things whereas in the deep sleep alone, exclusively, and especially, there does not appear any world of duality whatsoever. In reality, despite the truth that our essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being is ever of the nature of non-dual Pure Consciousness (Advitiya Chaitanya) - just as people are seeing water alone in the two distinct forms when they say - "In the sea in one region there is a mountain floating in the form of an iceberg" - similarly, although all of us ever exist in our essential nature of Pure Being alone, we believe that we are associated with a world of duality. This truth will become clearly discernible in the near future when we consider the commentary of the Srishti Kārikās as well as later on while deliberating upon the commentary on Turiya Kārikās. Let it be. From the standpoint alone of those people who believe that both in the waking and in the dream Atman is associated with the adjunct of a manifest world of duality, the Sruti describes in the manner: (a) Just as in Pralaya, in the Sushupti too the manifest world exists in the (potential or latent) unmanifest seed form; (b) and again - just as in creation and sustenance the world gets manifest once again - in the waking and in the dream the world gets manifest. From this viewpoint alone the present Māndūkya Śruti describes Prājña with details like - "He is Ekībhūta (has become unitary, non-dual); is Prajñānaghana (has become a solidified

lump of Pure Consciousness)" etc. It being so, there is no scope whatsoever for doubting in the manner - "If the Jīva becomes one with Prājña in Sushupti, what is the cause for him to wake up and to assume Jīvatwa?" For, although Jīva ever exists in the essential nature of Paramātman, the ignorant people are believing in the manner - "We are Jīvas" - in the waking and in the dream becuase of the association with the adjuncts misconceived due to Avidyā; although in deep sleep there does not exist any adjunct whatsoever - because then they are not cognizing the truth that they actually exist in their own essential nature of Brahman - therein they believe that they are associated with Ajñāna (ignorance).

HOW IS IT THAT PRĀJÑA IS SIGNIFIED BY THE WORD 'PRĀŅA'?

Let it be; from the reason mentioned above, it amounts to saying that in Sushupti really the Vyākṛita Prāṇa (manifested vital force) does not exist at all, is it not so? If so, what is the reason for calling Prājña by the name 'Prāṇa', who is Sushuptātman? Unless and until a suitable, satisfying solution is given to this doubt, it does not amount to having given a proper answer at all to the question - "In the present Kārikā why is this name of 'Prāṇa' used at all?" Hence that (solution) we will explain to some extent now according to the Bhāshya of Shri Śaṅkara.

In the Chhāndōgya Śruti while clarifying the meaning of the sentence - "Tattwamasi" ("That thou art") - which is the spiritual instruction given by the father (Uddālaka) to his son Śwetaketu - Jīva has been called 'Manas' and Prājña by the name 'Prāṇa'. The Upanishad (Chh. 6-8-2) states: "Just as when a person who has caught a bird ties a string to its body and is playing with it, the bird flies about hither and thither and even if it flies far away (from him) to the extent the long string allows it, unable to free itself from the control of the string that is in that person's hands, getting fatigued or defeated, out of despair finally it comes back to the starting point of the string held by the bird-catcher and sits on his hand - in the same way, Jīva, being tied down to the adjunct of his mind and having wandered about in the waking and in the dream wherever the mind roams about in all directions and finally in the Sushupti (deep sleep) takes refuge

in Sadbrahman alone called 'Prāṇa' and attains Vishrānti (quiescence, tranquillity)". The mind is an adjunct to the Jiva, while Prāṇa is an adjunct to Sushuptātman - from this Vyavahāra Drishti the Upanishad has called Jiva - 'Manas' and Brahman who is in Sushupti - 'Prāna'. Just as the bird is controlled, restricted by the string in the hands of the bird catcher, similarly Jiva is tied down to Paramātman's Swarūpa; howevermuch the Jiva goes far away from Paramātman, he cannot exist apart from Paramātman; finally, he has perforce to merge into the Paramātma Swarūpa and attain peace, quietude. For, that essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss alone is his (Jiva's) real, ultimate essence of Being - this truth the Sruti is expounding here with the help of an illustration. Anyway, here the name of Prana does not signify or refer to Vyākrita Prāna (manifest vital force); in fact, it is another epithet for Prājña alone. On the strength of the Śruti Pramāna (Upanishadic evidence) we should discern in this manner.

SATKĀRYAVĀDA

Now, we may endeavour to know the meaning of the Kārikā by analytical deliberation. We have by now understood that the Ātman of the waking state really exists as Vishwa (or Vaishwānara), the dream Ātman as Taijasa (or Hiraṇyagarbha) and the deep sleep Ātman as Prājña (or Avyākṛitātman). The Kārikākāra (Shri Gauḍapāda) has begun to delineate as to how this *Parameshwara* (Supreme Lord) with names like Avyākṛitātman, Prājña or Prāṇa brings about creation.

The meaning of the first half of the verse is: Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña - all these phenomena, being already in existence, come into being. If they are already existing, what exactly is the meaning for the statement - "They are born again"? No one reckons in the manner - "That which already exists - that alone is born"! This doubt may arise here in this context. The satisfactory solution for this is: Although they exist in their Paramārthaswarūpa (essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being), then they do not exist in the Māyārūpa (illusory forms) called 'Avidyākṛita Nāma Rūpa' ('names and forms projected by ignorance'). All these are already existing in a form without distinction alone in Avyākṛitātman; but at the time of creation, they

assume the illusory forms of names and forms projected by or conjured up by Avidyā and manifest themselves.

Any body may raise the question: "Even so, the Māyā of 'names and forms', which did not at all exist in the beginning, came into being, is it not so?" Not so. For, after birth the Māyārūpa manifests; before birth this Māyā exists in a Bija $R\bar{u}pa$ (seed form). That seed also exists having been projected, misconceived alone by Avidyā. For, we have already stated that - "Ātman ever exists in His own essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, as also the ignorant people only misconceive in Him the creation or birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world". When that which already existed as water, later on appeared in two distinct forms of water and foam, don't we say that the foam which in the beginning existed in the form of water and later on manifested itself in the form of foam? In the same way, this is to be understood. If we observe deeply, even now foam means water alone; even so, in our empirical workaday transactions we distinguish in the manner - pure clear water, impure dirty foam, is it not so? In the same manner, here in this context too in the beginning (i.e. before creation), Absolute; Pure Brahman of the very essence of Pure Existence (Sanmātra) alone existed; after creation ensued, the three distinct forms called 'Vishwa', 'Taijasa', 'Prājña', which were caused by Nāmarūpa Māyā misconceived by Avidyā, came into being. Just as water alone exists in the form of foam also, even when assuming the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa etc. their Paramārthaswarūpa, viz. Shuddhātmaswarūpa (very essence of Pure Being-Consciousness of Ātman) exists as It is per se. Even so, we may plausibly transact in the manner - "Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña came into being" - from the viewpoint of Māyā (illusion) of names and forms which appear as projected or conjured up by Avidyā. This very concept has been described in the Sruti in the manner: "In the beginning Brahman alone existed; thereafter, Hiranyagarbha and Virāt - these were born". Therefore, what has been stated viz. "Vishwa, Taijasa etc. which already existed came into being" - is proper, justified.

In this manner describing origination, birth is called 'Satkāryavāda'. Sānkhyans also have used the nomenclature of Satkāryavāda; but their opinion or doctrine is not Yuktiyuta

(associated with reason, logic); for, in that Darshana (school of philosophy) its followers have used this nomenclature on the basis of a concept, dogma that - "Already existing Pradhana (primordial matter) itself got transformed or metamorphosed into forms like Mahat, Ahankāra etc." If an entity gets repeatedly transformed, then what is its real form? - this question cannot be determined. It does not also appear to be acceptable if it is stated: "Pradhana, which is insentient, inert itself created by itself in different forms". But in the Satkaryavada which the Vedantins acknowledged (and propound) such a defect does not exist whatsoever. For, in deep sleep Atman alone existing and He alone appearing in waking and dream, associated with a world (Saprapañcha) - both these phenomena are in eveyone's experience indeed, and hence to say in the manner - "Atman alone is assuming various forms in this manner" - will surely be in consonance with universal experience. Thus, because when Atman, who was in the beginning Nishprapañcha (devoid of the adjunct of the world), later on appears as Saprapañcha (endowed with the adjunct of a world) there does not take place any mutation whatsoever in His essential nature and His originally existing Swarūpa alone appears in His Kāryāvasthā (created new state) we have perforce to determine conclusively that the Upādhi (adjunct) of names and forms which appear in waking and dream or in Srishți (creation), Sthiti (sustenance) is invariably Māyā alone, which is projected by ignorance (Avidyākalpita) - a mere false appearance alone. There is a phenomenon of the common people imagining a snake in a rope, water in a mirage out of misconception, is it not so? Just as there exists every scope for people to imagine in objects like a rope, mirage - phenomena like snake, water, respectively, in the same way there exists invariably every scope for ignorant people (Avidyāvantas, Ajñas) to misconceive names and forms in Atman who is Pure, Absolute. This alone is called by Vedantins "Avidyākalpita Nāmarūpa Māyābija". Every one will have to admit, agree unavoidably that - "The snake etc. which are 'born' from this Bija or seed do exist always in their true essential natures of rope etc."; for, without any real entity having been a substratum or support no Vikalpas (imagined things) whatsoever they may be - like snake etc. have been ever witnessed by anybody in this world.

Even the snake when it appears is verily, in essence, a rope only; the mirage water even when it appears is verily, in essence, a sandy waterless desert indeed, is it not? Therefore, that \bar{A} spada (substratum, support) in which a particular phenomenon is imagined - that substratum [To wit, that entity on which there is superimposition or Adhyāropa - that entity as the substratum is being called 'Adhisthāna'; this usage is in vogue in many present-day Vedāntic texts. But Shri Sankara uses the word 'Adhisthāna' with the meaning of body, Ashraya (support) only; the entity which is the substratum for Adhyārōpa (superimposition) he calls, to a large extent, 'Aspada' in his Bhāshyas. Therefore, in this treatise we too have used the word 'Aspada' in this sense or with this meaning only] - existing in its essential nature alone - is born from the Māyābija (illusory seed) of names and forms projected by Avidyā [To wit, some Vyākhyānakāras (post-Śańkara sub-commentators) have opined that - "Avidyā itself is Māyā; the statement - 'born out of Māyābija' - means that - 'imaginary things are born from $Avidy\bar{a}$ or ignorance, which is Anirvāchya (indefinable, indescribable). With regard to this interpretation - which is purely dogmatic - since it has no support whatsoever of Śruti statements, Bhāshya, Yukti and Anubhava, we have discarded it here as there is no need of its discussion or deliberation]. It is reasonable to accept this Satkāryāvāda.

In this manner, from Prājña both Vishwa and Taijasa are born by virtue of Avidyākṛita Nāmarūpa Māyābija; to wit, it amounts to saying that one and one Paramātman alone appears in three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña. If we see from the macrocosmic viewpoint, because there is no entity whatsoever which is not subsumed by forms like Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, there does not remain any object at all for creation. Therefore, - because it is taught that 'Prāṇa creates these three phenomena alone', it amounts to having specifically indicated that - 'He has created everything else.' It should hence be understood that this fact alone has been explained in the second half of the verse.

The statement - "Prāṇa creates everything" - means that He causes the birth or coming into being of all phenomena of the forms of sentient and insentient things. In the Brihadāranyaka

(Mādhyandina Recension 2-1-23) it has been stated that - "Just as a spider, without desiderating any other external cause as an aid, is born in the form of a thread of its own saliva which is not something other than itself, and just as from a fire of one singular form many small sparks of fire fly off in all directions, in the same manner from this one Prājnātman the senses (Prānas) like Vāk (speech) etc., the Lökas like Bhūhu, Bhuvaha, Svahaha etc., deities like Agni etc., all creatures (Bhūtas) from Brahma to a blade of grass are born in each and every Jiva as distinct Atmans who appear with different adjuncts in the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa etc." According to this Sruti statement, this Prāṇātman alone creates the insentient gross things, the adjuncts of the sentient Jivas, the Jivas - all these appearing as distinct objects. Just as from the Sun thousands and thousands of light rays emanate, from this Prānātman various beings (Jīvas) appearing in different bodies, like deities, human beings, inferior creatures etc. - all of them are born.

Although all these sentient and insentient (animate and inanimate) phenomena appear to be different, separate from Prāṇa, in reality (in the Absolute sense) they are not different at all. Just as, though the Sun is one and one only, by virtue of various adjuncts of Jalāshayas (water containers) hundreds of 'watery Suns' - meaning, reflections of the Sun - may appear to be different from him, in the same way these Jivas, by virtue of their different bodies as adjuncts, appear to be different or distinct from Paramatman, as also mutually among themselves - they appear to be different. Even when they are appearing like that, just as all the Sun's reflections appear depending upon the Sun alone, and further, in the ultimate analysis, apart from the Sun's existence those reflections do not have any independent, separate existence at all - in the same way apart from this Prāṇa neither any Jivas nor their *Upādhis* (adjuncts) exist in the least. All these, existing in the Prāṇātmarūpa alone, appear to be different from Him, as also, among themselves, each appears different from the other. This teaching alone we have to discern from the Srishti Vachana (statements pertaining to creation). Whatever things are born, none of them exists whatsoever apart from the Prājña, who is the cause for everything; even so, appearing as if all of them are different, their creation has taken place.

विभूति प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः । स्वप्नमायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ॥७॥

इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः । कालात् प्रसूर्ति भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ।।८।।

भोगार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे । देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा ॥९॥

Meaning: (7-9) Some people who deliberate upon the subject-matter of creation reckon that creation is Vibhūti (magnificence, splendour); some others imagine that it is akin to dream and illusion; those who are having a steadfast faith in creation opine that creation is Prabhu's (the Lord's) wish; those who are deliberators on the topic of time reckon that creation is by Time; some others say that creation is for enjoyment, while others think it is for sport, pastime. This is indeed the essential nature of the Divine Being. For the Āptakāma (one who has obtained all that he wished), how can there be any desire?"

DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT CREATION

Creation is caused by Prajña; the effect, existing in the beginning in the form of Prājña alone, later on It appears in Avidyākalpitamāyārūpa (an illusory form projected by Avidyā). When actually the creation takes place, the Jivas are appearing in different forms; while Intuitively deliberating upon each and every Jiva's Swarūpa (essence of Pure Being-Consciousness), if the three states of Consciousness are discerned, then from the viewpoints of the various states each and everyone of them can be divided into Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña. Thus, although creation is appearing in various queer forms, in reality, all this is Paramatman alone; but in the form It appears It is verily $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion) alone - this is the Kārikākāra's opinion. In the statement - "Prabhavaha Sarvabhāvānām Satām" - meaning, "For all objects or phenomena which are already existing alone there is creation" - in this statement all this explanation mentioned above is implicit. In order to elaborate upon this teaching the opinions of others, in contrast, are being enumerated by Shri Gaudapāda.

"Some people say that creation is Vibhūti (great might, superhuman power)". Their opinion is that Parameshwara, the Lord Creator, in order to manifest His Vibhūti, creates the world. But some others do not accept this opinion. For, by showing His Mahimā (glory or supremacy) to others there is no benefit accruing, or purpose served, for Him; nor is there any harm to Him by not showing His glory to others. 'Īśwara' means not a Samsāri (transmigratory being) like us, is it not so? Like the unrefined or uncultured people why should He show off His Lordship or supremacy? Apart from this, before the creation takes place there exists no one other than Iswara. To whom, shall we say, does He wish to show His Vibhūti and for that purport He creates? Shall we say that to create in that manner is His Svabhāva (essential nature)? That too is not proper; for, if it were so, He would have had to keep on creating indeed. These disputants may argue out in the manner: "In order to grant the fruits of *Dharma* (righteous actions) and *Adharma* (unrighteous deeds) of Jivas, Iśwara creates; hence, when the Jivas' Karmas become ripe enough, then He creates. Besides, is not Iśwara, who is omniscient, independent? How at all can we bind Him by clamping a restriction or stipulation of the type that - 'He should always be creating?" - But those who assert in this manner that He creates in relation to the Karmas of Jivas (Karmasāpeksha), will have to give up the contention that creation is His Svabhava; for, what is relative to or dependent upon another cannot be said to be 'Svabhāva'. Apart from this, those who say that 'Īśwara is merely Nimitta Kāraņa (an efficient cause) for the world and that He wishes to exhibit His Vibhūti and thereby for that purpose He creates' - if these disputants contend that - "Because this world of duality is an effect, just as for effects like a clay pot and pitcher etc. a potter who is endowed with Shakti (strength, power) and Jñāna (knowledge, intelligence) is a pre-requisite cause, similarly for this world (an effect) an efficient cause of an İśwara, who is Sarvajña (omniscient), Sarvashakta (omnipotent), is necessary" - on the basis of inferential logic, then by that very token of inferential logic it will have to be conjectured perforce that - 'Just as the potter has a body and desire for enjoyment, in the same way Iśwara too will have to possess these (Upādhis)? As otherwise, if one seeks to establish Iśwara's existence on the strength of Śruti Pramāna like the **Prashnōpanishad** statement - (6-3): "(Īśwara) reflected and saw" - then because other Śruti statements like - "I will become many", "I will be born in the form of the world" - (Taittirīya, Chhāndōgya) - say that - 'Īśwara mentally resolved' - and thereby it will have to be accepted perforce that - "Īśwara is not merely the efficient cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa) but also the material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa)". In that doctrine, because Īśwara Himself became (got transformed, metamorphosed as) the world, it amounts to saying that apart from Him there does not exist anything whatsoever and then this argument of 'Vibhūtikhyāpanapaksha' (avowing, proclaiming Īśwara's Vibhūti) will crumble.

Thus even after this doctrinaire theory that Iswara, the Lord Creator, in order to proclaim (Khyāpana) His Vibhūti (glory, supremacy), brings about creation (of the world of duality), there still remains another kind of Vibhūti theory to be considered here. To wit, those who used to accept Sānkhyans' Pradhāna were arguing in the manner: "Pradhana or Prakriti, without any dependence upon or aid from Iśwara, by itself gets transformed into the form of the world. By virtue of showing in various ways its Vibhūti, Prakriti provides Bhōga (enjoyment) and Mōksha (Liberation), which are called *Purushārtha* (the ultimate goal of human existence) to Purushas (selves)." This was the Sankhyans' doctrine, which is refuted in the Brahma Sūtras. To an inert, insentient Pradhana there cannot possibly be a desire accruing to provide Bhoga and Moksha to Purushas. Besides, to say that an insentient (Achetana) thing without the help of a sentient being (Chetana Vastu) by itself transforms itself in order to proclaim its Vibhūti - is opposed to $L\bar{o}k\bar{a}nubhava$ (universal experience). For, no one has ever seen either a cart, without there being a bullock or a cart-driver, by itself moving; nor clay, without the help of a potter as also in the absence of the wheel, stick etc., by itself getting transformed into various forms of pot, pitcher, etc. This doctrine is, in addition, opposed to the Sruti; for, the Srutis are teaching that Brahman Himself created the world. They are further teaching that He Himself became Murtavastu (things with forms) and Amūrtavastu (things without forms), Chetana Bhāva (sentient beings) and Achetana Bhāva (insentient things), Satya Bhāva (really existing entities) and false appearances.

In this manner, the Srishti Chintakas (thinkers of creation) have variously conceived thier respective doctrines. For those Vivekins or Intuitive deliberators, who are ratiocinating about the Paramārtha Tattwa (the Ultimate, Absolute non-dual Reality), this query: "How at all did this creation take place?" - has no meaning whatsoever. For, irrespective of the fact that whether it is assumed that Īśwara is the efficient cause alone for the world or actually He got Himself transformed into the world - no doctrine can ever possibly remain Nirdusḥta (irrefutable or inviolable) at all.

Although on the face of it the Sruti may apparently seem to state that - 'Īśwara gets transformed into the form of the world' - that statement is not in consonance with either Yukti (reasoning), or other Sruti teachings. In fact, this former is completely in contrast to these latter two aspects. In the first instance, this doctrinaire theory is opposed to Yukti in that: If it is said that Iswara gets transformed (Parināma), it amounts to saying that He is made up of parts (Sāvayava) and non-eternal (Anitya), like clay, gold etc. Because of the component parts of a thing getting less and less in number progressively, things get destroyed, is it not so? If it is contended that Iswara, associated with a subtle state of the dualistic world, is Himself getting transformed - it amounts to saying that Iswara always exists being associated with names and forms; then, in that event, the transformation of names and forms is verily Iśwara's transformation and thereby it amounts to accepting that the defects of these names and forms are those of Iswara alone. Further, if it is argued that Iswara in His pure form (Shuddha Rūpa) does not get transformed but His special qualities or characteristics (Visheshanas) only get transformed, then it amounts to saying that Iswara is not at all a cause (for the creation of the world). Thus it amounts to saying that *İśwara Pariṇāma Vāda* (theory of Īśwara's transformation) is opposed to Yukti.

Secondly, this doctrinaire concept is opposed to Śruti teaching also. To wit: 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुक्तप ईयते' - (Bṛihadāraṇyaka 2-5-19), meaning: "Parameshwara by virtue of magical, mystic powers is appearing as if He is endowed with many forms"; owing to misconceptions people are reckoning Parameshwara to

be of various kinds of world forms - thus the Śruti is very clearly declaring. Therefore, in the sense of Īśwara becoming the Jagat, the statement that - "Īśwara creates the Jagat" - is Māyāmātra (mere false appearance) indeed.

THIS IS SIMILAR TO SVAPNA (DREAM) AND $M\overline{A}Y\overline{A}$ (MAGICAL, ILLUSORY) - THUS SOME WHO KNOW THE TATTWA IMAGINE

This alone is the correct, proper concept. For, in the Srutis (Upanishads) too it has been taught, expounded in this manner alone. This fact will be more elaborately explained in the third Prakarana. The benefit that accrues in conceiving that this is Māyā, Svapna - is: Just as by scrutinizing either Māyā or the reality of the dream there is no worthwhile fruit whatsoever accruing, in the same way by ratiocinating upon the question -"How at all this creation took place, and why it was caused?" - no fruit whatsoever is ever possibly attained. But by Intuitively deliberating upon questions like: "Which is that real substrate for this Māyā?"; "Which is that Satyam (Ultimate Reality) which is the substratum for the false appearances seen in the dream?" - there is a great benefit. To wit, let us suppose that a magician throws up a rope-ladder, holding a weapon in hand appears to climb up that rope-ladder and vanishes into thin air without being seen by anybody. Further, if he creates an impression among all of us that he is having a duel with some one and eventually falls down being cut into pieces and once again if he appears to gather himself up and rise up - then by deliberating upon the question - "What is the secret of that magic?" - with all enthusiasm, is there any benefit accruing to us at all? No. Therefore, becoming indifferent in this matter and feeling - "All this is verily Māyā alone" - the wise people will attempt to find out the answer to the worthwhile question: "Where is the real magician?" In the same way, we will not bother about the task of deliberating upon questions like: "Which were all the things or phenomena that appeared to us in Svapna or dream?" or "How did those appearances come into being?" We will discard the consideration of the dream appearances thinking in the manner - "All those phenomena seen are not real; in the dream I alone existed but all else was a false appearance" - and determine that - "All those false appearances merely appeared in our singular essential nature of Pure Being alone." Is it not so?

Just like these illustrations only we must reckon creation too. Just as the Māyāvi (magician) threw up a rope-ladder and holding a weapon in hand climbed it up and having conjured up a vision as if he had a duel with some one and later made it appear that his enemies cut up his body and its pieces fell to the ground - and the magician made all this to appear merely as a phantasmagoria, in the same way we must discern in the case of Dārshtrāntika (the illustrated case). The three states of waking, dream and deep sleep are, like the rope-ladder of the illustration, mere appearances; Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña - these appearances of various forms of Ātman which are seen along with Upādhis of the three states, respectively, are, like the Māyāvi who was on the rope-ladder, mere false appearances only. This alone we call by the name of Prapancha (world) which is 'created'. All this creation is a mere appearance seen just like a magical show or a dream. In that case, what is the reality behind this? To wit, the magician, without actually being any of those appearances which he conjured up before us, was standing on the ground indeed by our side remaining as he was, is it not so? In the same way, our Paramarthaswarupa Atman, without being either these states of waking, dream and deep sleep or these Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña which appear within them, respectively, is of an essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being-Consciousness quite different or distinct from all those queer forms. We must divine that He, who caused or brought about 'creation', is Himself the Pure, Absolute Reality behind all these appearances.

But those people who have staunchly believed or determined that creation is absolutely real have imagined it in various ways. To wit, some proponents have imagined, believed that "Parameshwara is Sarvashakta (omnipotent). Satyasankalpa (whatever He wishes, it occurs then and there); therefore, by that Prabhu's (Lord's) Itchhāmātra (mere wish) alone all this creation has taken place; His mere wish alone is enough for the creation of the world; no other accessory or material is needed at all by Him." Some others are 'Kālachintakas'! In their opinion, all this world has come into being by virtue of Time alone. 'Birth' means - 'What was not existing in the past time appears in the

present time' - is it not so? For any thing or any creature to be born sufficient time limit is needed; a seed sprouting, growing as a sapling, giving out its foliage, finally bearing flowers and fruits - all these events take place in their stipulated times alone. People have believed that things last for certain durations of time. Therefore, becasue all things being born in time, last for a duration in time and eventually get destroyed in time alone it evolves that Time alone is the cause for everything. Thus the Kālachintakas opine. Even this theory cannot stand against the onslaught of reason, logic. For, let it be any object, plant or creature; for their birth, time alone is not the singular cause. For a plant, only if there are other accessories like a seed, fertile ground, manure, water - then only it is having a 'birth'; similarly, for creatures too those relevant different conditions and causes become necessary. Therefore, we are constrained to say that time is, in fact, Sādhāranakāranamātra (a mere 'common cause') only.

Some people think that Īśwara creates for His own *Bhōgārtha* (purpose of enjoyment) or for the sake of the creatures' Bhōgārtha; some others opine that He creates for the purpose of *Krīḍa* (sport). But will it be proper to say that just as people construct a house or a farm etc. for their enjoyment, in the same way Īśwara constructs this world and then enjoys the objects in them? All the *Īśwaravādins* (people who acknowledge the doctrine of a Lord Creator) agree and aver that 'Īśwara' means *Sarvaswatantra* (totally, absolutely independent), *Nityatṛupta* (eternally satiated) only. It being so, how is it possible to imagine as to which desire for any enjoyment He has at all? If we imagine anything in that manner, then it will amount to saying that before the creation Īśwara, without having any enjoyment, was discontented, meaning - He was '*Anīshwara*' (not a Lord). Is it not so? Therefore, this theory too is not proper.

In the same manner, the concept that - Īśwara creates for Krīḍārtha (purport of sport) - also will not be in consonance with Yukti (reason). Just like children, to say that - 'In order to get rid of ennui or boredom Īśwara has cast this game of creation' - will not be proper. For, if we imagine like that, then we will have to discard the acknowledgement that He is a Sarvajña (omniscient), Nityatrupta (eternally contented). We can-

not also argue in the manner that - "Just like great wealthy people, kings and highly-cultured people etc. also, without expecting any material benefit, merely for recreation indulge in sport or hiking, why should not Iswara indulge in creation (for recreation)." For, even in the case of such big wealthy people there exists invariably some sort of a benefit or purpose which we may not be able to discern all of a sudden. The wise people utter a maxim that - "Without expecting any benefit or purpose, not even an idiot engages himself in any activity." Even so, can it not be contended that for the sake of those Jivas who are yet to be created, Iswara brings about this creation? But there will always be counter-arguments of the type - "Before creation which Jivas are there? For whose sake is He creating?" Although this theory may seem to be proper from the Vyāvahārik viewpoint of assuming the distinctions of Jivas, the gross insentient things and Iswara, those people who have begun this search of finding out the truth or veracity of creation - if they, at the outset or prior to their deliberation itself, assume distinctions of Jivas, İśwara etc. - it would not be quite a rational approach.

Anyone may ask: "Because it has been mentioned in the Śāstras that Īśwara creates the world, we can assume it to be so, is it not so ?" - There is no defect whatsoever in assuming in that manner by those who have complete faith in the Sastra. The statement that - "Parameshwara, on account of His wish or desire of the type - 'Let the Jivas attain the enjoyment of the fruits according to their Karmas!' - creates" - is agreeable; it is true that it is a satisfactory answer meant for the middle-order seekers. But, even then, if it is surmised that - "Īśwara, in order to dispense or grant Karmaphalas to Jivas or realizing that for their sake it is proper to provide their objects of enjoyment, creates" - then we will be constrained to assume that - "Just as the parents for the sake of their children try to provide toys, properties, money and make proper arrangements for their education etc., similarly Iśwara for the sake of Jivas attempts to provide all desired facilities by means of His creation." Then in that event, just as there will be necessarily Pravartaka Dōshas (defects of instigating, prompting) of the type of love and attachment towards the children on the part of parents, similarly we will have to imagine that in Iswara too such defects exist. Apart from this,

that Śāstra which says that - "Īśwara creates the world" - is itself propounding in the manner - "That Brahman alone thou art"; "All this is verily Brahman" etc. also. Therefore, it amounts to saying that apart from Parameshwara neither there exists any world whatsoever nor any Jīvas, is it not so? In that argument in some people there may even arise a doubt of the type - "Why should Īśwara create at all?" Hence, although the various concepts pertaining to time, fortune, enjoyment, sport etc. may, to some extent, explain the tenet of creation, it is not possible to assert that they are satisfactory answers or solutions in all aspects to this question of creation.

Therefore, it is not possible to imagine that Īśwara who is Āptakāma (one who has all his desires fulfilled) has any kinds of desires, wishes whatsoever. This is, in fact, that Paramātman's Svabhāva (essential nature) alone; the creation of the type - "Paramātman appears as this form of Jagat" - is part and parcel of the Vastusvabhāva (essential nature of the Ultimate Reality). thus Shri Gauḍapāda has propounded.

Here in this context, what exactly is meant by Svabhāva is to be deliberated upon in some detail. If we interpret this word in the manner - "For Iswara creating is itself a Svabhava or essential nature" - then it will amount to saying that Iswara will have perforce to be always carrying on creation; for, the essential nature of a Vastu (entity) can never change. Apart from this, when we observe from the Paramartha Drishti or Absolute viewpoint - everything is verily Brahman, apart from Paramātman there does not exist anything else whatsoever. Therefore, the sentence - "This is Paramātman's Svabhāva" - we have to understand in the manner: Although rope etc. exist as they are, just as on account of people's Avidyasvabhava they appear as something else - to wit, because of not reckoning it to be a rope it appears as a snake - similarly a sea-shell appears as silver, the clear sky appears as polluted, the desert as a mirage - all these invariably appear differently due to Aviveka (a lack of discrimination) only. In the same way, because people are not able to cognize the truth that all this is Paramatman alone, this phenomenon in front of them is appearing as the world. It is quite but natural for unknown or unrecognized things to appear as different combinations or conglomerations, is it not so? In the same way,

it is but natural that unknown Paramātman too appears in the form of the manifold world. This alone is the import of the sentence mentioning 'Svabhava'.

So far it amounts to our having commented upon the Upanishad statement pertaining to **Prājña** - "For the Bhūtas or creatures He alone is the source of origination and dissolution." It is also tantamount to affirming here that the creation that is brought about by Paramātman is not *Paramārtha* (absolutely real) but it is a false appearance seen by those who do not have Ātmajñāna. This alone is called *Māyā Satkāryavāda* (the theory of magical creation by Paramātman). This will be explained in the forthcoming Prakaraṇas.

IV TURĪYA KĀRIKĀS

नान्तः प्रज्ञं न बहिष्प्रज्ञं नो भयतः प्रज्ञं न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् । अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्ममलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः ॥७॥

Meaning: "(Turiya is) not that which cognizes the internal (objects), not that which cognizes the external (objects), not what cognizes both of them, not a mass of cognition, not cognitive, not non-cognitive. (It is) unseen, incapable of being spoken of, ungraspable, without any distinctive marks, unthinkable, unnameable, the essence of the knowledge of the one Self, that into which the world is resolved, the peaceful, the benign, the non-dual, such, they think, is the fourth quarter. He is the Self, He is to be Known."

अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति -

निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानामीशानः प्रभुरव्ययः ।

अद्वैतः सर्वभावानां देवस्तुर्यो विभुः स्मृतः ।।१०।।

Meaning: (10) "Here these verses are to be found: Turya (the fourth) is the $\bar{I}s\bar{a}na$ (Lord) for removing all miseries, He is the Prabhu (Master), imperishable, the non-dual Reality who exists in all phenomena, Deva (brilliant Deity), said to be Vibhu (all-pervading Entity)."

TURĪYA ĀTMAN IS NON-DUAL

So far we have explained the purport of six Mantras of the

Upanishad. Now in order to indicate the purport of the seventh Mantra some Kārikās are begun. 'अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति', meaning -"Here these following verses are to be found" - this phrase is used to indicate that from hereon another Prakarana (topic) has begun. In the Upanishad Mantra the three epithets used, viz. Vaishwānara, Taijasa and Prājña - are meant for signifying the 'three quarters' (Pādas, literally meaning footprints) of Paramātman. It should be discerned that one and the same Sākshi who exists in all the three states is being called by those names. Although the Upādhis or adjuncts are classified as Sthūla (gross), Sūkshma (subtle), Kāraņa (causal), Paramātman is one and one alone; in this seventh Mantra His real essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness which is Nirupādhika (devoid of any adjuncts whatsoever) has been enunciated. The three quarters (Pādas) like Vishwa, Taijasa etc. have been mentioned only as a device for signifying this Absolute essence of Pure Being-Consciousness (Paramārthaswarūpa); in the Śruti this Swarūpa alone has been called 'Brahma' and 'Omkāra'. If this much teaching is remembered, the purport of the present Kārikā will become clear. Turya (For all the words like Turya, Turiya, Chaturtha - the meaning is 'fourth' alone) - this Paramārthātman (Absolute Self) - who is said to be the fourth because He is apart from these three imagined forms - Ishāna, Prabhu (Lord, Master) for removal of all miseries; because in Him there do not exist any adjuncts which are conjured up by Avidya, merely by cognizing this Swarūpa all miseries (of Samsāra) will vanish once for all. Without knowing Him - never at all will the Samsāraduhkha be eliminated, got rid of. The Sruti statement to the effect - "When it is possible to roll up the sky (empty space) like a sheet of leather, without cognizing this Deity, Divinity the Duhkha may come to an end!" - (Shwetāshwatara 6-20) - is mentioned with this purport only.

There is no scope for anyone to doubt in the manner: "Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña - are these not different forms of this Paramātman? If so, by them does not misery get destroyed?" For, Vishwa and Taijasa are Witnesses (Sākshi) for both Sukha and Duhkha. Because Prājña is the cause for everything, we have to discern that He is the cause even for Duhkhadarshana (wit-

nessing act of misery). Especially Prājña in that condition (state) is verily Anandamaya (of the very essence or embodiment of Bliss); even so, there is a 'probability' of His giving scope for Duhkha to appear in the forms of Vishwa and Taijasa. These latter two - though they are witnesses of Sukha also, there is emaciation, destruction for this Sukha and there also exists a Duhkha signifying that - "There is a greater Sukha than this." Therefore, all the three quarters called Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña have been reckoned here as 'Duhkha' alone. One who removes or destroys all those Duhkhas is verily this Turiyatman. For, to those who have cognized, Intuited the truth that - "This Turiya is Himself the essential nature of Pure Being of those forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña" - the Intuitive Experience of the type that - "Turiyātman is verily Nityanivruttaduhkha (of the very essence of being eternally rid of misery), Nityānandaswarūpa (of the essential nature of eternal, perennial Bliss)" - becomes crystal clear.

He (i.e. Turiyātman) is 'Avyaya' (devoid of emaciation); not only because He has got rid of forms like Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, but also because this - His Ānandaswarūpa exists perennially forever, without undergoing any change; for this reason also it is said: "He is a Prabhu (Lord, Master) who is responsible for the removal of all Duhkhas (miseries)." The reason for this His Swarūpa being 'Avyaya' is because He is Nirvikāra (immutable); because He is without any parts (Niravayava) in Himself intrinsically, there is no possibility whatsoever of any change taking place. In that case, if it is contended that due to an external cause He may possibly be transformed, changed - then it is reconciled by saying that - "He is Advitiva (non-dual); He is without anything second to Him." The word 'Advitiya' does not mean that He is one, solitarily alone; it means - 'He is Vibhu or supreme, He alone exists everywhere'. He is Deva (divine, self-effulgent) - not with a Swarūpa, which has to be illumined by another entity. Although here a meaning for each and every special characteristic that has been mentioned in the Mantra has been given, the quintessence that has to be grasped from the Mantra has been clarified - this fact we have to keep in mind.

कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।

प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः ।।११।।

Meaning: "It is being accepted that those Vishwa and Taijasa are bound by cause and effect categories; but Prājña is bound by cause only. Both these do not exist in Turya at all."

THE CATEGORIES OF SAMANYA (GENERA) AND VISHESHA (SPECIES, PARTICULARS) AMONG VISHWA ETC.

In their essential nature of Pure Being all the three of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are verily Turiyātmans. In that nature of theirs there does not exist any special or particular features whatsoever. But by virtue of the forms which appear to exist due to association with respective Upādhis projected by Avidyā, Shri Gaudapāda is expounding here a traditional methodology involving the categories of Sāmānya (genera) and Vishesha (species, particulars) with a view to teaching the Ultimate, Absolute Reality (Tattwa) of Turiyātman. If observed deeply (Intuitively), Turiyātman alone is Nityasiddha Padārtha (eternally existing Entity or Reality). Since there do not exist any particular or special characteristics in His essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, it is not at all possible to signify Him by means of any special features whatsoever; because those seekers of the highest calibre or qualifications cognize Him merely on the basis of Agama (traditional and Sastraic method of teaching the Ultimate Reality of Paramatman), there does not arise any need of any device whatsoever to indicate, or instruct about, Atmatattwa. For that reason alone, in the Upanishad by the system of Agama exclusively - to wit, by sublating all the different superimpositions of the type of - "He is not Antahprajña (inwardly conscious), etc." - alone this Chaturthātman (the fourth Ātman or Absolute, Supreme Self) has been taught. In spite of this, for the sake of Alpaprajñas (people with mediocre intelligence), utilizing the Pādatrayas (three quarters of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña), which are Kalpita (deliberately superimposed merely for the purpose of teaching the subtle entity of Atman beyond all mundane, empirical phenomena), as the doorways (means or a device) and by adopting a traditional methodology called 'Anvaya' (agreement) - 'Vyatireka' (pointing out features in which there is disagreement) Krama (system) the Absolute Reality has to be taught. Now it is a fact of life that common people out of a delusion (Bhrānti) misconceive a rope to be a snake, or a crevice in the ground or a streak of water etc. in poor light or visibility, is it not so? Making those very misconceptions as the basis for a pedagogic device, utilizing the methodology or system of 'Anvaya' and 'Vyatireka', the essential nature of a rope can be made known. To wit: "This object might also be a snake, also a crevice in the ground, or a streak of water too. If it were really a streak of water it should have actually flown further down; because that is not the case, it cannot be a streak of water. If it were a snake, there should have necessarily appeared on one side a hood or head and on the other side a tail; since this too is not a fact, it cannot also be truly a snake. Hence, it appears to be a crevice in the ground indeed," and so on. In this manner by collating the common features (genera) among those various imaginary phenomena as well as in contrasting the different characteristics that appear to exist in each one of them, at least the person, who is having or entertaining several doubts as to what that phenomenon in front of him could be, will be able to minimise his misconceptions. In the same way, in the present context too in order to help the Jijñāsus (seekers) to derive the Intuition of the Absolute Reality by means of teaching the Sāmānya-Vishesha Bhāva as applied to the deliberately superimposed forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, these Kārikās are begun.

"VISHWA AND TAIJASA (ĀTMANS) ARE BOUND BY EFFECT AND CAUSE CATEGORIES"

Kārya (effect) means what is a resultant fruit; Kāraṇa (cause) means what is efficient to bring about that effect. In the present context Kāraṇa means 'not having known' alone. For all the three - Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña - Tattwāgrahaṇa (not having cognition of the Reality) - such a Kāraṇa is Samāna (common) to all the three. Because the common run of people have not cognized, Intuited the Ultimate, Absolute Reality of Turīya alone, they have misconceived in (superimposed upon) Turīyātman the various (apparent) forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and

Prājña, is it not so? If we see from the really real viewpoint of the Tattwa (Absolute Reality of Pure Witnessing Consciousness), Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are not at all three different forms; all these three are indeed the Turiya (fourth i.e. Absolute, Transcendental) non-dual Ātman alone. Therefore, the Kāraṇa of the type of Tattwāgrahaṇa (not having cognized the Reality) is common to all the three forms. In fact, this root cause of Tattwāgrahaṇa is itself - from the Pāramārthik viewpoint - the originating (sprouting) seed form of Anyathāgrahaṇa (wrong knowledge or misconception) of the type of reckoning the Absolutely real Turiya or Ātman to be (something other than what It really is as) Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, which are found with special characteristics.

Because it is stated that - 'Agrahana is the seed, Anyathagrahana is the resultant fruit' - there is a possibility of miscostruing it to mean, just as the seed sprouts and grows into a tree and then gives out fruits, in the same manner, that Agrahana has given rise to Anyathāgrahaņa. For that reason alone, Shri Śankara has in this context written his Bhāshya in the manner: "तत्त्वाप्रतिबोध-मात्रमेव हि बीजं प्राज्ञत्वे निमित्तम्" - meaning: "The seed of the nature of 'not cognizing the Reality' is itself the Nimitta or cause for being Prājña, is it not so ?" Just as not cognizing it to be a rope is itself the cause for misconceiving that entity alone to be a snake, in the same manner to reckon (misconceive) Pure, Absolute Ātman Himself to be 'Prājña', 'Jagatkāraņa (the cause, the seed form for the world of duality)' - the absence of the Intuitive Knowledge of, or not being able to cognize, Atmaswarūpa is itself the Nimitta (root cause). Therefore, it has been stated: "Prājna is Kāraņabaddha (bound by being a Kāraņa or cause)". But in the case of Vishwa and Taijasa, especially, not only 'not knowing or cognizing the Atmatattwa' is there but also, in addition, there is scope for misconceiving Him alone to be of the form of another - to wit, 'He is Vishwa with Sthūla Upādhi' and 'He is Taijasa with Sūkshma Upādhi' - called 'Anyathāgrahana' in Vedantic parlance. This is a special feature here. Thus, the category of cause called 'Agrahana' is the common feature for all the three forms, viz. Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña; but

for Vishwa and Taijasa, in addition, there exists the special feature of having Anyathāgrahaņa also.

To a query that - "If it is affirmed that both Vishwa and Taijasa are bound by Kāraņa and Kārya, then it amounts to saying that both of them are associated with the same, common Upādhi! If so, how at all can one distinguish and discern in the manner - 'This one is Vishwa, this one is Taijasa' -? " - we have already given an answer. By virtue of His Sthūla Upādhi one is Vishwa and by virtue of His Sūkshma Upādhi one is Taijasa - these two (Ātmans) do possess these distinctive features and hence it is quite possible to distinguish their features and thereby it is quite possible to distinguish between them. Since both those Upādhis appear due to Anyathāgrahaņa alone, the teaching that both of them are 'Kāryakāraņabaddha' (bound by effect and cause categories) is proper indeed. Thus the conception of the distinctions of Vishwa and Taijasa is also mooted from the waking standpoint alone; in the ultimate analysis (considered from the Absolute Intuitive viewpoint) the decision of the type - "Between the two there does not exist any distinctive characteristic whatsoever" - taken on the basis of a subtler or superior viewpoint, has been deduced by the Kārikākāra (Shri Gaudapāda) in the second Prakarana, and hence that topic may be discussed threadbare in that context only.

Here it should not be doubted in the manner: "Tattwāgrahaņa means Abhāva (the concept of a non-existent thing) of the type of - 'not having cognized a thing'; now, how at all can this nonentity be surmised as a cause? How can it be proved that Prājña etc. are bound by such an Abhāva?" It is not at all the intention or purport of this Kārikā to teach that - "Agrahana is, in reality or actuality, a seed" (taking its literal meaning) and "Prājña is bound by that." We have already stated that Prājña means Parameshwara who is the Jagatkāraņa (cause for the world). The statement that - "Just as due to the cause of not having cognized the reality in the manner - 'This is verily a rope' - that uncognized, unknown rope itself appears as a snake, in the same manner because we have not cognized in the manner - 'This is Nityashuddhabuddhamukta (eternally Pure, Conscious and Liberated) Paramātman alone - that unknown Paramātman Himself is appearing as Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña; from the standpoint of Pramātru - who, in turn, appears from the waking viewpoint - to aver that Sushuptātman is Kāraṇabaddha while Jāgratātman and Svapnātman are both Kāryakāraṇabaddha" - is also justifiably correct. This subtle teaching will shortly be clarfied in full detail. When it is said that - "Parameshwara is a cause for the world (Jagatkāraṇa)" - it is meant that - "Just as the rope itself appears as the snake, Parameshwara Himself appears in the form of the Jagat" - alone. To the question that - "In that case, in reality, or actually, the creation of the manifold world has not taken place at all, is it not so?" - we have already provided a satisfactory answer. If the seeker deliberates on the explanation given for the Kārikāvākyas - 'स्वप्नमायासरूपेति' - (1-7); - 'देवस्येष स्वभावोऽयम्' (1-9) - this becomes clear and comprehensible. In the near future too we will provide an elaborate solution for this doubt.

TURĪYĀTMAN IS DEVOID OF THE TAINT, BLEMISH OF AVIDYĀ

So far we have explained the methodology of applying the concepts of Sāmānya (genera) and Vishesha (species, particulars) among Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña. Now let us endeavour to cognize the essential nature of Turiyātman. The statement that -"Both these are not established to exist in Turiya" - means either the concept of seed (Bijabhāva) called Agrahana (non-comprehension) or the concept of resultant fruit (Phalabhāva) called Anyathāgrahaņa (misconception) is not established to exist in Atman, who is the fourth (relatively). Because Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña - all these three forms (appearances) are superimposed upon Paramātman Himself who is Pure, Absolute (non-dual), 'Shuddhātman' alone is called 'the fourth' (in relation to the three); but in the absolute sense, it should be reckoned that in actuality the intension is not that Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are three (in number) and Turya, who is alongside those three, is the fourth. Just as the *Dharmas* (distinctive characteristics) of the misconceived forms like a snake, a crevice in the ground or a streak of water etc. do not in the least taint or tarnish the real rope, which is the common substrate (Aspada) for them, in the same manner the bondage or binding of both Kārya and Kārana concepts does not touch or taint Turyatman.

A DOUBT : HOW CAN THERE BE AVIDYĀBANDHA FOR VISHWA, TAIJASA AND PRĀJÑA ?

Now yet another doubt: It has been previously stated that Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are the epithets given to Paramātman alone due to the distinctions of the Upādhis (adjuncts). It being so, here in this context the statement that - "Prājña is Kāranabaddha, while Vishwa and Taijasa are Kāryakāraņabaddhas" - is contradictory to the former, is it not so? To this also we have already given a convincing solution. Kāraņabaddha means - 'One who is associated with an adjunct of Kāraņa; to wit, a Sākshi (a Witness) to the Kāraņa (cause, seed form)'; Kāryakāraņabaddha means - '(Atmans) who are having, or associated with, adjuncts of the forms of Karya and Karana, meaning those who are Sākshi (Witness) to them. In the form of Sākshi although they are not different or distinct in essence in the least, first indicating that from the standpoint of their respective adjuncts they are distinct, one from the other, thereafter it is shown that this conventional methodology of Sāmānya-Vishesha is adopted especially to help cognize the truth that - "Turyatman alone is the Tattwa (Reality, essence of Pure Being) of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña." This fact also we have already stressed.

Here some people may entertain a doubt of the type: "In that case, why is it that in the Kārikās - 'Kāryakāraņabaddhas' and 'Kāraņabaddha' are mentioned - indicating Bandha (bondage) ? Kāraṇa means Agrahaṇa (non-comprehension), Kārya means Anyathagrahana (misconception, mistaking one to be another) in this manner you have explained. Who is haiving these Kāryakāraņāvidyās? To Paramātman who is of the essential nature of Sākshi (Witnessing Consciousness) how at all can this Ajñāna be justifiably attached? In both the Śruti and the Kārikā because Atman who exists in the three Avasthas is Himself called Vaishwānara (or Vishwa), Taijasa and Prājña, does it not amount to saying that Vishwa, Taijasa etc. themselves also invariably have the experience of the Avasthas?" To this long-winded objection too, although we have already provided a satisfactory answer, if the solution is elucidated in full details once again to suit the doubt raised here, then the real import of Turiyatman may become crystal clear. Hence we will tackle this doubt part by part and provide convincing solutions:

(A) TO WHOM DOES AVIDYA ATTACH ITSELF?

Who has this Avidyā called 'Agrahana'? And who has the Avidyā called 'Anyathāgrahaņa'? These Avidyās are not there at all for Turiyātman; this truth has been enunciated very clearly indeed in the Kārikā itself. We cannot also accept the concept or theory that Avidyā exists for Shuddhātman (Pure Self or Being-Conciousness) since this is a self-contradictory proposition on the face of it. It is not possible too to say that Kāranāvidyās are there for Prājña and others alone; for, the disputant himself affirmed that they are misconceived in Turiya by virtue of Avidyā of the forms of Agrahana etc. No one can say that - "The snake misconceived in the rope - because it did not know that it was the rope - possesses Avidyas of the forms of Agrahana and Anyathagrahana," is it not so? Similarly, the statement that - "To Prājña, Taijasa and Vishwa, who are misconceived in Turiya alone, this Avidyā attaches itself" - cannot be acceptable, is it not so? This is the first doubt.

The solution for this is: In the empirical sphere or our workaday world (Vyavahāra) the person who is desirous of Intuiting, cognizing the Absolute Reality has perforce believed in the manner - "I am having the experiences of waking, dream and deep sleep"- is it not so? To such a person alone there exists this Avidya. That person who entertains an earnest desire of the following type alone is the properly qualified seeker for the Vedānta Jñāna, viz: "In deep sleep I do have Ajñāna (ignorance) of the type of - 'I do not cognize anything therein'; in the dream I am seeing a false phenomenon and believing it to be real alone, I am carrying on transactions therein; in the waking, though I am seeing real objects and am experiencing happiness and misery born out of enjoying those objects, there exists this Ajñāna which the $S\bar{a}straj\tilde{n}as$ (people well-versed in scriptural studies) say to be of the nature of not having cognized the Advitiva Paramātman (the non-dual Supreme Self). Now, about the Intuitive Experience (Anubhava) of the type - 'In deep sleep I am not cognizing anything at all' as also the Experience of the type - 'In the dream I am cognizing another thing' - are these both Experiences belonging to my very essence of Pure Being (Swarūpa or Svabhāva), or they being false concepts, is there anything quite distinct from these but which is verily my Svabhāva?" To such

a Jijñāsu alone there is Avidyā. Addressing this sort of an Adhikāri (fully qualified person) both the Śāstra (spiritual texts) and Āchārya (preceptor who is well-versed in the traditional methodology of spritual teaching) instruct in the manner: "In deep sleep not cognizing anything and in the waking and the dream cognizing something extraneous or external object - both these phenomena are verily Avidyā. This Avidyā of the forms of Kārya-Kāraṇa is not at all your essential nature of Being (Svabhāva); you are definitely, decidedly Turīya alone who is Nityashuddhabuddhamukta." When Ātmajñāna which is the resultant fruit of that Upadesha (spiritual instruction) accrues, then from that viewpoint no one has Avidyā whatsoever.

In the Present Kārikā after superimposing the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa etc. on Ātman and signifying the Pure Being of Ātman's essential nature, this deliberate superimposition has been rescinded and the essential nature of Turīyātman, as He really is, has been expounded. This traditional unique method of teaching called 'Adhyārōpa Apavāda (Nyāya) Prakṛiyā' has been explained at several places in this text.

(B) HOW ARE VISHWA AND TAIJASA SAID TO BE BOUND ?

For this doubt we will provide a solution by means of properly explaining and analysing the purport of the Kārikā alone. The meaning (purport) of the sentence quoted as an illustration in the manner - "The rope itself is the snake" - is: In the same sense you have to reckon the meaning or import of these sentences (about Vishwa, Taijasa etc.). What you had imagined to be a snake is, in truth, a rope alone, is it not so? In the same way, the discerning seeker or student should understand (cognize the truth) that - "The Avivekins (non-discriminating ignorant people) have believed themselves to be really Kāryakāraņabaddha, is it not so? 'We are bound by Kāryakāraņa Ajñāna' - in this manner it is appearing to them, is it not so? They are, in truth, Vishwa -Taijasa Atmans only; one who is appearing as Kāraņa-Ajñānabaddha is verily Prājña alone" - In this manner alone the various words used in the sentences have to be connoted and the intended purport should be comprehended. The statement that Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña have Avidyā is contradictory to Sruti teaching; for, in the Sruti both Vishwa

and Taijasa have been described as of Parameshwara Swarūpa alone with special characteristics of Saptānga (seven limbs). To say that they have Avidyā is not at all proper or tenable. To say -"Parameshwara has Avidyā"- is a self-contradictory statement.

In the alternative, for the sentences - "Prājña is Kāraņabaddha" and "Vishwa and Taijāsa are both Kāryakāraņabaddha" - another meaning can be suggested. Because the cause called 'Agrahana' is itself the cause for Prājnatwa (the abstract concept of Prājña), this Prājña is Kāraņabaddha, meaning, He is related to or associated with Kāranatwa (the concept of causation or cause-hood). In the Absolute sense (to wit, from the Absolute Intuitive viewpoint of the Ultimate non-dual Reality of Pure Being-Consciousness), Paramatman is not Karana (i.e. He being non-dual Absolute, beyond all empirical transactions, there cannot ever be any causation that can be attached to Him). This is the real intention or import behind these explanations. In the same manner, if it is said - "Vishwa, Taijasa are Kārya-Kāraņabaddha" - for conceiving them to be Kāryarūpas (of the form of an effect), both Kāryakāraņa (both effect and cause) are responsible. From the cause of not cognizing the Pure, Absolute Atman alone, its offshoot, as it were, of Anyathagrahana (misconception, a mistaken or erroneous knowledge) has arisen. Besides, it has been superimposed deliberately by the Sruti merely for the purpose of teaching the seeker in his ignorant state of not cognizing the Paramātma Tattwa, that - "Hiraņyagarbha is caused or born from Paramātman, while Virāt Purusha is caused from Hirayyagarbha." Therefore here also when it is said - "Kārya-Kāranabaddha" - it means only - "Kārya-Kārana Sambaddha (related to or associated with effect-cause categories)." In fact, here in this context the word 'Baddha' has been used to suit both the meanings of 'as if being bound' and 'having the relationship of It is Shri Gaudapāda's prime purport or intention here to signify that - "In order to help the Jivas rid themselves of the misconception of their innately having the bondage of Avidya (Avidyābandha) superimposes deliberately the relationship of Kāryakāraņabhāva (concepts or categories of effect and cause) among Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña Ātmans and then to instruct about the Pure (Shuddha) non-distinctive (Nirvishesha) Paramātma Tattwa which is the substratum for all of them, the Śruti as a device $(Up\bar{a}ya)$ has formulated these concepts."

(C) HAVE THESE VISHWA, TAIJASA AND PRĀJÑA ANY AVASTHĀS ?

Now for the doubt of the type -"If Parameshwara too has or experiences the Avasthās of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti, does it not amount to saying that He is also a Jīva who is a Samsāri (transmigratory soul)?" - it amounts to our having provided a solution indeed. For, if we examine on the basis of Intuitive deliberation the essential Reality (substrate) behind the Jīva who is appearing as if he is experiencing the three states of Consciousness of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti, it becomes discernible that he has no Avasthās whatsoever, in the absolute sense. This universal fact of Vedāntic spritual science will be made clear in due course also. From the Paramātha Dṛishṭi Jīva himself does not have Avasthās; it being so, how can Parameshwara, who is the Witnessing Pure Consciousness (Sākshi) of a Jīva's Avasthā, be associated with or tainted by the blemish of having an Avasthā?

Even in the case of the Jiva by virtue of his misconception alone these Avasthābhōgas (experiencing the states) are appearing; 'Jiva' means one who has been associated with the adjuncts of the waking body, senses and mind alone. There is no supporting evidence of any universal experience whatsoever to show that these body, senses etc. (of the waking) exist in the dream or in the deep sleep. If this universal experience is Intuited or cognized properly, then there is no support of any universal experience to imagine or conceive that -"The Jiva who is in the waking experiences either dream or deep sleep." Therefore, it is tantamount to saying that the usual, conventional belief that -"Jiva alone has the three Avasthās" - is truly a Bhrānti (delusion). It being so when viewed from the standpoint of Intuitive Experience or Knowledge, how at all can those experiences (projected as if to be true by Avidya) taint or touch Paramatman, who is the Jiva's Paramārtha Swarūpa (Absolute essence of Being)?

THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP OF AVIDYĀ TO TURĪYA ĀTMAN

In any case, by deliberating on the purport behind this 11th

Kārikā what has been deduced is: Both Agrahaņa and Anyathā-grahaņa which appear among the Avasthās do not at all taint Turiya - the Paramārtha Swarūpa of Ātman who is the Witnessing Consciousness for them; therefore, for Him there is no blemish or defect whatsoever of being associated with Avasthās. This purport alone will be clarified in the next Kārikās.

नात्मानं न परांश्चैव न सत्यं नापि चानृतम् ।

प्राज्ञः किञ्चन संवेत्ति तुर्यं तत् सर्वदृक् सदा ।।१२।।

Meaning: Prājña does not know a wee bit either Himself or anyone else, either real or unreal, false. Whereas Turya is always Sarvadrik (omni-percipient alone).

THE PURPORT OF STATEMENT THAT PRĀJÑA IS KĀRAŅABANDHA

The purport of this Kārikā has to be discerned following on the previous Kārikā. In this and the next Kārikā, in both, the distinction that exists between Prājña and Turya is being expounded.

In the Sushuptāvastha (deep sleep state) we do not have the cognitions of the type - 'I' and 'another person': neither is therein any cognition of the type - 'This is real, this is unreal or false' - in this manner is the common people's belief, is it not so? But the Śruti is teaching that, in truth, (from the viewpoint of Intuitive Experience of Sākshi Chaitanya) this person is Prājña alone.

IS THERE AJÑĀNA IN SUSHUPTI OR NOT?

Anybody may get a doubt of the type - "Ajñāna being there in Sushupti is in the experience of all of us, is it not so? It being so, how at all can the Śruti statement to the effect that - 'Our Swarūpa which exists therein is Sarvajña or omniscient etc.' - be said to be proper?" In the past Indra, who was practising Brahmacharya or continence, had this very same question put to Prajāpati. Indra had raised a doubt in the manner - "Here he does not have his own cognition or the cognition of any other being apart from himself; he appears to have been completely lost, destroyed therein. I am not seeing any happiness accruing from the cognition of this Sushuptātman."

(Chh. 8-11-2). But Prajāpati, on his part, had stated: "The essential nature (Swarūpa) of Sushuptātman is Amrita (deathless), Abhaya (fearless) Brahman alone." (Chh. 8-11-1) Thus the reason for such a great difference existing between the Sastra Drishti and the common people's Drishti is: In Sushupti Jiva has actually become one with Kāraņa Brahma who is of the very essence of Sadrūpa (Pure Existence, Being). 'स्वमिपतो भवति तस्मादेनं स्वपीतीत्याचक्षते स्वं ह्यपितो भवति' (Chh. 6-8-1) - meaning: "Because in deep sleep he has become one with his own Swarupa he is said to be 'Svapiti' (one who is asleep). He has become one with Paramātman who is his very Swarūpa, is it not so?" - Thus the Sruti is teaching. In the present context of Māṇḍūkya Upanishad too it has been verily expounded that: "In deep sleep, having become Ekibhūta (unitary, non-dual, Absolute) He exists as Prajñānaghana (mass, lump of Pure Consciousness) alone." -(Māndūkya Mantra No.5). Thus in that Avasthā because He has become a non-dual Entity or Reality, invariably there being nothing second to Himself, He does not get any cognition of anything else, nor is there any cognition whatsoever. Just as in the waking if there existed two phenomena like - 'I' and 'another thing' only and if there existed an Antahkarana (inner instrument of the Mind) which cognizes an object in the manner - "This is such and such a thing" - distinctively, then only there could have been any possibility of cognizing indeed, is it not so? But the Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness or Intuitive Experience), especially, which experiences the deep sleep, does exist therein undoubtedly; however, with what can anything (as an object) be cognized? The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is very clearly explaining that -"Because there is no second thing (to Shuddha Sākshi Chaitanya or Witnessing Pure Consciousness) exists alone, He does not cognize and not because He does not have, or has lost, cognition itself." (Bri. 4-3-30). Therefore, from the standpoint of the fact that - "Sākshi or the Witnessing Principle which is cognizing the deep sleep (experience) is nothing other than the omniscient Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) alone" - the Śruti causing the Witnessing Consciousness of deep sleep 'Sarvajña' is fully justified indeed. Even that Survajnatwa (omniscience) has been expounded on the ground of the truth that - "In relation to

the phenomena that are appearing in the waking and the dream Prājña illumines everything" - alone. But when the common people observe from the viewpoint of the waking, on the ground of their apparent apprehension of not cognizing anything whatsoever they think in the manner: "I did not cognize or experience therein anything whatsoever". Hence there is no real opposition or contradiction at all between the Śāstra Dṛishṭi and the common people's experience.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PROPONENTS OF VYĀKHYĀNA PRASTHĀNA (POST-ŚANKARA COMMENTATORS' METHODOLOGY) IS NOT PROPER

In this context, some Vyākhyānakāras or post-Sankara commentators have opined: "In spite of the fact that Atman's essential nature of self-effulgence truly exists in deep sleep, that Tamas or darkness, gloom, ignorance by virtue of which that Swarūpa or essential nature of His is not being cognized by Him - that Tamas is a particular kind of Anirvachaniya (indefinable, indescribable) Avidyā (ignorance) which is Bhāvarūpa (of the nature of a really existing entity). Because this has enveloped or covered up Ātman, He exists therein not able to cognize His own real essence of Pure Being. If it is not so, and if the Avidya of the nature of mere 'Agrahana' (non-Comprehension) were to exist therein, then there will arise a problem of there being no reason or cause that can be adduced for not cognizing anything whatsoever therein." This is their doctrinaire theory. Those who follow these Vyākhayānakāras forward yet another Upapatti or ground, expedient cause to affirm that in Sushupti such a Bhāvarūpa Avidyā actually exists: "By acknowledging the concept that in Sushupti such an Avidyā exists the following facts are evolved, deduced: (i) Therein also both Jiva and Parameshwara exist separately, distinctively; (ii) only Jiva has Avidyā, while Brahman exists in this Shuddha (Pure) nature only; (iii) no one attains Mukti (Liberation, Beattitude) merely on the strength of getting Sushupti; (iv) for that reason alone, it amounts to our finding a tenable reason for the fact of sleeping persons once again waking up; (v) on the other hand, if it is accepted that in Sushupti only Brahman exclusively exists, then to Brahman alone the Avidyā of the nature of - 'I did not cognize anything whatsoever' - will attach itself (unavoidably); because merely by

going to deep sleep everyone merges in or becomes one with Shuddha Brahman, therein itself they become Liberated or attain Mukti - such a *Anishṭa* or undesirable predicament also will be confronted; (vi) besides, the conclusion of the type that - 'There is no cause whatsoever for those who are asleep to wake up once again' - will become unavoidable."

This doctrine is not proper. For, in the first place, it has been very clearly affirmed in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad that - "Because this Jiva has become Ekibhūta (one or identical) with Prājña, the Jiva does not get either the internal or external cognition." If we Intuitively deliberate a little incisively, deeply on this, then there does not exist any Pramāņa (valid means of proof) even to assert - "There exists a Padartha or a thing, substance which is of the essential nature of an entity called Anirvāchya Avidyā (indefinable ignorance)"; although these proponents of this kind of Avidya are saying that - "This particular Avidyā is in fact Avyākritanāmarūpa (unmanifested names and forms) alone" - in the Gaudapāda Kārikās nowhere 'Nāmarūpa' or names and forms have been called 'Avidya'; also he has expressly stated that - "Agrahana (not having cognized the Tattwa or Ultimate Reality) is itself called Kāraņa Avidyā; misconception is itself Kārya Avidyā". In the second place, with the Sruti teaching that - "In deep sleep (Sushupti) Jiva becomes one with omniscient Iswara" - this doctrinaire theory (of the Vyākhyānakāras) does not at all agree i.e. it is not in conformity whatsoever; besides, even the statement that - "If mere Agrahana exists, it amounts to saying that nothing has covered up or enveloped Atman" - is also not rational; for, it is in the experience of every one of us that - (a) when the light of day is gone, in the night nothing being visible to our eyes; (b) the absence of that light alone being empirically dealt with as darkness.

TURĪYA IS SARVADŖIK RŪPA OR OF THE NATURE OF OMNI-PERCIPIENT WITNESS

In the present context there is no need whatsoever to say that to the sleeping people there exists a particular kind of Avarana or cover of Agrahana which is of the nature of Abhava or non-existence. For, in Sushupti neither there exists cognition

nor obliviousness; besides therein there is no possibility whatsoever of either the correct, proper knowledge or misconception existing at all. Especially, the statement that - "In Sushupti Jiva and Parameshwara exist separately, distinctively; only to the Jiva therein Avidya exists" - is totally opposed to the Śruti teaching. For, therein the Jiva is verily 'Prājña' alone. 'Prajña' means Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) and It is Atman's essential nature (Swarūpa) - thus the Śruti is affirming too. The Bhāshyakāra (Shri Śankara) also, while explaining the word 'Prājña' has opined that - "In Sushupti without there being any Visheshajñāna (particular, distinct knowledge) but there existing a particular kind of Prajñā (Consciousness) which is Swarūpamātra or Absolute, transcendental, Pure-Being per se - is a special uncommon feature." By virtue of which Chaitanya Prakāsha (Light of Pure Consciousness) we are all experiencing Sushupti - that alone is our real Swarūpachaitanya (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness) indeed. Therefore, Shri Gaudapāda has stated in this Kārikā that - "That Turya is perennially Sarvadrik (omnipercipient)". Chaitanya which is verily our Swarūpa alone 'always' - meaning, in all the three Avasthas exists. It is 'Sarvadrik'meaning, that Pure Consciousness being everything and, in the Absolute sense, because apart from It there does not exist at any period of time or anywhere any other entity whatsoever, that Pure Consciousness alone is everything and 'Drik' - meaning, of the very essence of the Light, Effulgence of Consciousness. Here it should also be discerned that with the prime purport of teaching this Turyarūpa, which is the Paramārtha or Ultimate Reality of Atman, Brahman alone, the Pādatraya or the three quarters have been superimposed upon Ātman in the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad.

We should not doubt in the manner - "If it is so, then because it amounts to saying that merely by means of going to sleep all people become liberated only, the spiritual instructions of the Śāstra and the Guru will be rendered futile, is it not so? It will also be tantamount to accepting that there is no cause whatsoever for those who are asleep to wake up at all, is it not so?" For, without having discerned the truth that - "Our Turyātmaswarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness of Turyātman) is eternally Sarvadṛik" - all the disputants or proponents of various theories are usually entertaining this doubt.

Whether it is in the waking or in the dream or in the deep sleep - everywhere this Turya alone exists; when we observe (Intuit) from the Paramartha Drishti, apart from the Chaitanya of this Turyatman there do not exist these Avasthas like waking, dream etc. at all; just as in the waking the sea-shell or nacre itself appears in the form of silver, this Chaitanya Itself appears in the distinctive forms of Pramatru, Pramana and Prameya indeed. Therefore, even the 'Pramātru Rūpa' (form of cognizership) which is cognizing everything in that $Avasth\bar{a}$ (i.e. waking) is, in truth, a reflection ($\overline{A}bh\overline{a}sa$) alone of this Turiyatma or Chaitanya. Why say more? Even what we call 'Jagrat Avastha' is also the Ābhāsa only of this Chaitanya; there does not at all exist any Jāgrat Avasthā apart from Turiyātmatattwa; similarly, apart from Turyātman neither there exists whatsoever Svapnāvasthā nor the reflection of the world comprising Pramātru, Pramāna etc. because of the mental projections which appear within that Avastha; whatever appears to exist therein is verily an Abhāsa (reflection), false appearance of this Turyātma Chaitanya. Especially in Sushupti, it is known to everyone that the distinctions or divisions of Pramātru (cognizer), Pramāņa (means of cognition) and Prameya (object of cognition) themselves do not exist at all. This fact we have already clarified while explaining the meaning of the second half of the Kārikā. For this reason alone, it was stated in the previous Kārikā (1-11) that both Agrahaņa and Anyathāgrahaņa cannot at all be established or proved to exist in Turya. It being so, we should reckon the fact that the purport behind the Brihadāranyak . teaching - "There is no Viparilopa (total disappearance or loss of perception, cognition of the percepient cognizer), is it not so ?" - (Bri. 4-3-23) - is itself being restated in the sentence: "That Turya is always Sarvadrik" - in the Kārikā.

It is very clear now that to those who have gained the Intuitive Experience of this Tattwa there cannot at all be any apprehension of a doubt of the type - "In Sushupti alone Liberation (Mukti) has to be attained; further, there will not be any cause whatsoever to be adduced for one to wake up at all!" What is the meaning of saying that to Ātman who is Nitya Niravasthā (eternally devoid of any states), Nityamukta (eternally Liberated) Sarvadrigrūpa (omni-percipient) has 'Sushupti'? What is the meaning of the statement - "That He has to attain Mukti

afresh"? What is the meaning of the statement - "One wakes up from Sushupti"? Since such questions are clarified in the next Kārikā, this discussion is enough. For the nonce, it will be sufficient if it is realized that - "For the sake of those persons who have not yet cognized that they are 'Nityaniravasthas', 'Nityamuktas' - for such Jijñāsus only first conceiving the $\overline{A}tmabheda$ (distinctions of $\overline{A}tman$) of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, then to that Jiva himself who exists in Prājñasthiti (state of Pure Consciousness) here it has been taught about his Ajñāna as also for his Turya, which is the Paramārtharūpa or essential nature per se of Pure Being-Consciousness, 'Sarvadrigrūpa' has been taught." Although in deep sleep they are themselves verily Prājña, to those alone who have not cognized that Tattwa or Ultimate Reality the empirical states of Consciousness (Avasthās) occur - meaning, the mundane Vyavahāric transaction to the effect - "They are occurring" - is being carried on; but for waking up from deep sleep, the Ajñana that exists in deep sleep is not the cause; we have to determine in the manner -"The absence of the Intuitive cognition to the effect - 'Therein I have become one, identical with (Ekibhāva) Prājña' - is itself responsible for misconceptions of the type - 'I slept, I woke up'."

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PRĀJÑA AND TURĪYA

द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यमुभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः ।

बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः सा च तुर्ये न विद्यते ।।१३।।

Meaning: "Not cognizing duality (Dvaita) is common to Prājña, and Turya. Prājña is associated with *Bījanidra* or deep sleep comprising the seed potency, cause of duality, but that (sleep) does not exist in Turya."

In this Kārikā, keeping in mind a particular doubt, a solution has been suggested. That doubt is: "Just as Prājña has association with Avidyā of the form of Agrahaṇa, in the same way Turya also has that very same association with Avidyā, is it not so? It being so, how at all can it be asserted that Prājña alone is Kāraṇabaddha or bound by cause?"

The solution for this doubt is: "Prājña is associated with Bijanidra." Not knowing the Ultimate Reality of the Self (Tattwa) alone is Nidra (sleep). Since this alone is the seed form for the

Visheshajñāna (distinctive knowledge) in the Vishwa and Taijasa Avasthās, it is called 'Bījanidra'. "Prājña is Kāraṇabaddha, is associated with Bījanidra" - to this sentence, keeping in mind the explanatory commentary for the 11th and 12th Kārikās alone, the correct purport must be discerned. In Sushupti by virtue of his Bījanidra - meaning, the Ajñāna or non-comprehension of the nature of not having Intuited the Ultimate Reality of the Self - with which he is fettered, Jīva - from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi - is verily Prājña; in order to indicate the subtle teaching that - "The misconception of the type - 'In deep sleep I am associated with a sleep of the nature that I did not cognize anything" - is itself an impediment for the conviction, Intuitive Knowledge of the type - 'Then I was Prājña alone' -" exclusively here in the Kārikā it has been stated that - 'Prājña is associated with Bījanidra.'

THE FORMS OF JĪVATWA ETC. OF ĀTMAN ARE CAUSED BY THE UPĀDHIS OR ADJUNCTS

We should not think, reckon that -"The Jiva who is in Sushupti has this Bijanidra; this knowledge alone is the cause for the concept of an Avastha called 'Sushupti', and not that the Jiva actually experiences an Avasthā called 'Sushupti'." Assuming an adjunct of an Avasthā called 'Sushupti', to the Jiva therein (in Sushupti) Prājñatwa has been superimposed, is it not so? If this truth is discerned, then Jiva is not in reality (from the Absolute viewpoint) one who is having Sushupti Avasthā; in the same way, Prājña too, in the Absolute sense, is not Prājña; then it amounts to accepting that his Paramārtharūpa or essential nature of Being is Turiya alone. Therefore, what was stated, viz. "Prājña has Bijanidra; that (Bijanidra) does not exist in Turya" - is proved to be correct. The subtle point that has to be discerned here in this context is : We should never believe, think that - "There are three Ātmans like Jiva, Prājña and Turya; Jiva has Nidra while Prājña, being totally different, distinct from him, is Avyākrita (unmanifest seed form) and is the cause for the world of duality; but Turiya is verily Atman, totally different from both these, devoid of Nidra and of any association with Avidya." For the specific purpose of rescinding, sublating Jivatwa (soulhood) which is superim-

posed upon (or misconceived in) Atman who appears as Jiva in the Vyavahāra or workaday transactions, the Śruti (deliberately) first superimposes 'Prājñatwa'. Thereafter, in order to rescind or sublate that deliberate superimposition or imputation of Prājñatwa upon that very same Atman, the Śruti once again superimposes 'Turiyatwa'. From the Paramartha Drishți, in Ātman there is no Jivatwa at all; neither is there Prājnatwa nor Turiyatwa in Him. By virtue of the Upādhi or adjunct of Prāṇadhāraṇa (endowed with Karaṇas like senses and mind, carrying on empirical transactions) - Jivatwa; by virtue of the Upādhi of Jagat Kāraņatwa, i.e. being the cause for the manifest world of duality - Prajnatwa; in relation to Bahishprajñatwa etc. (i.e. from the viewpoint of the experiences of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti being there for Ātman) - Turiyatwa - these three concepts are misconceived in Atman. Because all these Upādhis are appearing from the Avidyā Drishţi alone, from the Paramārtha Drishți (in the ultimate analysis based on Intuitive Experience) Atman is not Jiva, not Prājña, not Turiya even; He is verily the Advitiya Tattwa or non-dual Absolute Reality who is Prapañchōpashama or devoid of any trace of the world of duality indeed.

> स्वप्नित्रायुतावाद्यौ प्राज्ञस्त्वस्वप्नित्रया । न निद्रां नैव च स्वप्नं तुर्ये पश्यन्ति निश्चिताः ॥१४॥

Meaning: The first two are associated with dream and deep sleep; in the case of Prājña especially, (he is associated with) deep sleep devoid of dream. To those who are totally convinced about the Ultimate Reality deep sleep is not seen in Turya, neither is Svapna or dream seen at all.

THE ESSENTIAL REALITY OF 'SVAPNA' AND 'NIDRA'

It has been previously explained that when it is said that - 'Prājña has Kāraņa Bandha' - it means that He has Bijanidra. Now it is being clarified as to what is meant by: 'Vishwa and Taijasa have Kārya Kāraņa Bandha.'

'The first two' - (in this Kārikā) means - 'Vishwa and Taijasa (Ātmans)' - they are associated with Svapna and Nidra, i.e. dream and sleep, respectively. Prājña has Asvapna

Nidrā (deep sleep devoid of dream). People do not know as to what exactly is Nidra or deep sleep; for, while they are asleep they are not having any specific, distinctive experience (Visheshānubhava) at all. In the same manner, the common run of people have not deliberated upon, discriminated as to what exactly is Svapna (dream) and have jumped to a conclusion. They keep on saying that - "When we are asleep all sorts of bizzare appearances like phantasmagoria are falsely seen by us; that queer state itself is Svapna or a dream." Shri Gaudapāda, the Kārikākāra, has signified that - "Although the common people's knowledge or belief of 'not having cognized anything whatsoever therein' is proper, in the true sense (in the ultimate analysis on the strength of Intuitive Experience) not having cognized, Intuited \overline{A} tmatatwa (Ultimate, Absolute Reality of the Self) is itself Nidra (deep sleep)." In the same way, Shri Gaudapāda has indicated that - "Although there is partially some truth in what the common people believe in that Svapna or dream is merely a 'false appearance', in the true sense or ultimate analysis, seeing Atman wrongly (or misconceiving Him) in a different, alien form is Svapna or a dream." Though this truth will be clarified in the next Kārikā we are stating it here so that the readers are kept informed in advance. In the Māṇḍūkyōpanishad it has been very clearly taught that - "Where (he) does not entertain any desire (Kāma) and where (he) does not see any dream whatsoever (Svapna) - that alone is Sushupti or deep sleep" - (Mān. Mantra 5). On the strength of that Śruti statement only Shri Gaudapāda has written here that - "Prājña is associated with deep sleep devoid of dream."

Thus by our proper understanding of the words - Nidrā (deep sleep) and Svapna (dream) what is eventually established is: Both the forms, viz. Vishwa and Taijasa, of Ātman are appearing associated with Svapna and Nidra. Just as the person, who has not cognized (the reality of) a rope, is deluded (Bhrānti) to misconceive it (the rope itself) as a snake, in the same way because of our not having cognized Ātman in His real essential nature alone we are seeing (misconceiving) Him as Vishwa as well as Taijasa. By this Intuitive deliberation the doubt of the type - "How can there exist dream and deep sleep in the waking?" - will vanish into thin air. For, Nidra or deep sleep

means (now) 'not knowing, cognizing the Reality of Atman', Svapna (dream) means 'to grasp, cognize It wrongly (misconceive) in a different form'. Just as these Nidrā-Svapna phenomena exist in what the common people call 'dream state', in the same way they exist in what they call 'waking state' also. Therefore, it is stated here that - "The first two are associated with Svapna - Nidra." In the Sruti the special characteristics or features of 'Saptānga Ekōnavimshatimukha' - (Māṇḍūkya 3, 4) are equally applied to Vaishwanara and Taijasa, and for this equal treatment the above-mentioned teaching alone is the cause. If we further delve deep into the matter and observe Intuitively, what the common people call 'waking' and 'dream' states are both one and the same indeed; both are dreams alone - this teaching Shri Gaudapāda has clarified in the next Vaitathya Prakarana. Though that truth is for nonce kept aside, if it is discerned that the teaching that "Vishwa - Taijasa forms of Atman are appearing by virtue of Svapna-Nidrā states alone" is propounded here, then it is sufficient.

THE WRONG THEORY OF VYĀKHYĀNAKĀRAS

The post-Sankara commentators (Vyākhyānakāras) keep on asserting that for the $\overline{A}tmar\overline{u}pa$ (essential nature of the Self) that exists in the three Avasthas, there are three different Upadhis. It is their theory that - "In the deep sleep state (Sushupti Avasthā) an indefinable (Anirvachaniya) Kāraṇāvidyā (causal ignorance), in the dream state (Svapna Avasthā) both Avidyā and its effects of mind (Antaḥkaraṇa) and in the waking state (Jāgrat Avasthā) Avidya, its effect of mind (Antahkarana) and the conglomeration of the body and the senses (Sharirendriya Sanghāta) - all these three are the Upādhis for Atman." Because what these disputants have acknowledged as their theory of Avidyā is grossly opposed to Śruti, Kārikā, Bhāshya, Yukti and Anubhava - this erroneous dogmatic theory need not be reckoned here in this context by Jijñāsus. In fact, in all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep there invariably exists the Nidrā of the type of 'not knowing or cognizing the Ultimate Reality of the Self'; in the waking and the dream states there exists a Svapna of the type of 'seeing Anātmadrishya or phenomenon of not-Self totally different, distinct from Atman.' If we interpret the Kārikā in the manner that - "By virtue of a sleep (Nidrā) of Ātmājñāna or ignorance, non-comprehension of the Reality of Self alone the dream (Svapna) of seeing Anātman or not-Self is appearing" - then it amounts to our having brought about perfect harmony or reconciliation (Ekavākyata) between the Śruti teaching and the Kārikā explanation. In addition, it wil be in consonance with Yukti (critique of reason) and Anubhava (Intuitive Experience). How it is so we will clarify when interpreting the meaning of the following Kārikās.

IN TURĪYĀTMAN THERE DOES NOT EXIST ANY KIND OF AVIDYĀ WHATSOEVER

Thus it amounts to saying that for Vishwa and Taijasa Ātmans Svapna-Nidras only are the cause; for Prājña merely Svapnarahita Nidrā is the cause, is it not so? It evolves, from this, that - "In Turya, which is Paramartha or the Ultimate Reality and to which all these three forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are deliberately imputed, those persons who are established in the realization of the Reality do not see Nidra or sleep, nor do they witness in the least Svapna or dream which perforce appears because of that Nidra." Turyatman is Nityachaitanyaswarūpa or eternally of the essential nature of Pure Consciousness; Agrahana and Anyathagrahana - both these Avidyas are, in fact, illuminated by His Chidprakāsha or Light of Pure Consciousness alone; if we further look in incisively, Intuitively, then it becomes established that just as the misconceived snake is, in a manner of speaking, completely pervaded by the rope alone, in the same way both these Avidyas are pervaded by Turya's Chidprakāsha and there by it becomes evident that their Paramārtha or real essence of Being is Turya alone. It being so, how can these Avidyas exist in Him at all?

> अन्यथा गृहणतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः । विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्नुते ।।१५।।

Meaning: To one who misconceives It is Svapna, to one who does not cognize the Reality it is Nidrā. The wrong knowledge of both these - if it gets destroyed, then (the Sādhaka) attains the *Turiya* (fourth) *Sthāna* (abode).

HOW IS TURĪYA ATTAINED?

In has been stated that those who have cognized, realized, after due determination, the real essence of Being of Turiya neither Nidrā nor Svapna is seen, is it not so? There is no question of raising a doubt of the type that - "When can we determine and cognize Turiya? The states of waking, dream and deep sleep are continuously occurring to Man, is it not so? How is it at all possible to determine Turiya distinct from these states?" For, the deep-seated comprehension that the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep are really three separate experiences is itself responsible for this doubt; we have already clarified that Nidrā (sleep) means not having cognized, realized the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality), while Svapna (dream) means wrongly understanding or misconceiving. Although we are all eternally Nityachaitanyalakshana Turiyātmaswarūpas or of the very essence of Turiyātman of the special characteristic of eternal Pure Consciousness, quite contrary to this nature we have believed all along in a topsy-turvy manner - once as 'I am awake', once as 'I am dreaming', and once 'I am in deep sleep'. This Viparyāsa (contrariety, inconsistency), Viparitajñāna (misconception) - meaning, knowing in a topsy-turvy manner - should be got rid of; then only, instantly we attain the Turiyapada or Beattitude indeed.

'TURĪYA' IS NOT AN AVASTHĀ

Because in the Kārikā it has been stated that - "तुरीयं पदमश्नुते" - meaning, "He attains the position of Turīya" - there is a possibility of getting a delusion of the type - "Turīya means a position, state or situation; we have to earn or attain that state, situation or position which is beyond the waking, the dream and the deep sleep." There are also the adherents of the Vyākhyāna-Prasthāna who are invariably propagating that - "There exists a particular 'Nirvikalpa Samādhi' - an Avasthā or state in which there is no Vyavahāra or empirical transactions or functions attached to Ātman." Some people believe innately that this 'Nirvikalpa Samādhi' is itself 'Turīyāvasthā.' But this is not a correct knowledge. Shri Śankarāchārya has, in this regard, written in his Sūtra Bhāshya in the manner - "¬ चायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्थाविशेष

निबद्धोऽभिधीयत इति युक्तं वक्तुम् ; 'तत्त्वमिस' इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य अनवस्थाविशेष-निबन्धनत्वात्" - (Sūtra Bhāshya 2-1-14) - meaning : "It is not possible to assert that a state or situation in which there is no empirical dealing whatsoever is caused on account of a particular state (Avasthā) ; for, the Śruti - 'That thou art' - is declaring, proclaiming that without having the cause of any Avasthā, perennially we have Brahmātmabhāva or the Pure Being (Existence) of Brahmātman."

TURĪYATWA IS ETERNAL

Therefore, these phenomena of waking, dream and deep sleep are not three different Avasthas or states at all; neither is It called 'Turiya', the fourth, because that which is 'Turiya' is a separate Avasthā apart from those three. Just as it has been expounded in the present Kārikā 'not having cognized, realized the Ultimate Reality (Tattwa)' - is itself Nidra or sleep, and 'misconceiving or wrongly reckoning It (Tattwa) to be something other than what It is' - is itself Svapna or dream. In these two the whole gamut of the experiences of all Avasthas or states without any exception whatsoever are subsumed. To believe or reckon that these two also are Avasthas occurring in time as events one after the other is wrong; both of them are verily Viparyāsas or inconsistencies, contrarieties; false notions indeed. We should not imagine that in the waking and the dream state our Knowledge, Consciousness (Jñāna) has blossomed forth, while in deep sleep It has shrunk or shrivelled up. As Shri Sureshwarāchārya has written in his Sambandha Vārtika: 'असंकुचितचित्पद्मः प्राज्ञे स्वप्नप्रबोधवत् । तथाऽप्रबुद्धबोधाब्नः प्राज्ञवत् स्वप्नबोधयोः ॥' (Sambandha Vārtika 1085) - meaning - "Just as in the waking and the dream states, similarly in the deep sleep too Atman's Chitkamala or lotus of Pure Consciousness exists without getting shrunk or stilled; just as in the deep sleep, similarly in the waking and the dream that Chitkamala exists without blossoming." Ātman's 'Chitkamala' means 'Chidrūpa' or Pure Consciousness per se; It is not something which never at all attains or undergoes distinctive mutations, changes of the type of shrinking (contraction) or blossoming (decrease or increase). Turiya means our Paramārtha Tattwa or the Absolute Pure Being; in all Avasthās It exists invariably and inexorably as of the very essence of Kūṭastha (perpetually immutable) Nitya (eternal) Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness); we get a Viparyāsa or false, contrary knowledge (misconception) to the effect - "In the deep sleep cognition (consciousness) has vanished; in the waking and the dream It manifests Itself" - as a result of our imagining an Upādhi or adjunct in Ātman because of our Avidyā. In addition, there exists in us, quite deep-seated too, the Viparyāsa to the effect that - "Avasthās are three in number". Assuming the Māyāsankhyā or magical illusory numericals of three as applied to the macrocosmic forms of Ātman in the three Avasthās only this Shuddhātman or Absolute Self (Pure Being-Consciousness) is called 'Turīya' - that is all.

THE METHOD OF VIPARYĀSAKSHAYA OR GETTING RID OF MISCONCEPTION

Although the Turiya Swarūpa is perennially existing (as our very essence of Pure Being-Conciousnenss), as and when the Ajñas or ignorant people, who have not been (till then) able to cognize by means of their intrinsic Intuitive Experience (Sākshāt Anubhava), falsify, sublate the superimpositions (Adhyārōpas) one by one, they keep on approaching the *Turiyaprāpti* (attainment of Turiya), in the following order:

- (i) Because they are associated with (attached to) the 'I' concept (Pramātṛurūpa) conjured up by misconception (Adhyāsa), the macrocosmic Vishwa and Taijasa Ātmans are affected by Anyathāgrahaṇa of the nature of seeing duality; when, in the Absolute sense (Intuitively), the *Chinmātraswarūpa* or the essential nature of Pure Consciousness which is the Witnessing Principle (Sākshi) of the respective Avasthā is Itself cognized as his own Self, that *Svapna Viparyāsa* of the nature of Dvaitadarshana will be on the wane.
- (ii) Although from the standpoint of the waking and the dream the Agrahaṇa of the nature of 'not seeing the duality' exists in deep sleep, even therein because that Chinmātra which is the Witnessing Principle is verily his Self, when the cognition (Intuition) of the type "I do not have either Grahaṇa (comprehension) or Agrahaṇa (non-comprehension)" accrues, then the Nidrāviparyaya of the nature of Agrahaṇa will get ematiated.

- (iii) Although the embodied selves (Sharirātmas) who appear in the waking and the dream, in their apparent forms, are seen in different, distinctive forms, when the cognition of the type "For all the conglomerations of bodies and senses etc. (Kāryakaraṇasaṅghāta) which appear in the waking state Vishwa alone is the Ātman, while for all conglomerations of bodies and senses etc. which appear in the dream state Taijasa alone is the Ātman" accrues, then the Svapna Viparyāsa of the nature of Anekātmagrahaṇa (misconception of seeing many selves) will be got rid of.
- (iv) Although the division, difference of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña Ātmans due to the association with different Upādhis of waking, dream and deep sleep states, respectively, is being seen, when the Intuition of the type "In their Pāramārthikarūpa or Absolute essential nature devoid of any Upādhis whatsoever, all of them are really one and the same Self' is attained, then the Svapna Viparyāsa of the nature of seeing the distinctions of Vishwa, Taijasa, Prājña Ātmans will be destroyed.
- (v) Although seen from the waking viewpoint it appears as if the waking, the dream and the deep sleep states are different as also are real, when the Intuition that they mutually digress from one another (Anyōnyavyabhichārita) accrues, then the Svapna Viparyāsa of the nature of the comprehension of the reality of the difference among the three states (Avasthātrayabhedasatyatwagrahaṇarūpa) will get destroyed.
- (vi) Although for the non-dual solitary Ātman, who is the Witness for the three Avasthās, from the viewpoint of the Pramātru or 'I' notion, Sadvitīyatwa or being endowed or associated with duality, manifoldness is seen, when the Intuition that "The three Avasthās are false appearances only; because Ātman exists everywhere in His essential nature of Pure Consciousness alone He is verily Turīya who is non-dual Pure Consciousness indeed" accrues, then the Svapna-Viparyāsa of the nature of the comprehension of a Selfhood endowed with duality (Sadvitīyātmatwa-grahaṇa) will get deminished.

Thus Svapna of the form of Anyathāgrahaṇa and Nidrā of the form of Agrahaṇa - both these are actually Viparyāsas, and hence when they are destroyed by the adoption of the method of Adhyārōpa-Apavāda as described above the Jijñāsu attains

Turiyapada alone. Although Turiyātman is Nityaprāpta or eternally attained, by means of Viparyāsakshaya this Prāptaprāpti is attained.

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते । अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ।।१६।।

Meaning: "When the Jiva, who is sleeping as a result of beginningless Māyā or illusion wakes up, then he cognizes the non-dual (Self) who is Aja (birthless), Anidra (sleepless) and Asvapna (dreamless)."

TURĪYAPRĀPTI MEANS ROOTING OUT THE ANĀDIMĀYĀSVAPNA ALONE

The Intuitive Knowledge (Jñāna) of the Turiyaswarūpa or essential nature of Turiya which is the resultant of Viparyāsakshaya mentioned in the previous Kārikā is expounded here.

Jīva, who is a Samsārī (transmigrating soul) seeing two types of Māyā Svapna or magical, illusory dreams of the types - Bījanidra of the nature of Tattwāgrahaṇa and of the nature of Anyathāgrahaṇa of which the resultant fruits are dream and deep sleep; and begetting waking and dream which are the effects of Avidyā, he is seeing various kinds of Viparyāsarūpa Svapnas in the manner - "This man is my father, this one is my son, this one is my grandson; this is my farm, house, money, wealth; these are my employees, this is my granary and this is my cattle wealth - etc. - all these are mine; by means of these I am secure and strong, by these I am doomed." Thus this belief, concept of the Jīva being a Samsāri is a Svapna or dream projected, conjured up by beginningless Māyā. All this is the resultant fruit of Avidyā of the nature of Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgrahaṇa alone, and not anything that is really existing at all.

When an extremely compassionate or kind-hearted $\bar{A}ch\bar{a}rya$ (preceptor) who has gained the Intuitive Experience of the $Ved\bar{a}nt\bar{a}rtha$ or the Reality taught by the spiritual science of Ved $\bar{a}nta$ awakens this Jiva with spiritual instruction of the type - "Oh dear, you are not this Kartru (agent of action) or $Bh\bar{o}ktru$ (enjoyer) who keeps on performing righteous acts (Dharma) and unrighteous deeds (Adharma) and experiencing pleasure (Sukha) and misery (Duhkha); you are verily the Tattwa or the Reality

which is *Paramārtha* or Absolute, Transcendental; get up, become wakeful, why are you muttering in sleep?" - then to this Jīva will accrue this waking called '*Turīyajñāna*'.

TURĪYĀTMA SWARŪPA

Then, (at that stage of spiritual progress) what is that Intuition or cognition that will accrue to the seeker? It is: (a) This Atman is Aja or birthless; He is Kūtastharūpa or of the very essence of Absolute immutability devoid of any changes either internal or external; (b) how is He Aja or birthless? Because, He is devoid of Bijanidrā which is the root cause for changes like birth, death etc. and hence He is Anidrā (sleepless). Because Turiya is eternally of the essential nature of Chitprakāsha or self-luminary, self-effulgent Pure Consciousness, He is perpetually, perennially devoid of sleep, is it not so? Even when Agrahana (non-comprehension) was superimposed upon Him, He was the Witnessing Principle (Sākshi); that sleep could not be defined or described as either His Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) or something other than Himself and was, in fact, existing as of Mithyārūpa or a false nature. Even then, in the ultimate analysis or absolutely speaking, the essential nature of that sleep also was Atman alone (i.e. Pure Being-Consciousness); (c) now especially when considered from the standpoint of this Swarūpa, He is eternally devoid of sleep, and for that reason alone He is Asvapna. From Bijanidra, of the nature of Agrahana, alone the dream called 'Anyathagrahana' is caused or projected, is it not so? When seen from the viewpoint of the Reality it amounts to determining that there is nothing like sleep at all; and so where can there be any scope for the existence of Svapna or dream? (d) thus because He is Anidrā and Asvapna alone, we have stated previously that He is Aja, to wit, devoid of mutations like birth, death etc. It being so, He is Advaita or non-dual. In Him duality of any variety, viz. Sajātīya or belonging to the same species, Vijātiya or belonging to another species, or Svagata or inherently within oneself - does never exist even the least bit. Thus in this manner when the twin Viparyāsas (misconceptions) of Avidyā of the Jijñāsu (seeker of the Ultimate Reality of Ātman) are got rid of, he is said to have been 'awakened' and thereby cognizes the Absolute Reality of his Self.

EVEN THIS VIPARYĀSAKSHAYA IS REFERRED TO ONLY FROM THE VYAVAHĀRA DŖISHŢI

We should not anymore entertain any misconceptions like:

(i) Because it is said that - "Jiva is asleep by virtue of 'Anādimāyā' or beginningless illusion" - this sleep is, in the Absolute sense, exists from time immemorial; (ii) because it is stated that - "When the Jiva wakes up" - this waking of the nature of Jñāna has perforce to accrue in a particular period of time in the future; (iii) because it is mentioned that - "Then he Intuits Advaita or non-duality which is Aja, Anidrā and Asvapna" - at a particular point of time this Turiyabodha or Consciousness of Turiya accrues. For, Turiya (the Absolute Reality beyond the three Avasthas and hence called 'the fourth' relatively here) is not at all related to empirical categories like time-space-causation; when even Avyākrita itself is Kālātīta or beyond time, how at all can there be any relationship whatsoever of time for Turiya? Because the categories of time-space-causation being projected by virtue of Avidya are mere appearances which are 'Māyārūpavishesha' or with forms having various special characteristics totally illusory in nature, events like Janma or birth, Nāsha or destruction, death etc. which occur depending upon those time-space-causation categories have necessarily to be Māyārūpa or of the nature of illusion alone. This conclusion becomes unavoidable, is it not so?

Therefore, when we consider from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi, time-space-causation concepts, and Janma-Nāsha which occur depending upon them - all these are Svapna or a dream indeed; because Jīvatwa or soulhood is Svapna, whatever he (Jīva) is conceived of having like - Viparyāsajñāna (wrong knowledge), Samyajjñāna Utpatti (attainment of correct Knowledge of Reality) and Anādimāyāsvapna Nāsha (destruction of the dream projected by beginningless illusion, magic) - all these are phenomena which are invariably susceptible to be sublated without doubt. The true Intuition (that is propounded by the Vedāntic spiritual science) is: "This Jīvabhāva or concept, deep-seated belief of soulhood is never there for me; concepts like Agrahaṇa and Anyathāgrahaṇa which have to be destroyed never existed, do not exist even now, nor can they possibly exist in future too; when these rudimentary categories of time-space-causation

are themselves not existing at all, which is that Ajñāna or ignorance that has to be got rid of? And which is that Jñāna or Intuitive Knowledge that has to accrue? Therefore, what has been stated here as 'waking up from Māyāsvapna' is undoubtedly from the Vyavahāra Dṛishṭi alone; this conclusion is to be drawn.

प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः । मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।।१७।।

Meaning: "If the world of duality really existed, then it might vanish; no doubt about it; this Dvaita or duality is Māyāmātra or mere illusion; from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality Advaita or non-duality alone is sustained."

ĀTMAN IS ETERNALLY NISHPRAPAÑCHA (DEVOID OF THE WORLD OF DUALITY) AND KŪṬASTHĀDVAITA (ABSOLUTELY AND IMMUTABLY NON-DUAL)

- (i) Some Advaita adherents without reckoning the real import of the Śruti statement that "Ātman is Prapañchōpashama, Shānta, Shiva, Advaita" is nothing but Ātman's Nityasiddhaswabhāva or eternally established essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness have opined that "After obtaining the Jñāna taught by the Śāstra, a new, fresh Jñāna called 'Sākshātkāra' has to be attained and only then the world of duality will vanish." This is an erroneous understanding on their part.
- (ii) Some others believe that "After the Vākyajñāna or knowledge arising out of hearing the sentence the seeker should necessarily practise Upāsana or mental meditation and by means of Upāsana alone the Paramapurushārtha or the ultimate goal of all human endeavour, existence can be achieved." This doctrine has been refuted in the third chapter 'Advaita Prakaraṇa' of this treatise.
- (iii) Yet some others have imagined that "Even after Ajñāna is removed by Jñāna, its menace is unavoidable; in order to completely get rid of Ajñāna, Sādhanas like **Prasankhyāna** etc. are to be practised." This theory will be refuted and the problem solved convincingly at the end of the second chapter **Vaitathya Prakaraņa**.
 - (iv) But so many others aver that "Because even after the

dawning of the Vākyajñāna, this Dvaitaprapañcha continues to exist invariably, Ātman cannot attain the cognition of Advaitatattwa. Therefore, for the purpose of **Prapañchavilaya** or dissolution of the world of duality there still remains a Sādhana to be necessarily practised."

Now we will show the defects in their doctrinaire, dogmatic theories:

What is meant by Prapancha? Is it the really, actually existing duality, diversity? If so, then it is very clear, evident that it is not possible at all to drive it out of existence by any means or practices (Sādhanas) - whatsoever they may be. For, what really exists can never go out of existence. If it is contented that - "Existing things or material objects are being destroyed, is it not so?" - then it is to be understood that in this case it is not an absolute destruction without any residue of or unaccompanied by any concomitant ingredients (Niranvayanāsha). When we say that a thing or material object is destroyed, it means, in the ultimate analysis, that the matter comprising it has undergone a transformation only, not that it totally became essenceless. If we break-up a wooden chair, it becomes actually some wooden pieces; if those pieces are burnt, then they assume the form of ash etc. Even if this ash is put in water and then it is stirred up, the ash particles invariably remain in a subtle, invisible form in that water. Why say more? Even when this whole visible, manifest world of duality is said to be destroyed at the time of the annihilation of the universe (at the time of the Kalpa) by the Srutis, the Smritis and Puranas or the mythological texts, they purport to say that they remain in a subtle, potential state of 'Avyākrita (unmanifest) Nāmarūpa (names and forms)' and time after time they once again get manifest as the world of multiplicity, diversity called 'Vyākrita Nāmarūpa Prapañcha'. Therefore, to say that an existing world is to be made 'Vilaya' or totally extinct, essenceless is opposed to our empirical experience, it is also opposed to logic.

Even so, if these disputants persist in saying that - "This world of duality, diversity can be made 'Vilaya' by some sort of a Sādhana" - then, it will have to be unavoidably accepted that so far no one has by means of such a Sādhana attained Mukti or Liberation. For, if any one person had dissolved, an-

nihilated (Vilaya) the world without leaving any remnants whatsoever, now we could not have possibly seen any world at all. It is not like that at all, is it not so? Therefore, it is proper and tenable to say that - "An existing world of duality can never be made 'Vilaya' by anybody."

In that case, how is it proper, reasonable for Shri Gaudapāda to have said - "The Prapañcha projected by Avidyā can be destroyed by Vidyā" - ? Has he not stated that - "If the Anādimāyā Svapna of the nature of Agrahaṇa, Anyathāgrahaṇa is done away with (Kshaya) the seeker attains Turīyajñāna or swarūpa" ? - Thus anyone may raise an objection. We have already given a satisfactory solution for this objection. Though from the Vyavahāra Dṛishṭi this Avidyā and its Avidyākārya Prapañcha, meaning the world conjured up or projected as an effect of that Avidyā, are appearing at present, they do not in reality exist. This entire Dvaita is Māyāmātra or mere illusion; really, absolutely existing Entity is Advaita or nonduality alone. This alone is the philosophical teaching (Siddhānta).

THERE DOES NOT EXIST PRAPAÑCHA; NOR THERE IS ITS NIVŖUTTI (RIDDANCE)

Therefore to believe that - 'Prapañcha really exists' and then to reckon that - 'By means of a particular Sādhana it has to be dissolved' - both these concepts are wrong. The 'Nivrutti' of the world of duality does not mean its disappearance. For, in deep sleep the world is not seen by any one of us; even so, it once again becomes visible, appears. Therefore, real 'Prapañcha-pravilaya' or 'perpetual dissolution of world' means only 'Māyāmātra' or merely as a false appearance and to cognize the falsity of this world in the manner - "This is merely a false appearance (of duality); apart from my Swarūpa or essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, it does not exist by itself (independently)" - alone.

Those who believe (quite persistently) that - "There exists a Prapañcha in Ātman; however, it will be 'dissolved' or 'removed' by a particular kind of Sādhana" - should first get rid of this 'Bhrānti' or delusion, misconception by deliberating (Intuitively) on the illustrations, figurative analogies, like the 'Nivrutti' of rope-snake and 'Māyā Nivrutti' or falsification of an illusory

vision cast on people by a magician. This discriminative exercise has to be repeated mentally so as to comprehend the possibility of falsification or sublation of a mere superimposition on Ātman Consciousness. Take for instance the example of the rope-snake. The 'snake', which we have imagined, conceived in the rope by our deluded mind, does not really, actually exist during the time of its appearance and then by means of the true Jñāna or realization, cognition to the effect - "This is only a rope" - that 'snake' does not disappear. For, there never existed a snake at any time. In the same way, by mesmerism or hypnotism those objects or phenomena which a magician may conjure up externally like an elephant, or any other wild animal so as to be seen by all the onlookers actually do not exist at that time, nor do they disappear after the magician withdraws or removes his magical spell.

All false appearances - of whichever objects they are the projections, i.e. mental images viewed as objective reality - exist at all times in the actual form of that substrate-object alone; in the forms in which they appear they do not at all really exist, nor later on do they disappear or become extinct also. In the same manner, the phenomenon of the world too - because it is also misconceived in Atman (Pure Being-Consciousness) due to Ajñāna (a lack of Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) - really exists at all times, nay eternally, as Turīyātmarūpa alone. In its form of appearance it never exists whatsoever, nor does it disappear or get dissolved also.

With regard to the subject-matter indicated by the Kārikā: "If the world existed, then it was possible for it to disappear" - some disputants have raised a doubt of the type - "If it existed, could it vanish? It is proper to say that what exists that entity does not get destroyed, is it not so? Why did the Kārikākāra write in this manner which is quite opposed to universal experience? 'If it existed, it would have disappeared; because it does not go, it does not exist' - such a (ridiculous) statement which discriminating (wise) person will utter?" This is the doubt. We have already provided a satisfactory solution to this. In our workaday world the really existing things or objects may be subject to a transaction of the type - "Now they exist; but in a few days they may get destroyed." With regard to mere false

appearances no one deals in the manner - "They exist' - or "They get destroyed." Similarly, because this duality also, from the Absolute standpoint (Paramārtha Dṛishṭi), a false appearance (misconception) only, to reckon in the manner: "Only after (an actual event or occurrence of) the world of diversity totally disappearing or being destroyed, Ātman becomes or is rendered, as it were, Nishprapañcha or devoid of a world of multiplicity" - is wrong indeed. It is affirmed in the Kārikā that -"All of us are eternally, perennially devoid of the world of multiplicity." Therefore, here in this context there is no scope whatsoever for any doubt.

विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत कल्पितो यदि केनिचत् । उपदेशादयं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ।।१८।।

Meaning: "If this misconception were entertained by anyone, then it might have disappeared, destroyed. This theory is meant for instruction only; when it is signified, there is no duality at all."

ESPECIALLY THE DIVISIONS OF ŚĀSTRA, PRECEPTOR, DISCIPLE DO NOT EXIST IN ĀTMAN AT ALL

Now yet another doubt: "In truth, Atman is of 'Nityashuddhabuddhamukta' essence of Being; in Him there does not exist any world of duality whatsoever. To those who are seeing a dream because of 'Anādi Māyā' there is a 'Viparyāsa' of the type - 'I am experiencing Avasthās of Jāgrat, Svapna and Sushupti' - caused by the Kārya-Kārana Avidyās. By means of Tattwopadesha when the right knowledge accrues, they will get established in the essential nature of Pure Being of Atman realizing in the manner - 'Nishprapañcha Turiyātman Himself am I; I am Aja, Anidra, Asvapna' - this in essence is the doctrine that has been enunciated so far, is it not so? If it is so, then to the extent of - the Sastra and the Acharya who propound the teachings and the disciples who receive that spiritual instruction, teaching necessarily being there for this empirical transaction - at least, there will have to be perforce duality, is it not so? If you do not accept at least these distinctions of Sastra, preceptor etc., then your transaction of the type - 'From such and such a Sastra or from such and such a preceptor I attained this Nirvishesha Advaita Jñāna' - will be also rendered false, unreal only. Is it not so?"

The solution for this doubt is: These concepts of Śāstra, preceptor, disciple are not akin to the world of duality, multiplicity that the ignorant people have misconceived in Atman. In fact, no ignorant persons have misconceived these in Ātman at all. On the other hand: This distinction or differentiation of Sastra, Āchārya, Shishya has been (deliberately) superimposed (Adhyāropita) in Vedanta especially for the purpose of spiritual instruction (Upadesha). That is all. When a big building is being constructed the workers erect a scaffolding all around the walls, but when the structure is completed they remove the scaffolding, is it not so? In the same way, this differentiation of Śāstra, Āchārya and Shishya is conceived from the viewpoint of Adhyārōpa (superimposition) deliberately for the purpose of spiritual instruction. Both the Śāstra or the preceptor who teach the Ātmatattwa to the ignorant people do so in the manner - "You are a Shishya, I am (the Śāstra) Āchārya or Guru; you do not know the Reality, I will teach you. This entire world is misconceived in Ātman. If you cognize this truth, then you are That eternally nondual Atman alone" - in this manner the preceptor instructs. For those who instruct about the Ultimate Reality of Atman, Brahman, because the Intuitive Experience of the type - "All duality or diversity is indeed $Mithy\bar{a}$ or unreal, false; its real essence of Being (Swarūpa) is Ātman alone" - invariably is established in them, this deliberate superimposition of differentiation will not be responsible for their (apparent) Samsāritwa or transmigratoriness. While in the game of Chess the pawns are being assumed to be 'elephant', 'camel' etc. and are dealt with as such various symbolic representations, although the players very well know the reality in the manner - "All these pawns are wooden figures; this one is not really an elephant, nor is that pawn a camel" merely for the sake of the sport (recreation) they carry on this transaction of assuming the various pawns as 'an elephant' or 'a camel' etc., in the same way, the omniscient Sastra (Veda) or Āchārya, knowing full well the Ultimate Reality behind this apparent phenomenon of the world of duality alone, are carrying on the Vyavahārik (empirical) dealings of Śāstra, Shishya etc. Therefore, the fact that - "These (deliberate superimpositions) are not at all misconceptions which are the resultant effects of Ajñāna, nor is there any need for their removal, dissolution" - will

become clear merely by cognizing (Intuitively) the Turiyātmatattwa. "For the statement - 'After cognizing, there will not be Dvaita or duality' - the meaning is not at all - 'Earlier there existed duality'; when the Intuition accrues - 'This thing did not exist at any time at all' - this truth also will become quite evident" - In this manner alone that statement has its ultimate purport.

IF ONE PERSON GETS LIBERATED (MUKTA) UNIVERSALLY EVERYONE DOES NOT ATTAIN MUKTI

As a result of the above explanation one more doubt will raise its head here. That is: "If one Jiva by means of the spiritual instruction attains the Jñana, the entire world or universe will, as a consequence, get dissolved, and then all the Jivas have necessarily to attain Mukti or Beatitude, is it not so ?" - in this way, the ignorant people may doubt! But, in the ultimate analysis really there is no Dvaita at all; in the Absolute sense the non-dual Turiyatman alone exists. When seen from this Intuitive transcendental viewpoint there is no room for the above doubt at all. For, the doubting Thomas who thinks in that manner with that parochial viewpoint himself would not remain then. On the other hand, considering the issue from the Vyavahāric viewpoint, just as (in the rope-snake illustration) if one person who has misconceived a rope to be a snake gets rid of his false notion, there will never be any impediment or restriction for another person to entertain a delusion of mistaking the same rope to be a snake, similarly even if one Jiva Intuits that he is Nishprapañchātman, by virtue of the Avidyā that others have, that very Atman keeps on appearing as Saprapañcha or associated with a world of duality. From the Vyavahāra Drishți, the Sastra is instructing each and every human being separately; but from Paramārtha Drishţi, there are no misconceptions whatsoever even of the Śāstra, Āchārya and Shishya. Especially to doubt in the manner - "Even when one particular Jiva is Liberated, still other Jivas, many in number beyond count being there, it becomes imperative for each and every person there will have to be perforce a separate Avidyā and thus it will amount to saying that there exist many Avidyas, is it not so?" - is truly ridiculous. For, in the doctrine that - "Though in the Absolute sense (to wit, seen from the Intuitive Experience viewpoint), Advaita or non-dualism alone exists, by dint of Avidyā

alone duality is misconceived and appears" - even the surmise of a phenomenon of Avidyā existing is itself conjured up by Avidyā alone. It being so, to conjecture Avidyā, which is invariably the cause for all empirical transactions, to be 'one', 'many' (to wit, thereby involving and including it within the ambit of the empirical categories of time-space-causation which are themselves projections, nay products, of Avidyā) is inexcusable, stark ignorance indeed!

CONCLUSION

What is established by the deliberation carried out with regard to the Kārikās considered so far is: "Because in Ātman the world of diversity, multiplicity of the form or nature of an Avasthā does not exist in the least, in Him neither any Jīvatwa, which is itself a special characteristic of an experience within an Avasthā, nor any Īśwaratwa, which is of the form or nature of the Sākshi or Witness of any Avasthā, exists whatsoever. As stated in the Śruti - 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' - (Māṇḍūkya Mantra 2) - this Ātman is verily Brahman alone, Nirupādhika (devoid of any adjunct), Nirvishesha (devoid of any special characteristics).

V MĀTRĀTRAYA KĀRIKĀS

UPANISHAD

सोयमात्माऽध्यक्षरमोंकारोऽधिमात्रं पादा मात्रा मात्राश्च पादा अकार उकारो मकार इति ।।८।।

Meaning: "This is the Self which is of the nature of the syllable 'AUM', in regard to its elements. The quarters are the elements, the elements are the quarters, namely the letter 'A', the letter 'U' and the letter 'M'." - (8)

जागरितस्थानो वैश्वानरोऽकारः प्रथमा मात्राऽऽप्तेरादिमत्त्वाद् वाप्नोति ह वै सर्वान् कामान् आदिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ॥९॥

"Vaishwānara, whose sphere (of activity) is the waking state, is the letter 'A', the first element, either from the root 'Ap' to obtain or from being the first. He who knows this, obtains, verily, all desires, also, he becomes first." - (9)

स्वप्नस्थानस्तैजस उकारो द्वितीया मात्रोत्कर्षादुभयत्वाद्वोत्कर्षति ह वै ज्ञानसंतित समानश्च भवित नास्याब्रह्मवित् कुले भवित य एवं वेद ॥१०॥

"Taijasa, whose sphere (of activity) is the dream state, is the letter 'U', the second element, from exaltation or intermediateness. He who knows this exalts, verily, the continuity of knowledge and he becomes equal; in his family is born no one who does not know Brahman" - (10)

सुषुप्तस्थानः प्राज्ञो मकारस्तृतीया मात्रामितेरपीतेर्वा मिनोति ह वा इदग्ं सर्वमपीतिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ॥११॥

"Prājña, whose sphere (of activity) is the state of deep sleep is the letter 'M', the third element, either from the root 'Mi' - to measure or because of merging. He who knows this measures (knows) all this and merges also (all this in himself)" - (11).

अत्रेते श्लोका भवन्ति -

विश्वस्यात्वविवक्षायामादिसामान्यमुत्कटम् । मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ स्यादाप्तिसामान्यमेव च ।।१९।।

Meaning: "Here these verses are found: If there is an intention of mentioning 'Atwa' or going, wandering for Vishwa, when it is assumed to be a $M\bar{a}tra$ or element - then the $S\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ or genus of being $\bar{A}ditwa$ or first is Utkata or powerful, abundant; also the $\bar{A}ptis\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ or genus of obtaining, fulfilment, completion is abundant."

THE MATRA OR ELEMENT OF AKARA IN AUM(OM)KARA

Just as the Kārikās which explained the Pādatraya Śrutis were considered so far, now we will take up for deliberation the Kārikās elaborating upon Mātrātraya Śrutis. So far those Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña were expounded as Ātman's three Pādas (quarters) giving predominance to the 'named aspect' of the pedagogic method (Abhidheyapradhāna). Now those very macrocosmic forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña are being called and expounded as Ōmkāra's (which is the mnemonic symbol for Ātman, Brahman) Mātrātrayas or three elements,

letters, giving predominance to the 'name aspect' (Abhidhānapradhāna method of teaching). On the earlier occasion just as Turiyātman Himself was in truth (in the Absolute sense) Paramātman who was not the 'named' or Abhidheya, and just as from the Adhyārōpa Drishţi (viewpoint of deliberate superimposition) only those Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña Pādas were superimposed for the nonce and later were sublated (Apavāda), in the same way here too it will be taught that Omkara Itself in the Absolute Transcendental sense is the Paramārtha (Absolute Reality of Ātman) sans Abhidhāna; in It, only from the Adhyārōpa Drishți, the elements (Mātras) of Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra will be superimposed purely for the purpose of teaching and eventually they will be rescinded (Apavāda). The elaboration of this teaching will be made later on while explaining the 24th Kārikā. Now the essence of Omkāra's first element of Akāra will be signified.

As stated before, although Vishwa is really Turiya Himself, merely to facilitate its comprehension (by the Jijñāsu), it was conceived as Ātman's first Pāda, quarter, in the same way assuming the Absolute Reality of Turiya as Ōmkāra - that very Vishwa alone - although He is verily Ōmkāra devoid of the divisions, distinctions of Abhidhāna and Abhidheya - is assumed to be the 'Akāra' form of the first *Mātra* or metre, element of the Ōmkāra merely to facilitate the Jijñāsu's comprehension.

Even when assuming Vishwa as Akāra thus merely from the Adhyārōpa Dṛishṭi, the seeker should perforce reckon it giving predominance to the two genera (Sāmānya) of 'Āditwa' (being first) and 'Āpti' (being all-pervasive) for Vishwa. Then it will be discerned that there is no difference whatsoever between Vishwa and Akāra. Just as Vaishwānara has pervaded the whole universe Akāra also, because the letter 'A' is itself attaining the forms of all Varṇas or letters of the alphabet, is thereby all-pervasive. Just as for one who cognizes Turīyātma Vaishwānara is the first instrument or means (Sādhana) of knowing, similarly for one who wishes to Intuit Ōmkāra this Akāra becomes the initial Sādhana. Only after cognizing this first step, the other Mātras can be comprehended.

तैजसस्योत्विवज्ञान उत्कर्षो दृश्यते स्फुटम् । मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ स्यादुभयत्वं तथा विधम् ॥२०॥

Meaning: "In the matter of comprehending Taijasa as identified with 'U', that is to say, when Taijasa's identity with a letter is apprehended, the similarity of excellence is clearly seen, and of being intermediary also is equally clear."

THE UKĀRARŪPA MĀTRA

Just as in the past it has been explained in the case of Akāra which is identical with Vishwa, here too in the same way the Ukāra is to be comprehended as identical with Taijasa.

मकारभावे प्राज्ञस्य मानसामान्यमुत्कटम् । मात्रा संप्रतिपत्तौ तु लयसामान्यमेव च ॥२१॥

Meaning: "In the matter of Prājña's identity with the letter 'M', that is to say, when Prājña's identity with a letter is apprehended, the similarity of being a measure is seen to emerge plainly, and so also does the similarity of absorption."

THE MAKĀRARŪPA MĀTRĀ

The Makāra which is identical, non-different from Prājña should be understood in the same manner as we did in the case of the previous two Mātrās. Between the Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra which have been mentioned so far, on the one hand, and Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, on the other, there does not exist any distinction whatsoever. The purport in calling Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña by letters or names like Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra, respectively, is to teach the doctrine that - "Just as from the Vyavahāra Drishti they (Vishwa etc.) are Abhidheya (nameables or named objects), similarly Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra are their Abhidhāna (names), respectively; in their true essence of Being per se there exist neither Abhidhāna nor Abhidheya whatsoever. If a person, who stands at the top of a well, transacts in the manner - "This well is so much deep", and if another person at the bottom of the well transacts in the manner - "This well is so much high" - these phenomena or concepts of height and

depth are not at all two realities, entities (to wit, as if they are two distinct objects) - here too it should be comprehended.

त्रिषु धामसु यस्तुल्यं सामान्यं वेत्ति निश्चितः । स पूज्यः सर्वभूतानां वन्द्यश्चैव महामुनिः ॥२२॥

Meaning: "He who knows, with firm conviction, the common similarities in the three states is a great sage, worthy of adoration and salutation by all beings".

अकारो नयते विश्वमुकारश्चापि तैजसम् । मकारश्च पुनः प्राज्ञं नामात्रे विद्यते गतिः ॥२३॥

Meaning: "The letter 'A' leads to Vishwa; so also the letter 'U' leads to Taijasa; and the letter 'M', again, leads to Prājña. That which is beyond the letters, there remains no attainment."

THE BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATRAS

As we have explained so far, one who cognizes on the strength of Intuitive Experience (Anubhava) in the manner -"Between Vishwa and Akāra, between Taijasa and Ukāra and between Prājña and Makāra - comprehending the similarities (genera) between these pairs, just as a diamond expert examiner detects the real quality of the diamond after constant concentration in the manner - 'This jewel which is shedding or diffusing brilliance hither-thither is one alone (to wit, self-effulgent); apart from it there do not exist any rays of brilliant light' - and so, the entire mass or phenomenon of an Avastha comprising both these Abhidhāna and Abhidheya is verily Ātman who is associated with the respective Avasthā only" - such a person will himself become Vishwa indeed. This meaning is indicated by the sentence - "Ākāra leads (such a person) to Vishwa." This alone is the purport behind the invocatory verse (Mangala Shlōka) of the Upanishad in which the Acharya has stated that - "Vishwa has pervaded the Sthiracharasamūha (the conglomeration of movable and immovable phenomena) with His rays of Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness as also He enjoys gross pleasures." One who Intuits the truth that - "This (Vishwa) alone is Taijasa and Prajña; through them to cognize Ōmkārātman He (i.e. Vishwa) is the first device. He is also 'Ādi' or the beginning" - will be led to Vishwa by Ākāra. In this manner by means of discerning Intuitively the 'Akāra Artha' or real meaning of the first Mātra one who realizes the Ōmkārātman will attain the Intuitive Experience in the manner - "I am verily Vaishwānara."

In the same manner, comprehending the real import of the Mātrā "U", if the seeker cognizes the truth that just as by the Utkarsha (excellence) of Akāra this Ukāra has arisen, similarly if the subtle aspect from Vaishwanara is excelled or sublimated (Utkarsha), then Taijasa alone subsists; just as Ukāra exists as an intermediate entity between Akāra and Makāra and is similar, identical with both of them, Taijasa also is identical with Vaishwānara and Prājña - if one merges Akāra in Ukāra and Vaishwānara in Taijasa - this Ukāra will lead such a person to Taijasātman; it enables him to attain the Intuitive Experience of the type - "I am verily Taijasa or Hiranyagarbha who is the in dwelling consciousness within the Svapna and who is Sarvaprapañchōpahita or having the whole universe as an adjunct." In the same way, one who comprehends the similarity between Ukāra and Makāra by virtue of their Māna (measure) or Laya (merging, identity) as explained in the commentary on the Upanishad - to him this Makāra will help attain the realization or Intuition of the type - "I am verily Prājñātman, Avyākritātma, who is devoid of any time-space categories and the world of multiplicity, but who is having only the Kāranatwa (causation) as His adjunct." Because Taijasa is, through Prājña, a doorway to Intuit Omkārātman, He is the second Mātra. In the same way, for one who has merged Vishwa and Taijasa unto His Pure Being-Consciousness, Prājña Himself is verily the third Mātra of Ōmkārātman.

Although in this Jñāna Prakaraṇa or Chapter devoted predominantly to Intuition Upāsana (meditation which is Kartrutantra and Avidyātmaka in its essence) is not relevant in the ultimate analysis, in a secondary sense, for the sake of low and middle class seekers it has been mentioned. This fact has to be remembered here.

VI PRANAVA KĀRIKĀS (Upanishad)

अमात्रश्चतुर्थोऽव्यवहार्यः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत एवमोंकार आत्मैव संविशत्यात्मनात्मानं य एवं वेद ॥१२॥

Meaning: "The partless $\bar{O}m$ is Turiya - beyond all conventional dealings, the limit of the negation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. $\bar{O}m$ is thus the Self to be sure. He who knows thus enters the Self through his Self."

अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति -

ओंकार पादशो विद्यात् पादा मात्रा न संशयः । ओंकारं पादशो ज्ञात्वा न किञ्चिदपि चिन्तयेत् ॥२४॥

Meaning: "Here the following verses are found: One should know $\bar{O}m$, quarter by quarter; (for) there is no doubt that the quarters (of the Self) are the letters (of $\bar{O}m$). Having known $\bar{O}m$, quarter by quarter, one should not think of anything whatsoever."

PARAMĀRTHA ŌMKĀRAJÑĀNI IS A KŖITAKŖITYA; DEVOID OF THE DIVISIONS OF ABHIDHĀNA, AND ABHIDHEYA THAT REALITY WHICH IS BEYOND ALL EMPIRICAL DEALINGS IS VERILY ŌMKĀRA

Between the letter (Mātra) of 'A'kāra and the quarter (Pāda) called 'Vaishwānara' there does not exist any difference whatsoever; it should not be conceived that Akāra is the Abhidhāna (name) and Vaishwārana is its Abhidheya (the nameable object). Ōmkāra means the Turīyātman alone; Ōmkāra's Mātras means really the Turīya's Mātras only. Therefore, this Ōmkāra should be cognized quarter by quarter or letter by letter - both these mean the same thing. By the statement - "quarter by quarter one should cognize" - it means that if one Intuits deeply, Vishwa is verily Taijasa alone and that Taijasa is Prājña indeed. Finally, it has to be determined that Prājña in the ultimate analysis is really Turīya or Ōmkāra alone.

Thus for one who has Intuited (the Ultimate Reality of Ātman or Turiya or Ōmkāra) by this subtle process of merging (Laya) each quarter (Pāda) or each letter (Mātrā) there does not

remain anything else whatsoever which has either to be cognized or performed (by way of a Sādhana). For, in the case of a seeker who has Intuited to culminate in his plenary experience (Anubhava) in the manner - "That Absolute Transcendental Reality (Paramārtha) which is Nityanirupādhika or perennially devoid of any adjuncts, Nirvishesha or devoid of any special characteristics, Abhidhānābhidheyātita or beyond the distinctions of name and namable object and Nirvikalpa or devoid of any mental concepts alone is myself" - there is no possibility whatsoever of subsisting as either a Pramātru (cognizer) or Kartru (agent of action). Hence, he will remain without thinking about anything; meaning, for such a Jñāni (Realized soul) there is no botheration or anxiety whatsoever to be caused either by any Ishtaprāpti (a desirable thing to be acquired) or Anishtanivritti (getting rid of an undesirable source of misery). It is tantamount to this Ōmkāra Jñāni possessing no body at all (to wit, his Adhyāsa or misconception to the effect of his identifying himself as the body is sublated, falsified) and as a result there is no occasion for him to worry about endeavouring to acquire anything for the sake of his physical body or to do away with anything that is not desired. Because he cannot possibly have any Samsāritwa (transmigratoriness) - there is no possibility of his entertaining any botheration or anxiety of either attaining any fulfilment of a desired objective in other births (Janmāntara) or other worlds (Lōkāntara), or getting rid of any undesirable hardships. It further amounts to his having cognized everything that had to be cognized, as also having done everything that had to be done in this human existence.

> युञ्जीत प्रणवे चेतः प्रणवो ब्रह्म निर्भयम् । प्रणवे नित्ययुक्तस्य न भयं विद्यते क्वचित् ॥२५॥

Meaning: "One should concentrate one's mind on Ōm, (for) Ōm is Brahman beyond fear. For a man, ever fixed in Brahman, there can be no fear anywhere."

प्रणवो ह्यपरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च परः स्मृतः । अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्योऽनपरः प्रणवोऽव्ययः ।।२६।।

Meaning: Ōm alone is the inferior Brahman; and Ōm

alone is considered to be the superior *Brahman*. Ōm is without an inside and an outside, and without a front (effect), a behind (cause); and It is undecaying."

OMKĀRA WHICH IS *PARAMĀRTHA* (ABSOLUTELY REAL) ITSELF HAS BECOME THE FORMS OF PARA BRAHMAN AND APARA BRAHMAN

Here the Intuitive Knowledge of Oṃkāra is being eulogized. That 'Apara Brahma', which has been recommended in the Śruti by way of an injunction in the manner - "Meditate on It as associated with such and such qualities" - for the sake of low and middle class seekers, is verily this Praṇava alone, this Oṃkāra alone. That Parabrahma too, which has been expounded in the Śrutis in the manner - 'Not this, not that" - by refuting the names and forms misconceived because of Avidyā for the sake of the highest type of seekers, is verily this Oṃkāra alone. This Praṇava alone has been dealt with as Apara Brahma being associated with Upādhis (Sōpādhika) and as Para Brahma, being devoid of any adjuncts (Nirupādhika) in the Śrutis.

Because it has been stated in the Prashnōpanishad (Chapter 2) that - "Those who meditate on Para and Apara Brahmans through this *Pratīka* or symbol of Ōṃkāra attain the respective Brahmans" - this *Paramārtha Tattwa* or Absolute Reality also has been given the nomenclature of "Praṇava" figuratively implying It.

If we observe It Intuitively, It is neither Parabrahma nor Aparabrahma. It has no cause, nor there exists any effect of It. Within It there does not exist anything else which belongs to another species; externally to It also there does not exist anything whatsoever which is distinct or different from It. Therefore, It is Avyaya or without emaciation, degeneration; for, there is nothing whatsoever which is susceptible to get emaciated either within or without It (Mundaka 2-1-2). Akhand-eka-Rasa Chinmātra or It is verily Pure Consciousness which is impartible, and of one and the same essence of Being, is it not so?

सर्वस्य प्रणवो ह्यादिर्मध्यमन्तस्तथैव च । एवं हि प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा व्यश्नुते तदनन्तरम् ।।२७।।

Meaning: "Om is indeed the beginning, the middle and

the end of everything. If $\bar{O}m$ is cognized in this way indeed, then only one enters It (attains identity with It).

FOR COGNITION OF PRANAVA IDENTITY WITH PRANAVA ALONE IS THE FRUIT

For all the phenomena which appear as if they are actually born - just like an elephant projected by mesmerism by a magician, like the rope-snake, like the water of the mirage and like a dream - this Pranava alone is the birth (creation), sustentation and dissolution; in all these three Avasthās It remains in the essential nature of the Absolute Reality of Pranava alone. One who cognizes in this manner immediately thereafter - without any lapse of time whatsoever in between - enters into that Pranava. Or why should it be surmised that he enters into It? Here it should be discerned that in the Absolute sense the Intuitive Experience or Knowledge to the effect - "I ever exist as the very essence of that Pranava" - is itself being dealt with in the conventional empirical usage of 'entering into (Merging with).'

प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात् सर्वस्य हृदये स्थितम् । सर्वव्यापिनमोङ्कारं मत्वां धीरो न शोचित ।।२८।।

Meaning: "One should Know (cognize) Ōm to be Īśwara seated in the hearts of all. The wise one who cognizes the Ōmkāra as all-pervading grieves not anymore."

PRAŅAVA ALONE IS PARAMESHWARA WHO IS SEATED IN EVERYONE'S HEART

The seeker should cognize that - "Īśwara Himself, who is lodged in the hearts of all the Jīvas, who is the support, sustenance for memory and experience and who abides in the Antaḥkaraṇa - is this Turīyātman, this Praṇava who is the Witnessing Principle of that Antaḥkaraṇa indeed." The Śrutis like - "This Deity who is the Vishvakarma or creator of this universe, Mahātma or great one is ever existing, dwelling in the hearts of people' - (Śvetāśwatara 4-17); "That this Ātman Himself is the one who exists in the heart" - (Chhāndōgya 8-3-3), as also the Smṛiti like - "Oh, Arjuna, Īśwara dwells in the hearts of every creature" - (Gītā 18-61) are expressing this same opinion alone.

Thus the discriminative person (Viveki) who cognizes that Entity which pervades everywhere like the empty space ($\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$) is nothing but $\bar{O}mk\bar{a}ra$ alone, being convinced at heart in the manner - "Lo, this Self of mine Himself is the Turiyātma, Pranava who is all-pervading indeed" - will never grieve at all. For, to the person who has cognized the all-pervasive non-dual $\bar{A}tman$ alone to be himself, meaning, his very Pure Being-Consciousness, there does not exist anything else which becomes the cause for grief. Śrutis like - "One who Intuits, cognizes $\bar{A}tman$ does not grieve at all" - (Chh. 7-1-3) etc. are authoritative sources for this teaching.

अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च द्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः । ओङ्कारो विदितो येन स मुनिर्नेतरो जनः ।।२९।।

Meaning: "The Ōm, without measures and possessed of infinite dimension, is the auspicious Entity where all duality ceases. He by whom Ōm is Known, is the real sage, and not any other."

PRAŅAVA WHO IS AMĀTRA IS THE TURĪYA WHO IS APĀDA

Now Shri Gaudapāda is concluding his commentary on the last Kārikā as also the quintessence of the Upanishad:

This Paramārtha Tattwa of the form of Ōmkāra is Amātra (devoid of letters, measures); to wit, It is devoid of the distinctive forms like Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra as also Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, which have been indeed (deliberately) superimposed, assumed in this Paramārtha or Absolute, Transcendental Reality alone. In order to teach, expound the truth of this doctrine alone the Śruti deliberately superimposed first these forms and later rescinds them.

This Reality is devoid of the Mātras themselves; besides, It is verily Anantamātra (of infinite, endless measures, dimensions) also. Because It is not comprehended either by the senses or the mind, there is no possibility whatsoever of associating any division or distinction of the type - "This entity ends here at this juncture or point" - to It.

This Pranava is the *Upashama* (extinction, cessation) of **Dvaita or duality**, multiplicity, to wit, It is devoid of either the

duality of the forms of divisions or distinctions of Avastha (state) and Avasthāvanta (one endowed with the state) or the duality of the forms of Abhidhāna (name) and Abhidheya (nameable object). In It the Dvaita Prapañcha Duḥkha or the misery which is associated with the world of duality does not exist in the least; therefore, It is Shiva; to wit, It is of the nature of Paramānanda or supreme Bliss devoid of Sarvasaṃsāradharma or all the characteristics of transmigratory existence.

Only that person who has cognized that Omkara which is non-dual as mentioned above - he alone is a Muni and not any one else. "One who has attained the $\bar{A}tmaj\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ (Intuitive Experience or Knowledge of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) and (at the same time) has achieved the Nirāsa or sublation, falsification of the Anātmapratyaya or the concepts of not-selves without any residue or remnants whatsoever is sure to become a Muni (a sage); to wit, he will be one who has attained the Mouna (an attitude of silence, taciturnity) of the nature of Ananda (Bliss) which is its fruit." - (Brihadaranyaka 3-5-1) - thus the Sruti says. As stated in the Mahābhārata Udyōga Parva 43-60) 'मौनात्र स मुनिर्भवति नारण्यवसनान्मुनिः । स्वलक्षणं तु यो वेद स मुनिश्रेष्ठ उच्यते ॥' - meaning, 'Merely by silencing speech alone he cannot become a Muni, nor by living alone in solitude in a forest does he become a Muni; only that one who has cognized the essential nature of the Self will be called 'Munishreshtha' or the best Muni."

VAITATHYA PRAKARANA

I. RELEVANCE OF THIS CHAPTER

In the Śnti Ātman is said to be "Prapanchopashama, Advaita." In the Kārikās too it has been taught that - 'ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते' - meaning, "If one Intuits (the Reality) then there does not exist any duality at all." In the seventh Mantra of the Upanishad the Paramārtha Tattwa (Ultimate Reality of Ātman, Brahman) was first called 'Brahman' from the predominant standpoint of Abhidheya (nameable object) and then it was expounded that in that form of Turiyātman (the fourth Absolute Reality compared to the three macrocosmic forms of Vishwatma, Taijasatma and Prājnātma) there is no Prapañcha or world of duality (to wit, the variety of empirical transactions of the type) of seeing the waking or the dream or the deep sleep. In the same way, that same Tattwa being initially called 'Omkara' from the predominant standpoint of Abhidhāna (name), later it was taught that in that Ōmkāra devoid of Mātras (letters, measures) there is no Vākprapañcha (duality of speech) of the type of Akāra, Ukāra and Makāra which was briefly described in Mantra 12. Thus the very spiritual teaching to the effect that - "No world of duality or diversity of the forms of Abhidhana or Abhidheya does ever exist in whatsoever form in the Ultimate Reality" - was propounded in the Kārikās - 'ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते' - (Kā. 1-18) and 'द्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः' - (Kā. 1-29). The doctrine of the Chhāndōgya Upanishad of the type - "(That Paramartha Tattwa) is the one and one only without anything else second to It" - (Chh. 6-2-1) is this very teaching indeed.

In truth, in the Āgama Prakaraṇa the explanation of the Absolute Reality has been made in accordance with the Śruti teachings alone. While signifying the Śruti teaching what has been taught in this Vaitathya Prakaraṇa also has been pointed out at various places. For, what has been expounded in the Śruti as well as in the Āgama Prakaraṇa is mere 'Āgama' alone, meaning, taught in the traditional, conventional methodology of spiritual instruction. That Paramārtha (Absolute Reality) which is taught in that context as Turīyatattwa and also as Ōṃkāra adopt-

ing, following the Sāmpradāyic (traditional) system - called Adhyārōpa Apavāda Prakriyā - being our very Ātman alone, It is Svatahsiddha or self-established; not having cognized It as It really exists, the common run of people quite naturally have superimposed upon It both the experiences of the three states of Consciousness like the waking, the dream and the deep sleep and 'Abhidheyatwa' or namableness, objectivity. In the case of superior highly-qualified seekers, merely by mentioning before them this teaching that - "This Adhyāropa or superimposition - to wit, the projected or conjured up form - does not exist really in Atman of the essence of Pure Being-Consciousness" - the purport of the Sruti teaching is Intuited by them. But in the case of those for whom merely by such statement, enunciation the real import of the spiritual teaching does not become completely comprehended - for the sake of such seekers, with a view to clarifying those subtle teachings - this Prakarana has been started. The previous Prakaraņa (Chapter) was 'Agama-pradhāna' or predominantly based on the Sruti teachings as handed down from the teacher to the taught in a traditional manner; now this second Chapter is 'Upapatti-pradhana' or predominantly based on dialectical reasoning.

Although this Chapter is Upapattipradhana in its approach and treatment of the subject-matter, it should all through be remembered that here not merely the logical devices or arguments (Yuktis) have been utilized, but here also an attempt has been made to explain, delineate the real import of the Sruti teaching, as also the logical devices have been exemplified in consonance with the traditional Vedantic methodology alone. How this difficult task has been undertaken effectively and efficaciously, we will point out at various places while explaining the Kārikās. In the Upanishad the Atman who has the adjuncts of the waking and the dream states was described with special characteristics of 'सप्ताङ्गः एकोनविशतिमुखः' - meaning, "One who has seven (macrocosmic) limbs, and 19 doorways." - (Mantras 3,4). Because those special features have been stated to be common to Atman who is associated with adjuncts of the waking and the dream states, although from the Vyavahāra Drishti it appears as if those Upādhis (adjuncts) are different alone, in reality (i.e. from the Transcendental Absolute Viewpoint) both are similar (nay, identical); it

was indicated therein that for the waking state there does not exist any difference from or superiority over the dream state. How can that be true? It is known and accepted on all hands that - "Waking appears to be real, while dream is false" - is it not so? In order to solve this doubt by first showing that both these states are identical in all respects and then with a view to clarifying the fact that waking experience is Mithyā or false (as much as the dream experience) - this Chapter has been started. For this reason alone, since this is 'Vaitathya' (i.e. waking too is false) 'Prakaraṇa' - a Chapter which elucidates this fact - it can be said that a fitting name has been given to it.

II. SVAPNA VAITATHYA KĀRIKĀS

वैतथ्यं सर्वभावानां स्वप्न आहुर्मनीषिणः । अन्तःस्थानातु भावानां संवृतत्वेन हेतुना ।।१।।

Meaning: "The wise declare the falsity of all objects in a dream because of the location of the objects inside (the body) and because of (their) contraction."

THE OBJECTS THAT APPEAR IN THE DREAM ARE FALSE BECAUSE OF INADEQUACY OF SPACE

"The Punditas or wise people indeed opine that because the objects which appear in the dream exist within (the body) those phenomena which appear outside and inside are both Vitatha (false), not existing in that manner." In this Chapter, showing that all that exists in a dream is Mithyā (false), it has been then undertaken to expound that just like the dream the waking too is Mithyā. For, some non-discriminating people think that dream too is real only. 'Although what is seen as the dream may be real, the phenomena that appear within it can never be real' - is the opinion of the discriminative people. The reason that has been adduced here in this Chapter in answer to the question - "How is it that they are not real?" - is: "Because they are inside." The purport here is that because all those things seen therein are within the body, they are all false.

Here there may arise a doubt: Just because they exist within a room those things like a pot, cloth, etc. which exist therein are not rendered false at all! Here in this present context

merely on the ground that they exist 'within,' can it be said that all the dream objects are false? A solution for this is: Because they are 'Samvrita' or confined within a small, inadequate space, they are false, unreal. The word 'Samvrita' means, 'that which is contracted, compressed'. The dream occurs within the body itself, is it not so? But, within that dream, all things like a mountain, an elephant and a big forest appear. If it were true that therein actually a mountain existed, how could they at all exist in a restricted place (space) within the body? What is the size or dimension of the body and what is the size, dimension of an elephant or a mountain (comparatively)? Therefore, because they appear to exist in extremely constricted place or space, it amounts to saying that those objects like an elephant, a mountain etc. are false appearances alone. A consolatory explanation of the type -"Therein he merely sees a mountain, but not that actually therein a mountain existed" - cannot be forwarded; for, therein it appears as though the viewer is on one side and the objects like the mountain, the elephant, the forest - etc. appear to exist in front. It being so, how can it be reasonable to say that therein one did not see a mountain, an elephant etc. at all? In any case, it amounts to saying that because of the fact that within a very restricted space both the dream and its phenomena are seen, those things must necessarily be false appearances alone.

This same opinion has been conveyed by Shri Bādārāyaṇāchārya in his 'Shārīrakamīmāṃsā' (i.e., Brahma Sūtras) by the aphorism - 'मायामात्रं तु काल्ट्यंनानिभव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्' (3-2-3) - meaning: "The creation of the dream is merely magical, illusory; for, therein it is not completely, fully manifested." Material objects have necessarily to have the requisite amounts or proportions of time, space and causation for their existence, and they should not be destroyed or sublated - these are the pre-requisite conditions to be fulfilled if those objects are to be real, is it not so? But in the dream, for those huge objects like a mountain, an elephant or a forest to exist in reality there is no sufficient space within the body and this fact is very clear indeed. For the cart seen therein and for such other appearances, there do not exist the senses like the eyes etc. which are responsible or necessary for seeing them; nor do the raw materials like the wood and the

carpenter who can construct the cart exist therein whatsoever. Therefore, there is no proper cause for them at all; there is no sufficient time also; besides, all of them are sublated. All these details are being indicated in the next Kārikā. Hence, the statement that - "All the appearances seen in the dream are verily Mithyā or false, unreal" - is proper indeed.

अदीर्घत्वाच्च कालस्य गत्वा देशात्र पश्यति । प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ।।२।।

Meaning: "Besides, one does not see places by actually going there, for the time is not long enough. Moreover, every dreamer, when awakened, does not continue in that place (of dream)."

FOR THE PHENOMENA OF THE DREAM THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT LENGTH OF TIME

In order to drive home the idea that - "Because there does not exist sufficient length or duration of time the dream phenomena are Mithyā (false)" - here another doubt has been deliberately raised and that is: "What was stated in the previous Kārikā, viz. 'Because the dream phenomena exist in restricted space they are false' - is not proper; after going to another place alone the dream phenomena are seen - why cannot we conceive in that manner?" Let us assume that - while sleeping at night only one sees a dream in which he has travelled to a distant forest and has been wandering about therein. At that juncture why can't we imagine that the dreamer actually, really goes to a forest away from the body? - This is the opinion of the questioner. He may doubt in the manner that - "Going out of this body he wanders about" - (Brihadāranyaka 4-3-12) - this statement of the Sruti is there to substantiate, is it not so? In that way, we may assume that the Jiva (actually) leaving behind the body only goes out somewhere, is it not so?"

But that is not proper; for, there did not exist enough duration of time for the dreamer to go to a far-off place. There are instances of seeing a dream in which one, who is in an eastern region, is seen to have travelled to a northern region. To go to that forest from the eastern region by walk according to the actual time taken, several months will be needed to reach that

forest; can it be proper to imagine that by merely sleeping so much time had lapsed or passed? How at all will it be possible to accept that in one night he went to that far-off forest and returned also? Therefore, because there does not exist enough duration of time in the dream, to say that therein he has actually travelled to those far-off places is not tenable at all.

ON WAKING UP, TIME AND SPACE CATEGORIES ARE SUBLATED

There is yet another reason to conclude that in the dream one does not actually travel to a different place and sees the phenomena existing in that region. If one persists in saying that one who has slept at a place in the eastern region, had during the dream actually gone to a northern region - he should have woken up in the northern region only; but the real situation (ground reality) is not like that; he wakes up in the eastern region alone. Apart from this, one who has slept at night may dream as if he has wandered about in the forest during the daytime; if that alone was the reality, one who dreams that he has roamed about during the afternoon - if he suddenly wakes up at that instant, it should necessarily be afternoon only, is it not so? It is not at all like this in our common experience; getting up at that dead of night and remembering the dream experience of having travelled during the daytime, the person wonders at that queer experience. No one thinks that in such a small duration of time one whole day has passed and another night has arrived.

Another point: Let us assume that a person who slept at night sees a dream in which he meets his friend, who resides in another town, during the daytime and then wanders about in that town. If that person tells his friend - "I had come to your place in my dream yesterday when it was noon time and we had met at noon at this particular place" - does that friend say - "Yes, of course, I had met you there only" - and agree with him? No, not at all. Why even the person who had slept does not at all believe that he had really met his friend at that spot. Therefore, it amounts to saying that in this manner too there did not exist sufficient duration of time. In fact, the person who has slept and woken up believes in the manner - "All this is a mere dream,

not real." Hence, the dream was sublated, falsified. Especially for the Sruti - "Leaving behind the body, he goes to another region and wanders about" - the real intention, purport is not in the literal meaning at all; in fact, its real import should be understood to be: (Therein, in the dream) there does not exist any relationship with this (waking) body whatsoever; further, it appears as if we are roaming about at some place. Another Sruti sentence says: "Within his body alone, he is wandering about freely as he likes" - (Brihadaranyaka - 2-1-18); and this statement appears to be in full agreement with every person's experience too. Therefore, in dream no one goes to any other place whatsoever; therein there existed another time series (or flow of time) indeed - this alone is the correct interpretation and reckoning. It amounts to saying that quite in accordance with what we reckon in our Vyavahāra or workaday dealings as - "All that appears therein is a false appearance only" - it is proper to reckon that the dream phenomena are false, unreal alone.

> अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम् । वैतथ्यं तेन वै प्राप्तं स्वप्न आहुः प्रकाशितम् ॥३॥

Meaning: "Besides, the absence of chariot etc. is heard of in the Upanishad from the standpoint of logic. They say that the falsity arrived at thus (by logic) is reiterated by the Upanishad in the context of dream."

FOR THE DREAM OBJECTS THE PROPER CAUSES ALSO DO NOT EXIST

The Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad says: "Therein the chariots do not exist; nor do the horses yoked to the chariot exist, nor do the roads exist; even so, he creates (therein) the chariots, the horses as also the roads. Therein pleasures, joys and raptures - none of these exists. Even so, he creates pleasures, joys and raptures. Therein there do not exist tanks, wells or rivers; even so, he creates tanks, wells and rivers" - (Bṛi. 4-3-10). Therefore, within the dream sufficient time and space do not exist; therein the relevant causes or conditions to cognize the objects and to perform acts do not exist. Because only after the senses like eyes, ears etc. have ceased to operate, the dream occurs, therein neither the senses nor the aids for eyes to see etc. like the brilliant stars,

sun, the moon etc. do not exist. Therein to manufacture things like a cart etc. neither the requisite raw materials like wood etc. nor the proper implements like a chisel, hammer etc. exist; then, wherefrom can the Jiva acquire the ability within such a short period of time to manufacture such things? Therefore, we have to assume that as a result of his respective Karmas the mental concepts, thoughts of seeing such phenomena arise for the time being to the dreamer. The objects seen in the dream are falsified as soon as the person wakes up - to wit, the cognition that they were not really existing is gained; not only that, in the dream itself the fact that one particular thing becoming an object for a different mental concept in the manner - "Not this, that thing" - is quite popular, familiar.

Thus assuming that which is universally familiar only, the Śruti is stating that - "Therein no chariots existed." If we observe deeply, the intention behind this Sruti statement is: Neither to affirm that in the dream material objects actually exist, nor that they do not exist - whatsoever. On the other hand, the Śruti, having corroborated, for the purpose of explanation only, that fact which is universally, familiarly known, viz. - that all the phenomena of the dream are false as known to all human beings - has begun to expound that therein Ātman is Svayamjyōti (self-effulgent, self-illumining). "Although in the dream there do not exist a body, senses, external objects or the illumining brilliant objects like the sun, the moon etc. which are aids to the senses to perceive the objects, the Antahkarana or internal instrument of the Mind alone has metamorphosed itself into the forms of all those phenomena. Now, because those mental concepts (Vrittis) are being witnessed by Atman by means of His self-effulgent Light of Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness, which is verily His real essence of Pure Being - He is Svayamiyoti Swarupa" - thus to expound this profound spiritual teaching alone is the real intention behind the Sruti statement. Even so, the Sruti corroborating what is universally familiar as something materially, actually false, propounds that - "Whatever appears in the dream is verily false, unreal, but Atman who illumines those phenomena is of the essential nature of self-effulgent Light." This fact has been pointed out by the Kārikākāra.

WHAT IS THE REASON FOR ESTABLISHING SVAPNA MITHYATWA OR FALSEHOOD OF DREAM?

Here a doubt may arise in the minds of the readers, and that is: No one ever thinks or believes that a dream is real. It being so, what was the reason for writing these three Kārikās to establish the tenet - "Dreams are false?"

The solution for this is: Certain dreams which are significant in their content do occur. The exponents of dream science opine that - "If a person gets a dream of such and such a nature, such and such a fruit will accrue." In fact, people often do express opinions that according to the dream significance they had certain actual experiences. Apart from this, many scholars of Vedic Knowledge do raise objections of the type - "A dream, which is created or caused by Iswara who is Satyasankalpa or whose volitions or wishes always become true, how at all can it become false, unreal (Mithyā)?" Some proponents of other philosophical systems too do adduce certain logical devices to assert that dreams are real and exemplify it by means of certain experiences also. If their proposition itself becomes the real, spiritual fact or truth (Siddhānta), then this Vaitathya Prakaraņa itself will be rendered redundant, improbable. Hence, at the outset there arose a need for establishing the Svapna Vaitathya or falsity of a dream. In due course, we will examine the objections of these various theorists or proponents and demonstrate as to how their dogmas are without any worthwhile essence. For the nonce, assuming that the belief of the majority of the people that dreams are false has been proved on the strength of many Sruti statements as also logical devices (Yuktis), it will suffice if the teachings of the foregoing text are reckoned, discerned.

III JĀGRAT-SVAPNA EKATWA KĀRIKŅAS

अन्तःस्थानातु भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम् । यथा तत्र तथा स्वप्ने संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते ।।४।।

Meaning: "Therefore, (here too) the distinctions that exist in the waking, just as therein (i.e. within the dream) Vaitathya (falsity) is taught. But in the dream it is different because it is Antahsthāna (existence within the body) as also it is Samvṛita (contraction)."

AN INFERENTIAL METHOD TO DEPICT THAT WAKING IS MITHYA OR FALSE

Now Shri Gaudapāda is endeavouring to establish, on the basis of the illustration of the dream, the teaching that waking too is Mithyā (false, unreal) alone. There is apparently no possibility of accepting in their literal sense either the first half or the second half of this $K\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$. If the first half $K\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$ is translated literally, it means: "Therefore, because the differences are Antaḥsthāna or existing inside, they say - 'in the waking' -"; and for the latter half literally the meaning is: "Just as it is there, similarly in the dream, because there is Samvrita or contraction, difference exists." These sentences do not become meaningful, coherent at all. For, the concept that this verse (Kārikā) has the real purport of teaching that - "Just like the waking, the dream is similar" - becomes evident from these sentences; but, the actual situation empirically is opposed to this indeed. Only after it is established that a dream is false, this verse has been written, is it not so? Therefore, 'Tasmāt' meaning, 'Thus because the dream is false' - in this manner alone the meaning of this sentence has to be comprehended. According to the Bhāshya written by Shri Sankara for this verse, the reconciliation will have to be understood in the manner : 'तस्पात् यथा तत्र स्वप्ने तथा जागरिते भेदानां वैतथ्यं स्मृतम् । (स्वप्ने) अन्तःस्थानातु संवृतत्वेन च भिद्यते 11' - meaning: "There is a difference between the waking and the dream; the dream objects exist in a contracted space inside (the body); but in the waking it is not so. Even so, because the waking is just like the dream alone, those waking objects - just like the dream objects only - are false; thus the knowledgeable people say." In this sentence, the one hurdle, difficulty in comprehending its purport is that the conclusion: 'The dream is not like the waking; therefore, just like the dream the waking too is false' - does not seem to be possibly rational. Here in this context Shri Sankara has explained the real purport behind this sentence in the following manner:

जाग्रहृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यम् इति प्रतिज्ञा । दृश्यत्वात् इति हेतुः । स्वप्नदृश्यभाववत् इति दृष्टान्तः । यथा तत्र स्वप्ने दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यम्, तथा जागरितेऽपि दृश्यत्वमिवशिष्टिमिति हेतूपनयः । तस्माज्जागरितेऽपि वैतथ्यं स्मृतम् इति निगमनम् ।

अन्तःस्थानात् संवृतत्वेन च स्वप्नदृश्यानां भावानां जाग्रहृश्येभ्यो भेदः । दृश्यत्वम् असत्यत्वं च अविशिष्टम् उभयत्र ।।

Meaning: "The objects which appear in the waking are false - is the *Pratijñā* (major promise); for, they are objects (for the sight) - this is *Hetu* (Logical reason); just like the phenomena seen in the dream - this is *Dṛishṭānta* (illustration); just as the phenomena in the dream are false, in the same way it is so in the waking - this is *Upanayan* (application of Dṛishṭānta - the fourth term in logic, syllogism); therefore, the objects appearing (seen) in the waking too are false - this is *Nigamanam* (conclusion). Existing inside and existing in insufficient, contracted space - are the two features that are distinct, different with regard to the objects of the dream. Being a phenomenon (object of sight), being unreal or false - are the features common to both the states."

HOW IS IT JUSTIFIABLE TO GIVE DREAM AS AN ILLUSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF AN INFERENCE ?

There is a possibility of a doubt arising, of the type - "In this inferential deduction utilizing dream as an illustration - is it proper?" For this the consolatory explanation is: Viewed from the standpoint of the waking there are many dreams; all of them are Antaḥsthāna or occurring within the body. They are, in fact, showing phenomena which appear to exist within the body in a contracted space. Because it is impossible for huge phenomena like a mountain, an elephant etc. to exist either within our body or within the subtle nerves in it, to say that they are mere false appearances is rational too. Therefore, giving the dream as an example in this context is quite tenable.

OBJECTIONS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE REASON MENTIONED IN THE BHĀSHYA

Now then, "What is the meaning for the reason given (in the Bhāshya) - viz. Because it is an object appearing?" - this question has to be deliberated upon. (a) For this phrase - 'because it is an object appearing' - if it is interpreted as - 'because it appears to the dream intellect', then because the objects which appear to the dream intellect are really existing in the dream that cannot be the cause for Mithyātwa or falsehood here. Some

people may argue in the manner - "First of all because the dream intellect itself is false; because in the waking it gets sublated and because for the waking person the dream objects appear to be false alone - that cause is the proper one only; but because the dream intellect is not an object for the dream intellect itself, it becomes real alone since it is not a phenomenon objectified. Especially in the case of the waking objects, because they are not objects to the dream intellect the inference that they too are unreal or false will be wrong. (b) To say that - "A thing being an object to the waking intellect alone is 'Drishyatwa' or objectivity" - also does not become proper. For, in the waking all the phenomena of the dream have been sublated; because they (the dream phenomena) are objects to the memory (Smriti) which occurs in the waking mind (intellect), it does not at all become justifiable to adduce them as an analogy or illustration for the phenomena which are objects for the waking experience (Anubhava). (c) It is also not possible to doubt in the manner: "Merely being an object (Drishya) alone is the cause; the dream phenomena are objects for the dream mind, while the waking phenomena are the objects for the waking mind. In any case, being an object to the mind or intellect is the common factor for both the states, is it not so ?" For, this cause does not attach itself either to the waking mind or the dream mind; to wit: whether it is the waking mind or the dream mind, neither of them is an object to any mind or intellect at all.

Apart from this, if it is contended that - "Drishyatwa or being an object (objectivity) is itself the cause (Hetu) for Mithyatwa (falsehood)" - then in that case it will have to be admitted that - Because in Srutis like - 'Atman should be found out' - (Bri. 2-4-5); 'Brahman who is Aprameya or not an object has to be cognized in one and the same manner' - (Bri. 4-4-20) etc. - both Atman and Brahman have been stated to be 'Drishya' or object alone they too are false, is it not so?

To this doubt the **answer** is: The Sākshiprakāshyatwa or the self-effulgence or self-illumining capability of the Witnessing Pure Consciousness is Itself 'Drishyatwa' or being an object this alone is the real intended purport here. Sākshi (Witnessing Principle or Consciousness) is 'Nityadrigrūpa' or one who is perennially of the nature of a seer or witness; He alone is

witnessing the waking state just as He is witnessing the dream state. For this conclusion the Sruti also is a strong support. The Kāthaka Śruti states that: "Having realized that great and allpervading Self, by virtue of whom a man perceives the objects in both the dream and the waking states" - (Kathopanishad 2-1-4). Because in the present Māndūkya Upanishad (Mantras 3 and 4) also it has been propounded that the Vaishwanara who illumines the extroverted consciousness and the Taijasa who illumines the introverted consciousness are both endowed with "seven macrocosmic limbs and nineteen microcosmic doorways" - that Ātman or Pure Consciousness alone is verily Sākshirūpa or the Witnessing Principle indeed. Atman alone is, in truth, the Vaishwanara, who illumines the waking, as well as the Taijasa, who illumines the dream; because they are objects (Drishya) to that Sākshi the dream objects are not existing apart, separate from Him, and in the form they appear they are false; in the same manner, the waking objects too are objects to that very Atman alone who is of the essence of a Witnessing Consciousness and hence they are false - we can surmise in this manner. If it is questioned in the manner: "If it is so, what will be the plight of the Sruti which says that - 'Atman too is Drishya alone'?" - then, in that context the Sruti has to be interpreted to have the real intention of teaching that Atman has to be comprehended to be 'Adrishya' or not an object, on the strength of one's Intuitive Experience alone (Anubhava). For, the Sruti is preaching Atman to be Adrishya first and then instructs the seeker to cognize Him to be Adrishya alone.

Some people have advanced an argument of the type - "Here because there is no motive of Dṛishyatwa whatsoever, we have to discard it and adopt a tenet like 'संवृतत्वं न भिद्यते' in its place." But the waking objects are not 'Saṃvṛita' or contracted; whereas in the case of the dream objects because they appear within the body alone one may even say that they are Saṃvṛita. Antaḥsthāna (being or existing inside), Saṃvṛitatwa (existing in a contracted space or region) - these two are the special characteristics applicable to the dream only. These two aspects cannot at all be made applicable to the waking objects. Therefore, it is proper to adopt the motive of Dṛishyatwa according to the Bhāshya interpretation.

(Objection): In the present context the motive of Drishyatwa is not to be found in the verse also, is it not so? Wherefrom did the Bhāshyakāra adopt this interpretation adventitiously?

(Solution): We have mentioned already a consolatory explanation for this. In the Śruti it has been propounded that in both the waking and the dream equally there exists an Ātman endowed with 19 doorways, is it not so? Keeping that very teaching in mind here, it has been stated that Ātman illumines equally the Consciousnesses of both these states and because those two states are Dṛishya or objects* to Ātman both of them are equally false only. Hence, if these words are interpreted according to the Bhāshya statement, then the meaning intended by the Śruti will be discerned.

Here there is yet another secret teaching: Although Shri Śankara has borrowed, as it were, the motive of Drishyatwa from the Sruti and has given it a form to suit an inferential methodology with regard to a Sruti sentence, to the effect that - "Just like the dream the waking too is false" - and written his commentary, in truth this is not an inference at all. For, if we deliberate upon the question as to who is it that witnesses the Vyāpti or universal, invariable concomitance or pervasion in the manner - "Wherever Drishyatwa (objectivity) exists in all such instances there exists Vaitathya (a feasibility of inferring, concluding that it is false)" - then the waking Pramātru (cognizer) has not witnessed it at all; for, the memory of the type - "Now I have come to the dream from the waking" - can never accrue to anyone. The fact that - "This universally-pervasive witnessing capability has actually accrued to the dream Pramātru" - also cannot be asserted; for, that (dream) Pramātru is quite distinct, queer in essence, compared to the waking Pramātru; for him therein adjuncts like body, senses, mind etc. are totally different indeed. No one has ever seen that dream Pramātru waking up in that queer form itself. Because there does not at all exist anyone who has witnessed the universal concomitance or pervasiveness (Vyāpti) in this manner, the undesirable (illogical) conclusion that - 'One who infers in this way himself does

^{* (}Please refer to the commentary on the verses 4-36 and 4-66 wherein the words 'Chittadrishya' and 'Taddrishya' are explained).

not exist - confronts him. Even so, it is quite familiar to everyone that the memory of the type - "I was seeing a dream uptil now and now I have woken up" - is experienced by everyone. Invariably accepting the Intuitive Experience of the type that - "Because for this Ekatwajñāna or unitary Intuitive Knowledge to accrue there has to be perforce one and the same Kartṛu (agent of action or 'I' notion), that Ātman who witnessed the dream is Himself appearing in the form of the waking Pramātṛu; even so, He exists in His essential nature of Sākshi (Witnessing Pure Consciousness) even now" - we can establish the truth that - "In both the Avasthās Ātman exists equally (identically); because the Avasthās are false, their relationship, association does not taint Him in the least." We have to discern that in order to teach this lesson alone Shri Gauḍapāda has mentioned here 'Antaḥ-sthānatwa' etc.

THERE IS NO DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN WAKING AND DREAM

(Doubt): Because of facts like - "Dream is a state which occurs inside (the body); since it occurs in a contracted space the objects which appear therein are false" - etc., was it not earlier stated that there does exist a difference between the waking and the dream?

(Consolation): Yes, it was mentioned. That was suggested for the sake of the common run of the people as a device to enable them to cognize the Ultimate Reality of Ātman. If observed from the Absolute Intuitive viewpoint even that difference between them is not absolutely true. The Kārikākāra (Shri Gauḍapāda) to whom both the states are equal has the ultimate purport, intention of teaching, expounding the spiritual tenet of - "Between these two states there does not exist any difference whatsoever." For that reason only, he has composed this verse to suit this his purport alone. To wit - 'तस्पात् जागरिते भेदानां वैतथ्यं स्मृतम्' - meaning - "The knowledgeable opine that the objects which exist in the waking are false indeed." How is it? - in answer (he states): 'अन्तःस्थानातु' - meaning: "Because they exist within one's body." (In support) it has been stated in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 2-8-10 that - 'अन्तरस्मित्रिमे लोकाः । अन्तर्विश्वमिदं

जगत्' - meaning: "All these beings exist within ($\bar{A}tman$); the entire universe exists within ($\bar{A}tman$)." Since this world is objectified by $\bar{A}tman$ (Pure Consciousness) we cannot say it is $\bar{A}tman$; since it is not seen apart from Him, nor is it seen existing independently by itself anywhere and hence it is not different from Him. Thus because the waking world - just like the dream world - cannot be affirmed to be either separate from $\bar{A}tman$ or identical with Him - both these states are equal in all aspects.

(Doubt): In that case, saying (knowing) that the waking is false, was it proper to give the example of the dream?

(Solution): Here in this context, keeping in mind (assuming) the experience of the common people only the illustration of the dream (experience) is given as an example, but not with the intention of propounding, in the ultimate analysis or from the Absolute Intuitive standpoint, that both these states are of different natures in their essence per se. In truth, if it is examined from the Intuitive Experience viewpoint even the dream during the period of its actual experience in esse was being cognized as 'waking' alone. From the standpoint of that dream experience it also appeares as if therein: "Apart from this waking there exists a dream; this dream occurs in a contracted space within the body." It is true that to all of us it appears as if the dream is sublated in the waking. But when we are reckoning the dream as 'waking' within, that dream (within the first dream) which appears to occur within, also in the same manner is believed to be falsified indeed. Therefore, in reality there does not exist any difference whatsoever between the waking and the dream. This truth will be clarified in the following Kārikās.

Some people doubt in the manner - "In the Shārīraka Mīmāṃsā there is disparity, in that in Sūtra 2-2-29 what has been expounded as - 'The waking objects are not like (i.e. similar to) the dream objects' - is opposed to the explanation given here." That is not proper. For, Buddhists, who have accepted the fact that there exists distinction between these two states alone, have proclaimed that in the waking too the external objects do not really exist. Their logical argument is not tenable; for, they themselves have acknowledged dissimilarity between the two

states. This, in truth, is the purport behind the Sūtra. The Sūtrakāra (Shri Bādarāyaṇāchārya) has not stated there anything opposed to the present Kārikā.

THE IMPORTANT PURPORT OF THE KARIKA

In any case, we should not forget the fact that in this verse really taking inferential deductions alone in a predominant sense any teaching has been propounded. If this inferential deduction alone were true, then it will have to be assumed that the Parōkshajñāna or knowledge of something invisible, unknown of the type - "Waking has to be false just like dream" - alone will become the last word here in this regard. In whatever manner we may look at it, because the prime purport of this Prakarana is indeed that - "In our Intuitive Experience we do not reckon any distinction whatsoever between the waking and the dream states" - it is not proper to determine that this teaching is mere inference. Even so, with the intention that the common people with ordinary intelligence should also attain an insight into this Intuitive Knowledge of the Absolute Reality, here in this context we have to discern that the Bhāshyakāra (Shri Śankara) has written the meaning of the verse in this form of an inferential proposition.

> स्वप्नजागरितस्थाने ह्येकमाहुर्मनीषिणः । भेदानां हि समत्वेन प्रसिद्धेनैव हेतुना ॥५॥

Meaning: "Inasmuch as the diverse things are (found to be) similar on the strength of the familiar grounds of inference, the wise say that the dream and the waking states are one."

THE WAKING AND THE DREAM ARE EQUAL IN ALL RESPECTS

Now the author is signifying the fruit of the logical device of the form of inference which was mentioned in the previous Kārikā. The senses, the mind etc. which appear in the dream and the waking states are of the nature of *Grāhaka* (cognizing or comprehending instruments); both the objects and the *Sukha* (happiness, pleasure), *Duḥkha* (grief) that accrue from them are of the nature of *Grāhya* (objects of cognition). This familiar

reason is applicable to both the Avasthās.* "There does not exist any difference whatsoever between these two; hence, all the phenomena that appear therein are false alone" - are the features common to both. Because the dream too during the period it is seen appears as waking alone, for the two distinct phenomena of Adhyātmika and Adhibhoutika, which appear therefu quite similar to the waking, there does not exist any difference whatsoever. From the standpoint of the Avasthā which we are calling 'waking' between these two, it is real and the dream is false; if we discern (Intuitively) as to how in these respective Avasthās these phenomena are appearing, then these two are equally false indeed. How this truth can be reckoned is clarified in the explanation of the meaning of the next Kārikā.

आदावन्ते च यत्रास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा।

वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लिक्षताः ।।६।।

Meaning: "That which does not exist in the beginning and the end is equally so in the present (i.e. in the middle). Though they are on the same footing with the unreal, yet they are seen as though real."

BECAUSE THERE EXIST BEGINNING AND END FOR THE DRISHYAS (APPEARANCES) THEY ARE FALSE

The dream does not appear to us always; existing for a while, it disappears. We all have accepted it to be false. Therefore, because waking too appears and then disappears it becomes established that it is false alone.

Here a doubt: 'When the dream ends it is false, now we are really awake' - in this manner we clearly cognize: But just as the dream is sublated on waking, similarly we have not seen the waking being false and getting sublated in any other Avasthā. It being so, how at all can we accept both these states to be equal (in all respects)?

The solution for this is: The dream too during its period

^{* (}To wit, 'Dṛishyatwa' is a reason which is invariably common to both; a more familiar reason is there viz. 'Grāhya-Grāhakatwa.' This fact has been mentioned here as a supporting device for Anumāna or inference).

appears as (real as) waking alone. From the standpoint of that dream, at that instant, it appears as though there is another dream within that (first) dream and that inner (second) dream appears as though it is sublated in the (first) dream which we have (then) believed to be waking alone. In the same way, just because from the standpoint of the state which we have at present believed, reckoned to be waking, the state which appears to be the dream within alone gets sublated - to believe that this state alone (indisputably) is the waking and that it never gets sublated is wrong. For, even when the dream within the (first) dream was sublated that (first) dream which had the other (second) dream in its womb, as it were, was then believed by us to be 'waking' alone, never to get sublated indeed. Even so, that (first dream) state is false now.

(Doubt): This is not proper. For, even in the illustration mentioned by you, it amounted to saying that only the dream was the one which got sublated but not that the waking got sublated. In one night alone it is possible for many dreams to occur; although they are different or queer each from the other, all of them eventually get falsified in the waking. But in the same manner, in one day alone many wakings do not occur nor do they get falsified at all; is it not so? Even if any one out of obstinacy maintains that - "This waking phenomenon too is a delusion; the belief that - all the objects that exist in it are really existing - is also a delusion" - because all the people have acknowledged the fact that dreams are many and the objects which exist in those dreams do not have any mutual relationship whatsoever, it amounts to saying that the spiritual (philosophical) teaching that - "Waking and dream are equal in all respects" is rendered to be wrong alone, is it not so?

For this the solution is: Whichever state that we reckon as a dream does not at all appear to be a dream at that time; on the other hand, (during that period) all that dream is appearing as 'waking' alone. Observed from this standpoint, because all the states appear to be, then at that instant, waking alone - to determine the state which appears as waking to be not a dream - we do not have any proof whatsoever. Besides, just as the objects of the dream can never enter into the waking, in the same way the waking objects can never cross over into

the dream. The objects belonging to the dream world are undergoing changes during the dream time; but we cannot doubt in the manner - "The waking objects are steady, is it not so?" Although it has been determined from the standpoint of the physical sciences that the waking world is also undergoing changes, mutations every moment, we believe that it is steady, that is all. In the same way, we have believed that the dream objects during the dream time are steady alone; or, in the alternative, by virtue of certain changes that occur in the waking even if we believe those (waking) phenomena to be non-eternal we never reckon them to be false - in the same way, in the dream too we reckon that the dream objects are non-eternal only, but no one at that dream time reckons in the manner - "All this is false, for this is a dream" - at all. Therefore, in this respect too there does not exist any distinction whatsoever between the waking and the dream.

Another consideration: Just as the dream appears and then vanishes, in the same way the waking too appears and vanishes. While the special type of explanation for 'अन्तःस्थानात्' was being given we had clarified the tenet that - "Both waking and dream exist in Ātman alone" - (Refer to commentary on Kārikā 4 above). What we have believed to the effect that - "The dream appears only for a short period, while the waking lasts for a long time" - is invariably from the waking viewpoint only. But whether it is the waking world or the time that appears to exist within it - they can never squeeze, or sneak in, into the dream world. This fact we will further clarify (in the commentary on the 14th Kārikā). It being so, because the state which we are believing (reckoning) to be waking also, just like the state which we are believing to be dream, is appearing and vanishing in Ātman alone, it is not possible for us to assume the literal meaning of the phrase - "in the beginning as also in the end" - and to apply or attach a time-bound chronological order of the type - "waking precedes, dream follows" - to the states. However in both the states, the awareness of the type - "The whole of the dream is sublated, while the whole of waking remains without sublation" - especially persists doggedly. But if observed Intuitively in order to detect as to which is waking and which is dream, we do not at all have any exclusive, uncommon

significance. Therefore, what we have stated - that the two states are equal in all respects is correct, justified.

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते । तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥७॥

Meaning: "Their utility is contradicted in dream. Therefore, from the fact of their having a beginning and an end they are rightly held to be unreal."

CATEGORIES OF CAUSATION AND UTILITY OF OBJECTS OF ANY STATE ARE CONFINED TO THE RESPECTIVE STATE ALONE

Here a doubt: The statement that - "Because the phenomena of the waking have a beginning and an end they are false" - does not appear to be correct. For, as the false appearances, like nacre-silver and rope-snake etc., that are seen in the waking exist only at the time of their appearance, we may even ascribe Mithyātwa (falsity) to those phenomena for which there is a beginning as also an end. In fact, after they are falsified or sublated, all the people do agree by saying - "They did not exist really." But from real silver things like ornaments, utensils etc. can be made. If a real snake bites a man the poison spreads in his blood stream and it causes death. In the same way, the food available in the waking satiates hunger; water quenches thirst. It being so, because the waking objects have a beginning and an end we can, if we so wish, say they are 'unreal'; but can we reasonably say that they are, like the nacre-silver, rope-snake etc., false? The nacre-silver is of no utility, nor has the rope-snake ever bitten anybody; where is the comparison between these false phenomena, on the one hand, and the real objects like silver and snake, on the other?

Solution for this: The causation categories concerning objects like food and drink existing in the waking are sublated in the dream. One who has had a sumptuous meal and has slept, in his dream feels exhausted, weak from hunger. One who has drunk enough water here in the waking and has slept, may in his dream suffer from excessive thirst parching his tongue. It is quite familiar that a person who has become completely satiated by eating food and drinking water in a dream, on waking, finds

that satiation not being there at all, is it not so? What is the difference between these events? There is a beginning and an end to waking, similarly the dream too has them; in this regard, between these two states there does not exist any difference, distinction whatsoever. In fact, to say that - "Because they exist for a short duration, they are Anitya or non-eternal (or unreal)" - is also not proper. For, all of us have acknowledged that a dream is a mere false appearance. When we are awake no one ever thinks or believes that the dream world might be existing somewhere in an unknown region. In the same manner, when the dream lasts, it is reasonable to infer, conclude that the waking world does not exist anywhere at all.

Now yet another objection: There are reports that modern psychologists examine and analyse the mental habits and proclivities of patients and cure mental diseases or ailments. Apart from this, certain Yōgis are claiming that they can enter into the dream world, can cognize the news, events therein and can come back and report. It being so, it amounts to saying that the waking mind is capable of being responsible for the causation factors of the dream objects too. But no one from the dream world coming to our waking in this manner is in our experience. Therefore, it does not appear to be proper to say either because the dream appears only for a short while it is false; or only the waking state is like the dream false, is it not so?

Solution for this: This is not proper. For, those psychologists as well as Yōgis are trying to examine the dream from the waking standpoint only. While himself being in his waking state, the doctor - who by knowing what another person saw in his dream is endeavouring to diagnose - has not gone out of his own waking and has not wandered, ventured out anywhere else, is it not so? In the same way, to say that the Yōgi, without accepting the waking and the dream are distinct Avasthās, entered into (another's) dream state is meaningless, ridiculous! Is it not so? Till one has the memory of the waking all those experiences that accrue must necessarily (belong to or) be waking alone, is it not so? It being so, the memory of the type - "I can examine the dream"; "I have entered into the dream state

and have returned to waking" - is invariably an assessment of the dream based on his waking viewpoint alone. But the question - "What is the real dream experience?" - has to be cognized from the dream experience viewpoint alone. Therein, the concept of the type - "This is actually a dream" - does not exist at all; in fact, it creates a deep, innate belief to the effect that it is waking alone. With regard to the Avasthā which appears to be a dream while one is in his waking, every one has perforce to accept the fact that he felt in the manner - "During that period it appeared to me as waking alone." It is also certain that no one reckons at that time in the manner - "I have come from the waking state to this dream state." Therefore, it is doubly established that what you opined as the dream examination is actually from the waking standpoint alone. Apart from this, for a particular psychologist in his dream itself there is a possibility of his having dreamt in the manner - "This is waking; let me learn from this sick person about his dream experiences and then let me try to cure him of that disease." Merely on that count it cannot at all be determined that the first dream existed in that second dream which appeared to have occurred therein, is it not so? Hence, to believe that waking exists in dream too is merely a delusion indeed. Therefore it becomes fully established that - "Howsoever deep we fathom, the two Avasthas like waking and dream have a beginning and an end; because they do not at all exist one in the other, they are false states alone which appear for a while.

Here in this context some people have adopted a different recension of - 'सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्नेऽपि प्रतिपद्यते' - meaning: "The fact that the waking objects are of utility is seen (cognized) in the dream also." But because to the following sentence of "आद्यन्त्वेन" - both states having beginning and end this recension does not agree, this latter is not proper. If we adopt the present form of the Kārikā as given in this text, then the rational explanation to the effect - "Just as the objects which appear in the dream, although they appear to be of utility - Artha Kriyākāri (causation and utility categories) - in the waking, all that knowledge is sublated - similarly although here (in the waking) the objects appear to be of utility, this knowledge is invariably sublated in

the dream. For, it is in everyone's experience that one who has eaten food and has got satiated in the waking appears in the dream to be hungry" - becomes evident and expedient.

अपूर्वं स्थानिधमों हि यथा स्वर्गनिवासिनाम् । तानयं प्रेक्षते गत्वा यथैवेह सुशिक्षितः ॥८॥

Meaning: "The unique attribute is a mere appearance of the experiences in a particular state, as it is in the case of the dwellers in heaven. This he experiences by going there, just as one, well informed, does in the world."

MERELY BECAUSE OF THE APPEARANCE OF A UNIQUE ATTRIBUTE THE DREAM CANNOT BE RECKONED TO BE TRUE OR REAL

(Objection): To say that - "Just like the dream is the waking state" - is not proper; for, in the illustration of the dream not only what is seen in the waking but also, in addition, certain unique attributes exist. It being so, how is it proper to say that the waking is just like the dream?

(Solution): It is true that qualities or attributes which are not seen in the waking may appear to exist for Atman in the dream. Therein it may appear as if one is seated like Lord Indra on an elephant with four tusks, or one may realize therein that he is, like three-eyed Maheshwara, having three eyes. Though this is true, it is the rule of law of the region (Sthānidharma) meaning, a quality unique to that Avasthā, but not at all a Svatahsiddha Dharma or self-established quality. When the dream exists only, it (this unique or exotic quality or characteristic) appears, but not that it actually is attached to Atman's essential nature. Although a stick dipped in water appears to be crooked because of the refraction of light, in reality the stick therein has not become bent, and when the stick is lifted up above the water it is seen to exist as before (straight, and not crooked or bent); observing this, on this analogy, we can understand, comprehend this truth. In the same way, what is seen in the dream as though it was a queer unique quality truly belongs to the adjunct of the dream alone; for, as soon as we wake up that appearance is sublated.

In the first half of the Kārikā what is stated as - 'अपूर्व'

स्थानिष्मों हि' - is a usage of a neutral gender in the common translation which is a unique idiomatic feature of the Sanskrit language. If it had been stated as - 'अपूर्वाः स्थानिधर्मा हि' - what would have been the transliteration - that meaning we have to take in this context. Those queer characteristics this Atman alone witnesses therein. Just as on the strength of a habit of seeing such phenomena for a long time Atman sees in the manner -"These are such and such objects" - here in the waking and is recognizing the things, in the same way on the strength of a habit of the dream state Atman is seeing those queer things therein. The Svapnātman (called 'Taijasātman' in Māṇḍūkya Upanishad) reckons in the manner - "I am seeing these things here for a long time" - and not that He cognizes in the manner - "These, phenomena have come into being here anew just now." If observed Intuitively, therein the habit formed on the strength a long-standing impression does not exist whatsoever; those are really false, unreal phenomena which are witnessed because of the dream influence or domination. Even so, He is seeing them therein just as He is seeing real objects here in the waking; therefore, merely on this ground of uniqueness the dream is not rendered to be true, real; for, as soon as we wake up it becomes clearly seen that all those phenomena are false alone.

On the whole, what is to be discerned here is: When we observe from the waking viewpoint the fact that - "The unique or queer qualities that we see in the dream are phenomena which are bizarre and irrational when compared to the conditions here in the waking" - it may appear to be totally wrong, illogical to comprehend, reckon this waking to be equal to that (bizarre) dream state; but because of the fact that during the dream time all that experience therein is, like the waking experience, certain and convincing, merely on that one count we cannot imagine any difference (inequality) between the two states. For, whatever Avasthā in which we see a world of duality is being experienced by us all that occurs or strikes as if it is verily waking experience (to wit, as real) only and not in the manner -"This is a dream (to wit, unreal)" - at all. Thus the Vedantic truth that - "In all respects the Avasthas or states of Consciousness which we are calling 'waking' and 'dream' in our workaday dealings are identical, equal" - will be explained in the following Kārikās.

Therefore, what we said that - "Because both states have beginning and end (\overline{A} dyanta), these two states of waking and dream are false" - is correct.

स्वप्नवृत्ताविप त्वन्तश्चेतसा कल्पितं त्वसत् । बिहश्चेतोगृहीतं सद् दृष्टं वैतथ्यमेतयोः ॥९॥

Meaning: "Even in the dream state itself, anything imagined by the inner consciousness is unreal, while anything experienced by the outer consciousness is real. (But) both kinds of things are seen to be false."

जाग्रद्वत्ताविप त्वन्तश्चेतसा कल्पितं त्वसत् । बिहश्चेतोगृहीतं सद् युक्तं वैतथ्यमेतयोः ॥१०॥

Meaning: "Even in the waking state, whatever is imagined by the inner consciousness is false and whatever is perceived by the outer consciousness is true. It is reasonable that both these should be unreal."

IDENTIFICATIONS OF THE TYPE OF 'INSIDE' AND 'OUTSIDE' IN BOTH STATES ARE EQUAL

(Objection): Although in what is reckoned as waking just like the dream 'differences or distinctions, do appear, in the waking we actually perceive the objects externally outside ourselves. But in the dream the phenomena are appearing internally within us. Thus there exists distinction between these two states, is it not so?

(Consolation): Observing from the waking viewpoint it is true that this distinction is seen; but, while we are actually experiencing the dream this distinction is not striking, flashing to us in the least. Therein too internally - that is, in our Antaḥkaraṇa or mind only - the phenomena which are appearing are false. The distinctions of the objects which are conceived by the mind are merely imaginations; they appear to be 'false' indeed. Externally - that is, as if existing outside our body - those objects which appear strike as if they are really existing indeed. But just as it becomes certain as soon as we wake up that both these appear-

ances (to wit, internal and external phenomena) were false only, in the same way it is proper to surmise, infer that these phenomena of the waking too are false alone.

Here in this context one important, unique teaching that has to be discerned is: Everyone of us has strongly believed during the deliberation that - "Waking, dream and deep sleep these three states occur to me alone." When observed from this standpoint, the fact that these three phenomena are Vrittis (concepts) alone which occur in our Antahkarana is being signified by the Kārikākāra here by words like - "Svapnavritti" and "Jāgradvritti". In the Śruti what is explained in the manner -"The waking Atman is Bahishprajña" and "The dream Atman is Antahprajña" - is from this viewpoint alone. In fact, what we have reckoned in the manner that - "Waking is an Avastha which occurs when by the help of the senses the external objects are perceived" and "Dream is an Avastha which - without the functioning of the senses, by the force of Vāsanā or latent impressions - appears within us alone by virtue of the functioning of the mind" - is also from this viewpoint alone; the opponent has accepted and thereby put forth the objection by following this viewpoint only.

But, when we deliberate on the strength of the experience (Intuitively) of the respective state, there does not appear any difference or distinction whatsoever between these two Avasthas. For, in both the Avasthās it appears as though we possess all these paraphernalia, separately, distinctively, like body, mind, intellect, ego, memory, five vital forces (Pañchaprānas), ten sense organs. With a view to inculcating this viewpoint upon our mind, the Sruti has adduced the qualification of 'एकोनविंशतिमुखः' (one who has nineteen doorways) to both the Atmans (to wit, to Vaishwānara Ātman and to Taijasa Ātman). The purport behind that qualification is the fact that we reckon within those two Avasthās that the (respective) Ātman is endowed with nineteen adjuncts like mind, intellect etc. By following this tenet how we should comprehend the meanings of the qualifications like 'Antahprajña' and 'Bahihprajña' has been signified by Shri Sankara in the following manner:

(1) "बिहष्प्रज्ञः । स्वात्मव्यितिरिक्ते विषये प्रज्ञा यस्य सः बिहष्प्रज्ञः । बिहर्विषयेव प्रज्ञा यस्य अविद्याकृता अवभासते इत्यर्थः ॥"

Meaning: "One who has the *Prajñā* or cognition (consciousness) of an object outside, external to himself is *Bahishprajñaḥ*. One whose cognition (consciousness) which, being conjured up or projected by Avidyā, appears as though having external objects - (He is called *Bahishprajñaḥ*)."

इन्द्रियापेक्षया अन्तःस्थत्वात्, मनसः, तद्वासनारूपा च स्वप्ने प्रज्ञा यस्य इति अन्तःप्रज्ञः ॥

Meaning: "When compared to the senses, the mind is internal or inside, much more than those senses; because He has a cognition which is of the nature of their latent impressions, He is called *Antaḥprajñaḥ*."

According to the above Bhāshya sentences it becomes evident that the waking cognition or consciousness and its offshoot of cognition of the form or nature of latent impressions (Vāsanārūpa) - both are projections of Avidyā and are appearing associated with manifested objects (worlds of duality) and without any manifested duality but of the nature of latent impressions (Vāsanāmaya), respectively. Further, if we comprehend the subtle meaning of the phrases - 'स्थूलभुक्', 'प्रविविक्तभुक्' - all the doubts will be removed. The Bhāshyakāra (Shri Śankara) has stated that - "Because of the fact that Vishwa is Savishaya, a Prajñā or cognition which is gross is Bhōjya or to be experienced or consumed; but in the dream especially (to the Taijasa) mere pure Prajñā is Bhōjya." From this, it amounts to saying that the Prajñā or cognition is itself the Bhōjya and Vishwa, Taijasa are the Bhōktrus or consumers, enjoyers. This leads to the clear conclusion that both Vishwa and Taijasa Atmans are illumining the cognitions or awarenesses of their respective Avasthas as forms of Pure, Absolute Witnessing (Sākshi) Consciousness indeed. To those people who keep this subtle teaching in mind it will now become very clear that - "In both the Avasthās what appears as 'inside' and 'outside' is to the respective

Prajñā or cognition; but to the Sākshi who witnesses (pervades or illumines) even those Prajñās there does not exist either an inside or an outside."

Thus because both the Avasthas are appearing as of one and the same form or nature - to wit, from the standpoint of the respective Avasthā because both of them invariably comprise two divisions of the types of Sat (real) and Asat (false, unreal) - it becomes tantamount to accepting that it is quite reasonable, justifiable to determine that both these states are of equal existence, reality alone. Based on the waking standpoint and assuming the distinctions of 'waking' and 'dream' alone, here in this context it is stated that - "It is proper to say that both these are false." But if we - according to the explanation given for the qualification of 'Antaḥsthānāttu' previously in Kārika 4 - entertain the opinion that - "That which exists within Atman" - then there does not exist any difference or distinction whatsoever between these two Avasthas. For, in both the Avasthas those objects which are 'inside' or 'within' appear as of real nature and those objects which are 'outside' appear as of false, unreal nature, and in this respect both are equal indeed. Further, the feature of both these Avasthas, during their respective periods, appearing as 'waking' alone is also equal to both. Therefore, because it is not possible at all to specify or detect in the manner - "This is dream"; "This is waking" - it is reasonable to discern that these two states which appear in (superimposed upon) one and the same $\overline{A}tman$ (Pure Absolute Consciousness) are verily false, unreal - just as in one and the same rope the phenomena that appear to exist in various forms of a snake or a crevice in the ground etc. are truly Vikalpa or figments of imagination alone.

III THE ABSOLUTELY PURE ATMAN ALONE IS THE SUBSTRATE FOR ALL IMAGINATIONS

उभयोरिप वैतथ्यं भेदानां स्थानयोर्यदि ।

क एतान् बुध्यते भेदान् को वै तेषां विकल्पकः ।।११।।

Meaning: "If all objects in both the states be unreal, who apprehends these objects and who is indeed their creator?"

OBJECTION AGAINST THE TENET THAT BOTH WAKING AND DREAM ARE UNREAL

Here an objection: If it is so, it amounts to saying that to imagine the distinctions of 'waking' and 'dream' is itself a Bhrānti or delusion alone. Even if it is accepted that both these states are mere appearances, still the question that - "To whom does this delusion accrue?" - remains. Your conclusion, judgement is that the waking cognizer (Pramātru) is, like the dream cognizer, imagined, is it not so? If it is so, who is it that imagines like that? And, who is it that, by means of deliberation, determines and discerns in the manner - "This is not real"? Yet another doubt. If we have to misconceive a stump of a tree as a human being, both those objects have to be real only. If you say that - "There is no tree, nor there is a human being; but the tree itself is being misconceived as a human being" - then it would not be proper at all, is it not so? However, you have determined and declared that the objects that appear in both the states are verily false, unreal! Here, how at all can there be a distinction of the type - "First there is Bhranti; and later on it gets sublated and the correct knowledge accrues" - brought about? In addition to this, only to a person who is endowed with cognizing means like the senses, the mind etc. there can be either delusion or the correct knowledge which can sublate it, is it not so? But in your spiritual teaching all the means of cognition like the senses, the mind etc. which appear in both the Avasthās have become (have been deduced to be) false alone; how is this tenable at all?

In any case, thus by remembering a dream to determine that both the waking and the dream are false there is invariably a necessity of a Jñātṛu (knower) who is the substrate for the memory (Smṛiti) and knowledge (Jñāna). In order that this Jñātru obtains Bhrānti and Nishchayajñāna (conviction) there have to be necessarily things which are objects for him. In order that he misconceives and then determines as to what is proper or real, he should necessarily possess Karaṇas (instruments) of knowledge. In your Siddhānta which proclaims that none of these really exists, this distinction of delusion and its sublation does not suit at all, is it not so? - This alone is the essence of the objection.

कल्पयत्यात्मनाऽऽत्मानमात्मा देवः स्वमायया । स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तिनश्चयः ।।१२।।

Meaning: "The self-effulgent Self imagines Himself through Himself by the power of His own Māyā. The Self Himself cognizes the objects. Such is the definite conclusion of Vedānta."

THE FACT THAT BOTH THE REGIONS ARE FALSE IS ESTABLISHED BY ĀGAMA (ŚĀSTRA)

For this objection mentioned above the solution is: We are not expounding the tenet that these two Avasthās are false, unreal on the strength of any illustration following dialectics. This teaching is being divined and discerned by us from Āgama (Śāstra, Śruti) alone. We are merely formulating, by means of the logical devices known from those Śrutis, this above teaching, that is all. In the Āgama Prakaraṇa, propounding with regard to Vaishwānara and Taijasa that both of them are - "सप्ताङ्ग, एकोर्निवशित मुखः" - meaning - "Endowed with seven (macrocosmic) limbs, nineteen doorways" - both the Ātmans are described equally alike. Therefore, it has amounted to saying that the Āgama has hinted, suggested that both these Avasthās are equal, identical alone. That very teaching we are suitably mentioning by logical device only. That is all.

Now, if we examine in accordance with Agama (the traditional methodology handed down pedagogically from time immemorial adopting the Śāstraic reasoning) both the Avasthās which all of us are dealing with empirically as 'waking' and 'dream' are, in truth, being experienced by us in one and the same manner; and this fact of life is universally acceptable. It is not possible at all for any logician worth his salt to refute this. In both those Avasthās the respective Pramātru within them deems that the world at large is perceived by his senses alone. He is also thinking, believing that the objects which exist outside are real (entities which really exist) and the phenomena which are conceived, imagined inside are Asat or false, unreal. It is also in everyone's experience that when one of these Avasthās accrues the other does not exist at all. Even so, it is possible for an

innate identification of the type - "I woke up from a dream; dream is false, this waking is the real experience" - to accrue in both the Avasthās. It is absolutely certain now that although the *Pramātṛu* (cognizer) of the waking did not at all exist in the dream, the one who is having the innate identification of the type - "I am awake" - is himself misconceiving (wrongly reckoning) in the manner - "I myself saw the dream". Therefore, it became expedient for us to determine that - "Both these Avasthās were illumined by a Sākshi who is totally distinct from Pramātṛu; that Sākshi Himself now is experiencing in the form of a Pramātṛu both the Avasthās."

ĀTMAN HIMSELF IS THE SUBSTRATE FOR THE IMAGINATIONS OF THE FORMS OF THE THREE ĀVASTHĀS

Hence, the one who has witnessed the two Avasthās is Sākshi Himself. The fact that - "In Ātman alone these two Avasthās and the distinctions of Pramātru, Pramāṇa and Prameya that exist in them are merely imagined" - is irrefutable, incontrovertible indeed.

It being so, the logical arguments and questions of the type "How at all can Atman - without having any association or relationship whatsoever with anything else, and existing as Absolute, Pure, Transcendental and without performing any acts whatsoever - imagine this distinction of Pramatru, Pramana and Prameya in Himself? The Pramātru, who is endowed with Karana or means of action is tied down, confined to the respective Avasthā; whereas the Sākshi exists without any contact or relationship with the Avasthās. It being so, who is it that imagines these Avasthas and the different phenomena which are seen divided in the forms of planes like $\bar{A}dhy\bar{a}tmika$ (corporeal), Adhibhoutika (physical) etc. ? Without the Karanas how could Atman see at all? Without the real things existing, how could the false phenomena which appear to be like them be imagined at all?" - are all truly sophism, fallacious casuistry! In fact, because these two Avasthas appearing in this manner is in everyone's experience as also their apparent realities are appearing and vanishing, the logical conclusion drawn to the effect that both of them are false, unreal is itself the incontrovertible logic. Logic should always be in consonance with universal experience (To wit, in this context it is the comprehensive Intuitive Experience of the Sākshi Chaitanya) and not opposed to it. Therefore, Ātman alone is the really existing Entity; although in Him alone this distinction of Jñātru, Jñāna, Jñeya appears within these two Avasthās, in the form in which this distinction appears it is false, unreal indeed; it should be determined that its substrate in the absolute sense is Ātman alone who is the Witnessing Pure Consciousness. This alone is the Vedānta Siddhānta or the genuine spiritual teaching of Vedānta.

ATMAN CONCEIVES EVERYTHING BY VIRTUE OF MAYA

Because there does not exist any stronger logic which strikes down this conclusion which is arrived at on the strength of universal Intuitive Experience (Anubhava), those superlative, highly-qualified seekers on the strength of this much Intuitive deliberation, discrimination alone will decide, determine that - "Ātman is the Ultimate, Absolute, Transcendental Reality; both the waking and the dream states are false, unreal - mere false appearances misconceived, imagined in Ātman alone; therefore, their essential nature is Ātman alone." Even so, for the sake of satisfying or appeasing the minds of middle and low grade seekers, devotees, here Shri Gauḍapādāchārya has stated that - "Ātman by virtue of His own Māyā has imagined, conceived Himself in Himself alone."

What is meant by Māyā? To this question the answer is: Although Atman is ever devoid of any kinds of mutations like birth, death etc. and is verily non-dual, names and forms are imagined as if they belong to Atman's essential nature (Swarūpa) by dint of Avidya ; it is not possible at all to affirm them in the manner they appear to be either as Atman Himself or independent entities existing apart from Atman. Just as in the illustration it seems that although foam, from the standpoint of its real essence, is water alone, in the form it appears it is neither water nor is it a substance existing independently apart from water similarly these names and forms - observed from the viewpoint of workaday transactions (Vyavalıāra Drishți) conjured up by Avidyā - it is not possible at all to assert that they are verily Ātman or they are different, separate entities apart from Ātman. Such names and forms which are thus indescribable, indefinable (Anirvachaniya) are called by various synonyms as Prakriti, Bija

(seed form) for Samsāra, Ātman's (Īśwara's) Shakti, Māyā in Śrutis and Smritis. When observed from the waking viewpoint in the Atman who exists in deep sleep there exists a 'seed' called 'Agrahana', which is of the nature of 'not comprehending anything'; from that 'seed' the 'Anyathagrahana', which is of the nature of perceiving Atman Himself in a different form, exists in both waking and dream; since we have so far established that both these Avasthas are indeed (in their essence) one and the same Avasthā, in the dream, which is having these two forms, this Anyathagrahana appears to exist. In order to expound this implicit teaching alone in the sixth Mantra of Māṇḍūkya Upanishad, Prājña was stated to be :- "He alone is the Prabhavāpyaya or place of origin and dissolution of all beings". With a view to further elaborating that very fact here it is stated that -"Atman conceives (all of them) by virtue of His Māyā." This one phenomenon itself is called 'Agrahana' - meaning, noncomprehension, from the Adhyātmika Drishti (the viewpoint of the subjective, corporeal aspect) and from Bāhyadrishti (the external viewpiont) it is called "Māyā Bija" meaning, mystical seed form. Just as to a person suffering from the defect, disease of cataract if one moon alone appears as two, from the introverted Ādhyātmika Drishţi it is called a Bhrānti or delusion brought about by the defect of the eyes and from the extroverted viewpoint of what is seen it is dealt with as 'the second moon', is it not so? In the same manner here too we should understand, discern it.

THE WRONG CONCEPTS OF THE PROPONENTS OF VYĀKHYĀNA PRASTHĀNA

Failing to comprehend, discern the real intention, purport of this Kārikā which is written in order to clarify the tenet that - "Ātman who is the substrate, basis for the concepts of the two Avasthās of waking and dream is the one non-dual Absolute Reality", the post-Śańkara Vyākhyānakāras have raised a doubt here in this context and on the pretext of providing, suggesting a solution for it have, in fact, whipped up a big controversy itself; their doubt is - "Who is it that imagines? Is it Brahman or are they the Jīvas?"

The solution offered for this doubt by a section of the Vyākhyānakāras is: (1) The Jīvas themselves are those who

imagine. Because Jivatwa or soulhood is itself imagined, before the imagination there would not be any Jiva and thereby it becomes quite expedient, logical that only after imagination ensues the Jivatwa follows and only after Jivatwa is established the imagination can ensue; thus a doubt about this kind of a defect of mutual dependence (Anyōnyāshraya Dōsha) may arise here. But because all this is Māyika or the product, projection due to illusion and that in the case of Maya no defect whatsoever attaches itself here in this context, there is really no defect at all. Merely because a Māyāvi or magician appears to have cut-off his own head, really he has not done so, is it not so? Similarly here also we must understand, or, in the alternative, from one seed a tree and from that tree another seed - thus each from the other in a perennial series they can be born, is it not so? In the same way, Jiva and Avidya - their series is perennial. Therefore, here there is no defect whatsoever. This is another logical device to solve the doubt.

Some others say with regard to this topic:

(2) Brahman Itself is imagining here. The solution to the "To Brahman which is of the very essence of Pure Consciousness (Jñānarūpa) how could Avidyā attach itself?" that these disputants proffer is: When it is said - "Brahman is Jñānarūpa" - there is no import of the type - "The knowledge that is engendered by the Sruti" - at all; for, that knowledge is non-eternal, while the Knowledge which is verily the essential nature of Ātman is eternal. Similarly, it does not also mean - "A form devoid of Avidya"; for we have not accepted such a tenet at all. Further although the interpretation that - "Jñānarūpa means that which is endowed with the essential nature of Chaitanya or Pure, Absolute Consciousness" - suits Brahman, but because that essential nature subsists for all Jivas, there does not exist any difference whatsoever between this essential nature and Avidya. Now, against this theory the opponents point out a defect: If it is assumed that Brahman alone imagines Jivatwa - then it would amount to saying that if one Jiva attains Mukti everyone else will perforce have to attain Mukti. For, apart from Brahman Jivas do not at all exist; hence, if Brahman's Avidyā vanishes it amounts to saying that everyone's Avidyā disappears. Or, in the alternative, even for one who has attained the Brahmabhāva

or essential nature of Brahman, there cannot accrue Mukti; for, those proponents of that theory have accepted that for Brahman alone there is Avidyā. Therefore, it is tantamount to saying that even after the Self-realized Souls (Mukta Jivas) have attained the essential nature of Pure Consciousness (Brahmabhāva), Avidyā invariably subsists indeed. For this objection the solution that is offered by Brahmāvidyāvādins (proponents of the theory that Avidyā attaches to Brahman) is: This objection is not proper. For, we have not accepted the tenet that - "Apart from Brahman there exist many Jivas" - at all. Therefore, in our doctrine if the Avidya that has affected Brahman in the form of Jivatwa is removed, only one (Jiva) attains Mukti. In contrast to this, in your doctrine if the Avidya that projects Jivabheda or distinct Jivas is reckoned as one and one alone, then the defect of the type - "If one attains Mukti, everyone else perforce will have to attain Mukti" - becomes unavoidable. If you contend that each person has one separate Avidya, then you are confronted with the Gouravadosha or defect of (not attaching the proper dignity, respect and esteem for Śāstravākya) for imagining many Avidyās. Apart from this, because Jiva is imagined (misconceived) in Brahman, you have to perforce accept that he is Jadarūpa (of the nature of insentience, being inert); further, you have to accept that because he is conceived, he is invariably with a beginning $(S\bar{a}di)$. Hence, the doctrine that -"Jīva is the substrate for Anādi beginningless Avidyā" - cannot be sustained. If Avidyā is removed, Jīvas will have to be destroyed; then, there is no scope whatsoever for Muktas to exist; if it is contented that Avidya never gets destroyed, then it will amount to saying - "Vidyā is Avidyā alone"; for, you have accepted the tenet that by virtue of Vidyā, Avidyā is not destroyed. Further, you offer another solution that - "In the case of Māyā there is no Anupapatti or absence of reasonable grounds" - is it not so? In that case, Muktas also can have Kalpana or imagination; for, you have yourself accepted that in the theory of Māyā there is no defect whatsoever. In any case, the opinion of these Brahmāshritāvidyāvādins (proponents of the theory that Brahman is the substrate for Avidya) is that - "Thus if the tenet that 'By means of Vidya, Avidya is removed' - is to be sustained, then we have to conceive that to Brahman alone Avidya

attaches." In this manner, the followers of these two rival theories are seen to be pointing out such other many defects and discrepancies in each other's doctrines.

THE DEFECTS IN VYĀKHYĀNA PRASTHĀNA

Now we have to examine as to which of these two opinions has Shri Gauḍapāda accepted. For, if we read the Kārikā - "When the Jīva wakes up" - (1-1b) he appeared to have accepted the Jīvāshritāvidyāvāda or the theory that Jīva is the substrate for Avidyā. Because he has also stated that - "The deity called Ātman has imagined Himself by Himself" - here it appears as though he purports to say that Paramātman Himself is the substrate for Avidyā. Just as saying - "A job can be done this way, as also that way" - we cannot affirm that - "The essential nature of an entity may be this way, as also it may be that way" - and hence we cannot at all conclude that both these statements are correct; therefore, it becomes evident that we have to deliberate upon the question - "Between these two, which opinion is correct?"

Here in this context, our considered opinion is: Both these theories are not relevant here. For, this Prakarana has not been written to decide the question - "Which is the substrate for Avidyā?" In fact, its genuine purport is to demonstrate that -"Dvaita (duality, multiplicity) in its entirety is false, unreal" - and then to determine, establish the $\bar{A}gam\bar{a}rtha$ or the purport of the Sruti, Upanishad which is nothing but - "Advaita (nondualism) itself is the Vedāntārtha or ultimate teaching of Vedānta." Hence the deliberation on Avidyāshraya (substrate for Avidya) is not the real meaning of this verse. In truth, this deliberation is in vain too. For, by this exercise in futility of determining the question - "Who is the substrate for Avidya ?" - there is no benefit whatsoever accruing to us. On the other hand, instead of any benefit accruing, because it would amount to our accepting the tenet that - "Avidyā really exists - it will be totally opposed to Agamartha and thereby from this deliberation an undesirable result alone will accrue to us. The Upanishad Mantra No. 7: "He is not Antahprajña (one who is having internal Consciousness) nor is He Bahihprajña (one who is having external Consciousness)" - propounds the truth that - "Atman

is not the substrate, support for Vidyā or Avidyā" - and therefrom establishes the teaching that - "He is Advaita alone." Shri Gauḍapāda in Kārikā (1-18) has affirmed that - "If anyone has imagined a wrong concept, then it would necessarily have to be banished." If in this context he has stated that - "Ātman has imagined distinctions in Himself" - then it would amount to his contradicting his own earlier statement, teaching. Therefore, it becomes certain that because in this manner it is *Anarthakāri* or lands us into unwanted situation or predicament, this is not the really intended purport of the present verse.

THE REAL, GENUINE MEANING OF THE VERSE.

The real purport behind this verse is: We have already declared that the real intention of this Prakarana is to show the veracity of the truth that: "All duality, diversity is false, unreal" - and thereafter determine and proclaim the Vedantic teaching that - "Advaitātman alone is the Absolute, Transcendental Reality." Between these two tenets the first one, which purports to unravel the spiritual truth that all the phenomena that appear within the waking and the dream are in essence false, unreal, has been brought home to our mind by the subtle Intuitive deliberation that has been carried out so far. But uptil now the profound truth of Vedanta, viz. - "The non-dual Atman Himself is verily the Ultimate Absolute Reality which is their true essence of Being" - which is the second tenet - has not been expounded. For that purpose, here an objection has been initially raised, viz. : If both these Avasthas are said to be false alone, it amounts to saying that there does not exist any Reality whatsoever; for, apart from the phenomena that appear distinctively within these two Avasthas there does not exist any other object or entity whatsoever. We cannot also doubt in the manner - "The one who experiences both these Avasthās is left out, is it not so?" For, the one who experiences the Avasthā is the Pramātru; just as the Prameya (in the Avasthā) is false, the (respective) Pramātru is also false only. That thing whose being or existence changes - to wit, not existing as it is at present and having got its being or existence mutated so as to make it disappear - that thing is verily called 'false' (Mithy \bar{a}), is it not so? The Pramātru who exists in the waking is not

there in the dream, vice versa the dream Pramātru does not exist in the waking; this fact is by now very familiar, and so, in consonance with our Intuitive Experience (Anubhava) we have to perforce acknowledge that these two Pramātrus are both false appearances alone. It being so, apart from these two Avasthās there does not remain any Reality whatsoever in its own form which is the substrate for those imagined phenomena which appear within these two Avasthās; nor there exists any Jñātru or Knower whosoever who cognizes these two Avasthās; therefore, those who affirm that the two Avasthās are false appear to have fully adopted the teachings of the Shūnyavādins or Nihilists (a sect among Buddhists) alone, is it not so? - This, in fact, is the doubt raised in regard to the purport behind the Prakaraṇa.

solution for this doctrine is: In Śrutis like Kathopanishad (2-1-4) it has been propounded that - "One and the same Atman cognizes both the waking and the dream (Avasthās); that Sākshi (Witnessing Pure Consciousness) alone is Ātman." In fact, this Ātman being self-effulgent, self-illumining is the substrate for the Vikalpas or false appearances which are seen in the two Avasthas. That very Atman is the substrate for the false phenomena which are mentioned later on (from 2-20 to 28). The essential nature of Being of that Atman is truly of the nature of Nitya Chaitanya or eternally Pure Consciousness. Swarūpa Chaitanya (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness) alone is illumining the various phenomena within these two Avasthās. Let us assume that in poor light when any particular person mistakes, misconceives a rope lying on the ground to be a snake; another person demonstrates to him that it is a rope only and thereby the former cognizes it to be a rope and is convinced about it. Here in this instance, first having wrongly reckoned it as a 'snake', later on when someone instructed him about the 'reality' the former determined it to be a rope only; merely on that ground, there does not occur any change whatsoever in the Swarūpa or essential nature of Being of the cognizer, is it not so? In the same manner, here too it should be understood.

Here in this context any one may raise this objection: In the illustration the one who is deluded to believe it to be a snake

as well as the one who determined it to be a rope is one and the same person. But in this illustrated case it is not so. The one who misconceives, imagines different objects appearing in the dream is a different person, while the one who determines the Reality in the waking is different, is it not so?

This objection is not proper. For, in the illustration the mind and the senses of the person who has misconceived the rope to be a snake are associated or afflicted with a defect; but when he determines in the manner - "This is truly a rope alone" - there does not exist any such defect whatsoever either in his mind or his senses. Even so, in the real essential nature of Being of the person, who first was deluded by reckoning it to be a snake and later who determined it to be a rope, there is no difference whatsoever. In the same way, here too although there exists distinction between the dream Pramātru and the waking Pramātru, in the Sakshi which is the essential nature of the perceiver there is no change whatsoever taking place. Both these Pramātrus of the dream and the waking are perceiving the distinctions existing in the respective Avastha by the benign grace alone of that very same Atman who is of the essence of Chitprakāsha (light of Consciousness). He alone is the substrate for the memory of the dream and the determinative knowledge that occurs in the waking. Neither the waking Pramātru nor the dream Pramātru is different, distinct from the Sākshirūpa Ātman. For the proclamation of the type of - 'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति मन्ता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञाता' - of Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad (3-7-23), meaning - "Apart from this Sākshirūpa Ātman there does not exist any Drashtru (seer), Shrōtru (hearer), Mantru (imaginer), Vijñātṛu (discriminator) at all" - this alone is the reason. Therefore, just as the Buddhists aver that for the Jñānasmṛiti (knowledge from memory) there does not exist a Kūṭasthātman (Absolute Immutable Self) as a substrate - we have not followed their tenet here at all; the Sruti statements like - "Atman is the Mind of the mind" (Kena 1-2); "By which the mind also is objectified (that alone is Brahman)" - (Kena 1-2, 6) - are the supporting evidence for this conclusion. Hence this is the final conclusion of Vedanta science; by taking the non-dual Atman alone, who is cognized, Intuited by virtue of the Upanishadic

teachings, as the basic fundamental. we have argued here that both the Avasthas of waking and dream are false; but not basing our arguments on mere, fallacious logic.

IN BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHY NEITHER A MISCONCEIVER (VIKALPAKA) NOR KNOWER (JÑĀTŖU) WHO IS COMMON TO BOTH AVASTHĀS IS ESTABLISHED

Among the Buddhists - Bāhyavastusattāvādins (Realists), Kshaņikavijnānavādins (proponents of Momentary Idealism or Consciousness) and Śūnyavādins (Nihilists) - these are the three main groups. Among the proponents of the theory that - "A thing exists" - there are again two theories. "Mind (chitta) itself is the Jñātṛu (knower)" - is the theory of Vasubandhu. "Indriya Sanghāta or the conglomeration of the senses alone is the Jñātṛu" - is the theory of Vasumitra. These two disputants have acknowledged the tenet that - "Although the external objects are Kshanika or of momentary existence, the Vastu (entity) that is the support or substrate for them is Nitya (eternal)." Both these theories may, somehow to a little extent, be sustained with regard to the waking objects; but there do not exist any body, senses and mind which are common to the two Avasthas of waking and dream at all; in a particular Avasthā the body, senses etc. that are confined to that respective Avastha appear and they disappear along with that particular Avastha. Therefore in these theories one singular Jñātru is not established at all. Since in the Kshanika Vijnanavadins' theory the Vijnanasantana (the series or continuum of intellectual Consciousness) is one alone, somehow it may be made suitably applicable to the waking transactions in the manner - "One Jñātru is established"; but because the Vijnanasantana that exists in dream is quite different, distinct from the Vijnanasantana of the waking, it has to be perforce accepted that these are different only. Apart from this, it is established on the basis of universal experience that by means of the Vijnana or consciousness of the waking the Vijnanasantana of the dream is falsified, sublated. It is true that the Vijnanavadins have accepted the teaching that - "The Manovijñana or intellectual, mental consciousness or awareness exists in one and the same form; and the $\bar{A}layavij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ or seat, receptacle of consciousness called Chitta (mind) remains one and the same continuously till the attainment of Nirvana or Liberation, Beatitude"; but when both the dream mind and the waking mind are not appearing to be of one and the same form, then it is not possible to imagine, conceive them to be one and the same at all. It is not possible to affirm that in all the three states one and the same mind persists uninterruptedly; for, it is in everyone's experience that for both the waking and the dream their respective categories of time and space as also the phenomena belonging to the respective Avasthā are totally different. Especially in the deep sleep state there is no experience whatsoever of any concepts of time-space-causation and of various phenomena. In any case, thus it is tantamount to concluding that either in the theory of Sarvāstitwavādins (Realists) or in the theory of Vijñānavādins (Idealists) it is not established that there exists one who imagines, conceives both the Avasthās of waking and dream.

Now, even the theory of the Shunyavadins - who aver that all the phenomena which appear either within (internally, mentally) or without (externally, perceptually) are invariably essenceless - is, just like the opinion of the Vijnanavadins, full of defects only; for, in their theory also the teaching that - "The Dharmas (Drishyas) or various phenomena that exist in both the waking and dream Avasthās are merely Shūnya or essenceless" - cannot at all be demonstrated, proved. For, an attempt to prove that -"On the basis, strength of Pratitya Samutpāda - one thing appearing in relation to another (dependent origination) - it amounts to establishing the fact that the phenomena do not have any independent (Swatantra) existence (Astitwa)" - alone is the logical device adopted by the Shūnyavādins. But it is not possible at all for anybody to assert that dependent upon the dream phenomena, the appearance of the waking phenomena is established, and vice versa, dependent upon the waking phenomena,

^{* [}One particular Vyākhyānakāra, i.e. post-Śańkara commentator, has interperted the word - 'Dvayakāla' - to mean of the form of grasper - grasped (Grāhaka - Grāhya Rūpa). But it appears that he has not himself 'grasped' the real import of this word 'Dvayakāla' as well as the word 'Bahihi' at all. Therefore, we have not examined their commentary at all. With regard to the various tenets that are established by this Kārikā in connection with time, refer to the Introduction.]

the appearance of dream phenomena is established. For, when one of them exists or wherein one of them exists - the other never appears.

Further, on behalf of the Shūnyavādins what Chandrakirti* has objected in the manner - "The opponents are not mentioning the Atmalakshana or characteristics of the Self by actually cognizing the $\bar{A}tmaswar\bar{u}pa$ or essential nature of the Self" - is not acceptable to Vedānta Darshana or Vedāntic philosophy; this defect can be, at best, levelled against the doctrinaire theories of schools like Sānkhya, Yōga etc. which try to establish the Ultimate Reality of Atman on the strength of Anumana or inferential logic. That is all. To Sankhyans their teachings about Prakriti, Purusha and the Prakriti-Purusha Samyōga (relationship between Prakriti and Purusha) are all invariably perennially inferential knowledge. But in Vedanta on the strength or valid authoritative source of the Śruti sentence - "Ātman is Aparōksha or directly to be Intuited, is one who is the innermost Reality of everything" -(Brihadaranyaka 3-4-1) - it is accepted that Swayamprakāsha or self-effulgent and Aparōksha in consonance with universal Intuitive Experience and not that there is any attempt to attain the Atmasiddhi or Intuitive Knowledge of the Self by valid means of special characteristics. Following the spiritual teaching of - "Both the Pure Consciousness (Intuitive Experience) and the Atman who Intuits is not known by you" - (Bṛihadāraṇyaka 3-4-2) Vedāntins are affirming that - "Ātman is the subjective Knower who Intuits, cognizes everything and not that He is an object for any valid means of knowledge or cognition at all." Therefore, it should be realized that no objection of any kind can be levelled against the Vedānta Siddhānta or spiritual teaching of Vedanta.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF THE KARIKA

In any case, what is important in this Kārikā is this much: In Sushupti (deep sleep) Ātman appears to have become 'Ekibhūta' or undifferentiated and a mass of Consciousness (Mantra 5); in the waking and the dream He appears to be imagining various phenomena. But because being the substrate for all special characteristics He is illumining even their non-existence too by means of His own Pure Consciousness in all the three

states, this Atman exists in His non-dual essence alone bereft of any special characteristics whatsoever. Hence He is Nirvishesha or devoid of any special features. This truth is expounded in the Turiya Mantra (7) by means of refuting all special characteristics. However, those distinctions which have been refuted in the manner - "Nāntahprajña" meaning "He is not internally conscious" - are not to be reckoned to exist only in the waking and dream and not in the deep sleep - this is not, in fact, relevant here; the ultimate purport behind the refutation lies in propounding that - "A non-dual Reality devoid of birth is alone the Absolute, Transcendental Truth; apart from It there does not at all exist anything else whatsoever."

Here the quintessence of the verse is: "The non-dual Ātman Himself appears in the forms of the concepts as also the Jñātṛu or Cognizer, Knower etc." In the statement - "Kalpayatyātmanātmānam" (meaning - "He imagines Himself by Himself") - it is intended to convey the idea that - "The one who is imagining - He is Ātman alone." The phrase - "By Himself" - suggests that apart from Him there does not exist any instrument of knowledge; the phrase - "Himself" - signifies that apart from Him there does not exist any imagined object. We should interpret the sentence - "स एव बुद्ध्यते" - meaning - "He alone cognizes" - in a similar manner only.

On the whole, it means - "There is no bondage of the type of Avidyā, Kāma, Karma etc."; this truth will be elaborated upon in Kārikā 2-36.

WHICH ARE THOSE THINGS THAT ARE IMAGINED IN ATMAN?

विकरोत्यपरान् भावानन्तश्चित्ते व्यवस्थितान् । नियतांश्च बहिश्चित्त एवं कल्पयते प्रभुः ॥१३॥

Meaning: "The Lord diversifies the mundane things existing in the mind. Turning the mind outward, He creates the well-defined things (as well as the undefined things). Thus does the Lord imagine."

THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE IMAGINED PHENOMENA

While imagining how in what manner does this Atman

carry out this imagination? Of what various kinds are the distinctions of the phenomena imagined in Ātman? The answer is: Those empirical mundane objects like sound, touch etc. which lurk in the mind as well as the objects, phenomena mentioned in the scriptures are of the nature of latent impressions (Vāsanārūpa); He imagines them in various ways. Earth, air etc. which are fixed, definite entities - meaning, known objects - He imagines being extroverted, imbued with external Consciousness. In the same way, being endowed with internal Consciousness He imagines the indefinite, uncertain objects existing only during the period of imagination in various forms; endowed with internal Consciousness, he imagines in various ways concepts, feelings like desires, yearnings etc. Ātman alone is the Lord: One who is the cause for the various entities to come into existence.

When the mind is extroverted, the objects which appear are fixed, definite - meaning, they appear as entities with forms devoid of change; when the mind is turned inwards, meaning in states like the dream as well as wishful thinking within etc. those phenomena, which appear within the mind alone and during that particular period, are indefinite, disorderly. Thus because there exists the distinction of the mind being extroverted and introverted - although the forms of the phenomena that appear are invariably varied, manifold - all of them are verily imagined; it means that for all of them Atman alone is the substrate.

चित्तकाला हि येऽन्तस्तु द्वयकालाश्च ये बहिः । कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषो नान्यहेतुकः ।।१४।।

Meaning: "Things that exist internally as long as the thought lasts and things that are externally related to one together with the other, are all merely imaginations. Their distinction is not caused by anything else.

ALTHOUGH THE SPECIAL FEATURES BROUGHT ABOUT BY TIME-SPACE CATEGORIES EXIST, ALL PHENOMENA ARE VERILY IMAGINARY

Here a doubt: "The conclusion that - 'Just like the phenomena appearing within, the phenomena appearing without (externally) are also imaginary' - does not seem to be proper.

For, the internal wishful thinking or yearnings may be said to be imaginary, because they belong to the Chittakāla or mental period of time; meaning, they exist only when the thought (Vritti) arises in the mind (and also last till that thought endures). But that is not so with regard to the objects that exist outside; they have Dvayakāla, meaning - one object exists as long as the other object exists. Between a mental concept of a delicacy and the one which is actually cooked and served to many people is there no difference at all? "With regard to the actual existence of things which we have imagined within ourselves even we do not have a staunch belief; those things being imagined, conceived in the manner - 'It must be like this' - 'It must be like that' - as soon as the imagined idea, thought ends, we clearly reckon, realize in the manner - 'They were not actually existing (in time, space and with proper cause-effect relationship); we ourselves have imagined, conceived them.' The things which are seen by us in the external region are also seen by others and are steady, aren't they?" Thus any one may raise a doubt.

But this doubt too may not stand the test of Intuitive reasoning. For, here also we may adduce the illustration of the dream. Although when examined from the waking viewpoint the whole of the dream experience appearing to occur within our mind itself is true indeed, when considering the dream from the dream viewpoint per se (i.e. Intuitively as the dream experiencer) it becomes certain and convincing that a waking state which is distinct, different (Vilakshana) from the dream does not at all exist in the least. The dream at or during the time of the dream experience appears as waking alone (to wit, therein no one ever questions the reality or veracity of that experience; in fact, that experience being as real as the one in our waking is identical in esse. This truth is being driven home quite convincingly to all and sundry irrespective of faith, sex, culture, caste, race, nationality etc. by this Avasthātraya Prakriya, which is the real clincher in all spiritual teaching, taking one to the acme of all Knowledge and Happiness). Therein in dream internally some objects (phenomena) of Chittakāla - meaning, each object existing in one particular point of time as a concept and later completely disappearing along with that concept - are appearing; but outside therein the

things of the Dvayakāla - constant, steady - are appearing. "Dvayakāla Vastus" - means constant objects which appear as if one object exists along with another or amidst many other objects (all in one time series). When we say - "They talked to us as long as they were with us" - there is an implied meaning that they, we as also many other things around - all existed together. However, with regard to the concepts or thoughts that we entertain within our mind - none of them whatsoever exists along with another concept, idea at all; in fact, they are transient, inconstant phenomena which appear and vanish into thin air. Even so, we have no doubt whatsoever about the fact that all of them do exist as figments of imagination. Apart from this, the universal truth that - "The phenomenon called 'waking state' does not exist anywhere in the least during the period of the dream experience" - is to be accepted on all hands unreservedly as a more comprehensive, pervasive logical device (Vyāpaka Yukti). Therefore, in the waking too, just as it is in the dream, both the internal and the external phenomena (Drishya) are all imaginary indeed; merely on the ground of their having the distinctions of belonging to Chittakala and Dvayakāla, to assert that they are not imaginary at all there cannot be any evidence to be found.

> अव्यक्ता एव येऽन्तस्तु स्फुटा एव च ये बहिः । कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषस्त्विन्द्रियान्तरे ॥१५॥

Meaning: "Those objects that appear as obscure inside the mind, and those that appear as vivid outside, are all merely created by imagination. Their distinction is to be traced to the difference in the organs of perception."

ALTHOUGH THERE IS THE DIFFERENCE OF BEING UNMANIFEST, VIVIDLY MANIFEST ALL PHENOMENA ARE IMAGINARY ALONE

Within the mind, in the form of mere subtle impressions ($V\bar{a}sana\ R\bar{u}pa$) some phenomena exist; and some other phenomena appear to exist outside quite vividly, clearly. Merely on that ground, people believe that the objects which appear vividly are real, whereas the unmanifest, invisible objects within the mind are unreal. But what is the ground reality? All those phenomena

are imaginary alone. Even here, the dream illustration fully suits, fits in. For, in the dream too at that period of time we are believing those particular things which appear to exist actually, vividly external to us to be real, while those phenomena appearing in the form of subtle impressions within the mind to be unreal. Even so, we all are knowing that both of them are imaginary only; for, in the waking state none of them is to be seen. We have all accepted the ground reality that both of them did not actually exist and they were mere false appearances seen in a dream. Therefore, here in this context, for the distinction of 'being unmanifest' and 'being vivid, clear' their being actually real and unreal is not the cause; those things which are perceived by the senses are vivid, clear, while those which lurk or are hidden in the mind are false. By virtue of the distinction in the senses this difference is seen alone and not that this distinction is the cause for their not being imaginary.

From the deliberation that we have made so far another conclusion gets evolved. That is: Because of the fact that in both the waking and the dream states the temporal features of the type of - 'now', 'before', 'in future' - as well as the spatial features of the type of - 'here', 'there' - are being seen by us equally, in an identical fashion - those particular timespace-causation categories are confined to their respective state alone; in reality, (in the ultimate analysis) there do not at all exist any states called 'waking' and 'dream', neither does any temporal or spatial relationship exist between them nor any cause-effect relationship between them. Remembering this, if we observe from the Paramārtha Drishţi (i.e. the Absolute, Transcendental, Intuitive Experience standpoint), then the spiritual, philosophical teaching gets evolved, viz - "There does not exist any mutual difference, distinction whatsoever between waking and dream."

> जीवं कल्पयते पूर्वं ततो भावान् पृथग्विधान् । बाह्यानाध्यात्मिकांश्चैव यथाविद्यस्तथास्मृतिः ॥१६॥

Meaning: "First He imagines the Jiva (individual), and then He imagines the different objects, external and personal. The individual gets his memory in accordance with the kind of thought-impressions he has."

THE CONCEPT OR THOUGHT OF JĪVATWA (SOULHOOD) IS THE ROOT CAUSE FOR ALL CONCEPTS

From the deliberation that we have carried out so far, this much has been determined: "In the Avasthās (waking and dream) the objects which appear outside do not have any special features different from those phenomena which are conceived within the mind; and, as both these are imaginary we cannot conceive of any distinction whatsoever between them. Even so, the external and the internal concepts are mutually responsible for each other. By virtue of the latent impressions (Vāsanas) lurking in the mind the external distinctions of percepts are seen. By virtue of the experience of the external percepts the internal (conceptual) impressions are being engendered." Thus the common run of people are believing; what is the root cause for this?

For this question the answer is: First of all, people in general imagine, conceive in the manner -"I am a Jiva who performs righteous and unrighteous acts and then enjoys, experiences their fruits." Thus in this manner they first of all conceive of 'Jivatwa' or soulhood in Pure Atman, just as a snake is conceived in a rope. When it is stated here - "First, (in the beginning) they imagine, conceive" - it does not mean - "the first priority over everything else temporally." For, a universe comprising the whole gamut of distinctions like - time, space, causation, action, means of action, fruits - is appearing co-evally, coexistentially with the waking state. Therefore, the expression here - "They first of all conceive of, imagine Jivatwa" - means that by forging ahead with the concept of 'Jivatwa', then on the strength, basis of that rudimentary concept (called in Vedantic parlance as Ahamkāra or 'I' concept) all other concepts are entertained.

Thus beginning with the Jiva-concept at the head (rather root) of all other thoughts and on the strength (foundation) of that fundamental 'I' concept the other concepts like Prāṇa or vital force etc. are entertained by the people; in fact, for conceiving in the manner - 'internal concepts' and 'external percepts' this basic Jīvatwa-Kalpana or concept of 'I' as a transmigratory soul alone is the support. In the category of external concepts (percepts) we should include the movable and immovable, animate

creatures and plants and inanimate, insentient objects like the rocks, stone, sand etc. and the objects of the stellar region like sun, moon, stars etc. ($\bar{A}dhidaivika$ or Divine plane). On the other hand, the internal concepts mean Jñāna (knowledge), anxiety or eagerness, desire, wonder, mental feelings, emotions etc. - all such different concepts.

If it is asked - "What is the cause for this Kalpana or concept?" - the answer is: "To the Jiva, as mentioned above, whichever experience accrues - its memory is engendered; in the same way, to him whichever memory is born - an experience of that accrues" - thus we should discern. From such causes of enjoyments like food, drink, flower and fragrance etc. - the fruit known as 'Tripti' or satisfaction, satiation accrues thus this 'Anubhava' (experience), which is conceived, is the first; from it the concept of a 'Smriti' (memory) in the manner - "For both these there is a relationship of cause and result or effect" - is engendered; and once again from this concept of a Smriti another concept of an Anubhava ensues. Thus as we go on with this series of concepts, we entertain yet another comprehensive concept in the manner - "This is the action; these are the means of this action." Then, the concept of the type - "For this action performed with the aid of these means, instruments of action such and such a fruit has accrued. Then the concept - "As a result of this, this fruit accrued." From this evolves a concept that - "For these - action, means of action and the fruit of action - there exists a relationship." Again, as just now stated - Anubhava and Smritis - follow. Thus the external and internal Anubhavas or experiences (percepts) and Smritis (memories) are occurring continuously in a series. Thus just as the Kāthaka Śruti states: "Because he cognizes the Dharmas or phenomena as being different from himself, he (Jiva) is pursuing them alone" - (2-1-14) - although the ignorant Jiva, in reality (in the ultimate analysis, from the Absolute Transcendental viewpoint), is the essence of Pure Being of Atman who is Absolutely Pure and non-dual, he imagines in all such manner and struggles in the Mithyā Saṃsāra or false appearance of transmigratory existence.

We should not doubt in the manner - "In all such ways does anyone imagine only those things which do not exist at all?" Here in this context too the illustration of the dream is

available to drive home the point in question. Although therein only the individual person (i.e. the dreamer) exists in reality, his imagining in himself a new Jivatwa or life which does not at all really exist is in everyone's experience. The who is a Brahmin in the waking, in the dream he may experience as if he is a Vaishya or a low-caste rustic or a heathen; now in the waking one who is enjoying good health and who is strong and sturdy may in the dream appear to be suffering from a disease and to be a lame or blind person. Therein (in the dream) one may imagine in the manner - "I am living (existing) here in this way alone for such a long time. To end in such a plight such and such a thing was the cause; in future I will endeavour in such and such a manner and attain a better condition" - etc. and conceive of the relevant memory and experiences, the relevant action, means of action and their fruits and the relevant supporting concepts of time, space and causation; and further he may believe that they really exist therein (at that period of time). Even so, the moment he wakes up, the falsifying or sublating knowledge of the type - "All that was a mere dream; I was believing a false appearance itself to be real at that time" - accrues, is it not so? In the same way, now at present in the dream called 'Samsāra' which is Avidyākalpita or conjured up by ignorance we are all imagining phenomena like - we as Jivas; time-spacecausation categories; action - means of action - fruits; various experiences etc.; for all these imaginations the basic concept of Jivatwa which we have conceived of in the manner - "I am a Pramātru (cognizer), Kartru (agent of action), Bhōktru (enjoyer)" - is the substrate, support. If we observe from the Paramārtha Drishti then it becomes evident that all this is verily beginningless 'Adhyāsa' or misconception which has taken place in the Nityashuddhabuddhamukta Advitiyatman indeed.

AN ILLUSTRATION FOR MISCONCEPTIONS AND THEIR REMOVAL

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरन्थकारे विकल्पिता । सर्पधारादिभिर्भावैस्तद्वदात्मा विकल्पितः ।।१७॥

Meaning: "As a rope whose nature has not been well ascertained is imagined in the dark to be various things like

a snake, a streak of water, etc., so also is the Self imagined variously".

निश्चितायां यथा रज्ज्वां विकल्पो विनिवर्तते । रज्जुरेवेति चाद्वैतं तद्वदात्मविनिश्चयः ॥१८॥

Meaning: "As illusion (of the rope) ceases and the rope alone remains; when the rope is ascertained to be nothing but the rope, so also is the ascertainment about the Self".

FOR THE MISCONCEPTIONS IN ATMAN THE ANALOGY OF THE ILLUSTRATION OF A ROPE-SNAKE

The fact that - 'For all imaginations the Jivatwa Kalpana or 'I' concept alone is the substrate (root cause)' - we have already mentioned, is it not so? Now we will signify as to what is the cause for this Jivatwa Kalpana. In our workaday world there are instances of the common people misconceiving a rope as a snake, is it not so? What is the reason for it? It is 'not knowing a rope definitely to be a rope' alone. In poor light or in dusk people may misconceive (imagine) in various ways a rope to be either a snake or a streak of water or a crevice in the ground. We all know for certain that for all those various misconceptions the absence of the definite knowledge of the type - "This is a rope indeed" - is the cause; for, those who have reckoned the rope as a rope only with certainty do not at all entertain any misconception. In the same way, for the misconception of the nature of a false notion of the type - "I am a Samsāri who performs Dharma (righteous acts) and Adharma (sinful acts) and experiences, enjoys their resultant fruits" - to occur, the absence of the definite knowledge of the type - "I am the Advayātman (non-dual Self) who is of the essential nature of Nityashuddhabuddhamukta (eternally Pure, Conscious and Liberated) and Asamsāri (one devoid of Samsāra)" - alone is the cause.

AN ILLUSTRATION FOR THE SUBLATION OF THE MISCONCEPTIONS IN ATMAN

Just as when the light comes or when the light emitted from a bright object spreads and we determine a rope in its real form in the manner - "This is indeed a rope", all those misconceptions formulated about it vanish; in the same way, here too (in the illustrated case) we must reckon that as soon as the determinative Intuitive Knowledge pertaining to Atman is attained, all those misconceptions, which were appearing, do disappear. Just as if any person who knows the ground reality affirms a rope to be a rope alone and on the strength of his statement we get rid of the fear and trembling born out of the misconception (of a snake), in the same way those seekers (Jijñāsus), who listen to Śruti statements like: "Not this, not that" (Bri. 4-4-22); "All this is Atman alone" - (Chh. 7-25-2); "For this Brahman neither there exists a cause nor an effect, neither an interior nor an exterior; this Atman alone is Brahman" - (Bri. 2-5-19); "He is birthless within and without" - (Mundaka 2-1-2); "This embodiment of Pure Consciousness alone is all-pervading, birthless, devoid of old age and death, immortal, fearless - He is Brahman" (Bri. 4-4-25) etc. - attain the Intuitive Knowledge of Brahman and all the misconceptions that have been caused disappear.

Here in this case there exists a distinction between the illustration and the illustrated. That is: For the seer, the rope is an object of knowledge (Jñeya) existing outside; on the other hand, Brahman happens to be the essential nature of Being alone of the Jijñāsu. Even after listening to a statement with regard to the essential nature of the rope, there remains the necessity of determining after the proper inquiries as to whether it is really a rope or not? But Brahman was Atman alone in the past, is Atman even now and will be Atman in the future too. Therefore, some people here may entertain a doubt of the type - "How come we do not cognize our own Atman?" For this doubt the solution is: To know, cognize Atman does not mean to know, perceive Him just as we perceive an externally existing object like a rope etc. through our senses. Our essential nature of Pure (Swarūpa) perennially exists in Its self-effulgent, selfillumining Nitya Chaitanyaswarūpa or essence of eternal Pure Being-Consciousness. Even so, we have misconceived - due to Avidyā which is natural - that we are of the nature of Pramātru or cognizer associated or endowed with the body, the senses and the mind. When both the Śāstra and the preceptor instruct us in the manner - "You are not of the nature of Kartru-Bhoktru; neither you are of the nature of a Pramātru endowed with a body,

senses etc.; but you are of the essential nature of the Witnessing Consciousness who is ever observing, objectifying all these phenomena" - we give up the identification (deep-seated ownership) and rest established in our real essence of Pure Being-Consciousness. Only to this extent the similarity with the illustration of the rope should be accepted or adopted, and it should not be misconstrued that there is any intention, real purport of teaching to the effect that just like the rope our \bar{A} tman is an object for any $J\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ (knowledge) or that we have to sublate actually an ignorance $(Aj\bar{n}\bar{a}na)$ about Him and have to attain afresh a knowledge about Him (intellectually); this topic will be further clarified in the next Prakarana.

THE THEORY AVIDYA AS THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD AND ITS REFUTATION

The manner in which some followers of Vyākhyānaprasthāna (post-Śańkara commentators' methodology) have explained the illustration of the rope-snake mentioned here is: Both the ropesnake and its knowledge are Avidyātmaka (projected by or of the essence of Avidyā) which is indescribable, indefinable (Anirvachaniya) as either Sat or real and Asat or false, unreal. Because the snake is seen, it is not Asat, but because it is falsified, sublated by Jñāna it is also not Sat. To say that the two qualities of Sat (existence) and Asat (non-existence) - exist in one and the same object is a contradiction. Therefore, the snake is also not Sadasat or real-unreal. It is something Anirvachaniya, totally different from all these three. Because the known snake (Jñeya Sarpa) is indefinable, it amounts to saying that its Jñāna too is Anirvachaniya, which means - "An appearance which cannot be determined and defined as either 'existing' or 'non-existing'." Because both the snake and its knowledge are not existing always, it amounts to saying that they are Kārya or effects which appear during the interval (temporarily). Therefore, for these effects not only there must necessarily be a Nimitta Kāraņa (efficient cause) but also an Upādāna Kāraņa (material cause) also. If this cause is real just as clay etc., then its effects like pot, pitcher etc. will necessarily have to be real; both of them will have to be perforce known through certain Pramāņas or valid means of knowledge. Therefore, if we wish to solve this undesirable predicament the Upādāna (material cause) for both the ropesnake and its knowledge will necessarily have to be the indefinable Ajñāna alone. Both Bhrānti (delusion) and Samshaya (doubt) are Ajñāna alone; because of the reasons that they do not subsist through the Kārya (effects) and they are Sādi or with a beginning, they desiderate a different cause; then needing another second cause for that first cause, further a third cause for that second cause - thus a series of causes (Kāraṇa Parampara) will become a necessity also; in order to avoid this logical defect of an absence of finality or conclusion, it should be reckoned as Jñānābhāva or absence of knowledge; because it is of the nature of Abhāva (non-existence) also, one has to accept the proposition that Ajñāna which is Anirvachanīya, Anādi (beginningless) but Bhāvarūpa (of an existent nature) alone is the Upādāna Kāraṇa (material cause) for both this rope-snake and the rope-snake knowledge also.

This explanation is unsustainable, untenable. For, neither the rope-snake nor its knowledge is a substance, material object existing apart from the rope; the common people imagine the rope itself to be a snake and think in the manner - "Now we have got the knowledge of a snake" - and not that they believe or accept the fact that these imaginary concepts are truly, actually material things or that they necessarily should have a cause; further, it would not be reasonable for them to do so. Shri Gaudapādāchārya also, who has written the Kārikā, has stated that because of the fact that the rope is not determined in its true form, that rope itself is being misconceived as a snake, a streak of water etc. only; he has not at all mentioned or propounded that they are the Karya of the Anirvachaniya Avidyā. Further, if we follow the method of explaining the illustration by the Kārikākāra, then for the Dārshṭāntika (illustrated) the simple, straight-forward and spiritually purposeful meaning (opinion) of the type - "All that exists is the Paramatma Vastu alone; in It all the various components like Prāṇa etc. (mentioned later in the 19th Kārikā) are misconceived alone" - becomes the most appropriate, suitable one. For that reason alone, while explaining the opinion of the Chhāndōgya Upanishad the Bhāshyakāra (Shri Śańkara) has said:

"Brahman of the very essence of Pure Being (Sadrūpa) Itself is being transacted in the manner of Abhidhāna (name), Abhidheya

(named object) with concepts totally different from It. Just as in our workaday world a rope itself is being transacted as a 'snake' because of a Sarpabuddhi or snake-consciousness or concept; or, just as due to a misconception that it is different from clay, we deal with the clay itself using words like 'a lump of clay', 'pot' - etc.; further, just as for one who has reckoned, realized it to be a rope by dint of discrimination the snake, its name and concept too - all these (superimpositions or misconceptions) get sublated; and just as for those who have by means of discrimination cognized it to be clay the word-concepts like 'pot' etc. get falsified, sublated - in the same manner, for those who have Intuited It to be Sadbrahman by means of discrimination the word-concepts like 'separate effects' (other than its cause or substrate of Brahman) will get sublated." - (Chh. Bhāshya 6-2-3).

Therefore, in the present Kārikās there is no room whatso-ever for the theory that - "For the world (of duality) Avidyā is a material cause (Upādāna Kāraṇa)" - to be adopted. Just as the rope - when it is not determined in its definite, real form - is being misconceived as a snake etc.; and when its real essential nature is determined or cognized, no misconception whatsoever remains, leaving behind the rope (in its true existence) - in the same way, Ātman too, till He is not determined in His real essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness, is being misconceived as Prāṇa, etc. But especially when He is determined in the manner - "He is really Advitīyātman alone" by virtue of Vedānta Vijñāna or Vedāntic Intuition - then He subsists as nondual Pure Being-Consciousness, devoid of any misconceptions whatsoever.

FROM THE ABSOLUTE VIEWPOINT UNITY; FROM THE MĀYĀ VIEWPOINT MANIFOLD MISCONCEPTIONS

प्राणादिभिरनन्तैस्तु भावैरेतैर्विकल्पितः । मायैषा तस्य देवस्य ययाऽयं मोहितः स्वयम् ॥१९॥

Meaning: "(\bar{A} tman) is misconceived, imagined as $Pr\bar{a}$ na and such other innumerable phenomena. This is that Deity's (divine Being's) $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ or mystical show, He is Himself deluded by that."

ALL IMAGINATIONS (VIKALPAS) ARE MĀYIK OR ILLUSORY

Just as when it is not determined to be a rope, that very rope is being misconceived as a snake, a streak of water etc. - in the same way, this Ātman also is being misconceived in the forms like Prāṇa etc., which are mentioned in due course and many more such various forms. Even so, in reality (in the ultimate analysis) He is always of one and the same essential nature indeed.

Here in this context any one may raise a doubt of the type: In the rope-snake illustration etc. the things like snake, streak of water etc. exist separately, independently by themselves; only exclusively in the rope alone they are imagined, misconceived. If it were true that - "The snake does not exist anywhere at all" - no one would have misconceived the rope as a snake out of *Bhrānti* or delusion. **Bhrānti means to reckon one thing to be another**; if that other thing is proved not to exist anywhere, how can this Bhrānti take place at all? No, it cannot. But in the present illustrated instance, is it not true that Vedāntins affirm that common people imagine, misconceive Ātman Himself as Prāṇa and such other forms only which do not exist anywhere at all? How at all can this be suitable, tenable?

For this the consolation is: Merely on the strength of illustration of the type of rope-snake we are not trying to establish or expound either Ātman's unitary existence (Ekatwa) or the fact of all the other phenomena being imaginations, misconceptions. For all that we affirm, there is the support of Anubhava or universal Intuitive Experience. Merely on the strength of Tarka or logical arguments what can be established at all? In deep sleep, we have the Intuitive Experience of: 'Atman - who is of Chaitanya Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness), who is unitary, non-dual alone - Himself am I'; while in the waking and dream, although that very Atman of Chaitanya Swarūpa exists as He is, the other imaginary phenomena, which are of the nature of misconceptions alone, are also seen. When both these things are seen on the strength of Intuitive Experience, it can never be proper to forward an illogical argument of the type - "How is this possible at all? This too does not suit or is not in agreement with logic, is it not so ?" Therefore, using the proper logical device we should determine

that - "Just as the ignorant, deluded people misconceive a rope itself to be a snake, or a streak of water etc., in the same manner the ignorant people - although Ātman exists unto Himself as non-dual in His essential nature of *Chaitanya* (Pure Consciousness) - misconceive Him alone as 'Prājña' etc."

(Question): In that case, in Ātman, who is eternally Pure, Conscious and Free, phenomena or appearances which do not at all exist anywhere are appearing, is it not so? How should we reconcile this apparent anomaly?

(Answer): All this is 'that Deity's $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ or mystical prowess.' In the workaday world a magician by profession will demonstrate as if a tree in empty space has blooming flowers; merely on that count, are there trees which exist in space blooming with flowers? Not at all. In the same way, although that Paramātman exists alone by Himself eternally Pure, He appears as if He is endowed with the conglomeration of the body and the senses as also being associated with the triad of action, means of action and its fruit. He appears to be enjoying the transmigratory life in a world of duality which is totally different from Himself. Previously in the Agama Prakarana also (1-17) it was expounded that - "This Dvaita or duality or diversity is mere Māyā or Illusion" - is it not ? In this Vaitathya Prakarana too was it not stated in 2-12 that - "That Deity called 'Atman' by virtue of His Māyā or mystical power imagines Himself in various forms" -? In that manner, everything here also should be discerned. Although Atman exists in the Absolute form of Parameshwara alone, He appears as if He is deluded by His Māyā. Meraly because his Kalpita Rūpa or imagined (misconceived) form of Jiva - in which the special characteristic (Dharma) called "Antahkarana" or Mind is misconceived (Adhyasta) appeares to exist controlled by Bhrānti or delusion, there is no harm done at all to that Paramatman's real nature of Pure Being-Consciousness. To Him, who is always eternally Witnessing the three states of Consciousness by means of His Absolute, Pure Consciousness as the Sākshi, no trials and tribulations of this illusion of the transmigrates form (Samsāra) have really (in the Absolute sense) been canned at all; for that reason alone, Bhagavān Shri Krishņa has taught Arjuna in the following manner : दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया । मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ।।

(Gitā 7-14) meaning: "This Māyā of Mine which is of the nature of three qualities (of Satwa, Rajas and Tamas) and difficult to cross, belongs to Me, the Divine Being. Those who surrender unto Me alone are able to cross this Maya". In any case, there is no taint whatsoever of the whole gamut of Māyā Drishya or illusory phenomena, which appear in the three Avasthas of waking, dream and deep sleep, to Atman, Paramatman. One who determines (so as to culminate in his Intuitive Experience) that - "All these phenomena are verily Māyika or illusory, a mere phantasmagoria; to Me (who is the Pure Being-Consciousness of Atman) these phenomena of Samsara appearing within the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep do not at all afflict, taint in the least; I am really the eternally Pure, Conscious, Free Absolute Being alone" - in such a person, in reality, there are no misconceptions occurring at all. That aspect of the spiritual teaching that: "Just as - although in the rope the misconceptions like a snake, a streak of water etc. are appearing (i.e. they are superimposed upon it) - in actuality, they are not at all related in the least to the essential nature of the rope, in the same way to the essential nature of non-dual Atman none of these Vikalpas or imaginary concepts like Prāṇa etc., which are superimposed upon or misconceived in Him, actually taint Him in the least" - this tenet alone is relevant here in this rope-snake illustration.

SOME TYPES OF IMAGINATIONS MADE IN ATMASWARUPA

प्राण इति प्राणविदो भूतानीति च तद्विदः । गुणा इति गुणविदस्तत्त्वानीति च तद्विदः ॥२०॥

Meaning: "Prāṇa, say those who know Prāṇa, and Bhūta or material object, say those who know it; Guṇas, say those who know Guṇas; and Tattwas, say those who know them."

पादा इति पादिवदो विषया इति तिद्वदः । लोका इति लोकविदौ देवा इति च तिद्वदः ॥२१॥

Meaning: "Pādas, say those who know Pādas, Vishayas, say those who know them; Lōkas say those who know Lōkas; and *Devatas* (deities), say those who know them."

वेदा इति वेदविदो यज्ञा इति च तिद्वदः । भोक्तेति च भोकृविदो भोज्यिमिति च तिद्वदः ।।२२।।

Meaning: "Vedas, say those who know Vedas; and Yajñas, say those who know them; *Bhōktṛu* or enjoyer, say those who know Bhōktṛu; *Bhōjya* or the object enjoyed, say those who know it."

सूक्ष्म इति सूक्ष्मिवदः स्थूल इति च तिद्वदः । मूर्त इति मूर्तिवदोऽमूर्त इति च तिद्वदः ।।२३।।

Meaning: "Sūkshma (subtle), say those who know what is Sūkshma; and Sthūla (gross), say those who know it to be so; Mūrta (with form), say those who know what is Mūrta; and Amūrta (formless), say those who know it to be so."

काल इति कालविदो दिश इति च तिद्वदः । वादा इति वादविदो भुवनानीति तिद्वदः ।।२४।।

Meaning: "Kāla (Time), say those who know Time; and directions, say those who know them; theories, say those who know theories and *Bhuvanas* (worlds), say those who know them (14 worlds)."

मन इति मनोविदो बुद्धिरिति च तद्विदः । चित्तमिति चित्तविदो धर्माधमौ च तद्विदः ।।२५।।

Meaning: "Mind, say those who know the Mind; intellect, say those know it to be so; Chitta (memory), say those who know Chitta; and Dharma (righteousness) and Adharma (unrighteousness), say those who know them."

पञ्चिवंशक इत्येके षिट्विश इति चापरे । एकत्रिशक इत्याहुरनन्त इति चापरे ।।२६।।

Meaning: "Twenty-five principles or categories, say some; while others say, twenty-six; some say, it comprises 31 categories, while others say, it comprises of infinite categories."

लोकाल्लोकविदः प्राहुराश्रमा इति तद्विदः । स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकं लैङ्गाः परापरमथापरे ।।२७।।

Meaning: "People, say those who know it to be people; \overline{A} shramas (stages in life), say those who know them; Linga (sex), say those who know it to be of masculine, feminine or eunuch sexes. Some others call it as Para and Apara."

सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिविदो लय इति च तिद्वदः । स्थितिरिति स्थितिविदः सर्वे चेह तु सर्वदा ॥२८॥

Meaning: "Srishti (creation), say those who know creation; Laya (dissolution), say those who know dissolution; Sthiti (subsistence), say those who know subsistence; but He has always been all these."

THEORISTS ALSO HAVE IMAGINED VARIOUS CONCEPTS IN ATMAN

Not only the common run of people of the world but also the various philosophers as also theorists (thinkers) have conceived their own respective religious or spiritual tenets which are truly imaginations misconceived in Ātman. This is the sum and substance of these above mentioned Kārikās.

THE EXPLANATION OF WORDS LIKE PRANA ETC.

"Prāṇa", the word first used in these Kārikās, means "Prājña", who alone is the Kāraṇātma or the Self who is the primordial cause. All else are His effects, offshoots. The reason why Prājña has been called 'Prāṇa' has been explained in the previous Prakaraṇa (page 38).

"Bhūtas" means *Prithvi* (earth), *Ap* (water) etc.; "Guṇas" means Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; "Tattwas" means the 25 categories which the Sāṅkhyans enumerate - only these are the cause for the manifold world - thus various disputants or proponents of various theories were asserting.

Various theories, objects, worlds, deities. Sacrifices, enjoyer and the enjoyed objects - all these are the various categories or concepts to which several proponents of spiritual doctrines have given predominance in empirical or religious transactions. The

relevance of these theories in this context is rather incomprehensible.

"Sūkshma" means the subtle state of the Bhūtas or five primordial elements; "Sthūla" means the gross elements and the body, the senses etc. which are caused by them; Chārvākas or Materialists had greater belief in Bhūtas or primordial elements since they were perceptible objects or things. "Mūrta" means the theory of those who believe that Parameshwara is with form; "Amūrta" means the theory of certain people who used to argue that Ātman did not have any form whatsoever; this theory is presented by Shūnyavādins or Nihilists - thus opine certain people; but there does not seem to be any proper evidence or support for that opinion. For, it has been found out from the texts like Nāgārjuna Kārikās etc. that the doctrine of the Shūnyavādins is: "In all appearances, whatever they may be, there is no stuff, substance at all."

Those who have given predominance to time are astrologers; predominance is given to cardinal directions in the school of philosophy called 'Svarodayavadins'. Theories (Vadas) are beliefs in Dhātu Vāda (to wit, metals, mantras etc. contain in them the secret of immortality); Bhuvanas means the 14 worlds which are the regions of enjoyment of fruits of Karmas; Manas (mind) say Naiyyāyikas (followers of the school of philosophy called Nyāya); Buddhi or intellect say Sānkhyans (followers of another school of philosophy called Sānkhya); Chitta or idea say Yōgins - thus one and the same Antahkarana or Mind, psyche is given different names by different sects of philosophy based on different causes, reasons. The Kshanikavijnānavādins (a sect among the Buddhists) have imagined that this Chitta or psyche alone is momentary, transient and that it appears by itself both as the grasping agent (Grāhaka) and the grasped object (Grāhya). That the Dharmādharmas or virtues and vices are the causes for all Karmaphalas or fruits of actions is the doctrine of Mimāmsakas. Sānkhyans say that Purusha is the 25th category, whereas Pātanjala Yogins propound that Iśwara is the 26th category and Pāshupatas believe that Īśwara is the 31st category.

Thus the various proponents of different philosophies have imagined various concepts in one and the same Ātman. The purport of this present text is neither to find out the various

theories nor to determine their validity, veracity or otherwise. One and the same Ātman, who is Nirvikalpa or beyond imagination or concepts, has become various concepts like Prājña etc. It is enough if the seekers understand, discern the fact that all these are mere imaginations, misconceptions; that there is no difference whatsoever between the imaginary phenomena appearing in a dream and these various concepts when they are considered or examined from the Paramārtha Drishṭi. The Kārikākāra has expressed this very opinion at the end when he says: "सर्वे चेह तु सर्वदा" (In this everything is imagined always).

THE FRUITS OF MITHYĀJÑĀNA (MISCONCEPŢIONS) AND SAMYAJJÑĀNA (INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE)

यं भावं दर्शयेद् यस्तु तं भावं स तु पश्यति । तं चावति स भूत्वाऽसौ तद्ग्रहः समुपैति तम् ।।२९।।

Meaning: "Anyone to whom a teacher may show a particular object (as the reality) sees that alone. And that thing, too, protects him by becoming identified with him. That absorption leads to his self-identity (with the object of attention)."

एतेरेषोऽपृथग्भावैः पृथगेवेति लक्षितः । एवं यो वेद तत्त्वेन कल्पयेत् सोऽविशङ्कितः ।।३०।।

Meaning: "Through these things that are (really) non-different (from the Self), this one is presented as though really different. He who knows this truly grasps (the meaning of the Vedas) without any hesitation."

THE EFFECT OF MITHYĀJÑĀNA

Many differences, distinctions beyond count like Prāṇa etc. are imagined, misconceived in the non-dual Reality of that Ātman, is it not so? For all of them Ātman alone is the Paramārtha or Ultimate, Absolute substratum, essence of Pure Being; only the respective special form merely appears due to misconception, that is all. Without discerning this secret the various disputants believe steadfastly in what appears to them as real, to be the Ultimate, Absolute Reality and they preach the same doctrine to others

also. When any preceptor teaches his pupil that a particular tenet among all these various concepts as the Ultimate Reality, then that teaching will be held firmly in the mind of the pupil in the manner - "This alone is the Ultimate Absolute Reality; this alone is my Swarūpa or essence of Being" - or "This alone is the means for attaining my ultimate goal of the present existence (Purushārtha)". Just as the convicts in a prison are securely bound, shackled by the jailors and are prevented from escaping, in the same way that very belief, concept itself is firmly binding that pupil and is creating a faith in him to the effect that all other tenets are unreal, false. Previously in 2-19 it was stated that: "This is the Māyā of the Deity; by this he alone is deluded" - is it not so? Accordingly, each and every person is holding on obstinately to his respective misconception indeed.

THE EFFECT OF SAMYAJJÑĀNA

But these Prāṇa etc. do not at all exist apart from Ātman; just as the rope itself is imagined in various forms like a snake, a streak of water etc., these too appear as if they exist independently apart from Ātman, and one who conceives (cognizes) in this manner is the one who has properly understood, discerned the purport of the Veda texts.

One should not doubt in the manner: "Although the misconception of the snake does not exist in the rope, a real snake invariably exists somewhere (in the empirical world); but as regards the misconceptions like Prāṇa etc., apart from Ātman, they do not at all exist anywhere, is it not so? Then, how does the illustration suit or becomes relevant in the present context?" For, this phenomenon conceived in the form of 'this snake', when we say - "This snake which is appearing before me" - it does not exist 'anywhere' in reality. In the same way, these phenomena of Prāṇa etc. which have been described above do not at all exist anywhere, being in the same predicament or situation. In the illustration the snake may exist (as a real object, entity in the empirical region) somewhere; but in the form of - "This snake which appears herefore" - it (i.e. the rope-snake) does not exist whatsoever, and in the same way, all the misconceptions of the type of Prana etc. in the apparent forms they appear do not exist anywhere at all. Therefore, there exists positively, a parallel, proper relevance between the illustration and the illustrated.

Thus one who has determined in the manner - "Ātman alone really exists; none of the misconceptions (Vikalpas), whatsoever they may be, in the form in which they are appearing exists at all either in Atman or anywhere else" - will be endowed with the capability, qualification of determining the true purport of the Vedantic texts as it really is. In fact, he is the one fully qualified person who can comparatively weigh and evaluate, determine the respective purports behind the Karmavākyas or statements pertaining to religious rites, rituals etc., Upāsanavākyas or statements pertaining to the Vedic meditations as also the Jñānavākyas or statements pertaining to Self-Knowledge; all the rest - howevermuch they might have studied the Mimāmsā Śāstra (texts of Jaimini's school of philosophy which propose to inquire into the etymological and ritualistic aspects of the Vedas) - will not have the Intuitive Knowledge to discriminate and determine as to which is Paramārtha or Absolute Reality and which is merely empirical, transient (appearance).

KĀRIKĀS DEVOTED TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE PURPORT OF THE PRAKARAŅA

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा । तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥३१॥

Meaning: "Just as dream and magic are seen to be unreal, or as is a city in the sky, so also is this whole universe known to be unreal from the Upanishads by the wise."

THE FACT THAT DUALITY IS FALSE APPEARANCE IS ESTABLISHED BY THE VALID MEANS OF VEDĀNTA (UPANISHADS)

In this Prakaraṇa it has been expounded that duality is unreal (Asat), is it not so? For this exposition, there is $Pr\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ (the valid means of evidence) provided by the Upanishads. This is not merely a futile imaginative exercise of building a castle in the air. Just as, though the dream phenomena as well as the magically-projected phenomena do appear to be real, they are in truth unreal, false; just as in the phenomena called 'Gandharvanagara' or a celestial city seen in the sky or empty space there

are appearances of a commercial street, houses, multi-storeyed buildings, men and women roaming about etc., and all of a sudden that whole phenomenon of the celestial city disappears in a jiffy - in the same way, this universe is a mere false appearance, and this truth the scholars, wise people (Panditāḥ) have cognized on the validity, authority of the Upanishadic sentences. If we observe the statements of Śrutis like: "All this universe was, in the beginning, Ātman alone" - (Aitareya); "Where there appears to be duality there one may see another; may hear another, may smell another, may touch another, but where this Jñāni is verily (himself) the Ātman alone who can see what and with what......?" (Bṛiḥadāraṇyaka) etc. - it becomes evident that their real ultimate purport of spiritual instruction is that all the phenomena of the manifold universe are merely a false appearance indeed.

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ।।३२।।

Meaning: "There is no dissolution, no origination, none in bondage, none striving or aspiring for salvation, and none liberated. This is the highest truth."

THE WHOLE GAMUT OF EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS IS THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF AVIDYA

Although what has been conclusively established in the previous verse itself to the effect that both the waking and the dream states are of the same category on the strength of logical devices, this conclusion alone is not the prominent purport of this Prakarana; for, merely by indicating this much there is no benefit accruing at all. In order to determine exclusively the real essential nature of Atman which has perforce to be cognized (Intuited) by means of $\bar{A}gama$ or the implicit, subtle methodology traditionally handed down through a long line of preceptors well versed in the Upanishadic pedagogics, the profound teaching that - 'All duality, diversity is Mithyā' - is propounded. Because of the fact that if one cognizes that Truth it amounts to his getting rid of Avidyā, Kāma, Karma and the transmigratory life's experience of the nature of Sukha and Duhkha, as also the Atmaikatwa Jñāna or the non-dual Self-Knowledge becomes beneficial, fruitful.

How is it? To explain, if one Intuits the truth that - "All duality is false, unreal; Ātman alone is the Ultimate Reality" and if it is further determined that both Loukika (empirical, secular) and Vaidika (scriptural) transactions in their entirety are invariably the subject-matter of Avidyā alone, then there does not at all exist anything like birth, growth, death etc. Therefore, it amounts to concluding that there is no one at all who is bound (by transmigratory existence); nor is there any one who performs, practises Adhyātma Sādhana or spiritual disciplines. To one who is born there is bondage, is it not so? To one who is bound there is a need of Sādhana, is it not so? Therefore, it amounts to concluding that there is neither a Mumukshu or a seeker of Liberation or salvation, nor a Mukta or one who is Liberated. Is it not true that the quintessence of all Loukika and Vaidika Vyavahāras is: By performing such and such a Sādhana such and such a fruit, benefit should be acquired? Only to a person who fully believes that Utpatti or creation and Pralaya or dissolution of the world of duality, diversity are really occurring, this above Vyavahāra also really exists. But to one who has decided that all these are, like a dream, false alone - just as to one who has woken up the gains and losses or the happiness and misery accruing from the dream transactions do not affect at all - no transaction, whatsoever it may be, is really real in the ultimate analysis (Paramārtha).

If the question - "To one who has attained the Paramārtha Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) how can there be no Utpatti (creation) and no Pralaya (dissolution)?" - is raised, the answer is provided convincingly based on Śruti statements like - "Where one sees as if there exists duality, there one sees another" - (Bṛi.); "To one who has the knowledge that here Bheda or diversity, distinction exists, he obtains death after death" - (Kaṭha); "All this is Ātman alone" - (Bṛi.) etc. To objects which really (empirically) exist, there is birth and there is destruction also; but to a false appearance like a hare's horn there does not ever exist any birth or destruction, is it not so? Observed from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi, the Absolutely existing (i.e. non-dual, Transcendental) Ātman can never have birth or death whatsoever. For any object or substance there can be destruction caused either from another object or substance; or by the mutation of its own

constituents or ingredients it can be destroyed; to Ātman, who does not have both these pre-requisites or conditions and who is Absolutely, Transcendentally as also non-dually existing (by Himself, unto Himself, for Himself, so to speak) how at all can there be any destruction?

It is true that in our workaday world those objects and creatures which are perceived to exist are born and are destroyed; it has been already demonstrated, explained that all those are like the rope-snake, misconceptions imagined in Ātman (2-29). All phenomena like rope-snake, nacre-silver etc., because they are mere mental imaginations only - neither do they get their birth in the rope, nacre etc., respectively, nor do they merge in the latter indeed and get destroyed. Further, no wise (discriminative) person ever imagines that misconceptions like the rope-snake etc. are born in one's mind alone or that they get destroyed therein in the mind itself.

We cannot also affirm that the phenomena like the rope-snake etc. were born due to a blending of both the mind and the external objects like rope etc. and then got destroyed. We have already refuted (in the commentary on the 17th Kārikā of the previous Prakaraṇa, 1-17) the doctrinaire theory which propounds - "From Avidyā Shakti both the rope-snake and its knowledge are caused and destroyed" - based on the strong reason that it is contradictory to universal experience. On the same basis, because the world of duality is a mere imagination (misconception), it (i.e. world) is not really created, born; nor does it get destroyed anywhere or end up in any other entity. Thus we have to determine.

ALL DUALITY IS A FIGMENT OF IMAGINATION INDEED

Any one may here in this context raise the question: "How can it be said that all this world of diversity is a mental imagination alone?" The answer to this is: Whether in the waking or in the dream, if the mind is quivering, vibrating - then duality, diversity is seen appearing; but if it is not so, as is the case in Avasthās or states like Sushupti (deep sleep) and Samādhi (trance) etc., duality or diversity is not seen. Therefore, all duality or diversity is verily Manōvikalpa or vibration (volition) of the mind alone.

(Doubt): The fact of duality being independent is also to be cognized by the Karaṇa or instrument, medium of the mind alone. This much is the truth and not the (far-fetched) doctrine that - 'Duality, being the mind's figment of imagination, does not seem to be rational, tenable.' Merely on the ground that in the darkness of the night objects are not seen, and in the light of a lamp they are seen, it cannot be understood, reckoned that by the lamp alone the objects are produced or brought into existence; or, in the alternative, merely on the ground that blind people cannot see objects, it does not amount to saying that apart from the eyes the external objects do not exist at all, is it not so? In the same way, here in this present context too why can it not be assumed that the mind is merely a valid means to know, cognize duality?

(Solution): Not so. Although in darkness the objects are not seen, not visible, or to the blind people the sight or form of the objects is not visible, people can touch the objects and determine, decide, in an alternative manner, that they exist. But it is not so in the case of duality; if there is no mind, it is not possible, in any manner, to determine that duality exists. If the mind exists, duality appears or is seen; if it is not there, duality does not appear; hence, it is established that the phenomenon of duality, diversity is mind's imagination or misconception alone.

Here there is an important point that the true seeker has to perforce keep in mind: When it is said that - "If the mind exists, duality exists; if it is not there, duality (too) does not exist" there is a scope for misinterpreting this statement to mean -"Duality is a phenomenon different or separate from the mind; and in duality the mind is not included." But, the ground reality is not like that at all; the mind is included in duality only; or, it is rational and proper to decide, determine that mind and duality are one and the same. Atman, in His very essence of Pure Being-Consciousness, is non-dual (i.e. having nothing else second to, or other than, Him; there does not at all exist the division or distinction of Grāhya (that which is objectified, comprehended) and Grāhaka (that which is the objectifying subject or cognizer). The significant word "Advaita" - connotes the subtle concepts of - (a) nothing else similar to It exists; (b) another entity or thing apart from It (Reality of Atman) does not exist at all; (c) within It there does not exist any distinction or division at all - all these profound meanings are signified by that one pregnant word. To the mind the distinctions of itself being the 'I' (subjective consciousness), the senses and the sensate external world of duality are always visible. To the Jīva (soul), who is utilizing this mind in the external world of diversity, it appears in the manner - "Like me, there exist many other Jīvas." This alone is being called by us as "Dvaita". In any case, thus because all this duality, diversity is the misconception (imagination) of the mind only, Dvaita (diversity) does not really exist at all; therefore, what is taught in the Kārikā, viz. - "There is no Nirōdha or dissolution; nor is there Utpatti or creation," - is proper indeed.

The real purport behind the expression - "This is *Paramārtha* (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality)" - is: "In that Entity in which there does not exist any concepts or categories like 'Nirōdha', 'Utpatti' etc. That alone is **Paramārtha**."

THE DIFFERENCE (CONTRAST) BETWEEN THE BUDDHISTS' THEORY OR DOCTRINE AND VEDĀNTA

Here in this context there is a secret which has to be discerned: The examples, illustrations of Svapna, Māyā and Gandharvanagara, mentioned in the previous Kārikā, keep on coming in the Buddhistic Vijñānavāda texts. The deliberation on the Abhāva or non-existence of Nirōdha (dissolution), Utpatti (birth, causation) etc. mentioned in the present Kārikā is well-known as mentioned in the Buddhistic Shūnyavāda (Nihilistic) texts. The invocatory verse in the Mādhyamika Kārikā written by Nāgārjuna runs like this:

अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतम् । अनेकार्थमनानार्थमनागममनिर्गमम् ।। यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवम् । देशयामास संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ।।

Thus for reasons like - (a) to a great extent there appears to be similarity of word usage in the Buddhistic texts; (b) to those people, who do not examine with all concentration and discrimination by the mind it appears as though there exists innumerable sentences in Gauḍapāda Kārikās with a similarity of

meaning too - some people have opined that Shri Gaudapāda has borrowed his Siddhānta (spiritual teachings) from Buddhists alone; and some others were of the opinion that Shri Gaudapāda entertained an opinion that - "Buddhistic Siddhanta itself was Upanishadic Siddhānta." Some scholars, who have not been able to discern or divine the traditional methodology of Shri Śankara's Advaita Siddhanta, or those, who are opponents of Advaita philosophy, have even levelled the serious allegation that - "Shri Gaudapāda and his followers who are Advaitins are 'Prachhanna Bouddhas' (meaning, though they are secretly following Buddhism, they have hidden this fact and have dubiously professed themselves to be Vedantins)." Because of the fact that this allegation is logically associated with the whole Kārikā text, only after all the deliberation of this text is completed the validity and veracity or otherwise of this allegation can be truly and elaborately deliberated upon, discussed either in the appendix or in the introduction. For the nonce, it is quite necessary that one knows this much, viz.: When the Vijñānavādins (Idealists) use the illustrations of Svapna, Māyā etc., their purport (intention) is that - 'Apart from Vijnana (mental consciousness) the external object does not exist'; when the Shūnyavādins (Nihilists) use them, their opinion is that - 'For any phenomenon (appearance) there is no real essence of Being.' But when the Vedāntins use the very same illustrations it is their teaching that - 'Each of the illustrations of Svapna, Māyā (magic) or Gandharvanagara (celestial city in the empty space) indicates the truth that there invariably exists a real substratum for a false appearance.'

In the present Kārikā the sentence which states that - "There is no Utpatti, no Pralaya, no Baddha, no Sādhaka, no Mumukshu, no Mukta" - its purport is: "Just as it is taught in the Upanishad that all the Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) of Avasthātraya (three states of Consciousness) is imagined (misconceived) in Advaita Ātman (non-dual Self) and that this non-dual Ātman alone is the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality); that all the rest of the duality is a mere figment of imagination (Vikalpamātra) appearing in Him; just as the Shūnyavādins opine that duality is essenceless (Nissāra) or just as the Vijñānavādins say that all this (manifold world of duality) is a mere momentary

mental concept - here in this context there is no such opinion at all. Neither the Abhidhāna Prapañcha (world of names) nor the Abhidheya Prapañcha (world of named objects, phenomena) in their respective forms of appearance is Paramārtha (really Real, Absolute Entity); all these are Avidyākrita Vyavahāra (empirical transactions projected because of Avidyā or ignorance). In the Shūnyavāda or theory of Nihilism no object or substance whatsoever is really existing (essenceless) at all; in Vedānta, however, although as long as the empirical, mundane transactions exist or continue the Vyāvahārikā Prapañcha (empirical, material world) is dealt with as if it is real, its real essence of Being, in the ultimate analysis (i.e. from the Absolute Reality viewpoint), is Advitīyātman alone."

HOW CAN IT BE SAID THAT ŚĀSTRA IS PRAMĀŅA OR VALID MEANS FOR ADVAITA

Here in this context a **doubt** may arise: To say that Śāstra (Upanishadic lore) indicates (teaches) non-duality is a Vyāhatōkti, meaning a contradictory statement. For, Śāstra becomes Pratipādaka or that which propounds or expounds, and Advaita is Pratipādya or that which is propounded, and if this kind of duality is accepted, then non-dualism cannot be established, proved; if it is not accepted, how at all can one assert that Advaita is Śāstrasiddha or established on or through the valid means of the Śāstra?

(Consolatory Explanation): With the help of the rope-snake illustration we have already (2-17, 18) given a detailed solution for this query. Unless and until the reality (substratum) of the rope is accepted or acknowledged, there is no scope whatsoever for the imaginations (misconceptions) like the snake, a streak of water etc. to appear; for, any false appearance (misconceived or superimposed phenomenon) - whatever it may be - can never appear (manifest) without there really being an \overline{Aspada} (substratum, support) at all. Merely on this ground alone, the Sastra which refutes the (reality of) duality or diversity also can be proved to be the valid means for Advaita (non-dualism).

(Objection): This solution is not proper, rational. For, just as the imaginary concepts like the snake, a streak of water etc. the rope too is invariably an imaginary concept in its cause.

Therefore, assuming - without any valid proof - the rope to be a Paramārtha or Roality devoid of any Vikalpa or misconception, if one goes on arguing, then it becomes illogical, irrational.

(Solution): Not so, when we conceive of objects in various ways like - "This is a rope", "This is a snake", "This is a streak of water" etc., although the object existing in front of us is not a Vikalpa, there in that region or spot there invariably exists a particular substance which is perceived by us and which we address as 'this' but which is not at all an imagined thing (Avikalpa Padārtha). Now, keeping that entity (which serves as the substratum) as an illustration, example, to propound that Advaita is the substratum for all sorts of mental concepts is not at all illogical or improper. On the other hand, to argue that a thing which is addressed by us as 'this' and which is perceived by us before us is itself not existing amounts to opposing universal experience (Anubhava). Even in the case when one obstinately affirms that that substratum too does not exist, then because of the fact that - one who says that such a thing does not at all exist or one who exhibits his misconception saying that all these are mere imaginary concepts alone - in both cases at least the disputant has perforce to admit that he himself exists, here there is no scope whatsoever for the vain argument that everything is Shūnya or essencelessness.

(Doubt): Here there is no proper semblance or relevance between the illustration ($Drisht\bar{a}nta$) and the illustrated ($D\bar{a}rsht\bar{a}ntika$). For, in the illustration a substance called 'rope' is an object for the $Pratyaksha\ Pram\bar{a}na$ or valid means of perception. But in the case of the illustrated $\bar{A}tman$, the $Siddh\bar{a}ntins$ (Ved $\bar{a}ntins$ who propound Advaita) keep on affirming that He is not perceived by any valid means. It is quite reasonable, logical too. How is it possible at all for any Vikalpas to arise in $\bar{A}tmavastu$ or the Entity of the Self which is ever, eternally Aprameya or imperceptible, unobjectifiable?

(Solution): This is not at all a defect. For, the fact that our Atman exists is popular, familiar; only with regard to the question of what exactly is His real essential nature of Being there is no certainty, definite cognition, that is all. There is no rule of law at all that the entity in which people entertain a misconception should necessarily be determined through

a valid means (Pramāṇa). If it has been cognized, reckoned through the means of perception in the manner - "This is a rope" - in that entity who will ever misconceive it to be something else? Only if a thing is generally (perfunctorily) known in the manner - "this", but if it is not determined in the perfect manner in answer to the query - "What is 'this'?" - then alone people imagine, guess in the manner - "This is a rope"; "This is a streak of water" etc., is it not so? In the same way, we all have the common, general form of experience 'I'; with regard to it none of us has any doubt whatsoever. No one can ever doubt in the manner - "Do I exist or not?" We are perceiving every now and then special features like - 'I am a happy person'; 'I am a miserable person'; 'I am a fool'; 'I am a wise person'; 'I am born'; 'I will die'; 'I was a young man'; 'I am an old person'; 'These are my people' - etc. The 'I' which is $\overline{A}tmar\overline{u}pa$ or of the nature of self-consciousness, awareness is accompanying all these thought-constructs, mental concepts. Because 'Sukhitwa' (happiness) and 'Duhkhitwa' (misery) etc. are universallyacknowledged experiences alone, the Sastra need not undertake the task of establishing or proving their validity at all; it is also universally known that they do not always exist in the selfconsciousness. Further, with regard to this specific form of 'I' notion or concept - that too is universally established; that too the Sastra need not endeavour to establish or prove. But it has perforce only to determine the question - "What exactly is the real essential nature of this Atman or self of the nature of 'I' concept? In fact, this is what the Sastra unravels or reveals. Because Atman is not an object for any kind of knowledge (to wit, He can never be objectified as a known concept or percept, and hence the Śrutis emphasize the truth that He is 'Aprameya'; it is not possible for the Sastra to delineate in the manner -"Atman is such and such an entity"; in truth, the Śāstra has not at all undertaken this impossible task. However, the Śāstra by propounding that the special characteristics, which are appearing to exist in $\bar{A}tman$ (Pure Being-Consciousness), do not at all belong to His essential nature of Being in the manner - "Neti, Neti" - (Not this, not that) - (Brihadāranyaka); "Asthūlamanaņu" - (which is not gross, which is not subtle) - (Bri.) etc. refutes, rejects all those Dharmas or qualities, characteristics which do

not belong to Him in the least, and by such negation alone (negatively, so to speak) the Śāstra helps indicate our Ātman or Self.

THE VALIDITY OF NEGATING SENTENCES

We should discern the truth that scriptural sentences like -"Not this, not that"; "Not gross, not subtle" etc. - merely refute the respective misconceived form exclusively and achieve the fruition of their purport, but we should never assume that they indicate or imply the Abhāva or non-exisitence of a special characteristic or another special feature different from it or opposed to it. 'Ajñāna' means the absence or lack of Jñāna, or it may mean also 'misconception, wrong knowledge opposed to Jñāna.' If it is said: "This is not gold", it may also imply that "It is brass"; but, in that same manner, when it is said in the case of Atman - "Not this, not that" - there is no opinion or teaching whatsoever implied, of the type - "Something else." If it is stated - "Atman is not Sukhi" - its purport is not at all - "Ātman is Duhkhi"; for, the Śāstra attaches equal relevance to both the statements viz., - "Atman is not Sukhi" and "Atman is not Duhkhi". In Atman no special characteristic form or quality whatsoever 'really' exists. Therefore, in reality there is no special distinction in Atman at all; in fact, in distinctionless Atman alone all distinctions or special features are imagined, misconceived - and this alone is the purport behind all Nishedha Śruti or scriptural statements of negation. In Avasthās or states like Sushupti (deep sleep) and Samādhi (trance) etc. we are not seeing any distinct quality or characteristic whatsoever in Atman (Pure Consciousness). Therefore, the Śāstra does not indicate directly, positively in the manner - "Atmon is of such and such distinctive nature, quality - etc."; merely after stating - "Atman is not this, not that" - by refuting qualities, characteristics not belonging to His essential nature, they (scriptures) stand vindicated in communicating their ultimate purport. Merely on this count the scriptures or Śāstra is said to be a Pramana or valid means to signify or teach the subjectmatter of Ātman, i.e. Self-Knowledge. For this reason alone, Shri Dravidāchārya, one of the ancient preceptors belonging to his traditional line (Sampradāya) of teachers, had written the Sūtra

or aphorism: "सिद्धम् तू निवर्तकवत्" (Merely because of their refuting, removing those Dharmas or qualities which do not belong to Ātman, the Śāstra Prāmāṇya or validity of the scriptural texts is established) - this Shri Śaṅkara has expressed in his Bhāshyas.

IN ATMAN DVAITA (DUALITY) WHICH IS INAUSPICIOUS DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL

भावैरसद्भिरेवायमद्वयेन च कल्पितः । भावा अप्यद्वयेनैव तस्मादद्वयता शिवा ॥३३॥

Meaning: "This Self is imagined to be the unreal things and also to be non-dual; and these perceived things are also imagined on the non-dual Self. Therefore, non-duality is auspicious."

THE PRIMA FACIE ARGUMENT OF DVAITADVAITAVADINS

It has been stated in Kaṭhōpanishad 2-3-2 that - "The Ātmatattwa or the Reality of the Self, devoid of Pralaya (dissolution) etc., is Itself Paramārtha or the Absolute Reality" - is it not so? Ātman is being seen, the imagined phenomena like Prāṇa etc. are also being seen. It being so, how at all can it be determined that Ātman alone is the Ultimate Reality and not Prāṇa etc.? The Advaitins may doubt in the manner that: "Because we have assumed that appearances (phenomena) exist, there is no benefit accruing, is it not so?" But whether there is any benefit or not, it is true that Dvaita (duality), like Advaita (non-duality), is appearing. Therefore, it is proper, legitimate to assume that both these are real indeed.

(Doubt by Siddhānti): Both Dvaita and Advaita cannot possibly exist in one and the same entity; for, they are opposed to each other. Therefore, it should be declared that Dvaita is unreal. Is it not so?

(Opponent with prima facie viewpoint): Not so. In a tree the manifoldness of many branches is seen; in the sea the variety of waves, bubbles etc. is seen. Therefore, it amounts to saying that there is no opposition, contradiction between Dvaita and Advaita. Apart from this, it is not correct to say that there is no benefit accruing from Dvaita. Just as there exists a benefit of the attainment of $M\bar{o}ksha$ (Liberation) from $Ekatwajn\bar{a}na$ (Knowledge

of Unity), there exists the benefit of the conduct of Loukika (mundane, empirical) and Vaidika (scriptural, religious) transactions from Nānātwa or manifoldness also.

REFUTATION OF DVAITADVAITAVADA

This theory, doctrine is not proper. For, although it is true that misconceptions like Prāņa etc. do appear, it is not possible to affirm that they are real, because their essential nature does not exist ever as it appears. Just like the misconceptions of a rope-snake, a streak of water, they are getting sublated, falsified. Just as the real essential nature (empirical entity) of the rope exists, subsists as the substratum for all mental, misconceived concepts, Atmaswarupa eternally, perennially exists as the substratum for all misconceptions like Prāṇa etc. Further, just as the rope itself is misconceived (wrongly imagined) to be the appearances, Atman is being misconceived as Prāṇa and such other forms. Not only is it true that just as those Vikalpas get sublated each by the knowledge, cognition of the other, these Prana and such other misconceived forms get sublated; but further these misconceived forms do not appear whatsoever in Avasthās or states like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. Although it is true that in the Snuti (Upanishad) the Sushuptātman is called 'Prājña', 'Prāṇa', then (i.e. in deep sleep state) He is not at all cognized or Intuited in any distinctive form with special features whatsoever. It is true that by comparing with special forms existing in Jagrat and Svapna we have to say that He $(\bar{A}tman)$ therein (in deep sleep or trance) remains in His Kāraņarūpa or causal seed form; but because in Sushupti no special distinctive form really appears therein, Atman exists as Advitiya or non-dual (one without anything else second to Him); in Him therein no division, distinction of the forms of Grāhya (grasped, comprehended object) or Grāhaka (grasping, comprehending subject) whatsoever appears.

(Doubt): We should aver that the phenomena which appear in Jāgrat and Svapna are Ātman's 'Prachalitarūpas' or forms which are set in motion, i.e. in vogue alone, is it not so?

(Solution): This concept especially cannot at all be acceptable to anyone; for, Atman is Kūṭastha, in Him there can never occur any mutation whatsoever. Therefore, all the phe-

nomena which appear in Jagrat and Svapna are (due to) the natural proclivity, tendency of the fickle mind; just as when there is a lamp the brilliance, glow of the light that is seen, in truth, belongs to the lamp alone, in the same manner it amounts to saying that only when the mind exists the duality, diversity that is seen or which appears belongs to, is related to, the mind alone. In due course (4-73) the Kārikākāra himself states that the Dvaita (duality) of the form of Grāhyagrāhaka is a mere vibration of the mind. Because of that fact, we should not conclude that - "All this amounts to Vijnanavada alone". We will indicate the vast distinction between Advaita which propounds that - "In the Kūṭastha Ātman both the mind and the Dvaita that appears as an object to it are Kalpita or misconceived, imagined" - and Vijñānavāda in due course. Let it be. On the whole, Ātman, remaining perennially in one and the same form or nature, is Himself imagined both in the form of the false, unreal phenomena of Prāṇa etc. and in the form of the Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental) Sadrūpa (of the essence of Reality, Pure Existence) Advayātman (non-dual Self). That is all, and it should not be reckoned that the rest of the phenomena really exist as separate, distinct entities and - just like a thread passing, running through different flowers - Atman, alone exists in all substances, objects.

ALL PHENOMENA ARE, IN THE ABSOLUTE SENSE, THE NON-DUAL ATMAN ALONE

(Objection): That Atmatattwa which exists as the Sadrūpa (Pure Being, Existence) in Avasthās like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. Itself gets transformed in various forms with special features in Jāgrat and Svapna. The sea itself gets transformed into various forms like waves, foam and bubbles etc. and is appearing in those distinct forms, is it not so? This is also just like that only. Besides, there is a Śruti sentence (Taittirīya 2-7) saying: "That Ātmatattwa Itself created Itself." Just as the Paramātmatattwa, which is analogous to the sea water of the illustration, really exists as Sadrūpa, in the same way these various phenomena with distinct features, which appear after being transformed in the waking and the dream, analogous to the various distinct forms like the waves, foam etc., are indeed Sadrūpa alone, is it not so? How is it proper to say that phenomena (Bhāvas) are false,

unreal? If this alone is true, then it amounts to admitting that Upanishads are exclusively the valid means (Pramāṇa); Karmakāṇḍa - because it signifies phenomena which are Asadrūpa (of the form, nature of unreality) - though a part of the Vedas (just like the Jñānakāṇḍa which comprise the Upanishadic lore) - is rendered Apramāṇa (invalid), is it not so?

(Solution): This is not proper. For, those phenomena like Prāṇa etc., remaining as non-dual alone, are imagined indeed. Even when imagining in the manner - "They exist in the various forms of Prāṇa etc." - they do not at all exist without giving up or discarding their Advayātmaswarūpa (the essential nature of non-dual Self or Pure Being-Consciousness) which is Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental Reality). This truth we have previously (2-30) indicated already. These phenomena of Prana etc. do not exist in their respective distinctive forms giving up the support of or apart from $\bar{A}tman$ (Pure Being-Consciousness), is it not so? Even when they have manifested in the forms of appearance, nothing else does exist anywhere at all. It is not possible to aver that - "In that case, let it be said that Atman too is Kalpita (imagined) only!" Because, a Vikalpa (concept, imagined thing) can never exist without an \bar{A} spada (substratum). An imagined rope-snake etc. cannot be said to be imagined without it having an entity or a substance (Vastu) which is a substrate for it, is it not so? Hence, it is not possible for anyone to assert that Atman too, who is the support, substrate for all imaginations (Kalpanas), is Himself an imagined thing, a concept. For that reason alone, the Sruti is stating: "That is Satya (real), that alone is Ātman" - (Chhāndōgya 6-8-7). Further, it has to be determined that because for all kinds of mental concepts It (Self) is the Witnessing Consciousness (Sākshi), It is not imagined; for, in reality (i.e. from the standpoint of universal Intuitive Experience), without Sākshi being there, no object (Padārtha) can ever appear at all.

(Doubt): In that case, what is the purport behind writing the Kārikā in the manner: "He is also imagined in the Advayarūpa (non-dual form)"?

(Solution): The meaning of that statement is not that - "He $(\bar{A}tman)$, existing non-dual is also Kalpita". Just as for all the

various imaginations (concepts) of individual cows (i.e. the species) the $S\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ (genus) of 'Gotwa' (cowness) exists as a substrate - the $S\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyar\bar{u}pa$ (the category of genus, which appears to exist persistently in all phenomena of the form of duality, is also Kalpita (imagined or conceptual) alone; for, in \bar{A} tman, in the absolute sense, these categories or concepts of $S\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ (genus) and Vishesha (species, particular) do not exist in the least - in fact, this is the (intended) purport of that statement.

Now, the prima facie statement of the opponent that -"Atman being of the essential nature of Dvaitadvaita alone is proper; only then, both the Karmakānda and Jñānakānda acquire Prāmānya (validity, authority)" - is in all respects improper. For, Ātman is always, perennially Niravayava (devoid of parts), is Eka (unitary, non-dual). It should not be doubted here in the manner - "In that case, Karmakānda is rendered invalid!" For, by assuming the universally familiar duality or diversity alone if Karma or action is stipulated by way of an injunction, the Karmakānda invariably acquires validity; but there is no cause whatsoever to imagine that - 'In order that the validity of the Śāstra be upheld or established, duality has perforce to be real only.' Besides, once it is determined that Advaita (non-duality) alone is real Dvaita (duality), which is of the form of Kriyā (action), does not subsist at all; only if in that manner duality subsists, it could be asserted that Dvaita has necessarily to subsist in reality, is it not so? The Śruti (Brihadāranyaka 4-5-15) is very clearly declaring that no duality whatsoever exists from the standpoint of the Jñāni when it says: "When from the viewpoint of this Jñāni everything became Ātman alone (i.e. Pure Being-Consciousness, the Ultimate-Absolute Reality), then there with what can He see what?" - thus, it is not possible to imagine, infer that the fact that there is no Vyavahāra (empirical transaction) was mentioned exclusively pertaining to the states like deep sleep and trance etc.; for, Vidyā or Intuitive Knowledge denotes, depicts an Entity, Reality which always (perennially) exists and not a particular thing or phenomenon which exists (appears) in an Avasthā. Besides in Śrutis like - "Ātman is Adrishta (imperceptible), Avyavahārya (beyond the realm of workaday transactions), Prapañchōpashama (devoid of the world

of duality), Shānta (tranquil), Shiva (auspicious), Advaita (non-dual), He is cognized as the fourth. He alone is Ātman, He should be cognized" - (Māṇḍūkya 7); "That alone is Ātman, That alone thou art" - (Chhāndōgya 6-8-7) - etc. it is expounded that Advaita is not restricted exclusively to any one state. Therefore, it is proper, reasonable only to say that - "Ātman is not transformed into the forms of phenomena like Prāṇa etc.; all those phenomena, existing as Ātman alone who is of the really Real (Absolute, Transcendental) essence of Pure Being-Consciousness, are appearing in those various forms."

ADVAITA ĀTMAN ALONE IS OF THE ESSENCE OF AUSPICIOUSNESS

Thus, for reasons like: (a) Ātman is the substrate for all mental concepts, (b) His essential nature of being non-dual never changes - even when the imagined phenomena are appearing, the non-dual nature itself is 'Shiva' or of Mangalaswarūpa i.e. the essential nature of auspiciousness; the mere imagined phenomena are Amangalaswarūpa (of the nature of inauspiciousness). For, just like the rope-snake etc. they are the cause for Anartha (calamities, life's troubles and travails) like Bhaya (fear), Shōka (misery) etc.

नात्मभावेन नानेदं न स्वेनापि कथञ्चन ।

न पृथङ्नापृथिकञ्चिदिति तत्त्वविदो विदुः ।।३४।।

Meaning: "This world, when seen from the standpoint of the Self, does not continue to be diverse. Nor does it exist in any manner in its own right. Nor do phenomenal things exist as different or non-different (from one another or from the Self). This is what the realizers of Truth have cognized."

THE INAUSPICIOUS MANIFOLDNESS DOES NOT AT ALL (EXIST REALLY)

Nānātwa means manifoldness i.e. things being different from one another; where that (such manifoldness) exists there is invariably inauspiciousness. For instance, from beings like a tiger, a thief etc. which are different from us, inauspicious experiences like fear, terror etc. accrue. But if we properly examine, observe

the phenomenon of duality or diversity, then we can discern that it is nothing but of a nature of $\overline{A}tman$ (Pure Being-Consciousness). Just as when viewed, observed in the light of the lamp the snake (i.e. rope-snake) is verily seen as a rope, in the same way if we see (cognize, Intuit) with the light of $J\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ (Intuitive Knowledge), then Dvaita is verily $\overline{A}tman$ or Pure Being-Consciousness; the former is not existing separately at all. Then, especially in its apparent form of duality it does not at all exist; all that exists is verily $Advait\bar{a}tman$ (non-dual Self) - and is this not called 'J \tilde{n} ana'?

Now, although in the Vyavahāra Avasthā (waking, empirical state of Consciousness) the Vikalpas (imagined things, phenomena) invariably appear to be distinct from one another, observed from the Paramārtha Drishti even the Vikalpas, distinct from one another, do not at all exist. The Vikalpas like a snake, a streak of water, which are imagined in the rope, no one ever thinks, reckons to exist really, invariably being distinct from one another - is it not so? People, in general, have believed that a horse is really existing distinctly, separately from a he-buffalo; but with regard to the imagined (misconceived) rope-snake etc. - which are mere appearances - no one ever believes with regard to them in the manner - "These are fit to be cognized in the manner - 'This is different from that'." Therefore, they are not distinct from one another; nor one can affirm that all of them (i.e. such misconceived phenomena) are one and the same too. In the same way (if this line of Intuitive reasoning is pursued to its fruition, finality) we can never assert that those Vikalpas are different, distinct from Paramātman (Supreme Self) or non-different. Previously in 2-30 it was true that it was stated: "Although all these $Bh\bar{a}vas$ (phenomena) are Aprithak (non-different), He (i.e. Atman) is cognized to exist separately indeed"; but the intended purport behind that Kārikā was only to strengthen the truth, teaching that. "The non-dual Atman alone exists; none of the apparent phenomena whatsoever exists really" and not at all with any opinion of expounding a teaching that - "All apparent phenomena do exist without change apart from Atman." Therefore, there does not exist any opposition, contradiction between the teachings of that Kārikā and the present Kārikā. In any case, thus apart

from Ātman all the rest of the categories or concepts or phenomena - everything else - are merely misconceptions indeed. They are not different, distinct from Paramātman, nor are they one with Paramātman. Among themselves too, they are not different from one another, neither is it ever possible to affirm that they are all one and the same; no phenomenon - whatsoever it may be - from the Paramārtha Dṛishti - is distinct separate at all. Therefore, the non-dual Ātman is perennially of Mangalaswarūpa (essential nature of auspiciousness); it is now established that whether within or outside Himself (i.e. Ātman) there does not exist any cause whatsoever which gives rise to Amangala (inauspiciousness).

DELIBERATION ON THE ESSENCE OR REALITY OF DIFFERENCE, DISTINCTION (BHEDA TATTWA) IS NEEDLESS

Some among the thinkers - adept in the deliberation on the essential nature (or reality) of distinction or difference - first assuming that all empirical phenomena exist distinctively or separately from one another, undertake to examine the doctrine of those who opine that - "Difference, distinction is to be established exclusively on the valid means of perception." They further endeavour to discuss the topic after imagining (assuming) a question that - "Whether the concept or category of distinction, difference is a Dharma (quality, characteristic) or Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) of separate entities, objects?" But after it is determined in the manner - "All the phenomena which are appearing to us are mere misconceptions; they are misconceived in (superimposed upon) the non-dual Atman" - there is no scope whatsoever for this discussion. In any case, the final candid determination, decision of those who have cognized the Ultimate Reality of $\overline{A}tman$ (Self-realized souls) is: "As a result of any phenomenon (or misconceived object of appearance) which is Adhyārōpita (superimposed) upon the non-dual Ātman, there is no taint of Amaigala (inauspiciousness) whatsoever affecting or adhering to the latter." There is no harm or danger being posed by any Yukti (logical device) or Anubhava (experience) - whatsoever they may be - to this truth, teaching.

THIS ABSOLUTE REALITY WILL BE INTUITED BY VEDANTINS WHO ARE ENDOWED WITH A COMPOSED, CALM, CONCENTRATED MIND

वीतरागभयक्रोधैर्मुनिभिर्वेदपारगैः ।

निर्विकल्पो ह्ययं दृष्टः प्रपञ्चोपशमोऽद्वयः ।।३५।।

Meaning: "This Self, that is beyond all imagination, free from the diversity of this phenomenal world, and non-dual, is seen by the contemplative people, versed in the Vedas and unafflicted by desire, fear and anger."

PEOPLE WHO ARE QUALIFIED FOR ADVAITATMA JÑANA

Although in this manner this Ultimate Reality is devoid of any blemish, stigma of Amangala (inauspiciousness) whatsoever and It is our very $\bar{A}tman$ (Self) alone, this $Advay\bar{a}tma$ Tattwa(non-dual Reality of our Self) is not Intuited, cognized by everyone. For, those, in whose Antahkarana the latent impressions, proclivities of duality are very strong or deep-seated, are unable to dissociate themselves from, or discard, their Dvaitasatyatwabuddhi (steadfast belief in the reality of duality or diversity), which is having a vice-like grip on their intelligence from time immemorial. Because defects like - (a) having attachment in things which are desirable, and having hatred in undesirable things; (b) a fear complex that things wanted by them may get destroyed or the apprenhensions that some particular impediment or risk may entail them; (c) a pronounced, burning desire for things wanted by them and if any hindrance, impediment to that desire is encountered then indignation, wrath etc. - are abounding in their mind, although this Ultimate Reality which is non-dual and auspicious is verily their $\overline{A}tman$ (i.e. their innate essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness in esse), they are incapable of cognizing, discerning It. Only to those persons, who are devoid of these above-mentioned defects, drawbacks and who are always ratiocinating, ruminating in their minds about this Paramatmatattwa alone and who have cognized, Intuited this Vedānta Tattwa (Ultimate Reality expounded by the Vedantic, Upanishadic texts) which is in truth the goal of all Vedas exclusively, this Tattwa (Reality) which is devoid of any trace or taint of Dvaita and which is Advaita and Mangalakara (auspicious) will be cognizable.

This opinion is clarified in the following Mundaka Upanishad sentence and such other Sruti sentences, viz. 'वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः' - (Mundaka 3-2-6) meaning: "Only those Jñānanishthas (people who are fully established in the Self-Knowledge) who have determined convincingly the Tattwa (Absolute, Ultimate Reality of the Self) by means of Vedāntavijnāna (Vedāntic Intuitive Knowledge or Experience) and who have attained Sattvashuddhi (purification of the mind, heart) will attain the Paramāmritatwa (the Absolute, really real immortality)." This phrase of a verse, viz. "वीतरागभयक्रोधैः" - meaning: "Those who are devoid of attachment, fear, anger or hatred" - is seen in Gita (4-10); there in that context too, it has been stated that - "To those who are purified by means Jñāna (Self-Knowledge), Tapas (meditation, austerity) Bhagavattattwa (the Absolute Reality of Paramatman) becomes cognizable."

THE TRANSACTIONS (BEHAVIOUR) OF A VIDWAT SANNYĀSIN (REALIZED SOUL)

तस्मादेवं विदित्वैनमद्वैते योजयेत् स्मृतिम् । अद्वैतं समनुप्राप्य जडवल्लोकमाचरेत् ।।३६।।

Meaning: "Therefore, after knowing It thus, one should fix one's memory on (i.e. continuously think of) non-duality. Having attained the non-dual, one should behave in the world as though one were dull-witted."

IF NON-DUAL ĀTMAN IS INTUITED, ONE GETS ESTABLISHED IN ĀTMASMŖITISANTATI OR CONTINUOUS CONTEMPLATION OF THE SELF

It is spiritually instructed for the benefit of Mumukshus, who are genuine spiritual practitioners, in the manner - "Because of the fact that in this manner by means of $J\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ (Self-Knowledge) the Anartha (life's torments and traumas) in the form of Dvaita (duality) are totally destroyed in all respects, one should determine Intuitively that this $\bar{A}tman$ (Pure Being-Consciousness) exists in this manner and should engage his memory (i.e. constantly remember) in non-duality; one should achieve the inclination, keen interest of the mind exclusively for (the ultimate goal of) cognizing the non-dual Reality alone."

Or, in the alternative, the spiritual teaching can also be interpreted as: "By cognizing this non-dual Atman one should endeavour to establish his mind firmly, steadfastly in remembering the non-dual Atman." If the second meaning is accepted and reckoned, then because it becomes self-established that - "Once Jñāna or Self-Knowledge is attained that alone will thrive, persist in the seeker's memory" - here in this context the teaching that - "This Atman's Knowledge (Intuition) has to be perforce attained" - is most important. On the strength of Sruti sentences like - "This Ātman is Brahman" - (Māndūkya 2); "It is the opinion of the Knowers (of Reality) that the One who is Prapañchōpashama (devoid of the world), Shānta (tranquil), Shiva (auspicious), Advaita (non-dual) is Himself the fourth; He alone is Ātman" - (Māndūkya 7) - which expound Ātmajñāna if one acquires the Intuitive Knowledge of Advaita Atman, then the Dvaita Jñāna (kanowledge of duality, diversity) which is opposed to the former and is false, unreal (i.e. misconceived) will by itself disappear, get sublated; if it is falsified (i.e. got rid of), then because the defects like Rāga (attachment), Bhaya (fear) etc. can never exist, there is no scope whatsoever for the Dvaitasmriti (remembrance of duality to be real) to exist as it does at present. Therefore, then the Advaitasmriti alone will get set, established. Hence, to say, here in this context, that it is stipulated by way of an injunction in the manner - "One should acquire Advaitasmriti" - is not proper; for, Advaitātman as well as the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) about Him remains devoid of Kriya (action), Kāraka (means of action), Phala (fruit of action) indeed.

THE ERRONEOUS DOCTRINES THAT EVEN AFTER THE ATTAINMENT OF VĀKYAJÑĀNA (KNOWLEDGE BORN OUT OF ŚRUTIVĀKYA) ONE SHOULD PERFORM OTHER SĀDHANAS

Here in this context anyone may **doubt** in the manner: "First, one should cognize Advaitātman by means of Śāstra; in order that cognition to become steadfast or strong, one should repeat the *Smṛitisantati* (continuous remembering Advaitātman) - thus here it is stipulated as an injunction." In fact, some disputants have expressed their opinions thus vociferously.

But this opinion is not proper; for, as we have already stated that it is not possible at all for the Dvaitasmriti to subsist

or remain once the Advaitajñana is attained. It is not possible also to doubt that - "It may be that that Jñāna has not become steadfast, strong." For, where is the cause for doubting in the manner - "If a sentence is Advaitatmapara or concerning the nondual Atman, then from such a sentence the correct, proper Ātmajñāna or Self-Knowledge is not produced" -? True, some people do doubt in the manner - "By means of a sentence Aparōkshajñāna (direct Intuitive Knowledge) does not accrue". But, just as in the parable that - "Some ten dull-headed people were crossing a river; after they reached the opposite bank of the river, while counting their total number, each one counted the external nine persons only leaving out to count himself and all of them were agitated and anxious as they thought one of them (the tenth man) has been drowned in the river, out of ignorance; at this juncture a wayfarer counted in order each one of them and convinced each one of them in the manner - 'You are the tenth person.' Instantly, each one obtained the Aparōkshajñāna that - "I am myself the tenth (missing, left-out) person" - in the same way, here also when the Sruti instructs in the manner -"The Turiyātman, devoid of any duality, diversity whatsoever, alone is thyself" - instantly for the Aparokshajñana to accrue there exists no hurdle, impediment whatsoever.

(Doubt): If in this manner merely by Vākyashravaṇa (listening to the sentence) the correct knowledge of the entity as it really is (Yathārthajñāna) were to accrue, the stipulation of further Sādhanas like Manana (ratiocination, reasoning), Nididhyāsana (contemplation) by way of injunctions (Vidhi) in the Śruti will be rendered futile, purposeless, is it not so? Further, the Śruti having stipulated yet other Sādhanas like Shama (control over the mind), Dama (control over the senses), Brahmacharya (celibacy); Yajña (sacrifice), Dāna (charity), Tapas (meditation, austerity) etc., according to this doctrine, becomes worthless, futile, is it not so?

(Solution): Not so. Because, Manana and Nididhyāsana also are needed in order to cognize Ātman properly. In the case of one who does not possess the superlative capacity, qualification of attaining Jñāna merely by Shravana alone, for such a practitioner Manana as well as Nididhyāsana is needed. Because of the fact that by means of acquiring perfectly spiritual

(purificatory) practices, disciplines like Shama, Dama etc. his mind, intellect gets mature and thereby the Aparōkshajñāna accrues, these being stipulated as injunctions is not futile or fallacious. Because in texts like Ḡitā etc. it has been propounded that for those qualified seekers who perform Sādhanas like Yajña, Dāna, Tapas the beneficial fruit of *Chittashuddhi* (purification of the mind by way of giving up attachments, dislikes for external objects and other desires) is obtained and thereafter the qualification, capacity of attaining Jñāna is attained - those Sādhanas also being stipulated does not become futile at all.

IS THERE ANY NEED OF ANY SADHANA FOR SHABDAJÑANA OR KNOWLELDGE ACCRUING FROM WORDS

Some people like Brahmasiddhikāras (Maṇḍana Mishra's followers) have here raised a doubt of the type: If a Vākya (a sentence) is Nirdushṭa (inviolable, irrefutable), then it is not proper, logical to say that for the word knowledge to accrue Sādhanas like Yajña (sacrifice) and such other rituals are needed. Anyone who has the capability of interpreting a sentence as also the familiarity with Nirukta (one of the six Vedāngas, that which contains glossarial explanation of obscure words, especially those occurring in the Vedas, or etymological interpretations), Vyākaraṇa (grammar) etc. can reckon the meaning of a sentence. Is it not so?

This doubt is not proper. For, if anyone's mind is not sufficiently refined (i.e. being rid of impurities like fickleness and extrovertedness, and being full of mundane desires etc.), then it cannot discriminate, determine that such and such alone is the meaning of a sentence. If it is contended that because a sentence is Nirdushta its meaning should necessarily accrue to everyone, then there is no cause or scope whatsoever for disagreement among various disputants with regard to the meaning or interpretation of a sentence. It is not reasonable to imagine, infer that merely on the ground of one possessing the exquisite, excellent instruments needed for Jñāna (Knowledge) even a person who does not have 'Chittashuddhi' (purified mind, heart) can attain Jñāna. For, even if one of the finest pair of spectacles is used, utilized (i.e. available for use), either by a blind person or an illiterate person, the skill or excellence of reading by means of the spectacles can never accrue. Therefore, the Siddhānta (final

spiritual teaching) is that - "Only to a properly qualified person alone the Vedas or sacred scriptures can communicate, convey the proper meaning and knowledge implicit in them, and not that to all and sundry the subtle knowledge born out of the interpretation of the *Vedic* (or Vedāntic) sentences will accrue."

Another point: The Absolute, Ultimate Reality that the Vedānta Vākyas expound is Ātman who is the innermost entity in everything. But by nature the common run of people are engrossed invariably in examining the external objects through their senses alone. Therefore, only to those, whose Chitta (mind) is withdrawn from external objects of perception by means of Vairāgya (renunciation) and whose mind has acquired the inner 'Intuitive vision' by becoming Antarmukha (introverted) and has become capable of cognizing Atman who is Atindriya (imperceptible to the senses), nay who is beyond the reach of the senses and the mind - to such persons alone the cognition of the real purport of the Vedantic sentence will accrue. For that purpose alone those who are spiritual practitioners should acquire Chittashuddhi through the performance of Yajña, Dāna, Tapas and Pratyagdrishti (inner Intuitive vision, viewpoint) through the disciplines of Shama, Dama etc. Although among the Sādhakas for those who have very sharp intellect (superlative discriminative mental faculty) by means of merely listening to the Vedāntic sentence once the full import and subtle Intuitive significance of the sentence may accrue, those who have impediments like Agrahana (non-comprehension), Samshaya (doubt), Anyathāgrahana (misconception) with regard to the Padartha (the Reality, entity signified by the words) have necessarily to repeat Śravana (listening to Vedantic texts) and have to practise assiduously so as to imbibe the scriptural reasoning; and these requirements are rightly to be anticipated in them.

Therefore, the statement that - "Knowing that Advaitātma-tattwa is extremely subtle and all-pervasive, those seekers who wish to Intuit that Absolute Reality should necessarily practise Sarvakarma Sannyāsa (giving up, renouncing agentship of all actions) as also endeavour to observe disciplines, spiritual excellences like Shama, Dama, Uparati, Titiksha, Shraddhā, Samādhāna (i.e. Shaṭka Sampat) etc." - is quite reasonable indeed.

JÑĀNI REMAINS WITH NIRAHAMKĀRA (NON-EGOISM)

In this manner one who has Intuited Advaitatmatattwa (i.e. a Jñāni, Self-realized one) cognizes, finds out that "Ātman, who: (a) is beyond (the six mutations of life) hunger, thirst, grief, attachment, old age, death; (b) is beyond all empirical transactions; (c) is of the very essence of Pure Being which is Sākshāt (direct), Aparōksha, (Intuitive); (d) is devoid of continual changes like birth, death etc. - Himself am I" - and thereafter carries on all workaday transactions as if one who is not knowing anything at all. Without exhibiting in the manner -"I am a Jñāni of such and such a calibre" - with regard to the abundance of Jñāna (Self-Knowledge), Vidyā (erudition), Dharmāsakti (deep devotion, attachment to religious virtues, righteousness) etc. and lives on without any defects like Dambha (hypocrisy), Darpa (pride, insolence) etc. whatsoever. Just as the Śruti - 'तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्' - (Bri. 3-5-1) - has stated, after attaining Ātmajñāna in its plenitude he (i.e. a Jñāni) lives like an innocent lad. In order to delineate the behaviour of such a Jñāni, Shri Sankara has quoted two verses in his Sūtra Bhāshya (3-4-50):

गूढधर्माश्रितो विद्वानज्ञातचिरतं चरेत् । अन्धवज्जडवच्चापि मूकवच्च महीं चरेत् ।।
यं न सन्तं न चासन्तं नाश्रुतं न बहुश्रुतम् ।
न सुवृत्तं न दुर्वृत्तं वेद कश्चित् स ब्राह्मणः ।।

(Meaning: "The Jñāni who has observed a secret set of religious virtues (*Dharma*) maintains his behaviour without making it known to anyone; he is roaming about on earth like a blind man, like an ignorant one, like a dumb person. He who is not known to anyone whether he is a *Satpurusha* (a holy man) or *Asatpurusha* (a wicked, unholy man), whether he is one who

^{1.} In the Ashwamedha Parva verses 46-52 of Mahābhārata Epic it is stated :

गूढधर्माश्रितो विद्वान्विज्ञानचरितं चरेत् । अमूढो मूढरूपेण चरेद्धर्ममदूषयन् ।।

has not listened to and learnt Śāstra or one who has excessively listened to the Śāstra, whether he is of a good behaviour or of a bad behaviour - such a one alone is a Brāhmaṇa.")

निस्तुतिर्निर्नमस्कारो निःस्वधाकार एव च । चलाचलनिकेतश्च यतिर्यादृच्छिको भवेत् ।।३७।।

Meaning: "The Yati (recluse, mendicant) should have no appreciation or greetings (for others), and he should be free from rituals. He should have the body and soul as his support and he should be dependent on circumstances."

WHEN JÑĀNA ACCRUES PARAMAHAMSAPĀRIVRĀJYA BY ITSELF, AUTOMATICALLY, ACCRUES

In the previous Kārikā it has been stated that the Jñāni should behave like a Jaḍa (dull-witted person), is it not so? What kind of behaviour is that? To this question an answer is provided here in this Kārikā.

The statements like - "without praise, without salutations or prostrations" - are meant to denote that - "He does not have any actions whatsoever which have to be (ordinarily) performed to satiate either the deities or the sages." It indicates that for him there is no stipulation of performing a Homa (sacrifice), Puja (worship) etc. for propitiating a deity and whatever such rituals may be there; in the same way, the statement that he does not have any 'Svadhākāra' signifies that the annual rites to satiate 'Pitrus' (manes, ancestors) also do not entail him. It amounts to saying that for the Yati (i.e. Sannyāsin) none of the scriptural rites or rituals like - "Putrotpatti" (getting progeny) for the conquest, success in Manushyaloka or this empirical world, Karmas meant for "Pitṛulōkajayaprāpti" (success, conquest in the world of manes) and Upāsanas (meditations) meant for "Devalōkaprāpti" (attainment of divine, celestial world) - whatsoever is enjoined to be performed. Because he has attained the Intuitive Knowledge to the effect - "I am of the very essence of Nityamukta or perennially liberated state" - for him henceforth there are no 'other worlds' to be attained; nor are there any more spiritual Sādhanas remaining for him to be performed. Just as the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad says : 'एतं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः

पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तेषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ।।' - (3-5-1). The purport of this Śruti statement is that since for the Jñāni there is no desire whatsoever for the three worlds, he renounces entirely all the Karmas and the Upāsanas and adopts a way of life of a Paramahaṃsaparivrājaka (i.e. a wandering mendicant or monk who has no mundane possessions).

For this reason alone, such a Jivanmukta (a Realized Soul in this very life-span) is eulogised in the Smriti in the following manner:

निराशिषमनारम्भं निर्नमस्कारमस्तुतिम् । निर्मुक्तं बन्धनैः सवैंस्तं देवा ब्राह्मणं विदुः ॥

- (Mōksha Dharma 245-24).

Meaning: "He does not have any desire whatsoever; he does not perform any action with any desire for the attainment of its fruit at all; there is no need for him to prostrate before any deity, nor is there any need for him to praise any deity. He is freed from all kinds of bondages. The deities reckon such a one as the true $Br\bar{a}hman$ (Brahmin)."

For him there is no place to pinpoint and say - "This is his home" - as in the case of a householder. His living place means 'Chalāchala'; here 'Chala' means the body; for, this keeps on changing repeatedly; 'Achala' means Atmatattwa which is Kūṭasthanitya. When by virtue of his *Prārabdha* (fate, destiny) the forgetfulness of Atmatattwa occurs and when due to the cause of taking food etc. the $B\bar{a}hyasmriti$ (memory of external objects) occurs, then the home is the body alone which is Chala. But when there is no rise or occurrence of external, extroverted memory in this way, then Atmatattwa alone is his home; meaning, in his essential nature of $\overline{A}tman$ (Pure Being-Consciousness) he rests steadfast, fully established quite naturally, habitually. Hence, he is called 'Chalāchalaniketa'. For this reason alone, it has been stated in the \bar{A} pastamba Dharmas \bar{u} tra (2-21-10) that : One who is a Sannyāsin should "give up the Agni (hearth); should remain without a known living place or home".

Such a Jñāni will be "Yādricchhika", meaning - he is content with whatever is easily available, procurable without any

restrictions, constraints as regards his necessities of life like Koupinam (a strip of cloth worn over the privities), a covering cloth, food etc. There are Smriti sentences to support this: "Koupina and covering cloth - these he should wear sufficient for his needs" - (Goutama Dharma Sūtra 3-18); "Some people say that things which are thrown, discarded here and there should be cleaned and used" - (Goutama Dharma Sūtra 3-19). The meaning of the Gitā sentence - "He is satisfied with Yadricchhā from whatever is easily obtained" - (Gitā 4-22) - is this alone. This purport is described in detail in Mōksha Darma as:

निस्तुतिर्निर्नमस्कारः परित्यज्य शुभाशुभे । अरण्ये विचरैकाकी येनकेनिचदाशितः ।। - (Mō. Dh. 242-2).

Meaning: "Without praise, without prostration, giving up Punya (merits), $P\bar{a}pa$ (demerits) eating whatever food is available, roam about in the forest in solitude".

In this Kārikā, Paramahamsapārivrājya which is spontaneously self-established by $\bar{A}tmaj\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ (Self-knowledge) devoid of any association with any Kriyākārakaphala and which is attained by one who has Intuited, realized Advaitatmatattwa has been explained. For this the Śruti statement : 'एतद्ध स्म वै तत्पूर्वे विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते कि प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्माऽयं लोकः' - (Bri. 4-4-22) meaning: "Those who are Jñānis inquire and think in the manner - 'By progeny what is to be achieved by us? This alone is our Atman, this alone is our Loka (world)' - live without desiring for progeny" - is the authoritative source. In this same Sruti (Bri. 4-4-22) further it is propounded that an accessorial aid to Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) is this 'Pārivrājya', which is of the form of 'Sarvakarmasannyāsa' in which the practitioner has to renounce all mundane, empirical rites and rituals as well as accessories like Yajñōpavita (sacred thread) etc. necessary for them, and is itself recommended for those who are still continuing their efforts to Intuit the Tattwa. Therefore, the ultimate purport of the Kārikā is that - A 'Mumukshu' (seeker of Liberation, Beatitude) who wishes to Intuit Advaita Tattwa should perforce be endowed with extreme Vairāgya (renunciation, detachment from and disinterest in worldly matters)."

तत्त्वमाध्यात्मिकं दृष्ट्वा तत्त्वं दृष्ट्वा तु बाह्यतः । तत्त्वीभूतस्तदारामस्तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो भवेत् ॥३८॥

Meaning: "Examining the Reality in the context of the individual and in the external world, one should become identified with Reality, should have his delight in Reality, and should not deviate from Reality."

METHOD OF ACQUIRING TATTWANISHTHA

Previously, it had been stated that the seeker should practise 'Smṛiti Santāna' or continuous, relentless remembering (contemplation) of Advaita (non-duality, Pure Absolute Being-Consciousness), is it not so? Here a doubt arises: "Only after the mind stuff assumes the form of the external object, the knowledge or cognition of the object ensues? But Ātman does not have any form at all! It being so, how at all is there any possibility of any Ātmākāra Vṛitti or a mental concept of the form of the Self being acquired? If it is not there, then how at all can one attain Ātmajñāna?"

For this, the solution is: 'Atmajñana' does not mean -'acquiring the mental concept of the form of Atman'. For, Atman is Himself, without being dependent upon anything else, familiar (i.e. innately, intrinsically known universally). It being so, where is the need at all for a *Vritti* (mental concept, thought-construct) about or pertaining to Him? Since He is verily the Self (Intuitive non-dual Being, Experience per se) of the 'Jijñāsu' (the seeker of this Self-Knowledge), He does not have any hindrance, impediment obstructing His cognition. When the Avivekins (nondiscriminative, ignorant people) have allowed themselves to be attached to or bound by thoughts about aspiring for or hankering after the external (transient) objects alone, they naturally have acquired a deep-seated misconception, is it not so? To get rid of this alone is Atmajñana needed. Everyone entertains the concept of 'I'; but in it there is intricately included a misconception which has blended (mysteriously, as it were), with Anātman (not-Self) which is not one's real Self. Getting rid of this misconception alone is the genuine Atmajñana in esse.

It being so, we should first discern that - "All the constituents like the body, the vital force, the senses, the mind, the

intellect, the ego etc. - which are Ādhyātmika (of the corporeal plane) - just like the rope-snake, dream and magic - are mere imaginary false appearances; their reality (substrate) is Ātman alone." In the same way, we should cognize that - "The earth, the water etc. - which are Ādhibhoutika (of the material, physical plane) and their effects are all false appearances alone in the forms in which they are perceptible; their essential nature is really Ātman alone." Thus we should cognize that the world of duality (Jagat) which appears externally and the body, the senses etc. which appear internally - all these are - just as it is stated in the Śrutis, viz. 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्व तत्सत्यं स आत्मा' - (Chh.), meaning "Everything is Ātman alone......" -; 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम्' - (Chh. 6-1-1), meaning "Everything is merely a vain transaction of words, speech; all changes are mere names and forms" - in their perceptible forms unreal, false alone.

Thereafter, on the validity, veracity of the of the Śruti sentence - 'तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमिस' - (Chh. 6-8-7) - we should become one with the *Tattwa* (Ultimate Reality) Intuiting in the manner - "For all this world of duality which is being seen and for me - Ātman is the Sadbrahma alone (i.e. the really real substratum). That Paramārtha Tattwa alone I am."

In this manner, after discerning that - "Everything is Akhanda Tattwa (immutable, impartible Reality) devoid of a within and a without, and that alone is my essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness" - one who is delighting relentlessly is 'Ātmārāma.' One who has cognized the Ātmatattwa in the manner that - "Below, above, behind, in front, to the right, to the left - everything is Ātman alone" - (Chh. 7-25-2), and ruminating, ratiocinating about It alone, who is ever delighting as an Ātmārāma with the Intuitive Experience of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness - such an enlightened person ramains steady, steadfast without slipping away from Ātmatattwa. This alone is called "Ātmanishthā"

THE OPINIONS OF SOME VEDĀNTINS HAVING MISCONCEPTIONS

(1) Bhāvanāsanchayavāda or Theory Of Attaining Mōksha By Means of Suppressing Heaped Up, Accumulated Imaginations, Concepts:

Failing to discern the truth that - "The Paramartha Tattwa is eternally non-dual; Ajñāna alone is the solitary impediment in the path of cognizing It" - some people had interpreted this Kārikā in a different manner. What they opined was: "By accumulating Atmabhavana or concepts about the Self if the seeker attains Samādhi, then, as a result of this, Moksha is attained. If the mind (Chitta) is fickle, wayward, then it amounts to the seeker having slipped down from the Tattwa; but if all the Chittavrittis (mental concepts) are Nirodha (suppressed, repressed), and Samādhi (trance) is attained, then it is tantamount to the seeker having become one with the Tattwa alone; by means of Vedānta Vākya (Upanishadic sentences) if the seeker cognizes the truth that - 'I am Brahman' - and practises that Jñāna itself repeatedly (Anusandhāna) then he attains Samādhi and becomes one with the Tattwa Itself. His Chitta (mind) melts down all duality (Dvaita) and turns itself towards non-duality (Advaita) and finally itself gets merged in Advaitatmatattwa."

This opinion is not proper, correct. For, by the valid means (Pramāṇa) of the Vedas (i.e. the Upanishads here in this context) once a seeker attains the Vijnana (Intuitive Knowledge, Experience) of the type - "I am myself Advaitātman" - there does not subsist, remain any other $\bar{A}tmadarshana$ (Intuition of the Self, Reality) separately; thereby, there is nothing else whatsoever to be done, performed in order to obtain It afresh, or anew. In the case of those who affirm that - "Merely by means of (listening to) the Vedavākya, Ātmajñāna is not attained or It does not accrue" - Veda (scriptural texts) are rendered Apramāņa (invalid, unauthoritative). If by means of Sādhanas like Dhyāna (meditation) etc. the Chitta (mind) is endowed with Samskāra (refinement, purification) and thereafter if the Chitta is destroyed, it amounts to this Dhyana being rendered futile; if it is not so and if it is accepted that even in the Muktyavasthā (state of Liberation) Chitta exists in its Swarūpa (essential nature of Being), then Advaita is never established at all; for, it amounts to accepting that even then the two (dual) Tattwas (entities) of Atman, Chitta do exist indeed. If it is contended that - "Only after the Chitta has transformed, metamorphosed all Dvaita (duality, diversity) into Advaita (non-duality) it (Chitta) also gets destroyed and hence there is no cause, scope for this doubt at all" - even then,

because of the fact that it amounts to Advaita becoming a product of a Sādhana of Dhyāna, that Advaita (Tattwa) is rendered to be Anitya (non-eternal). Shri Sureshwarāchārya, the author of Brihadaranyaka Vartika has pointed out many such defects in the doctrines of these 'Ekadesha Vedāntins' (Vedāntins with lop-sided views, opinions) and has finally declared: "The Bhāvana (concept, belief) of the type - 'I am a Samsāri (transmigratory soul)' - persists in a Jiva without a beginning (Anādi) ever since Kōtikalpas (crores of creations); if such a deep-seated belief, concept were to be destroyed merely by a Bhāvana practised for a brief time in one particular Janma (birth), then what Pramāṇa (evidence, valid proof) is there to assert that by dint of that practice made in a brief period of time the Vāsana (latent impression) continues to exist eternally? It being so, what this Bhāvanāsanchayavādins propound as their doctrine is not correct, proper. By this means there can never be a deliverance, liberation from such Anartha (calamity) at all - (Bri. Vā. 4-4-778, 79)."

It being so, one who is a Jijnasu (seeker of Self-realization) should not entertain the misconception that - "I will become the Tattwa (Ultimate Realtity of the Self) by means of a Sādhana (spiritual practice entailing performance of something either at the body level or at the mental level) and thereafter I will try not to slip down from the Tattwa." Atman is verily our Swarūpa (the essential nature of Pure, Absolute, non-dual Being-Consciousness), is it not so? What is meant by saying - 'slipping down from one's essential nature of Being' -? What is meant by attaining such a state of 'not slipping down from the Tattwa' by a Sādhana? It is not proper to believe erroneously (or to entertain a misconception) in the manner - "For Atman who is of the essence of Ekarūpa (one and the same nature) there exists a possibility of giving up His essential nature because of Chitta Vikshepa (mental aberration) and sliding, slipping down; or, one's essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness as the Self is to be obtained, attained afresh, anew in states like Samādhi etc." In truth, if one (i.e. the genuine seeker) attains the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge, Experience) of the type - "I am ever (eternally, perennially) of the very essence of Brahman, Atman" - alone, it is tantamount to being one with Tattwaswarupa; then only, there

is no question of 'slipping down' from Swarūpa indeed. For the Gitā statement - "Parameshwara exists equally in all Bhūtas (creatures and objects); even if they get destroyed, He is not destroyed; one who has cognized this truth - he alone has verily cognized the Truth" - (Gitā 13-27) - this alone is the purport, intended meaning.

(2) The Theory That Even After The Attainment Of Jñāna There Can Be Dvaita:

In this context there is a need for examining the opinions, doctrines of some more Advaitavādins who propound a cause for Mōksha.

One particular group of Advaitins say: "Mōksha is acquired by the mere removal of Avidyā, which is the Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) for the Adhyāsapravāha (continuous flow of misconception) of the type - "I am a Kartṛu (agent of action), a Bhōktṛu (an enjoyer). Therefore, if Avidyā is Nivṛitta (removed, is got rid of) by means of Brahmavidyā, then merely the Nivṛitti of Kartṛutwa, Bhōktṛutwa etc. will ensue but not Sakaladvaita (the whole gamut of duality). Even so, by means of Brahmavidyā, Pramātṛutwa (cognizership) is got rid of. Then the world like Pṛithivi, Ap etc. is not perceived by him. Just as those who do not have certain sense organs do not perceive the respective sensations like Shabda (sound), Sparsha (touch) etc., in the same way here too it should be reckoned. Therefore, although the external world of Pṛithivi, Ap etc. exists as before, the Jñāni attains mere Dvaitanivṛitti alone but not Prapañchanivṛitti at all."

This opinion, theory is not correct. For, at the outset what these proponents have imagined as 'Avidyā which is Adhyāsōpādāna (material cause for the misconception of the 'I' concept) is itself not established to be true, real; in that case, where is the question of that Avidyā being destroyed by means of Vidyā? Sometimes these people keep on saying that - "Avyakrita which is the state of the seed form of the world is itself this Avidyā"; but to say that that is the Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) for Pramātrutwa ('I' notion as the cognizer) there is no authoritative statement or supporting proof whatsoever. Apart from this, only to one who has Pramātrutwa there occurs, accrues the cognition, knowledge of the Prameya (perceived object); but to say that - "There exists a Prameya devoid of a

Pramātru" - is meaningless, ridiculous. It being so, the statement that - "Even after the Adhyāsa (misconception) of the Pramātrutwa is removed, the entities like Prithivi, Ap etc. which are Prameya continue to exist" - is rendered meaningless indeed.

Here anyone may raise a question of the type - "Merely by the removal, disappearance of one individual's Pramātrutwa, can it be possible to affirm that the whole world like Prithivi, Ap etc. will become extinct?" But this doubt is not correct. For, the world (that we have assumed to be existing really, actually before us) is merely an imagined world alone projected due to misconception; apart from it no other world really exists at all. If that misconception is removed, got rid of, then the truth that - "The phenomenon of the world of duality never existed, nor was it removed" - will become very clear. This fact was previously (1-16) clarified. If it were the case that a really existing world does not appear, then merely on that count it does not amount to saying that one has attained Nishprapañchātma Darshana (Realization of the Self devoid of the world of duality). Merely on the ground of a form not being perceptible to a blind man, who will ever transact in the manner that - "Form does not exist anywhere in the world at all" -? In the Sruti Atman has been described in the manner - 'प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतम्'; it is a sentence which signifies a Nitya Satya (an eternal Truth) indeed. Therefore, the argument that - "Even after one attains Atmajñana" the Dvaitaprapancha invariably exists" - is untenable.

(3) The Theory Of Advaita Being Visible to Anubhava Engendered In An Avasthāvishesha:

There is another opinion; that too is opposed to Yukti (logical devices). The doctrine of the proponents of this theory is: "Although Tattwajñāna removes, destroys all Karmas, Avidyā and Rāga, Dvesha etc. that are produced, it is not capable of doing away with Prārabdha Karma which is Śrutisiddha (established on the authority of the Vedas). Therefore, as long as the impediment of Prārabdha Karma exists, It (Tattwajñāna) is not capable of removing Dvaitaprapañcha (the world of duality, diversity). The concept that - "The Jñāni is also invariably seeing, perceiving duality; at the same time, he is also endowed with Brahmātmānubhava (the Intuitive Experience of Brahman-Ātman)" - is self-contradictory, is it not so? - for this kind of an

objection there is no scope here. For, in the state of Asamprajñāta Samādhi (a trance in which there does not exist any distinct knowledge, consciousness) there exists Atmaikatwadarshana (Intuition of non-duality of Atman); but being within the control, grip of Prārabdha Karma on other occasions (i.e. when not in Samādhi state) there invariably exists Dvaitaprapanchadarshana also. Therefore, the objection of the type -'Because Dvaitadarshana is Vyabhicharita (changing, transient) it is $Mithy\bar{a}$ (false, unreal) only; as long as the body exists, who can, and how, attain Aparōksha Darshana (direct, Intuitive Knowledge, Experience)?' - cannot plausibly raise its head here. For, only to a person who has got a body while the Prārabdha Karma is yielding its fruit the Aparoksha Jñana has perforce to accrue. From our historical texts it is learnt that great sages like Vyāsa and many others, though they were embodied, were Aparōkshajñānis. Hence, even for a Tattwadarshi (one who has realized the Ultimate Reality of the Self) the Dvaita Prapancha may invariably be perceptible." This is the opinion of these proponents.

This doctrine also is not correct. For, if it is accepted that - "At one moment Dvaita is seen and at another moment it is not seen" - then it amounts to saying that there may be Chyuti (ruin, loss) affecting, or accruing to, Atman's essential nature. Apart from this, because an Anishta (undesirable result) of the type - "One who possesses a body will perforce have to have Pramātrutwa (cognizership, 'I' notion, egoism); Dvaitadarshana also will necessarily have to exist" - is faced with, if one asserts, quite opposed to this logical deduction, saying that there can be Advaitadarshana simultaneously, coevally - then it becomes grossly self-contradictory. It is also not proper to deduce that - "Because of facts like - (a) Sages like Vyāsa etc., who were embodied, were stated in the Sastras to have attained Aparokshajñana; (b) from historical records also it was learnt that they were Aparokshajñānis, on the strength of Śrutārthāpatti Pramāṇa (the valid logical means of inference based on Sruti statements - used to account for this apparent contradiction) and hence we are constrained to imagine that even for those who are embodied there can accrue Aparōkshajñāna and at the same time, together with it, by virtue of Prārabdha Karma Dvaitadarshana also may accrue to him." For, if the Sastra expounds statements with

contradictory meanings then it will be rendered *Apramāṇa* (invalid, unauthoritative).

Here one **doubt**: The concept that a body exists; the phenomenon of Dvaitadarshana exists - both these are the offshoots, effects of *Mithyājñāna* (misconception). But because for a Jñāni there can never be any Mithyājñāna, even if Dvaita appears as if it exists, in reality all that is *Mithyā* (false, unreal) indeed. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the Jñāni there does not at all exist any Dvaita, is it not so? Merely because it appears as if there exists Dvaitadarshana, what is the impediment for Jñāna?

(Solution): This alone is the correct Intuitive Knowledge. Merely, on determining the truth that - "The whole gamut of duality is false, unreal" - in consonance with Anubhava (Intuitive Experience of Pure Being-Consciousness), it becomes tantamount to (acknowledging) saying - 'Advaita alone is Paramārtha (Absolutely real)' - and hence even after Pramātrutwa is sublated, falsified there is no question whatsoever of believing at any time in the manner - "Ajnāna (ignorance) persists; or even after Ajnāna is removed, Ātman has two distinct states, viz. in one He perceives Dvaita and in another He does not perceive Dvaita." This alone is the finally established (time-tested) Siddhānta.

(4) The Erroneous Teaching, Doctrine That A Jñāni Also Has To Practise Advaitasmṛiti (Memory of Non-Duality) Incessantly:

For this same verse some have written the following commentary: The statement that - 'By means of Jñāna that accrues from the Vedānta sentences Avidyā is destroyed' - is verily true. But even so, as a result of the fact that Avidyā existed from time immemorial even this Vākyajanya Jñāna (i.e. knowledge born out of the Vedāntic sentence) is falsified, sublated by Avidyā. To explain, Avidyā is of two types: What exists as a natural phenomenon is one Avidyā, what has come into being during an interval, for a period in time, is another Avidyā. The latter kind of Avidyā which has come into being during an interval envelops (Āvaraṇa) the object which is Anātman (not-Self); this vanishes as soon as Jñāna accrues. But in the case of the other natural Avidyā (Swābhāvikāvidyā), which exists from time immemorial, it is not so; even after it is removed by Jñāna it reappears or

rears its head, so to speak. Because it is in everyone's experience universally that even in Jñānis defects like $R\bar{a}ga$ (attachment), Dvesha (hatred) etc. (to wit, they are indeed the offshoots of Avidyā only) are seen sprouting out - (just as a blade of grass which has dried up during the winter, comes to life during rainy season) we should reckon that, in the same manner, Avidyā reappears recurringly. Therefore, the adherents should not remain satisfied merely knowing (intellectually) this Ātmatattwa by means of Śāstra texts; they should keep on regaining that Advaitātma Smriti (memory of non-dual Self) repeatedly. This opinion alone is signified by, implied in, the verse: "तत्वमाध्यात्मिकं दृष्ट्वा" For this opinion there is support of the following Śruti also: 'तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ज्ञाह्मणः' - (Bri. 4-4-21). meaning - "Even after cognizing that Ātman alone one who is a Vivekin (discriminating seeker) should attain Prajñā (the Intuitive Consciousness)."

This opinion too is not correct. For, in our workaday world when people have misconceived (wrongly cognized, imagined) a sea-shell or nacre as silver, the real cause for this misconception of 'silver' is simply the person not having cognized that sea-shell properly, correctly, that is all; but not that apart from the knowledge or otherwise of the sea-shell there exists separately the knowledge and ignorance of the false silver - none of us can ever acknowledge this far-fetched, bizarre concept. People mistake or wrongly reckon a sea-shell alone to be 'silver' because of Bhrānti (delusion), is it not so? In the same manner, when a simple, frank explanation of the type - "Because people have not properly Intuited Atman as He is, He alone is seen by them in the Mithyākāra (false appearance, form) as the world of duality" - is sufficient (to drive home the subtle teaching, truth), if it is misinterpreted in a totally different, distorted manner, imagining Vidyā(s)vidyās of the types - Jñāna which cognizes Anātman and the false, wrong knowledge which has accrued as a result of not cognizing Anātman, respectively, then it smacks of Gouravadosha or defect of not attaching the proper dignity, respect, esteem for Śāstravākya.

Anyone may raise a **doubt** here like: "In our workaday world, there is a transaction of treating *Pratyaksha* (perception), *Anumāna* (inference) as *Pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge), is

it not so? Therefore, we should accept that there exist separately Vidyā and Avidyā pertaining to Anātman, is it not so?" But, although before we wake up - in the dream transactions, which appear therein to be real alone, the Vastuvibhāga (divisions or distinctions of objects) like 'What is real' and 'What is false, unreal' as also the Jñānavibhāga (divisions or distinctions of knowledge) like 'correct knowledge' and 'wrong knowledge, misconception' are appearing as if they are true - because of the fact that all that was merely a dream, on waking we determine that all those transactions were false alone; in the same way, it is reasonable and proper for Vivekins (wise seekers) to determine, decide that both the Pramāṇaprameya Vyavahāra (transactions involving the cognizer and the means of cognition) and the Satyamithyādivibhāga Vyavahāra (transactions of dividing real and unreal or false phenomena) appearing due to $\bar{A}tm\bar{a}vidy\bar{a}$ (ignorance or lack of the Self-Knowledge) are false, misconceptions only.

Now, these proponents say that - "Because Rāga and Dvesha caused by Avidyā are seen to be existing in Jñānis too, it should be accepted that even after the ignorance with regard to the Self is sublated (by Jñāna) it sprouts out again" - is it not so? Our rejoinder to this is: "One in whom there appear Rāga, Dvesha etc. he has not really attained Advaitātmabhāva (the Intuitive Experience of non-dual Self, Pure Being-Consciousness) at all. It being so, the statement that - 'Even after Avidya is sublated, falsified it reappears and strikes down, destroys Vidyā or Self-Knowledge' - is extremely ridiculous. This school of philosophy existed even prior to the Vārtikākāra (Shri Sureshwarāchārya, one of the direct disciples of Shri Sankarāchārya). The manner in which this fallacious doctrine has been refuted by him is: "If Avidyā exists as before, even after Jñāna accrues, then what is the Pramāņa (valid proof) to affirm that even after that Avidyā is destroyed it once again does not reappear?" (Bri. Vä. 4-4-914); "Between Vidyā and Avidyā there exist the Bhava (concepts) of Bādhaka (sublator) and Bādhya (sublated); in fact, this is the relationship that exists between them; it being so, how can the Avidyā which is itself sublated ever falsify or sublate Vidyā which is the sublator? There is nothing like fire, which burns out wood, is itself being burnt out by wood, is it not so?

Even when it was existing, this Avidyā did not destroy Vidyā; it being so, to affirm that after it (Avidyā) was actually destroyed it can sublate, falsify Vidyā, what *Pramāṇa* (proof) is there?" - (Bṛi. Vā. 4-4-915, 916, 917). Therefore, to assert that - "Avidyā rears its head again and again; and in order to destroy it Vidyāsmṛiti has to be constantly observed, practised" - can never be proper, rational.

(5) The Doctrine Of The Mādhyamikas

A verse which is like a replica of this Kārikā had been composed by Mādhyamikas (followers of a school of Buddhism), viz. : 'शून्यमाध्यात्मिकं पश्य पश्य शून्यं बहिर्गतम् । न विद्यते सोऽपि कश्चित् यो भावयति शून्यताम् ॥' - (Mādhyamika Vṛitti, p. 1124) - meaning : "Recognize that which is inside as Shūnya (i.e. essenceless); recognize that which is appearing outside too is verily Shunya alone. (Recognize also) that no one - who cognizes, reckons that everything is Shūnya - exists." - This is, in fact, the literary meaning of this verse. Here in this context unless and until it is determined as to what exact meaning has been adduced to this word 'Shūnya' by these proponents, we cannot determine the essential teaching or otherwise of this doctrine. If these people have called the *Paramārtha* (Ultimate, Absolute Reality) Itself, which cannot possibly be described or defined by any statement or words, by the word 'Shūnya', then the phenomena which appear to us within and without in our workaday world are not real in the forms they appear. We can interpret this verse in a particular manner so as to mean: "The essential nature of Reality of this world of duality which appears distinctively in the forms of Pramātru, Pramāna and Prameya is Shūnya." Then, in that context, it amounts to merely saying that "Shunya" means another name for that Tattwa (Atman) which the Vedantins expound. Then it will have to be perforce accepted that there will not exist any difference, distinction between the tenets of the Vedantins and those of these Madhyamikas. Otherwise, if it is contended that apart from the Turiyātman, which is descirbed and propounded in the Māndūkya Upanishad as being 'Prapañchōpashama' (devoid of the world of duality), 'Shānta' (tranquil), 'Shiva' (auspicious), there exists separately an entity or phenomenon called 'Shūnya' - then it amounts to saying that -

"Being devoid of Vastusvabhāva (essential nature, stuff of an entity or an existing substance) is itself Shūnya." Since we have to take up this second meaning itself for elaborate examination and discussion in the fourth Prakaraṇa, let us stop this topic here. Mentioning merely that such a phenomenon of Shūnya can never be established in any manner, we will proceed in our deliberation.

BEING ONE WITH THE REALITY, GETTING FULLY ESTABLISHED IN IT ONLY ONE SHOULD NOT SLIP DOWN FROM THAT TATTWA

Now, the purport behind the second half of this Kārikā has been mentioned in a brief axiomatic manner alone. The gist of this latter half of this verse is: "One (the true seeker) should determine that all duality is Avidyākalpita (projected or conjured up by ignorance) in the manner in which this teaching has been expounded in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, and should himself remain, stay put being one with Tattwa; Advaitātmanishṭhā (consummate, steadfast establishment in the non-dual Self of the very essence of Pure Being-Consciousness) which is Itself the Tattwa (Ultimate, Absolute Reality) - one should be absorbed in It." Since this topic of Advaita Tattwa is being explained in full detail in the next, i.e. the third, Prakaraṇa (called Advaita Prakaraṇa) we conclude this second Prakaraṇa here.

III ADVAITA PRAKARAŅA

1. RELEVANCE (RELATIONSHIP) OF THIS PRAKARAŅA

Hitherto it has been depicted that what is determined in the Upanishads as the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) of Omkara in the manner - "It is devoid of Matras, the fourth, not suitable for Vyavahāra, wherein the Prapañcha has come to nought, Shiva (auspicious), Advaita (non-dual)" - is verily Paramārtha beyond speech and mind. In the same way, in the Kārikās of the "Agama Prakarana" it was mentioned here and there that -"Atman is Advaita (non-dual)." Thus what was mentioned there to the effect that - 'Ātman is non-dual' - was merely Pratijñā (a pronouncement, proclamation), but it was not substantiated by adducing Yukti (logical, dialectical arguments). There, no logical devices whatsoever were adduced and it was merely proclaimed with the opinion (belief) that the superior class of seekers of Self-Knowledge would, merely by means of Śravana (listening to the scriptural pronouncements) of the type - "Atman is Advitiva" immediately Intuit the Reality of the Self.

Similarly, it was mentioned merely by way of a proclamation that Dvaita (duality) really does not exist in the manner -"If one cognizes the Tattwa, there does not exist any Dvaita" -(1-18). If it is said that the Paramārtha is "Advaita" - it means that (a) It alone, singularly and exclusively, is Paramartha, as also (b) in It there does not exist even the least taint of Dvaita; between these two subtle meanings, although the superior class of seekers who are endowed with sharp intellect may determine or discern the truth that Atman has no taint whatsoever of duality merely on the basis of $\bar{A}gama$ (i.e. $\hat{S}astraic$ methodology of teaching in a traditional manner) of the form of spiritual instruction (Upadesha) - the low or inferior class of students may not grasp the real import of this subtle truth. They may, on the other hand, doubt in the manner - "When the duality is being actually perceived, if it is stated that Atman does not have any relationship whatsoever with it (i.e. duality), how at all can we believe it ?" For the sake of such people, too, it has been already explained as to how Dvaita is false by means of Tarka (logic,

reasoning) in consonance with Sruti statements; as also by means of illustrations of Svapna (dream), Māyā (illusion), Gandharvanagara (a celestial city) etc. - phenomena like 'Dṛishyatwa' (appearance as a percept), 'Ādyantatwa' (concepts of a thing having a beginning and an end) were exemplified. Though Svapna etc. do appear, there is not the least bit of any taint of these phenomena to Ātman which is the substrata for them; because these phenomena like Svapna, Māyā, Gandharvanagara do not at all exist before they appear and after they are sublated also, they are invariably false indeed. In the same manner, the duality that is appearing in Ātman also is 'Vitatha' (that which does not exist in reality as it appears). This truth was also depicted in the second Chapter of 'Vaitathya Prakaraṇa.' By virtue of this tenet it was also determined that the Kāryarūpa (the form of Its effect) of Advaitātman (non-dual Self) is false.

Now, if it is demonstrated that - 'Atman by His very Svabhāva (essential nature of Being) is devoid of any Kāraņatwa (category of being a cause); in Him there does not exist even an iota of Kāranatwa for Dvaita; He is by Himself alone (Absolutely) Paramārtha (the Transcendent Reality)' - then it may certainly be possible to establish the truth that Atman, in the predominant Absolute sense alone, is 'non-dual'. For, only if it is demonstrated in that manner it can surely be decided that -"The Paramartha, which is invariably the innermost Self of everything, has perforce to be non-dual" and thereby the Ajñāna (ignorance, lack of correct knowledge) with regard to Paramārtha will totally be sublated, negated. As otherwise, merely if Its Kāryarūpa (form of effect) is shown to be false, there may still be a doubt of the type - "In It there may be really Kāraṇatwa (category of being a cause)" - lurking in everybody's mind. Because there is an axiomatic truth that - 'Wherever Kāranatwa exists there invariably Kāryatwa has to arise' - even after it has been demonstrated that the Kārya (effect) is false, the people with mediocre intelligence may doubt that 'Dvaita Vaitathya Siddhi' (the establishment of the truth of duality being false) has not been completely achieved. This opinion has been mentioned in the Brihadāraņyaka Vārtika (of Shri Sureśwarāchārya) in the manner:

'कार्यात्मा कारणात्मा च द्वावात्मानौ परात्मनः ।

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमोहोत्थौ तन्नाशे नश्यतस्ततः ।।' (Bṛi. Vā. 2-4-282)

Meaning: "Paramātman has two forms of Kāryarūpa and Kāraṇarūpa; both these are born due to the Avidyā about that Ātman who is Sarvāntara (innermost Being of all); therefore, if that Avidyā is destroyed - they too get destroyed."

This opinion has been revealed in the Kārikā too, which states: "If the misconception with regard to these two phenomena gets destroyed, he attains to Turiyasthāna (the fourth Absolute position)" - (1-15), is it not so? Because in the Sruti - "He is not Prajñānaghana (a lump of Consciousness)" - (Māndūkya Upanishad Mantra 7) it has been indicated that the 'Prājñaswarūpa' (essential nature of Consciousness) which is of the form of a cause is also not present in Atman, it is true that it amounts to both the categories of cause and effect being negated alone; but it was stated only by way of a Pratijñā (proclamation), that is all. Therefore, when a doubt of the type - "Whether the truth that Ātman is of an 'Advaita' Swarūpa devoid of both cause and effect categories has to be known merely by means of $\bar{A}gama$ (Sastra) alone or is it possible to discern it by means of logical dissertation?" - arises in our mind, in order to demonstrate that this truth can also be discerned by means of logic this third Chapter called 'Advaita Prakarana' has been begun.

In fact, this Chapter has not been commenced with the lone purport of demonstrating that - 'Advaita can be established by means of logical reasoning (discrimination) also.' Some people may doubt in the manner: "Even after we have accepted the fact that both the phenomena of cause and effect are false, why cannot it be deduced that - 'If Dvaita is false, Advaita also is false'?" Buddhists like Nāgārjuna etc. who are proponents of 'Shūnyavāda' (theory of essencelessness) have undertaken the task of establishing the theory that - "No viewpiont - whatsoever it may be - is proper." Therefore, some people may possibly doubt in this manner: "Since Vedānta too is negating both the categories of cause and effect, it is also championing the cause of that Shūnyavāda alone. In order to remove such a doubt also, here it has become quite necessary to demonstrate the fact that - "By means of Tarka also the universal and eternal

truth that Advaita is Paramārtha can be established" - in a convincing manner.

THE PLACE OF TARKA

Because it is stated that - "Advaita can be signified by means of Sruti and it can be established by Tarka (reasoning, logic)" - it should not be concluded that Tarka also, along with Śruti (Śāstra Pramāṇa), is an independent Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge). In the Sruti, which is the authoritative source for the Āgama Prakaraņa, since Advitīyātman is self-established the special features of Avasthātraya which are superimposed upon Him (i.e. Advitiyātman or non-dual Self) are sublated (falsified, negated, rescinded) and the truth that - "Atman is of Advaita Swarūpa (of the very essence of non-duality, i.e. having nothing second to Himself)" - has been clearly explained. Therefore, to some extent, the Sruti also has followed Tarka (reasoning) alone and has, for the sake of the superior class of seekers, instructed the self-established Tattwa (Absolute, Transcendental Reality). That very truth was explained fully in the Agama Prakarana Kārikās. Since here in the present Chapter (Advaita Prakaraņa) too - having followed or adopted that kind of Tarka which is adopted with felicity in the Sruti but in consonance with universal Intuitive Experience (Anubhavānga Tarka) so that it does not contradict It, the impediments like Samshaya (doubt), Viparīta Grahana (misconception, wrong knowledge) are rescinded, negated and the real purport of the Sruti alone has been signified - it has been affirmed that - "By means of Tarka also Advaita can be established." That is all. This explanation should be suitably made applicable to the second Vaitathya Prakarana also.

Because Ātmatattwa is not a *Prameya* (object of perceptual knowledge), It cannot possibly be established by any Pramāṇa whatsoever; because It is *Swatahsiddha* (self-established), there is no need whatsoever for establishing It by means of any Pramāṇa. Even so, for the sake or benefit of those seekers who are endowed with limited or low-grade intelligence (discriminative faculty) and are having predominantly an extroverted viewpoint, the Śruti, adopting the ancient time-tested traditional methodology of 'Adhyārōpa Apavāda Nyāya' (axiom of Superimposition and Rescission), deliberately superimposes on It certain

Dharmas (special features or attributes) which do not really exist in It and relatively rescinds certain other Dharmas, showing that they do not exist in It. Those preceptors who are well-versed in this traditional methodology of teaching are utilizing as an aid to this teaching the empirical logical arguments (Loukika Tarka) in consonance with that methodology. Therefore, in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, in order to clarify the truth that - 'Ātman is Advaita', first Dvaitamithyātwa (the truth that duality is false) was indicated and then the Kāryarūpa (the form or category of effect) was rescinded by means of Tarka; but here in the present context the Kāraṇarūpa (the category of cause - as a superimposed special feature) is rescinded, refuted. Thus, because Advaita Tattwa is self-established alone, It reveals Itself to the properly qualified seekers without any hindrance or hurdles whatsoever indeed.

2. AJĀTI PRATIPĀDANA PRATIJÑĀ (PROPOSITION OF THE EXPOSITION OF NON-BIRTH)

उपासनाश्रितो धर्मो जाते ब्रह्मणि वर्तते । प्रागुत्पत्तेरजं सर्वं तेनाऽसौ कृपणः स्मृतः ।।१।। अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पण्यमजाति समतां गतम् । यथा न जायते किञ्चिज्जायमानं समन्ततः ।।२।।

Meaning: "The Dharmaha (follower of a Dharma or one who has religious aptitude) who has relied upon or taken resort to Upāsana (mental meditation) rests (exists) in Jātabrahma (a reality or entity which has a birth) in which everything was Aja (unborn) prior to creation. Thereby, he is said to be Kṛipaṇa (a wretch, a mean person). Therefore, I will tell you as to how (Brahman or the Absolute, Ultimate Reality) which is Akārpaṇya (not mean) and is having or endowed with uncaused or unborn Samata (quiescence, equanimity), though It is being born everywhere, is not being born, even the least bit."

THE BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM CONDEMNING AN UPASAKA

In the Upanishads Brahman has been instructed, taught in

two forms: (a) the *Upāsyarūpa* (form of an object for mental meditation) endowed or associated with adjuncts which are the effects of names and forms; (b) the Jneyarupa (form of object of Intuitive Knowledge). Between these two forms what is described in the Sruti in the manner - 'मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः सत्यसङ्कल्प आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्थः सर्वरसः' - (Chhāndōgya 3-14-2), meaning - "One who is endowed with mental concepts, thoughts; with Prāṇa Sharira (having the subtle body comprising the vital force); with $Bh\bar{a}$ (Chaitanya) $R\bar{u}pa$ (of the nature of the Light, Radiance of Pure Consciousness); with Satyasankalpa (having volitions which really, unfailingly fructify); like the empty space $(\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha)$ all-pervading and subtle; having a body - devoid of any attributes like $R\bar{u}pa$ (form) etc.; with the totality of Karmas (actions) which are found in the form of macrocosmic universe; with the totality of all desires found in the world; with all the fragrances found in the world; with all the tastes found in the world......" - is that of "Sopadhikarupa" (form endowed with adjuncts, attributes); what is described in the Sruti in the manner - 'नेति नेति' - (Bri. 2-3-6), meaning - "Not this, not that"; 'अस्थूलमनण्वमह्रस्वमदीर्घम्' - (Bṛi. 3-8-8), meaning - "Not gross, not subtle, not short, not long"; 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्' - and 'नान्तःप्रज्ञं न बहिःप्रज्ञम्' - (Māṇḍūkya 7), meaning - "That which is devoid of sound, touch, form and taste and which is indestructible"; "That which does not have any internal consciousness, or external consciousness" etc. - is that of "Nirupādhikarūpa." Between these two forms, because the Upāsyarūpa is stipulated specially for the purport of Upāsana alone, this is not belonging to or related to the Brahma Swarupa; whereas because the Nirupādhikarūpa is being Intuited universally even in states like Sushupti (deep sleep) and Samādhi (trance), it belongs to or pertains to Brahma Swabhāva. Because in the Vaitathya Prakarana it has already been established by means of Tarka in consonance with universal experience that - "Those objects seen only in the waking and the dream alone - none of them is Paramārtha" - it is proper indeed to determine or decide that - "Savishesha Rūpa (the form associated with special features) does not belong to the Brahma Swabhava." For that

reason only it was demonstrated, by means of suitable Yukti, in the previous Chapter itself (2-31) that the distinctions of the type of *Utpatti* (causation), *Pralaya* (dissolution), *Baddha* (bound), *Mukta* (liberated) etc. are not absolutely real (*Paramārtha*). Hence, it evolves by itself (obviously from all this) that the Brahma Swarūpa which is stipulated for the purport of Upāsana does not belong to the essential nature of Being of Brahman.

Some people who have not known this secret opine: "What is stipulated by way of injunctions in Vedānta (Upanishads) is Jñāna alone of the form or nature of Upāsana; the Saprapañcharūpa (form associated with the world) of Brahman is itself Paramartha; 'Brahman is born in the form of the world of duality' - thus the Śruti has also stated in the Srishti Prakaraņa (Chapter devoted to Creation) and hence a Jiva has to perforce meditate upon Saguneshwara (the Lord associated with different qualities) and attain Paramapurushārtha (the supreme goal of human existence). In the Upanishads there exist many sentences which describe the Brahma Swarūpa, is it not so? In all of them there exists exclusively the description of Brahman, but it is not the purport of the Sruti to indicate that merely by knowing Brahman intellectually, one attains Mōksha - thus they interpret the purport of the Vedas. Further it is their contention that - "The Śrutis like 'स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः' - (Māndūkya Mantra 7), meaning -'He alone is Ātman, one should cognize Him'; 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' - (Chh. 8-7-1), meaning - 'He should be searched out, He should be cognized'; 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत', (Bri. 1-4-7), meaning -'One should meditate upon Him as Atman alone'; 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' - (Bri. 2-4-5), meaning - 'Oh dear, Atman alone should be perceived' - etc. are sentences which stipulate by way of injunctions that one (i.e. the seeker) should perform Upasana of Ātman by virtue of this Upāsana the Adrishta Mōksha (liberation which is invisible and posthumous) which is mentioned in the Sāstra will accrue, or Avidyā will be destroyed."

Because the root cause for their this erroneous contention is the misconception of the type - "Brahman is really of the essential nature of getting transformed into the form of the world

of duality" - alone, this third Chapter of Advaita Prakaraṇa has been begun for the prime purport of removing (rooting out) this *Bhrānti* (delusion) and at the same time signifying the Paramārtha Swarūpa of Brahman.

THE PURPORT OF THE FIRST VERSE

Those people who have known (Intuited) Brahman or Atman who is Nitya (eternal) and Aja (devoid of birth) assume, reckon that 'Dharma' (meaning Jiva) [The word 'Dharma' is used in Vedāntic parlance to mean 'Jīvātman' or a soul; for instance, refer to Kathopanishad 2-1-14] who thus exclusively or entirely resorts to or relies upon Upāsanas alone in the manner: (A) "I am an Upāsaka (meditator); I have to meditate upon Brahman and attain the Sāyujya (merger) of Brahman"; for this, the following Srutis are the authoritative sources -'देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति य एवं विद्वानेतद्रपास्ते' - (Bri. 4-1-7), meaning - 'One who meditates upon this Brahman in this manner becomes the deity and attains the merger into of Devatas (deities); 'एष म आत्माउन्तर्हृदय एतद्ब्रह्मैतिमतः प्रेत्याभिसंभिवतास्मि' - (Chh. 3-14-4), meaning - "This alone is the Atman who is in my heart; after leaving this world and I transmigrate, I will reach Him' - etc. (B) "Before the creation took place all this was Brahman alone which was devoid of birth. Now I am existing in Brahman which is born in the form of the world; by performing Upāsana I will reach that very Brahman alone" - for this opinion the following Srutis are the authoritative sources: 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद् विजिज्ञासस्व । तद् ब्रह्मेति ।' - (Tai. 3-1), meaning - "From which alone all these creatures are born, by which alone after being born they are thriving, that which finally they reach and become one with It - that Entity you cognize; that alone is Brahman" - thus one has cognized an Alpabrahma (limited, inferior Brahman) who is Parichhinna (divided) - and hence they consider him to be a Kripana (wretched, low-class person) and Dina (sorrowstricken, ruined or spoiled man). As against these Śrutivākyas there are also other Sruti statements which signify that the Upāsya Brahman is not Paramārtha. To wit: 'अथ योऽन्यां देवताम्पास्तेऽन्योऽसा-वन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद' - (Bri. 1-4-10), meaning - "One who is

meditating in the manner - 'This deity is separate, I am separate' - thinking that the deity is different or separate from himself he does not know the truth"; 'यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वाऽस्मिल्लोके जुहोति यजते तपस्तप्यते बहूनि वर्षसहस्राण्यन्तवदेवास्य तद् भवति, यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वाऽस्माल्लोकात् प्रैति स कृपणः' - (Bri. 3-8-10), meaning - "Oh Gārgi, one who, without cognizing this Brahman devoid of destruction, performs in this world a Homa (one kind of sacrifice), performs Yāga (another kind of sacrifice), who does penance for many thousands of years to such a person all those are practices which yield fruits which are non-eternal, ephemeral; Oh Gārgi, one who, without cognizing this Akshara Brahman (Ultimate Reality devoid of destruction), leaving this world and transmigrates, he is Kripana (a wretched fellow)" - This Sruti is the authoritative source for the above statement. For the teaching that - "The Brahmarūpa which is Upāsya is not Paramārtha" - the Talavakāra Śruti is the authoritative source : 'यद्वाचाऽनभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते । तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ।।', meaning - "That which cannot be indicated by speech, but by which speech itself is being stated - That alone you cognize as Brahman; that which people meditate as 'this' (as their object) - that is not Brahman (at all)."

THE PHENOMENON OF JANMA (BIRTH) IS FROM THE AVIDYĀ DŖISHŢI ; AJĀTI ALONE IS PARAMĀRTHA

Atman who is devoid of any changes or mutations of birth whatsoever, either internally or externally; and (ii) by virtue of Avidyā, believes that he is Dīna (miserable, sorrow-stricken) and has staunchly reckoned that: "I am born; I exist in the born Brahman; (iii) by resorting to or relying upon the Upāsana of that Brahman, in due course of time (in future) I will reach Ajātabrahman (the birthless, unborn Reality)" and (iv) has thereby misconceived his own Self, who is verily the eternally-attained Brahma Swarūpa, as one who has not yet attained that Brahma Swarūpa - is a Kṛipaṇa (a wretched, worthless fellow); I will now tell you about that Akārpaṇya or Brahman which is devoid of Kṛipaṇatwa and is birthless; one who has cognized that Reality is called a 'Brāhmaṇa'. 'अय य एतदक्षरं गागि विदित्वाऽस्माल्लोकात्

प्रैति स ब्राह्मणः' - (Bri. 3-8-10), meaning - 'Now, one who has cognized this Akshara (indestructible Entity, Reality) and leaves this world and transmigrates, he alone is a Brāhmaņa' - this Śruti is the authoritative source for this statement. The cause for this Kārpanya is invariably "to believe or reckon that Brahman is endowed with the divisions of 'Upāsya' (object meditated upon) and 'Upāsaka' (the meditator)"; the real essential nature of Brahman is opposed to that. For, the Sruti states that - "Where another thing does not appear (is not seen), where another thing is not heard, where another thing is not cognized - that alone is Bhūma (the ground Reality, the Absolute Reality as the substratum of all apparent appearances). That which is Bhūma - That alone is Amritam (immortal, deathless)" - (Chh. 7-24-1). Therefore, that Entity - attaining (cognizing) which the Avidyākrita Kārpaņya (wretchedness caused by ignorance) is removed, rooted out - that 'Akārpanya' (Entity - devoid of wretchedness) I will tell you. That alone is 'Ajāti' (unborn, birthless Entity); for, That Entity has no birth whatsoever. It has acquired Samata (quiescence, equanimity); for, It has no Vaishamya (incongruity, divergence, disparity) caused by any limbs, constituents or parts. A thing which has components, parts - its parts invariably have, or undergo, changes and hence the thing will necessarily have a birth (Janma). For instance, clay, having components or parts, is born in the forms of pot, pitcher etc.; a seed having components is born in the forms of plant and tree. But this Brahman because It is devoid of components or parts - cannot possibly have disparities or ups and downs; in fact, It can never be born. Hence, This alone is 'Akarpanya.'

Here a doubt may arise : On the strength of Śruti sentences like - 'तदात्पानं स्वयमकुरुत' - (Tai. 2-7), meaning - 'That created Itself by Itself'; 'तदेक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' - (Chh. 6-2-4), meaning - 'It wished : I will become many, I will be born' - etc. Brahman is known to be having birth, is it not so ? This world comprising $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space), $V\bar{a}yu$ (air) etc. - is seen to have been born (created), is it not so ? The Vedāntins also cannot possibly accept any other thing except Brahman as the cause for the world of duality, is it not so ? It being so, how at all can it be proper

to affirm a rule of law in the manner - "There is no phenomenon called Janma (birth) at all" -?

To this the solution is: Because, as exemplified above "There is no Janma whatsoever for the Paramartha Tattwa" - is itself the inviolable truth, even the fact that - "Its appearance as if It is born (created)" - is projected or conjured up - when observed from Avidyā Drishti alone. Though the rope exists as it is, its appearance in the Vikalpas (misconceptions, false imaginations) like a snake etc. is seen to exist, is it not so? Although the moon is one and one only, due to a defect of the eyes it appears as if there are two or three moons, is it not so? Merely on the ground of the appearance, does anyone believe that in reality, actually there existed a snake, as also actually there existed two or three moons? No, not at all. Similarly, although there does not exist anything else whatsoever as a second entity apart from Parabrahman, nor are there any divisions whatsoever within Itself - that Parabrahman appearing as if It is being born as various primordial elements like Ākāsha, physical entities and as Jivas endowed with various conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. is itself called 'Janma'.

In that case, what is the plight of the Sruti statements like - "Brahman is born as Jivas and the Jagat" -? To this question, the answer is given in the next Kārikā.

3. THE JANMA ETC. OF THE WORLD IS $\overline{AVIDYAKA}$ (PROJECTION OF IGNORANCE)

आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः ।

घटादिवच्च सङ्घातैर्जातावेतन्निदर्शनम् ॥३॥

Meaning: "Just as the empty space is born in the forms of Ghaṭākāsha (pot spaces), similarly Ātman is 'born' in the forms of Jīvas; just as the Ākāsha is born in the forms of Ghaṭa etc., Ātman is born in the forms of Sanghātas (conglomerations). For birth this is an illustration (demonstration)."

TO SHOW THAT JĪVAS ARE BORN GHAṬĀKĀSHA IS THE ILLUSTRATION

It has already been stated that to conclude that Brahman is

not born is itself 'Akarpanya', is it not so? For this conclusion both the reason and an illustration have been mentioned here. Because Paramātman is, just like Ākāsha, subtle and devoid of components or parts, He is Sarvagata (all-pervading) and Nitya (eternal). Thus when it is stated in the Srutis that - "He exists in the forms of Jivas" - the Srutis imply that just as the Akasha exists in the forms of Ghatākāsha, Paramātman too exists in the forms of the Jivas. Their real import is: "Existing in Its very Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness) Brahman exists in the Jivarūpa also in this body." In Śrutis like: "Having created it, (Brahman) entered into it only" - (Taittiriya); "This Parameshwara has entered herein up to the end of the nails" -(Bri.); "He tore asunder the membrane of the skull and entered through this doorway" - (Aitareya) etc. because of the fact that it is being very clearly stated that - "That very Brahman has entered into this body in the Jivarūpa" - we have to perforce interpret them as indicating that Jivas are not really born at all.

The Srutis do not have their final or real purport in stating that Jivas are born. Some people may here raise a doubt saying: "In some Srutis it has been very clearly stated that Jivas are born, is it not so?" For this too, keeping this illustration of Ghaṭākāsha in mind, a consolatory explanation may be given. Just as the Mahākāsha (the vast empty space) which is existing everywhere, when the earthen (empty or hollow) pots are produced, appears as if it is born in the forms of Ghatākāsha (the empty space within or in the hollow space of the pot), similarly Paramātman also existing in His own Swarūpa, when the adjuncts like the body, the senses, the mind etc. are born - appears as if He is born in the Jivarūpa. When we properly observe, just as, it becomes clear that though the Mahākāsha exists as Mahākāsha alone, when the pots are 'born' the empty spaces (Akashas) within them may appear to have been born due to (delusion); in the same way, we have to conceive that those Srutis have the real purport of denoting that Paramatman appears as if He is born in the Jivarūpa; but the Srutis do not at all have any purport in saying that actually or really the Jivas are born.

Anyone may get a doubt of the type - "Just as in the illustration the adjuncts like the earthen pots are born, the conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. are really being born and hence why should it not be imagined that through those media of adjuncts the Jivas too are really born?" But even the adjuncts also are not really born at all. For, the earthen pot is in reality earth, is it not so ? In fact, $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ itself (i.e. the subtlest primordial element) gets transformed in the order of Vāyu (air), Agni (fire), Ap (water) and finally into Prithvi (earth) and appears in the form of the earthen pot. It being so, it amounts to saying that Akasha - with the adjuncts of earthen pots etc. - meaning the adjunct of Akasha itself - has been produced in distinct forms. In the same way, the conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. - just as the $\overline{A}k\overline{a}sha$ itself appears in the various forms of Ghata etc. - are projected by Avidyā in Brahman alone and hence neither the Jivas, who are endowed with adjuncts, nor the body, the senses etc. - which are the adjuncts, are born at all. Just as the rope-snake etc. - all of them are imagined (misconceived) in Brahman due to Avidyā; because such depiction alone is the real, final purport of the Sruti, it has no real purport in teaching or expounding that Brahman gets transformed into Chetana (sentient, animate) and Achetana (insentient, inanimate) forms. This truth will be further explained in some more detail later on. For that reason alone it has been stressed in the Śruti that - 'स य एषोऽणिमैतदात्म्यिमदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमिस' - (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - 'This subtle Reality is there, is it not so? This alone is the essence of all this; That alone is Satya (real), That alone is Atman, That alone art thou" - and reiterated that Brahman alone which is of the form of the cause of the world is the Reality; Jiva is really Brahman alone (in the ultimate analysis).

> घटादिषु प्रलीनेषु घटाकाशादयो यथा । आकाशे सम्प्रलीयन्ते तद्वज्जीवा इहाऽऽत्मिन¹ ॥४॥

^{1.} This Kārikā has been quoted by a Buddhist by name Shantarakshita in his treatise "Mādhyamikālaṅkāra Kārikāvyākhyāna" - as found in a Tibetan translation of the treatise.

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते । न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते तद्वज्जीवास्सुखादिभिः 1।५।।

BOTH AT THE TIME OF DISSOLUTION (PRALAYA) AND SUSTENANCE (STHITI) JĪVAS ARE VERILY AJABRAHMARŪPAS

Just as the adjuncts called 'Ghaṭa' etc. which are thus Avidyākṛita (projected by ignorance) are born and thereby Ākāsha appears as if it has been born in the forms of Ghaṭākāsha, in the same way although Brahman exists as It is, by virtue of the creation or birth of the Dehendriya Sanghāta (conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) which is Avidyākalpita (imagined due to ignorance) It is appearing as if It has been 'born' in the forms of Jīvas - this truth has been demonstrated by means of Yukti so far. In the same way, in these two Kārikās it has been propounded that - "Jīvas are really Brahma Swarūpas alone even during Pralaya (dissolution of all creation) and Sthiti Kāla (the life-span of the soul)."

Just as when the objects like a pot, a pitcher etc. are born it appears as if Ākāsha also has been born in the forms of Ghatākāsha etc., in the same way when the adjuncts of the pot etc. are destroyed, it appears as if the Ghatākāshas etc. have merged in the Mahākāsha (the vast empty space). Just as by virtue of the adjunct of many pots, the Mahākāsha appears as if it exists as many forms of Ghatakāsha, in the same way, by virtue of the adjuncts of many conglomerations of the body and the senses, many Jīvas appear as if they are separately and distinctively transacting indeed. Just as from the Paramārtha Drishti (the Absolute viewpoint) the Mahākāsha remaining as Mahākāsha alone, only due to the association with Upādhis and out of Bhrānti (delusion) it appears as if it is experiencing or undergoing Utpatti (birth), Sthiti (sustenance, existence) and Pralaya

^{1.} This Kārikā has been exemplified by the Buddhist, named Bhavya, in his treatise - "Mādhyamakahridayakārikā" - as stated by Prof. Vidhushekara Bhaṭṭāchārya, Calcutta, in his treatise - "Āgamashāstravritti". Whereas Vijñānabhikshu has written in his Sūtrabhāshya that this verse is found in Vishņupurāṇa.

(dissolution, merger) in the forms of Ghatākāsha, in the same way Brahman - although It exists eternally without any transformations or mutations of the types of Janma, Sthiti and Pralaya or death - It appears as though, in the forms of many Jivas, It is experiencing Utpatti, Sthiti and Pralaya. For this reason alone as the Sruti says: "This Purusha when being born begets a body and is acquiring the relationship with Sharirendriyas which are the cause for Dharma (religious merits) and Adharma (religious demerits); when He is leaving the body and transmigrating He dies and is giving up the relationship with the Sharirendriyas" -(Bri.) - by virtue of an association with a body alone Jivas appear to be having Janana (birth) and Marana (death). Because of the fact that the conglomerations of the body, the senses etc. are verily Avidyākrita (projections, misconceptions caused due to Avidya, for Jivas - in the predominant sense (i.e. from the Paramartha Drishti or Transcendental viewpoint) - it amounts to saying that there do not exist any Janana (birth) and Marana (death) whatsoever.

WHY DO THE CATEGORIES OF ACTION, FRUIT AND ENJOYMENT APPEAR TO BE DIFFERENT?

Anybody may raise a query of the type; "Thus in the form of Brahman if Atman is one and one alone, in our workaday world of various transactions it appears as though there exist many Jivas and to each one of these Jivas, in keeping with his own respective Karma, different enjoyments of the fruits are accruing, is it not so? How at all can this be reconciled?" For this query too a consolatory explanation based on the illustration of the Ghatākāsha alone has to be mentioned. Because of the fact that if one pot is having relationship with dust, smoke etc. the respective Ghatākāsha also appears to be tainted with impurities like dust, smoke etc. but all the other Ghatākāshas do not at all have even this apparent relationship whatsoever; in the same way, it is appearing as though for each Kāryakaraṇa Sanghāta (conglomeration of action and means of action) there exists one each Jiva separately, as also each Jiva is having relationship with different Sukhas and Duhkhas. The fruit of one's Karma does not accrue to another.

THE IMAGINATION OF JĪVATWA AS ALSO THE IMAGINATION OF MANIFOLDNESS OF JĪVAS ARE OPPOSED TO REASON, LOGIC

Here in this context, both Sānkhyans and Vaisheshikas were doubting about the following defect in the teachings of Advaitins: In the doctrine of those who affirm that in all the bodies one Ātman alone exists - if one Ātman gets Sukha all other Ātmans too perforce should get Sukha. If one gets Duḥkha all others should perforce get Duḥkha only. But in our workaday world such a thing is not seen to be happening. Therefore, those who accept the principle of proper system for Sukha and Duḥkha have invariably to acknowledge that Ātmans are many alone.

This doubt is not proper. For, in the doctrines of the Sānkhyans it has been accepted that the Purusha is Nirlepa (devoid of any taint or smearing) and that Sukha and Duhkha etc. are the qualities of the intellect (Buddhi). At the same time, because they have accepted that Atman is Chinmatraswarūpa (of the essential nature of Pure, Absolute Consciousness) there is no authoritative, reliable source or support whatsoever in their philosophical teachings to imagine any difference among Ātmans. The Sānkhyans used to say that - "Because the Prakriti was separately, distinctively providing each Purusha (self), Bandha and Möksha, we acknowledge that Purushas are many. Further because of the facts that for each one of them Janana (birth) and Marana (death) etc. are different or separate, as also at one and the same time, in one and the same manner all Purushas do not engage themselves in Karma - it has to be perforce accepted that Purushas are many" - This was their argument. But, as stated in the Kārikā, since that Bahutwa (manifoldness) can be made applicable by the illustration of the Ghațākāsha alone, there is no justification or propriety in imagining many Purushas merely on this shallow ground. The Sānkhyans also were saying that - "The Bandha-Mōksha Vyavahāra (transaction of bondage-liberation) is not Paramārtha (absolutely real)." It was their doctrine indeed that for Prakritis alone there were Bandha and Mōksha. Apart from this, Shri Bādarāyaṇāchārya has proved that the doctrine that - "Pradhāna which is Achetana (insentient, inanimate) is the cause for the world of duality" - is illogical by adducing many arguments in his "Shāriraka Mimāmsā." Therefore, the doctrines

of the Sānkhyans cannot possibly withstand the onslaught of reason or logic.

Coming to the 'Vaisheshikas' doctrines now, they used to contend that - "Qualities like Itchhā (desire), Dwesha (hatred), Sukha (happiness), Duḥkha (misery), Jñāna (knowledge), Prayatna (effort), Dharma (righteousness), Adharma (unrighteousness), Saṃskāra (latent impressions) - are all belonging to Ātman and they were all different for each and every Atman." Since these disputants had opined at the same time that - "Because in Atman there does not exist any defect whatsoever and thereby since Saṃskāras (latent impressions in the mind) which are the cause for Smriti (memory) cannot possibly exist in Atman, He is Sarvagata (all-pervading)" - it is not possible at all for them to establish the fact that - "Such and such a body belongs to such and such a person." No one can ever establish a systematic theme of Sukha and Duhkha in the doctrines of these disputants. Apart from this, it is the theory of the Vaisheshikas that - "Ātman is a Dravya (substance); and Itchhā etc. (mentioned above) are His Gunas (qualities)." It is their opinion that because Guṇa (quality) and Guṇi (entity endowed with or having that quality) are proved to be inseparable and inherent, there exists an eternal relationship called 'Samavāya' (inherence) between them. If this eternal relationship of Samavaya is ever existing, then Mõksha can never accrue; if they exist in different places or regions, then the doctrine that - "Itchh \bar{a} etc. are the qualities of Atman" - itself will vanish into thin air. Especially if it is opined that the essential nature (Swabhāva) of Ātman are the Gunas, then there can never at all be any relationship whatsoever between them. Because the Vaisheshikas were asserting that the Samavāya Sambandha also was a separate, different Padārtha (substance, substantive entity), there has necessarily to exist another Sambandha (relationship) between that Samavāya Sambandha and Atman; then in that event, there would have to be perforce yet another relationship between that and Atman - thus there will not be any finality reached at all. In any case, this doctrinaire theory of the Vaisheshikas cannot be sustained by reason (Yukti). Therefore, neither according to the Sānkhyans' nor the Vaisheshikans' philosophical doctrines the Atmanānātwa (manifoldness of Atman) gets established.

THAT ATMAN HAS SUKHA AND DUḤKHA IS OPPOSED TO UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE

These philosophical systems (schools) were in vogue in ancient times. Although they are not existing today, there do exist Vedāntins as also other Dvaitins (dualists) who profess the cause of the theory of $\bar{A}tman\bar{a}n\bar{a}twa$. But their opinions are opposed to universal experience. For, the contention that Atman has relationship with Sukha and Duhkha is rendered false in states like Sushupti and such other states. It is a fact of universal experience known to everyone that in deep sleep Atman does not have the experience of Sukha. Some Dvaita Vedantins stubbornly start affirming on the strength of the memory of the type - "I slept happily" - that therein too Atman does have the taint of Sukha and Duhkha. But because of the fact that in the experience of deep sleep it is quite familiar to everyone that therein there does not exist any cognition whatsoever of distinctions like 'I', 'You'; 'Sukha', 'Duḥkha' - etc. to disregard this universal experience and, on the other hand, to attach all importance and value to the 'memory' that accrues in the waking with regard to this phenomenon of deep sleep in their reasoning is very clearly vain logic indeed.

Anybody may raise an objection of the type - "To the question that - 'If it is asserted that Atman really does not have any relationship whatsoever with Sukha and Duhkha, there will be a doubt as to who is having Bandha; besides, in order to evade the Samsara Bandha to whom should the Śastra instruct?' - To such other queries there is no solution whatsoever forthcoming from Atmaikatwavādins (proponents of the theory of Atman being non-dual), is it not so ?" But this objection is not proper. For, to this objection too by means of the illustration of the Ghațākāsha - as mentioned in the present Kārikā - a solution can be provided. Just as by virtue of a relationship with Upādhis like the Ghata (pot) etc. even when defects like dust, smoke etc. are imagined to exist in Akasha due to Avidya but actually to the Mahākāsha their taint is not there even the least bit and never at any time, in the same way even when the Avivekins (nondiscriminative people) have imagined that Jivas too in the Vyavahāra Avasthā (state of empirical, mundane existence, meaning the waking state), by virtue of their association with the

conglomerations of the body and the senses, are having Sukha and Duhkha, from the Paramārtha Drishți - in the non-dual Paramatman who is of the essential nature of Nitya (eternal), Shuddha (Pure, Absolute), Mukta (liberated) there does not at all exist even the least bit of relationship with Bandha or Möksha etc. In fact, Dvaitins also often accept the Drishti Bheda (different viewpoints) of Vyavahāra and Paramārtha. Even Dvaitins also acknowledge that in order to teach or propound the truth that - "When the Dehadharmas (qualities belonging to the body) are being misconceived (Adhyāsā) in Ātman, even though it appears as though Atman Himself is having birth, old age, death etc., from the Paramartha Drishti, Atman does not at all have Janma, Jarā, Marana etc." - alone the Śāstra exists, is it not so? In the same way, in the teachings of Advaita Vedantins too because they have acknowledged the fact that the Sastra is there with a view to teaching that - "Although due to Avidyā it is imagined that Atmans are many and that they have Samsāritwa, from the Paramārtha Drishți Jivas do not at all have any Bandha, Mōksha etc." - there is no contradiction in their philosophical teachings.

In any case, in this manner, just like the illustration of the Ghaṭākāsha and Mahākāsha for Ātmans in the Jīvarūpa, both Utpattyādi (birth etc.) and Saṃsāritwa (transmigratory existence) are Kalpita (imagined, misconceived). Because in the Absolute sense it can be stated that - "Ātman is one and one alone (i.e. non-dual); He is Nityamukta (eternally free, liberated)" - it should be concluded, discerned that the doctrinaire theories of Dvaitins who imagine that Ātman and Anātman are absolutely real (i.e. existing really, distinctively) are not proper.

रूपकार्यसमाख्याश्च भिद्यन्ते तत्र तत्र वै । आकाशस्य न भेदोऽस्ति तद्वज्जीवेषु निर्णयः 1।६॥

Meaning: "Further, just as phenomena like form, action and name are distinctively separate here and there but only empty space ($\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$) does not have any distinctions, in the

^{1.} Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhaṭṭāchārya, Calcutta, has inferred that in a Tibetan transliteration by Bhavya called "Tarkajwālā" there exists a Kārikā with the same opinion.

same way, there should be a decision (arrived at) with regard to Jivas."

EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS OF TREATING NAMES, FORMS AND ACTIONS AS DIFFERENT, DISTINCT

(Doubt): In the doctrine of *Dvaitins* who say that Atmans are many, the fact of each person having a different name, each one having a different form or appearance, each one having a different action - thus each of these aspects being real separately becomes suitable, applicable. But in the Advaita Siddhānta (philosophy of non-dualism) which propounds that Atman is one and one alone how at all can all these aspects mentioned above be applicable? To provide a mere consolatory explanation to this doubt, saying that - 'All this appears due to Avidya' - is not proper. For, when it is really and undoubtedly being perceived (by all) that Jivas are actually distinct, one from the other in the matter of names, forms and actions, if we go on imagining that all those things are merely Avidyākrita - then whatever becomes inconvenient or unsuitable to the Vedantins' tenets - all that can be nonchalantly brushed aside on the strength of this theory of 'Avidyākrita', is it not so? Anybody who follows tenets which are in consonance with universal experience - how can he accept this kind of a doctrine?

(Solution): For this a convincing solution is: Even for this doubt also it amounts to our having provided an answer by means of the illustration of the Akasha. Although the vast empty space is one and one alone, due to the differences or distinctions of Upādhis like a pot, a pitcher, a large room etc. we imagine in our workaday dealings that the pot-space, the pitcher-space and the room-space are all different and various; and we think that they are having different forms so that relatively the pot-space is small, the pitcher-space is bigger, while the room-space is the biggest; similarly, we imagine in our workaday transactions that we can bring a little quantity of water in a pot for drinking purposes, store large quantities of water in the pitcher and sleep and live in a big room - thus we think of various acts of utility. Just as in one and the same vast empty space the distinctions of names, forms and actions are imagined (conceived) due to the differences of the Upādhis (adjuncts) alone, in the same way to

accept the tenet that - 'Due to the cause of the adjuncts like the body, the senses Jivas are also imagined to have different names, forms and actions' - there is no defect whatsoever. Therefore, Advaitins have determined the truth that - 'In one and the same Ātman thus the distinctions of name, form and action are misconceived only."

नाकाशस्य घटाकाशो विकारावयवौ यथा।

नैवाऽऽत्मनः सदा जीवो विकारावयवौ तथा ॥७॥

Meaning: "Just as for the Akāsha, Ghaṭākāsha is neither a Vikāra (a mutation, transformation) nor an Avayava (component), in the same way for Paramātman too Jīva is neither a mutation, transformation nor a component, part."

(Objection): The illustration that is given here is itself not proper or relevant - thus any *Dvaitin* may doubt. For, the various phenomena of names, forms and actions that are seen in the *Ghaṭākāsha* etc. are actually existing distinctively, is it not so?

(Solution): This is not proper. For, Ghatākāsha is not a real effect or resultant change of $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$. Just as an effect of an ornament takes place from gold, no one ever thinks or will accept the veracity of the statement that the vast empty space itself has undergone a change or transformation to become the congested, restricted pot-space, is it not so? Does anyone say that just as the Kāryarūpas (forms of effect) like foam, bubble, ice etc. are caused from water, from the cause of Mahākāsha (vast empty space) the effect of Ghatākāsha (pot-space) has occurred? Or, does anyone say that just as to a tree the branch is a component - of the real Ākāsha imaginary phenomena like Ghaṭākāsha etc. are parts or components? In any case, for the $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ all the phenomena like Ghațākāsha etc. are neither Kāryarūpa (forms of effect) nor Avayava (parts); for, $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ itself is an entity without parts. It being so, it should perforce be admitted that due to the association with adjuncts alone the various names like Ghatākāsha, Karakākāsha, Apavarakākāsha etc. and their respective forms and functions too appear as though they are different and varied, indeed. In the same way, it can never be stated that Jivas are the Vikāras (distinctive, mutated forms) nor Avayavas (constituents, components) of Paramātman. Therefore,

it amounts to saying that the common run of people are transacting in the manner that Ātmans are distinct and various due to misconception alone.

THE MISCONCEPTIONS THAT SOME DISPUTANTS HAVE ENTERTAINED WITH REGARD TO JĪVAS

Some ancient Vedantins like Bhartruprapancha etc., despite all this being expounded so, had imagined that because Jivas have been called 'Vijñānamayas' (full of consciousness) in the Śrutis, the Jivas are verily the Vikāras (mutations) of Paramātmachaitanya (the Pure Consciousness of the Supreme Self). Because of the fact that in the Sruti it is stated that - "Just as the sparks fly off from fire, from Paramātman are born the Jīvātmans" -Jivas are the Amsha (a part) of Paramātman - thus some others had interpreted it. Even today some Dvaitins are saying that Jīvātmans are actually the Amshas alone of Paramātman. All this is not proper. For, since Paramātman does not possess any Avayavas, it will be wrong to understand or reckon that Jivas are either the Vikāra or Amshas; especially if Ātman is reckoned to be 'Sāvayava' (endowed with parts) there will be opposition to the Sruti which states that Atman is 'Eka' (one and one only) and Advitiya (non-dual); because anything that is Savayava has perforce to be Anitya (non-eternal), these disputants will be confronted by an undesirable inference or concept that Paramātman is Anitya and Vināshi (destructible, mortal). Some other modern (present-day) Vedāntins have imagined a relationship of Prakāra (mode, manner) and Prakāri (a thing endowed with that mode) between Paramātman and the Jivas. But because it is not possible at all to imagine whether Dravya (substance) and Guna (quality) are Bhinna (different) or Abhinna (non-different), their theory also is defective. Some others have imagined that Jivas are the embodiments of Paramātman, and just like the sun and his rays Paramātman is Amshi (one endowed with parts) and Jivas are Amshas (the parts); all these are mere concepts, imaginations alone and have no support whatsoever of any Sruti or Yukti or Anubhava. Hence there is no necessity of examining or considering their doctrinaire, dogmatic theories at all. Therefore, it should be discerned that by virtue of the Upādhis projected by Avidyā alone the empirical transaction

of Jivabheda (manifoldness and distinctions among Jivas) has arisen.

यथा भवति बालानां गगनं मिलनं मलैः। तथा भवत्यबुद्धानामात्मापि मिलनो मलैः ।।८।।

Meaning: "Just as for the boys Ākāsha is polluted by impurities, in the same way for the ignorant people Ātman too is impure with impurities."

THERE ARE NO IMPURITIES LIKE KLESHA (DISTRESS) ETC. IN JĪVĀTMAN

(Objection): Let it be that Jiva is neither a mutation nor a part of Paramatman; merely on that count can it be said that Jiva himself is Paramātman? Paramātman means Ātman who is of the essence of Nitya, Shuddha, Buddha, Mukta; not one like the Jiva who is associated with impurities like Klesha (misery, distress), Karma (action), Phala (fruit) and is verily endowed with Antahkarana (Mind) which is the native place for their Vāsanas (latent impressions). It being so, to say that both of them are one and the same is a contradictory statement, is it not so? In Paramātman Kleshas like Avidyā (ignorance), Rāga (attachment) etc. do not exist, nor Karmas which are of the forms of Punya (merit) and Pāpa (demerit); nor does He have any taint of Karmaphalabhōga (enjoying the fruits of actions) nor its Vāsana (latent propensities). These are facts which are Śrutisiddha (established by the scriptures). Therefore, the tenet that - "Paramatman means the Parameshwara whom all the Jivas have to meditate upon and become blessed by Him" - alone is correct. In some Srutis it has been stated that Paramatman Himself is the Atman of everyone; but if their literary meaning itself is taken to be the Tattwa (Absolutely real or True), then it will be rendered to be an extremely contradictory statement and hence it appears to us that to say that - 'Those statements are 'Arthavāda' (of secondary importance) sentences which have been used for the purpose of eulogising, praising Upasana' is proper.

^{1.} Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhaṭṭāchārya has written that this Kārikā is quoted by Shāntarakshita in his 'Madhyamakālaṅkāra Kārikā.'

(Solution): It is true that if, as you have said, there were really these Klesha etc. in Atman, we would have had to accept this indeed. But the truth is not like this at all. It has been already established on the analogy of the illustration of the Ghatākāsha that Ātman, whom the common run of people are reckoning to be a Jiva, is actually Nityashuddha (eternally pure), but Avivekins (non-discriminating, ignorant people) only believe Him to be a Samsāri. Therefore, the concept that Jiva has Klesha. and such other tribulations of transmigratory existence is verily Avidyākrita and not Paramārtha (really real). Just as the nondiscriminating people believe that Akasha has pollution, they are misconceiving Jiva to be having Klesha etc. Although from our Vyavahāra Drishţi it is appearing that Ākāsha possesses a blue colour, those people who have discrimination decide that empty space has no colour whatsoever, is it not so? In the same way, those who have cognized the Reality of Atman will never believe that He has Samsara Dharmas. Although Avivekins are rushing towards a mirage with the intention of drinking water, thinking that in that region there exists water, the people who know the ground reality decide in the manner - "This is verily a mirage; there does not exist any water here"; in the same way, Vivekins decide that in $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ tman there does not at all exist Samsāritwa. Even the empty space being polluted in the lower regions or the water of the mirage etc., which the Avivekins have misconceived to exist, really do not exist, is it not so? In the same way, the misery and other tribulations of Samsara that the common people have misconceived to exist, do not exist at all in reality in Atman - thus the seekers should discern.

मरणे सम्भवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरिप ।

स्थितौ सर्वशरीरेषु ह्या¹काशेनाविलक्षणः ॥९॥

Meaning: "In all aspects like dying, being born, going and coming, standing - in all the bodies the Jiva exists in a manner not different from Ākāsha."

ALL PHENOMENA LIKE JANMA, MARAŅA ETC. OF JĪVA ARE AVIDYĀKRITA

The topic which was explained with the help of the illus-

^{1.} In some books herein there is a text like - 'चाकाशेनाविलक्षणः'

tration of the empty space so far is being concluded here. If the pot gets destroyed then the pot-space or Ghatākāsha does not get destroyed; neither when the pot is produced that empty space is born; if the pot is carried away to some other place, the empty space does not travel along with it. Or if the pot is brought back the empty space does not return along with it. If the pot rests where it is, it cannot be said that the empty space has stood still. Neither the good qualities nor the defects of the pot taint in the least the empty space. Whatever changes may occur in the pot, the empty space remains (Unaffected) as it is. Is it not so? Ākāsha is a Dravya (substance) which has no relationship with any other thing - called in Vedantic parlance 'Amūrta Dravya' (formless substance); for this reason too, observed from the Absolute viewpoint, because even the phenomenon called 'pot' is a form of Prithivi (element earth) only - which is the Kārya (effect) of the subtlest primordial element of Akasha alone - none of the Dharmas (qualities or special features) of the earthen pot can possibly touch or taint Akasha. In the same way, that -"None of the Dharmas of the Sharirendriya Sanghāta (conglomeration of the body, the senses) taints Atman" - is the Siddhanta (philosophical teaching) of Vedānta.

सङ्घाताः स्वप्नवत् सर्वे आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः । आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विद्यते ।।१०।।

Meaning: "The conglomerations, like the dream, are created by $\overline{A}tmam\overline{a}y\overline{a}$ (the illusory, magical power of the Self). There is no logical proof (Yukti) whatsoever to say (assert) that some of them are superior to the remaining groups or all are equal to one another."

ALL THE BODIES ARE ĀVIDYAKA (PROJECTIONS OF IGNORANCE)

So far it has been explained in accordance with the illustration of the *Ghaṭākāsha* that though Ātman is *Aja* (devoid of birth), *Advaya* (non-dual), by virtue of His apparent association with *Upādhis* (adjuncts) like the *Dehādi Saṅghāta* (conglomerations of body and the senses) He appears as many Jīvas and as endowed with various Saṃsāra Dharmas from the Avidyā Dṛishṭi; it has also been propounded that, just as the empty space itself

has assumed the forms of the pot etc., Ātman Himself appears as the *Dehādisanghāta* due to Avidyā. Even so, because of the fact that there is every scope for the Avivekins, who believe that the various special forms projected by names and forms are real only, wrongly believe (misconceive) that the earthen pot etc. are verily the transformations or mutations of the empty space, and similarly that the bodies are the special forms of transformation of Ātman only - in order to fully establish the teaching that all of them are invariably *Mithyā* (false) this verse has been written.

Just like the earthen pot etc. the Dehādisanghātas, which are the adjuncts of Atman, are false indeed; for, they are projected by the mind or imagined due to Avidya, just like the dream bodies and bodies conjured up by magic (Māyākrita Dehas). No one believes that either the pots etc. appearing in a dream or the pots etc. conjured up by magic (Māyā) are really the Parināmavisheshas (special features caused by transformation). For, they are confined to the false Svapnāvasthā (dream state) or Māyāvasthā (illusory state). In the same way, the Sharirendriya Sanghātas too are projected by the Nāmarūpamāyā (illusory power of names and forms) which is itself caused by not cognizing Atman, and hence there is no reason whatsoever to reckon that they are real. It is not possible for anyone to stubbornly believe or reckon that the bodies which appear in the dream as also the bodies that are conceived or projected (illusorily) by a magician do really exist apart from Atman, is it not so? In the same way, there is no supporting proof or evidence whatsoever to assert that the bodies of various Jivas who appear in the waking do exist apart from and independently of Atman. They too are the effects of Nāmarūpamāyā, which appears due to the cause of not cognizing Ātman. In the previous Vaitathya Prakarana itself it has already been mentioned (explained) that - "People who are well-versed in Vedānta (philosophical science) say that all this world of duality exists just like Svapna, Māyā as also Gandharvanagara (celestial city)" - (2-31); is it not so?

THE BODIES APPEAR TO BE SUPERIOR OR INFERIOR BECAUSE OF AVIDYA ALONE

Here a doubt may arise: The Kāryakāraņa Sanghātas do not exist in one and the same degree or manner in all the Jīvas.

It is stated in the $S\bar{a}stra$ that by virtue of Punya (superior Karmas) one begets a meritorious body, by virtue of $P\bar{a}pa$ (sinful) Karmas one begets the bodies (birth) of low-class animals and by virtue of mixed Karmas the human bodies are acquired. Therefore, due to a difference in the degree of their *Dharmas* (merits) and *Adharmas* (demerits) among the Jivas, in the matter of enjoying Sukha and Duḥkha there has arisen a difference in degree. It being so, can it be said that all these bodies are, like the dream bodies or illusorily projected bodies by a magician, false appearances only?

(Solution): This doubt is not proper. For, there is no cause to imagine that either by virtue of Dharma or Adharma there exists a difference in degree among the bodies of creatures; or because they are all created out of the primordial elements, all the bodies are equal in all respects. For, invariably among the conglomerations of the body and senses appearing in the dream as also among the conglomerations of the body and senses which are imagined due to Māyā - at that moment it appears as though there exists a difference in degree in the same manner; but those conglomerations of the body and senses are not at all real. In the same way, when observed from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi, among the waking bodies too which are the effect of Nāmarūpamāyā, caused by not having cognized the Ātman, there is no room at all to believe that there exists really any difference in degree or any equality in all respects.

THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION THAT EXIST AMONG THE VEDĀNTAVĀDINS

Giving the illustration of the Ghaṭākāsha in the present $K\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$, it has been propounded that in non-dual $\bar{A}tman$, by virtue of the apparent association with the $Up\bar{a}dhi$, $J\bar{i}vatwa$ is misconceived (Kalpita), is it not so ? In the Brahmasūtra Bhāshya it has been decided that just like the sun's reflection (Pratibimba) $J\bar{i}va$ is the $\bar{A}bh\bar{a}sa$ (reflected, false appearance) alone of Paramātman; he is not virtually (actually) Paramātman, nor is he different from Paramātman. In order to indicate that in the $Vy\bar{a}vah\bar{a}rik\bar{a}vasth\bar{a}$ (waking state wherein all empirical transactions ensue), in which $J\bar{i}vas$ appear to be different, their distinct bodies are engendered so as to enjoy, experience the fruits of

Pāpa (demerits, sins) and Puņya (merits, righteous acts) in accordance with their respective Karmas, here in this context the illustration of Ghațākāsha has been given; in the Sūtra Bhāshya, however, the illustration of the sun's reflection has been given in order to signify that one Jiva's Karma cannot taint or affect another Jiva. By association with an adjunct if the water shakes the Pratibimba or reflection (of the sun) too appears to be shaking; just as this shaking does not relate to or affect all the other reflections, similarly in the case of the Jivas too their respective Karmaphalas (fruits of actions) belong to the respective Jivas only. In order to indicate this truth in the Sūtra Bhāshya the illustration of the Pratibimba (reflection) has been given. In any case, these two illustrations have been mentioned with the prime purport of explaining, elucidating the teaching that among the Jivas one's Karmaphala does not affect or occur to the other Jivas and not with the intention of teaching that actually, really Jiva is a part of Brahman (or Atman) or he is a reflection of Brahman. Not cognizing this truth, the presentday Vyākhyānakāras (post-Śańkara commentators) have propounded their 'Avacchedavāda' following the $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ illustration and 'Pratibimbavāda' by following illustration of sun's reflection and have thereby brought about two warring factions and have given rise to a raging controversy. With a view to explaining the opinion of a gloss called 'Pañchapādikā' on Shri Śankara's Sūtra Bhāshya, a treatise called 'Vivaraņa' was written by Prakāshātma Yati. His opinion about this topic, in a quintessential form, is: In the doctrine of those who imagine the relationship between Jivas and Brahman akin to Ghatākāsha and Mahākāsha, because Brahman, who is within the Brahmānda (the created macrocosmic universe) like the Ghatākāsha, is rendered Apūrņa (incomplete, imperfect), and thereby has become Paricchinna (limited, circumscribed) - Brahman who has not become Avacchinna (separated, distinct) will perforce have to exist apart from the macrocosmic world (Anda); in that event, the statement of the Sruti - "Brahman is Sarvagata (all-pervading), Sarvaniyāmaka (controller of everything)" will not be tenable. For, an Anavacchinna Brahman (impartible, unseparated Brahman or Self) cannot possibly exist in a region wherein the Avacchinna Jivas (partible, separated souls) exist. But in our doctrine which propounds that - "Jiva is the Pratibimba alone of Brahman" - since in one and the same container of water ($Jal\bar{a}shaya$) the $Sw\bar{a}bh\bar{a}vika$ $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (natural empty space) as also the $Pratibimb\bar{a}k\bar{a}sha$ (the empty space of reflection) can co-exist - and thereby since Brahman can in His own essential nature coexist in the region where the $J\bar{i}vas$ exist there is no defect whatsoever.

The Avacchedavādins (proponents of the theory of separate existence) point out a defect in the doctrine of the Pratibimbavadins in the following manner: Because Jiva is a Pratibimba it is not possible for him to cognize in the manner - "I am Brahman who is Bimbarūpa (of the form or nature of a bright orb)." Apart from this, because the Bhrama (delusion) with regard to the object of the Pratibimba (reflection of the orb) suits only to one who is of the form or nature of Bimba (a sentient, self-illumining object) alone, these disputants will have to perforce accept that to Brahman alone by means of Tattwajñāna (knowledge of the Reality) Ajñāna Nivritti (deliverance, liberation from ignorance) accrues. Besides, even if it is accepted, as these disputants propound, that there exists Aikya (oneness) between Bimba and Pratibimba, different from Brahman, who is different from Bimba, Jiva himself has invariably to be appearing separately. Further, of Brahman who is Amūrta (formless) - how at all can a Pratibimba be born or produced? - This is the objection of the Avacchedavādins.

In the pristine pure Vedāntic methodology of Shri Śaṅkara there is not even an iota of scope for the dry dialectics of these two warring factions among the modern Vedāntins. For, no one can ever compel or constrain, stipulating that there should necessarily exist a comparison or similarity between an illustration and the illustrated example in all respects and aspects. As per the Vedānta Siddhānta no one accepts that - "Jīva really exists separately from Paramātman." Therefore, there is no scope or cause for raising a controversy of the type - "Whether a Jīva, like the Ghaṭākāsha, is Avacchinna (separate) or like the Pratibimba which appears in a mirror or water, he is a reflection of Brahman?" Because of the fact that the Bhedavyavahāra (empirical dealings of differentiation) of conceiving Jīvas and Brahman as separate entities is itself Avidyākalpita (a projection, product of imagination due to ignorance), it has been attempted in the Śrutis

to show that - "Jīvaswarūpa (the essential nature of Being of the soul) is really not different from Brahman" - That is all.

In the present context, both the illustrations of Ghațākāsha and Pratibimba are completely suitable or applicable. Because the illustration of the Ghatākāsha has been shown to be suitable in the original text itself, there is no need whatsoever for examining it once again. The relevant aspect in the Akashadrishtanta is: "Because Paramātman, like the $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (vast empty space), is having Nityashuddhabuddhamukta Swabhāva (the essential nature of being eternally Pure, Absolute Consciousness - Liberated), the defects that people - with a deep-seated, staunch viewpoint or standpoint of the different, various Upādhis alone - have superimposed upon (misconceived in) Him due to Avidyā do not - nay can never - taint Jivātman." Now, if the Pratibimba illustration is considered, just as the sun, by virtue of his relationship with the adjunct of water, appears to acquire or assume the difference of the form of a reflection and to acquire qualities or special features like becoming big or small, in the same way although Atman, who is one and one alone, by virtue of His relationship with Upādhis, like different Kāryakāraņa Sanghātas, acquires the Chidābhāsarūpas (false appearances of Pure Consciousness) as also the Dharmas of those Upādhis, in His real essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss He does not have any Vikāras (mutations, transformations) whatsoever and exists in one and the same form which is Nitya Shuddha (eternally Pure, Absolute). This is the relevant aspect here.

In any case, because of the fact that by means of these two illustrations also the truth that - "Although for the Aja (unborn) Advaya (non-dual) Paramātman by virtue of an apparent association with an Upādhi Jīvatwa is appearing, from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi He exists in His pristine Avikāraswarūpa alone" - is established, it is not proper or justifiable for Vedāntins merely on the basis of illustrations (just like the other Tārkika Darshanakāras or founders of alien logical systems of philosophy) to create among themselves discordant or differing opinions in this matter and quarrel.

4. FOR THE TENET THAT - 'BRAHMAN IS AJĀDVAYA SWARŪPA' - THE VALID SUPPORT OF ŚRUTIS

रसादयो हि ये कोशा व्याख्यातास्तैत्तिरीयके ।

तेषामात्मा परो जीवः खं यथा संप्रकाशितः ।।११।।

Meaning: "The various sheaths like Rasa etc. are described in Taittiriyaka (Upanishad), is it not so? That Parajiva who is the Ātman for all of them is Himself the one whom we have shown to be like Ākāsha."

THE TAITTIRĪYA ŚRUTI'S PRAMĀŅA FOR THE TEACHING OF ĀTMAIKATWA (NON-DUALISM OF THE SELF)

In order to signify that - 'Whatsoever has been propounded about the subject-matter of Atmaikatwa (the non-dualism of the Self) so far is having the authoritative support of the Sruti' - the following text has been written. Some Vedantins are arguing "Although the truth that - 'Atman is Prapanchopashama (totally devoid of the world of duality), Shivaswarūpa (of the very essence of auspiciousness) and Advaita (non-dual)' - has been demonstrated, depicted in the first Agama Prakarana, all that has been mentioned by the Śruti as Upāsanapara (meditationoriented). All the Upanishadic sentences have the final purport of teaching Upāsanas only and by showing this fact alone there will be full agreement; otherwise, this will be contradictory to Sruti sentences which clearly mention about Jivotpatti (creation of Jivas) etc."; and by their influence the true seekers should not be misguided or confounded and fail to discern the genuine spiritual teaching of Ajādvayātman (unborn, non-dual Self). For this prime purport alone so far it was demonstrated that Ātmaikatwavāda (theory of the non-dualism of the Self) is fully in consonance with Yukti (logical device) with the help of the illustration of Ākāsha alone. Now the following text is being begun to depict the truth that - "All the Upanishads have the one prime purport of teaching Aja-Advitiya-Ātman; they are not there to propound Jātabrahman (the Ultimate Reality endowed with birth)."

First of all, this Kārikā has begun to illustrate the authoritative support of Taittirīya Upanishad. In the Ānandavallī Chapter of that Upanishad the five sheaths covering Ātman have been propounded one by one in the order of 'Annarasamaya', 'Prāṇamaya', 'Manōmaya', 'Vijñānamaya', 'Ānandamaya'. The word 'Kōsha' means a covering sheath of a sword. Just like the sheath covering a sword the five Kōshas of the type of Annarasamaya etc. have 'covered up' Ātman. Paramātman exists in all of them like the life-force - thus it has been propounded there. That very Paramātman is depicted here by the illustration of Ākāsha.

(Doubt): Here in this Upanishad statements like 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः', 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः' - etc. depict Ātmans, is it not so? What evidence is there to show that herein the Kōshas have been taught?

(Solution): Here the reason for calling the Pranamayadi sheaths Atmans is: It is stated like that by assuming for the time being what appears to the Avidyā Drishti (viewpoint of the ignorant people); that is all. For the common run of people it appears as though the body which is Annamaya (full of, i.e. a product of, food that human beings eat) is itself their very essential nature of Being. When they come to cognize that this concept is not reasonable, they believe that Prāṇamaya Kōsha is their Atman. In this same way they go on believing the Manomaya and Vijnānamaya etc. to be Atman or the Self. Therefore, adopting their this viewpoint, the Upanishad calls these Prāṇamaya etc. one by one 'Atman' and the really real Atman alone, who is innermost to everything and the substratum for everything, 'Puccha Brahman' (the Reality at their back, tail end, i.e. their very sustaining Entity). Therefore, in this context it has been taught that Paramatman, who is really the innermost Entity beyond these five Köshas, is Himself 'Atman' of all of us. Not even an idiot will think that for one body really there exist five Atmans, is it not so? Therefore, it is proper indeed to reckon that in the Upanishad it has been taught in the following manner: First, from the viewpoint of the ignorant common run of people, to imagine each one of the Koshas to be Atman by indicating progressively that the preceding covering is merely a body and currently what is taught is the real $\bar{A}tman$; and finally, from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi (i.e. viewpoint of the Absolute Reality, Intuitive Experience standpoint) it is propounded that Paramātman Himself who is innermost to all else is verily our $\bar{A}tman$ (one's innermost Self as his very core of Pure Being).

Or, in the alternative, for this verse we may interpret it and comment on it in a different manner. In the sentences of the type - 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः' - meaning, "There exists another Ātman called 'Prāṇamaya' within this person" - that Ātman who is endowed with the respective Upādhi of the form of that Kōsha is indicated here. In our workaday world also it is seen that in one and the same Akasha there ensue empirical transactions of the type - 'Ghatākāsha', 'Karakākāsha', 'Apavarakākāsha' - when it is associated with adjuncts like the pot, the pitcher, a room, respectively, and, by virtue of this transaction a misconception is entertained to the effect that these Ghatākāsha etc. are different, distinct - is it not so? In the same way, here in this context too by virtue of the association with Upādhis like the body, the vital force etc. Atman becomes an object for empirical transactions of treating Him as Annamaya, Prāṇamaya etc. As a result of this, the people may believe variously in the manner - "Atman is Annamayātman, Prāṇamayātman etc." In order to stress the fact that - "The Sruti undertakes to teach in the manner - 'This Self is the Mukhyātman, devoid of any Upādhi and innermost to all else.' This very Atman is being taught as: That which is 'Satyam (real) Jñānam (conscious), Anantam (endless) - is this Brahman' - " - it has been conceived in the Sruti that Atman is having the special features of the five Koshas and it states that "Within this Atman there exists another Atman called Prāṇamayātman" - and such other sentences. That Ātman about whom it has been stated in the Sruti to be a Kāryarūpa Ātman associated with Upādhis like Annamaya Kōsha, Prāṇamaya Kōsha etc. - and since all these Koshas are like the rope-snake etc., imagined or misconceived due to Avidya, for all of them He who is Atman whom the Sruti has described at the beginning itself as 'Satyajñānānanta' - that very Ātman alone we have signified by Yukti (logical device) in the verses like - 'आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैः'. That is all, and what we have signified is not, like the logicians

say, an Ātman who is imagined or conceived by means of the human intellect. With regard to the Ātman whom the Tārkikas have imagined, to assert that He really exists and that really He is a Samsāri - there is no Pramāṇa (valid source or evidence) whatsoever; but the Jīva, whom we have mentioned, is Sōpādhikātman (Self endowed with an adjunct) alone as mentioned in the authoritative source of the Śruti. Therefore, this doctrine alone should be accepted by Mumukshus - This alone is the prime purport behind this teaching.

द्वयोर्द्वयोर्मधुज्ञाने परं ब्रह्म प्रकाशितम् । पृथिव्यामुदरे चैव यथाकाशः प्रकाशितः ।।१२।।

Meaning: "Just as we have indicated in Madhujñāna, Parabrahman has been signified in dual forms as 'in this Prithivi' as also 'in the womb'."

THE AUTHORITATIVE SUPPORT OF VĀJASANEYAKA ŚRUTI FOR ĀTMAIKATWA

Apart from this, in Madhujñāna - here the word 'Madhu' means 'Brahmavidyā'; for, that knowledge signifies Amritatwa (immortality) and hence it provides immense happiness, pleasure to Mumukshus. Because that Brahmavidyā is taught in the 'Madhubrāhmaṇa' which is to be found in Vājasaneyibrāhmaṇōpanishad (i.e. Brihadāranyaka Upanishad) that is called here 'Madhujnāna'. For the expressions, 'in the Prithivi' and 'in the womb' - there is a Śruti sentence : 'यश्चायमस्यां पृथिव्यां तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषो यश्चायमध्यात्मं शारीरस्तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषोऽयमेव स योऽयमात्मेदममृतिमदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम्' - (Bri. 2-5-1) - meaning - "Although the Upādhis of Prithivi, Sharira are different, separate, Atman who is endowed with them is one only. He, who being Tejomaya and Amritamaya exists in Prithivi, He alone is this Purusha who is endowed with the Upādhi of the body and is Tejomaya and Amritamaya; That alone is Parabrahman which has become everything" - In the same way, from the expression - 'यश्चायमप्सु' up to 'यश्चायमस्मित्रात्मिन' - taking two Upādhis like Adhidaiva and Adhyātma - it has been taught that in both one Parabrahman alone exists. Just as in the verse - 'आकाशस्य न भेदोऽस्ति' - (3-6) - we have indicated Ātmaikatwa,

in the same way it has been stated in this Madhubrāhmaṇa also. Therefore, the purport of this exposition is to assert that whatever we have stated is in consonance with the Śruti Pramāna.

जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वमभेदेन प्रशस्यते । नानात्वं निन्द्यते यच्च तदेवं हि समञ्जसम् ॥१३॥

Meaning: "Because there exists Abheda (non-difference) between Jiva and Ātman, the teaching that - 'Those two are non-different' - being eulogised, whereas the teaching that - 'Those two are different' - being condemned in the Śruti becomes equitable, reasonable."

THE SCRIPTURAL LOGIC IN SUPPORT OF ATMAIKATWA

Both in the Śruti and in the Smriti authored by Vyāsa the Aikya (identity) of Jīvātman and Paramātman is eulogised by means of Yukti in consonance with the illustration of Ghaṭākāsha as also by means of the Śruti Prāmāṇya of Taittirīya Upanishad; the Nānātwa Darshana (appearance of the manifold duality) which is seen by the common run of people due to their innate Avidyāswabhāva (innate nature of ignorance) and is conjured up, as it were, by the Kutārkikas (dry-dialecticians) quite in contradiction of the Vedic lore is condemned in the Śruti also. For example:

- (a) 'भूतेषु भूतेषु विचित्य घीराः, प्रेत्यास्माल्लोकादमृता भवन्ति' (Kena 2-5), meaning "Realizing the truth of one and one Ātman alone existing in all the movable and immovable creatures, the Vivekins (those who are discriminative in their aptitude) transcend this Vyāvahārika Lōka (empirical world of duality) and become immortal."
- (b) 'अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् । महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचित ।' (Kaṭha 1-2-22) meaning "That Vivekin who has cognized Ātman, who is devoid of a body, is eternal in the non-eternal bodies of deities, manes and humans; and who has comgnized Mahāvibhu (the Supreme all-pervasive Being) exists without any grief."
 - (c) 'यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् । सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह । ब्रह्मणा

विपश्चितेति ।' - (Taittiriya 2-1), meaning - "Whosoever cognizes that Brahman exists in the *Paramākāsha* (subtlest empty space) in the cave of the heart - he, in the *Brahmarūpa* (the essential nature of the Ultimate Reality) who is *Sarvajña* (omniscient), experiences all the desires (the whole gamut of them) - all at once."

(d) 'स यो ह वै तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' - (Mundaka 3-2-9), meaning - "One who cognizes this Parabrahman - he verily becomes Brahman alone" - in all these Śrutis the Intuitive Knowledge that - "Jīvātman alone is Brahman" - is eulogised.

In the following Smṛitis the Abhedajñāna (non-different or non-dual Intuitive Knowledge) is eulogised: (1) 'क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत । क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ज्ञानं यत्तज्ज्ञानं मतं मम ।।' (Gitā 13-2), meaning - "Oh Arjuna, know that the Jiva who exists in all the abodes (bodies) to be Myself alone; it is My considered opinion that the (distinctive) Knowledge of the Kshetras and the Kshetrajā is Itself the correct Knowledge."

- (2) 'सर्वभूतेषु चाऽऽत्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मिन । संपश्यन्नात्मयाजी वै स्वाराज्यमिषगच्छित' (Manu 12-91), meaning "That $\bar{A}tmay\bar{a}j\bar{i}$ (one who is established in the Self), who has cognized $\bar{A}tman$ in all objects and all objects in $\bar{A}tman$, attains $Sw\bar{a}r\bar{a}jya$ (independent lordship)."
- (3) 'ममान्तरात्मा तव च ये चान्ये देहसंस्थिताः । सर्वेषां साक्षिभूतोऽसौ न ग्राह्यः केनचित् क्वचित् ।।' (Mōksha Dharma 351-4), meaning "This Paramātman who is the innermost Self of myself and yourself as also all those who are embodied souls is the Sākshi (the Witnessing Principle) for everyone; no one ever can cognize Him."
- (4) 'यदा समस्तदेहेषु पुमानेको व्यवस्थितः । तदा हि को भवान् सोऽहमित्येतद् विफलं वचः ।।' (Vishņu Purāṇa 2-13-91), meaning "When in all the bodies one and one Purusha alone is existing, the statements like who are you? I am such and such a person are futile."

In the same way, in the following Śrutis the Jivātmanānātwa (manifoldness of Jivas) is condemned: (a) 'उदरमन्तरं कुरुते। अथ तस्य मयं भवति।।' - (Tai. 2-7), meaning - "Anyone who brings about even the slightest division will be afraid".

(b) 'अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद' - (Bṛi.

- 1-4-10), meaning "Now, he who performs meditation on another deity in the manner 'This deity is different, separate; I am different, separate' does not know (the truth)."
- (c) 'अथ येऽन्यथातो विदुरन्यराजानस्ते क्षय्यलोका भवन्ति ।', meaning "Now, those who have known it to be different, to them there will be another King (lord); their world will get demolished."

In the following Smritis the doctrine of *Bheda* (division, distinction) is condemned:

- (1) 'म्रान्तिदृष्टिभिरात्मापि तथैकोऽपि पृथक् पृथक्' (Vishņu Purāṇa 2-16-29), meaning "Those who are having the viewpoint of delusion misconceive one Ātman alone to be different."
- (2) 'भेदश्च तस्याज्ञानकृतो भवेत्' (Vishņu Purāṇa 6-7-95), meaning "The difference, distinction too is caused by Ajnāna."
- (3) 'द्वैतिनोऽतथ्यदर्शनः' (Vishņu Purāṇa 2-14-31), meaning "Dvaitins (dualists) are those who are having Mithyādṛishṭi (viewpoint of misconception, false notion)."

Thus the fact that - 'In the Śāstra, the Abheda (non-difference) of Jīva and Ātman has been eulogised and their Bheda has been condemned' - suits the doctrine of Ātmaikatwa and not the Nānātwa doctrine.

The Kudarshanas (vain doctrinaire theories) which the congenital logicians have imagined do not, in this manner, suit the Vedic teachings; they have also been condemned in the Smritis: या वेद बाह्याः स्मृतयो याश्च काश्च कुदृष्टयः। सर्वास्ता निष्फलाः प्रेत्य तमोनिष्ठा हि ताः स्मृताः।।' - (Manu 12-95), meaning - "Those Smritis which are alien (i.e. contradictory in their teachings or tenets), and whatever wrong philosophies are in vogue - all those cannot yield any benign fruits after death; (in fact) all of them will culminate in hell." Therefore, it is tantamount to saying that Advaita alone is the real meaning or final purport of Śrutis (i.e. the Upanishadic lore).

जीवात्मनो पृथक्त्वं यत् प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रकीर्तितम् । भविष्यद्वत्त्या गौणं तन्मुख्यत्वं हि न युज्यते ।।१४।।

Meaning: "Before creation, separation or difference between Jiva and Ātman has been mentioned, is it not so?

That was stated by way of *Bhavishyadvṛitti* (a futuristic concept) in a *Gouṇa* (secondary) sense. For, *Mukhyatwa* (predominant sense) is not reasonable, tenable."

THE REAL PURPORT OF THE SRUTI DOES NOT LIE IN DEPICTING JĪVA AND ĀTMAN AS SEPARATE

(Doubt): The fact that Jiva and Paramatman are separate, different has been mentioned in the Sruti (Upanishads) as also in the Karmakānda, is it not? Because one who is Grāmakāma (desirous of acquiring land) should perform such and such a Yāga (sacrifice); similarly Pashukāma (one desirous of having many animals); Putrakāma (one desirous of having a son); Āyushkāma (one desirous of having longevily); Brahmavarchasakāma (one desirous of attaining the lustre, brilliance of the Ultimate Reality or it can also be the vigour of a celibate) - for all such various people with such desires should perform particular Karmas for attainment of particular fruits - in this manner various Karmas are stipulated by way of injunctions, it amounts to having stated that many Jivas invariably exist. In the same way, it has also been stated in the Vedas that different from Jivas, Parameshwara, who is endowed with immense wealth and other excellent divine qualities, also exists. 'स दाधार पृथिवीं द्यामुतेमाम्' (Rigveda 10-121-1), meaning - "He has held together both the earth and the stellar region" - thus also it has been stated, is it not so? It being so, somehow merely imagining only the Jñānakāṇḍa to be suitable, can it be said that you have evaded (the defect of) contradicting the Sruti? Apart from this, there are sentences of the type of - "One who has cognized Him transcends grief" - (Chh. 7-1-3); "That Ātman should be searched out, He should be cognized" - (Chh. 8-7-1); "One who has cognized Brahman attains the Supreme State" - (Taittiriya 2-1) in the Jnanakanda also; are they not denoting that Jiva and Paramātman are different? It cannot be said that the Jīva, who aspires to get rid of his grief and become Kritartha (one who has achieved his goal), is himself Paramatman, is it not? Is it possible to assert that the Jiva, who aspires to search out Paramātman and cognize Him, is himself Paramātman? One who by means of Brahmavidyā has to attain Parama Purushārtha (the prime purport of human existence) cannot himself possibly be

Brahman, is it not so ? In any case, in this manner when in the Śruti itself it has been stated that Jīva and Paramātman are different, how at all can we determine that *Ekatwa* (non-duality, identity of the two) alone is the tenet suitable to the Śruti."

(Solution): Even before the Upanishadic sentences which mention about creation, the Vedic sentences, which state the difference between Jivas and Paramātman from the Paramārtha Drishti, are not really signifying that difference at all; in fact, they are teaching the Gounabheda (difference in a secondary sense) alone that is apparent between Ghatākāsha and Mahākāsha. Merely on the count of there being a sentence, there cannot be any establishment of the existence of any substance whatsoever ; the sentence should have Tātparya (culmination in pointing out the veracity) in the object which it intends to signify. For example - "He cooks the rice" - in this sentence the objective or significance is not - "He cooks the already existing cooked rice" - at all; its real purport is to signify that - "He is baking the raw rice so that it gets cooked in the future." In the same way, here too from the standpoint of the Bhavishyadvritti (sense of a future event) we should reckon that this has been used.

(Doubt): In that case, has it not been stated in the following Śrishti Vākyas (sentences mentioning creation) of the type - "That Entity from which these Bhūtas (objects) are born - that is Brahman" (Tai. 3-1); "Just like the small sparks flying off from fire" - (Bri. 2-1-20); "From that this Ātman the empty space was born" - (Tai. 2-1); "(That imagined:) 'I will become many'; 'It created Tejas (fire)" - (Chh. 6-2-3) etc. - that there was really a creation of the Jīvas and their respective Kāryakarana Sanghātas (conglomerations of body, senses)? We have already stated that in Karmakānda also there exist sentences which sifnify the difference between Jīvas and Paramātman, is it not so?

(Consolatory explanation): Not so. For, these sentences do not at all have the final purport of indicating difference. To wit: First of all, those sentences which are in the Karmakāṇḍa, stipulate as injunctions $K\bar{a}myakarmas$ (rites or rituals performed specifically for the fulfilment of a particular desire), for the sake of those ignorant common run of people who hanker after Karmaphalas, by adopting their standpoint only, as also the Nityakarmas (daily routine rituals) for the purpose of $P\bar{a}pakshaya$

(destruction of demerits, sins) for those who are Mumukshus (desirous of attaining Beatitude here and now in this very life); therefore, it cannot be asserted that those sentences also have the final purport of teaching that Jivas and Paramatman exist separately. For, in that event there arises a defect of imagining two different final purports (Tatparyas) for one and the same sentence. Further, those sentences in the Upanishads which describe the creation and dissolution of the world of duality have invariably the final purport of teaching Atmaikatwa alone. For, in those very Upanishads, in later portions, sentences like: "That one who exists in this man and in the \bar{A} ditya (the sun) is one and the same" - (Tai. 2-8); "I am Brahman" - (Bri. 1-4-40); "That thou art" (Chh. 6-8-7) - Ātmaikatwa alone has been expounded in very clear terms. We have already shown that in the Sruti, Bhedajñāna is condemned with the support of sentences like -"One who does Upāsana in the manner - 'This deity is different, I am different' - does not know the truth" - (Bri. 1-4-10). The truth that all Srutis have the one prime or final purport of teaching Ekatwa (non-duality, identity of Jivas and Paramatman) will be established in the following texts substantiating this conclusion with Intuitive reasoning. Thus the fact that - "The Sruti sentences pertaining to the creation and dissolution of the world of duality have the prime purport of teaching Ekatwa" is discerned from the valid but implicit reason that in the Karmakānda, adopting the viewpoint of the ignorant common run of people as also invoking the Bhavishyadvritti axiom, those sentences are used. Therefore, it should be understood that there (i.e. in the Karmakānda) Gounārtha alone is signified.

Further, a doubt of the type that - "In the Jñānakāṇḍa also there are sentences which state that Jīvas and Paramātman are different" - was raised, is it not so ? For that too it should be understood that a convincing solution has been provided by this verse. For, there also in those very Upanishads there do exist sentences which stress and affirm Ātmaikatwa alone in the concluding portions.

This verse can be interpreted in another manner: To wit: Although in the Śruti there are sentences which denote the creation of Jivas and the conglomerations of bodies and senses, they should be perforce understood to have been used on the

basis of Gouṇaprayōga (usage with a secondary sense) with Bhavishyadvṛitti; for, in the Mukhyārtha (in the predominant sense) there in that context they do not become suitable, tenable at all. To explain: Before the sentence which describes creation there is a sentence:

'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (Chh. 6-2-1), meaning: "One alone without a second to It" - which stresses Ekatwa alone. That very Ekatwa has been stated later on in the manner -

'तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमिस' (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - "That alone is real, That alone is Ātman, That thou art" - by assuming Bhavishyadvritti the Śruti states in a secondary sense (Gouṇa) that Jīvas are different from Paramātman. This too has been mentioned in consonance with the commonplace viewpoint of the ignorant people of the world alone; therefore, it is also Gouṇa only. This usage has to be understood in the same manner when it is said: "I am cooking the rice." (i.e. with the Bhavishyadvritti alone). Therefore, for the Śruti which mentions about the difference between Jīvas and Paramātman the prime purport does not lie in teaching Bheda or difference.

मृल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गाद्यैः सृष्टिर्या चोदिताऽन्यथा ।

उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथञ्चन ।।१५।।

Meaning: "By means of illustrations of clay, iron, sparks etc. the various kinds of creation have been mentioned, is it not so? That is verily a device alone for the intellect to descend down upon Tattwajñāna; in no way there exists difference."

THE ŚRUTIS ON CREATION HAVE AIKYA (IDENTITY) AS THEIR PRIME PURPORT

(Objection): Although it is true that prior to creation Ekatwa alone has been stressed in the Śrutis, after the creation takes place all this has verily come into existence, as also the Jivas exist as separate entities alone, is it not so?

(Siddhānta): We had already provided a convincing solution to this objection in 3-2 in the manner: "Just as the Mahākāsha has been born as Ghaṭādyākāshas as also the various forms of pots etc., the Jīvas and the various conglomerations of

body, senses etc. are apparently born" - thus we have to discern. Is it not so? Once again why have you raised it?

(The Opponent who has raised the objection): This is not proper. For, what you stated as your solution is: "The Sruti has the prime purport in mentioning Mithyāsrishti (apparent, false creation) alone; in the absolute sense, it is not preaching creation at all" - is it not so? This statement does not seem to be in agreement with the Sruti; for, in the Sruti the illustrations of clay, iron etc., have been mentioned. In the Sruti illustrations like: "Oh dear, just as if one lump of clay is cognized, it amounts to knowing all the effects that are produced from the clay" (Chh. 6-1-4); "Oh dear, if one ingot of metal (iron) is cognized, it amounts to knowing all the effects made out of the metal" (Chh. 6-1-3); "Just as small sparks are flying off from fire" - (Bri. 2-1-20); "Just as a spider emits out its saliva as a thread and later withdraws it; just as from the earth plants and trees are born; similarly from the Akshara all else is born" -(Mundaka 1-1-7) - etc. - entities like clay etc. which really get transformed only are exemplified and not as in the illustrations of - "Just as Ghațākāsha" or "Just as the conglomerations of body, senses which are born in the dream" - objects which are seen in false creations are exemplified. Therefore, what is discerned from the Sruti dealing with Srishti is: From Brahman which is Aja and Advaya really (actually) all this world of duality is created; now (at present) really Jivas exist separately (apart) from Brahman indeed. Thus although the Śruti is, in reality, propounding the creation of Jivas and Jagat you are trying to establish Mithyā Srishti alone; therefore, your doctrine is not in consonance with the Śruti."

(Solution): To opine in this manner is not justifiable; for, the Srishti Śrutis have an alternative meaning too; they do not have the prime purport in teaching real creation.

(a) 'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्रायं कुतश्चित्र बमूव कश्चित्। अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥'

- (Katha 1-2-18)

Meaning: "This Ātman of the essential nature of Pure Consciousness is not born; nor does he die. Neither was He

born from anything whatsoever, nor anything is born from Him; He is without birth, eternal, percnnially existing, ancient; even if the body is killed He is not killed.";

(b) 'स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमरोऽम्तोऽभयो ब्रह्म' - (Bri. 4-4-25) - Meaning: "That this Jiva alone is Ātman who is great and birthless; He is devoid of old age, devoid of death, of the nature of the essential nature of immortality, devoid of fear - Brahman" - etc. - such Śrutis are the authoritative sources for this above tenet. Because in these Śrutis, Brahman is taught to be Kūṭasthanitya (Absolute and eternal) pointedly or specifically, it amounts to saying that there is no possibility whatsoever of Brahman getting or being transformed into the form of the world of duality. There are several Śrutis which expound and proclaim that Jīva and Paramātman are one and the same only.

The purpose for giving illustrations of the clay etc. is not to propound the tenet that - "Brahman gets transformed to become the Jagat or world of duality"; for, in Srutis like - Oh dear, just as if one lump of clay is cognized it amounts to knowing all those things which are made out of clay; just as the phenomenon of Kārya (effect) is a mere name produced by speech and the material of clay alone is the reality" - (Chh. 6-1-1) - because it has been stated that - "All Kāryas (effects) are invariably false and 'the phenomenon of clay alone is real' - " and thus it has been stressed that Kāraņa (cause) alone is real - we have perforce to determine it in that manner. In the illustrated example too, after stating that - "Tejas, Ap and Anna (earth) - these primordial elements are the effects of Brahman" - the implicit teaching that the products like fire etc, which are born out of them are not different from their respective causes like Tejas etc. is clarified by the Sruti in the manner: "The Agnitwa (fireness) of Agni (fire) is gone. The Kārya (effect) is a mere name brought about by $V\bar{a}k$ (speech); the fact that Agni is the three forms is itself the truth" - (Chh. 6-4-1). At the end of it all because the Sruti concludes declaring: 'ऐतदातम्यमिदं सर्व तत्सत्यम्' (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - "This alone is the Atman (Self) for everything, This alone is Satyam (real)" - and has also stressed the fact that the Parama Kāraņa (the ultimate cause) of Sadbrahman alone is the Reality - we have *perforce* to decide in this manner. Therefore, what we have stated, viz. "The conglomerations of body, senses are created by means of Ātma Māyā" - (3-10); "Just as the Ghaṭākāshas are caused and existing distinctly, similarly we should understand the creation etc. as also differences, distinctions etc. of the Jīvas" - (3-9) - is fully in agreement with Śruti alone.

In that case all this had been stated before, is it not so? Then why is it that this verse has been written? - If it is asked like this, we say: Previously it was merely stated that the Srishti of Jīvadehādisaṅghāta (creation of the conglomeration of body and senses of the Jīvas or souls) signifies only Mithyāsrishṭi (false creation). But now it is being shown here that for the Śrutis which describe the birth etc. the prime purport is teaching Ātmaikya (non-duality of the Self) alone. Therefore, there is no defect of repetition.

If it is asked: "For the Srutis which describe creation, their prime purport does not lie in describing creation, but to signify another topic only - how at all can this conclusion be sustained?" - the answer for this question we will explain now. Based on various illustrations of clay, metal, sparks etc. creation has been dealt with in different Upanishads in different ways, is it not so? All those various kinds of creation are invariably subtle devices adopted to prepare the intellect so as to be able to comprehend the teaching of Aikya (unity, identity) of Jivas and Paramatman. Besides it has already been stated that for exemplifying those illustrations the real purport of the Sruti is not to teach that the 'effect' is really born, but only to signify the essential nature of the cause. In the illustrated example also, after stating expressly the Satyatwa (reality) of the Kāraņa (cause) in the manner - "That alone is Satyam (real)" - it is repeatedly seen to have been reiterated that Jiva is verily Paramatman in the manner - "That alone is Atman, That alone are you". On the other hand, if it were the real intention of the Sruti of teaching that - "Jivas really are born" - alone, then it would have amounted to saying: (a) In order to attain Brahmaswarupa the seeker should perforce perform another kind of Sādhana like Upāsana etc.; (b) Brahmaswarūpa does not exist just now but in the future, in another state of Being, It has to be acquired afresh. If

that were the truth, then a sentence - signifying an opinion that you are already here and now Brahman - of the type - "That alone are you" - would not have been used. But this sentence of - "That alone are you" - which implies that - 'Here and now you are that' - is repeated often by the Sruti. Therefore, it becomes established that the Srishti sentence is actually a subtle device adopted to enable the intellect to comprehend, grasp the truth that - "Jiva and Paramātman are one and the same" - but it has no purport whatsoever in signifying the birth of Jivas or their manifold forms. For this reason alone, although in each Sruti a different kind of creation has been described, for all of them one and one Atman alone exists as the cause - this alone is the final purport for the various Srutis (describing various ways of creation) and hence, since such variant creations are invariably a subtle device alone, there cannot be any defect of their being mutually contradictory entailing this teaching. For this reason alone, in the Brihadāraņyaka Bhāshya Vārtika Shri Sureśwarāchārya states:

प्रक्रियानियमो नास्ति पुंच्युत्पत्तिप्रधानतः ।
प्रतिश्रुतिविगीतश्च प्रक्रियाणां समीक्ष्यते ।।
यया यया भवेत् पुंसां व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मिन ।
सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्यात् साध्वी सा चानवस्थिता ।। (Bṛi. Vā. 1-4-401, 402)

Meaning: "There is no rule of law to say that the method of creation should be one and the same. For, the important thing or aspect for the Śruti is to teach the *Tattwa* (the Ultimate Reality) to *Sādhakas* (seekers) alone. In each śruti a different kind of creation has been described. By whatever method of creation if it is possible for the people to comprehend, discern the *Pratyagātmatattwa* (the Absolute Reality of the innermost Self), that method alone is proper in this Vedāntic spiritual science. The systematization that - 'The method should invariably be such and such alone' - is not to be found here."

THERE ARE ŚRUTIS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE A DIFFERENT MEANING BUT WITH THE PRIME PURPORT OF SIGNIFYING A PARTICULAR INTENDED OPINION

Here a doubt may arise: How at all can it be proper to

say that the Śruti mentions Srishți without a prime purport? If there is no real intention of teaching creation, all those detailed descriptions of creation being mentioned at various places will render the Śruti to be invalid indeed, is it not so? Even if we accept the latter contention, then the defect of imagining the Śruti, which is supposed to be *Nirdushta* (inviolable, infallible), to be unnecessarily *Apramāṇa* (invalid) entails us, is it not so?

(Solution): A satisfactory answer to this doubt is: "It is not so. There are instances of the Sruti - in order to signify or point out the meaning in a manner in which it really intends the seekers to interpret or discern its real import - adopting a subtle device or ruse of describing quite a different topic in detail. There is also an axiomatic truth that wherever a fruit or benefit is mentioned in the Sruti (called in Vedantic parlance as 'Phalasruti') in that topic the Sruti invariably has its prime purport. In its proximity itself if there is no mention of benefit with regard to the topic stated by way of a subtle device, then Saphalaśruti (sentence having benefit mentioned) the sentence which is Aphala (not having a fruit) is Anga (subordinate, subservient). Thus the purport is to be determined in consonance with a Mimāmsā Nyāya (an axiom followed in the exegetical science formulated by the Mimāmsā philosophy). That axiom should be adopted here also in this context. Merely on this basis the Śruti is not affected and cannot be said to become Aprāmānya (invalid).

In support of the tenet that in the Sruti there are illustrations too - in order to point out, signify a particular opinion - quite a different topic (apparently as one irrelevant or disconnected with the present subject matter or opinion) being mentioned. To explain: In Brihadāranyaka Upanishad there exists a portion which narrates a $Pr\bar{a}nasamv\bar{a}da$ (a dialogue of the vital force). There in that context the anecdote runs like this: In ancient times once the deities pledged to defeat the demons by recourse to $Udgith\bar{a}$ (a recitation of certain Mantras or hymns). They requested $V\bar{a}k$ (the organ meant for speech) and such other sense organs one by one to recite $(Udg\bar{a}na)$. While the sense organs of $V\bar{a}k$ etc. were reciting, by the evil influence of the Asuras (demons), each of them got identified with one auspicious topic

each. To wit, when Vāk was reciting the Udgithā the benefit that accrued from speech it lent to the other sense organs, but in the auspicious act of pronouncing the hymns in a refined manner, especially, it got itself 'attached' saying in the manner - "This is mine". In the same way, because the Asuras went on influencing the other sense organs too with a sinful desire of identification (Ahankāra), they too became afflicted by 'attachment' in their respective special functions or faculties. Thus since all the sense organs like Vāk etc. were smeared by sin, they realized that they could not any more recite properly (Udgāna) and thereby were not fit to be *Upāsya* (meditated upon) and finally approached the Prāṇa (Brahman or Ātman who is addressed here as 'Mukhya Prāṇa' also) and begged of Him to recite the hymns (Udgāna). The Asuras attempted to smear sin on to the Mukhya Prāṇa too, but failing in that attempt finally they themselves were destroyed . For this story being mentioned there - the real purport for the Sruti is: "Because Prāṇa is endowed with qualities like Purity etc. He alone should be meditated upon" - alone and not to state, as mentioned there, in reality there was the association of sin or there was a mutual dialogue among the Prānas (sense organs) as its final purport. In the same way, here too it should be determined, decided that the Srutis do not at all have any prime purport in stating Srishti etc., but they all have the one singular purport of teaching that - "Atman alone is Paramārtha (absolutely real)".

(Objection): Even in this above illustration that you have mentioned it appears to be reasonable to imagine that the Śruti has a real purport in every aspect mentioned therein. If we assume Vāgādi to mean the deities who are the presiding authorities for the respective sense organs like Vāk etc., as stated therein, we can interpret it saying that among them there occurred a dialogue and finally the deities decided that among them all Prāṇa alone is all-powerful and supreme; in this manner why cannot it be imagined? Thereby, it does not amount to our imagining Aprāmāṇya to any part of that Śruti, is it not so?

(Solution): It cannot be assumed like that. For, this Prāṇasaṃvāda is not to be found in the same form or manner in all the Śrutis. If it were the prime intention of the Śrutis to

signify that Prāṇasaṃvāda is Paramārtha (absolutely real) alone, then wherever Prānasamvāda occurs, at every place this story should have been narrated in one and the same form; but it is not so. That story has been mentioned variously in different contexts. For instance, in the story found in Brihadaranyaka the Vāgādis are Udgitakartrus (those who are the performers of the recitation); it is described there that they themselves did the Udgāna. But in Chhāndōgya Upanishad it is stated that they are Omkāra which is an Avayava (constituent part) of Udgithā. In the Brihadāranyaka itself in another place (i.e. 6th Chapter) this Prāṇasaṃvāda has been described in a quite different way altogether. To wit: It is stated therein that once the Vāgādi Prāņas (sense organs), in order to decide as to who among them was the best, they all approached Prajāpati (the first-born Lord of all creations); He, it is said, told them: "Among you he - who when he leaves the human body and goes out, the body appears to become Amangala (inauspicious, degenerated) - he is the best." Accordingly, the Prāṇas (senses) one by one left the body but yet the body remained as before; when finally the turn of Mukhya Prāṇa came and He made an attempt to get up and leave, immediately - just like a sturdy well-bred horse wrenches off the ropes tied to its legs, along with the pegs to which they are fastened - the remaining Prānas (senses) felt as if they were forced to be pulled out of their respective places, stations and thus Mukhya Prāṇa convinced all of them that He was the best among all of them. In the same way, in the Prashnopanishad yet another version of the mutual dialogue among the Pranas is described. That dialogue, there, is purported to signify the truth that - "The power of keeping the body completely under control belongs only to the Mukhya Prāṇa." In the Aitareya Upanishad, especially, there occurs a dialogue pertaining to the question: "That Prāṇa (vital force) which if he leaves the body or discards it the body itself will fall away; that one when He enters the body the latter becomes capable of standing up once again - He alone is the supreme among all the Pranas." Just as the deliberation pertaining to which topic a dialogue took place differed in each context and in their details - in the same way, in various aspects like - in which order the Vāgādi Prāņas were examined,

in the number of the Vāgādi Prāṇas who took part in the dialogue - in different places it is described in different ways.

THERE IS NO AGREEMENT IN THE SRISHTIPRAKĀRAS (METHODS OF CREATION)

Therefore, since this anecdote is mentioned in each section of the Vedas in a different manner, it becomes determined that there is no deep concern or interest whatsoever for the Śruti with regard to the question of this story being in a set, specific form. In the same way, we should discern the topics of Srishti etc. For, in one Śruti beginning with Ākāsha the process of Srishti is mentioned, while in another Śruti beginning with Tejas (fire, Agni) it is described; in some other places Prāna etc. have been mentioned first; while in yet other places without following any order Srishti has been described.

FOR THE SRISHŢI ŚRUTI THERE IS NO OTHER FRUIT OR BENEFIT AT ALL

Here too a doubt may be raised; Srishți has not taken place in one and the same Kalpa (a day of Brahmā, 1000 Yugas or 432 million years of mortals and measuring the duration of the world). Therefore, in each Kalpa it might have taken place in a different manner. Therefore, Prāṇasaṃvāda and Srishṭiprakāras mentioned in the Śrutis might have taken place in different Kalpas in different ways. When in this manner the Śruti sentences can be interpreted without any contradiction, unnecessarily imagining that there exists opposition mutually among the Śruti sentences why should any defect of Aprāmāṇya be foisted on them? - In this manner it may appear to some people.

This cannot possibly be the proper $Siddh\bar{a}nta$ (spiritual teaching). For, the defect of imagining that the Vedas have stated anecdotes which do not serve any worthwhile purpose or yield any benefit whatsoever will perforce entail these opponents. For, in the illustration in the Prāṇasaṃvāda barring the one topic (teaching) that - 'Mukhya Prāṇa Himself is supreme' - even by knowing the remaining story part no benefit or utility whatsoever is likely to accrue to the Śrōtṛus (listners). If the truth (teaching) that Prāṇa is supreme is cognized by the seekers, there invariably exists a benefit of knowing that by performing Prāṇopāsana (meditation on Prāṇa) one can acquire the fruit of that Upāsana.

In the same way, in the illustrated example of $\bar{A}tmavich\bar{a}ra$ (deliberation on the Self) also by cognizing the topic of Srishti in a suitable orderly manner there cannot possibly accrue any benefit to the Śrōtrus; since all those Śrutis in the end culminate in propounding Atmaikatwa (non-duality of the Self), it is quite clear that they have the final goal, purport of Atmaikatwa Jñana. In fact, it has also been mentioned in the Srutis that if the seeker cognizes Atma Swarūpa (the essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness of the Self), who is Kūtastha (Absolutely established), benefits like Abhaya (fearlessness), Shāshwata Sukha (eternal Bliss) etc. accrue. Hence, as we have stated at the outset, viz. in the vicinity of a Sruti which mentions a Phala if a Sruti sentence which is bereft of any benefit, fruit is found, then invariably the latter is the former Sruti's Anga (that which is subservient, subordinate in its import) - accepting this Mimāmsā Nyāya, to imagine or infer that Srishti Śrutis are secondary in importance to the Srutis which propound or teach Atmaikatwa is itself reasonable, tenable.

(Question): Why cannot it be imagined that with regard to Prāṇasaṃvāda too the real purport is: "In this manner, one should perform *Dhyāna* (meditation)"?

(Answer): This is not proper. For, by contemplating in the manner - "Prānas quarrelled with one another in a competitive spirit" - no desirable fruit can accrue. In the same way, it will not be proper to infer that undesirable fruits like rebirth etc. will accrue to Śrōtrus from contemplating on Srishti etc. There is a rule of law that for Dhyana a fruit proportionate to its intensity should perforce accrue. We may have to imagine that by meditating or contemplating upon quarrel among Prāṇas the fruit that accrues will be quarrel only! That is not desirable for anyone, is it not so? Therefore, it is proper only to infer that for the Srutis on Srishti etc. the fruit is invariably Brahmarupaprapti alone. For this teaching there is support of the Sruti also. To wit: The Śruti states अन्नेन सोम्य शुङ्गेनापोमूलमन्विच्छाद्भिः सोम्य शुङ्गेन तेजोमूलमन्विच्छ तेजसा सोम्य शुङ्गेन सन्मूलमन्विच्छ । - (Chh. 6-8-8), meaning: "Listen, my boy! From the effect of food search out the cause of water and cognize it; from the effect of water search out, my boy, the cause of fire; from the effect of fire

search out Sat (Pure Existence) the cause, my boy". (This is actually the literal meaning). The implicit meaning of the sentence here is: "For Prithivi (earth) Ap (water) is the cause; for Ap the cause is Tejas (fire); for Tejas the cause is Sadbrahman (the Ultimate Reality of Brahman). Oh my boy! From the effect find out, cognize the cause." Following the axiom that - "The effect is not different from the cause" - we should decide that Sadbrahman, which is the root cause for everything, is Paramārtha. This alone is the prime intended purport of the Sruti. Therefore, it becomes certain that - "The purport behind the statement of Utpatti (creation) is to teach a device to cognize Ātmaikatwa alone; but to reckon that the Śruti also has a prime purport in teaching Kāryasatyatwa (reality of the effect) is not proper at all."

आश्रमास्त्रिविधा हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टदृष्टयः । उपासनोपदिष्टेयं तदर्थमनुकम्पया ॥१६॥

Meaning: "There are three Āshramis (People in different stages of life) with different viewpoints called Hina (low), Madhyama (middle) and Utkṛishṭa (superior). This Upāsana (meditation) is instructed for their sake out of compassion."

THE PLIGHT OF SENTENCES PERTAINING TO KARMAS AND UPASANAS

Here a **doubt** may arise: If the tenet that - "Paramātman who is of Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swabhāva alone is the Ultimate Reality, and all else is false, unreal" - is itself true, then in various Śrutis like - "Oh dear, Ātman alone should be sought out, He alone should be listened about, deliberated upon and contemplated upon" (Bṛi. 2-4-5); "There exists Ātman who is devoid of sins, is it not? He should be searched out, He alone should be cognized" - (Chh. 8-7-1); "He should take a decision like this" - (Chh. 3-14-1); "One should meditate on Him as Ātman alone" - (Bṛi. 4-1-7) etc. - why is it, apart from Jñāna, Upāsana also is instructed? Why is it Karmas also have been stipulated as injunctions in the manner - "As long as one is alive he should perform Agnihōtra Hōma" - etc.? For this, as stated in the 14th Kārikā, this solution may be provided: The Siddhāntin may say that from the standpoint of Bhavishyadvṛitti - to wit,

keeping the fact that - "Later on in the Śruti, Ātmaikatwa will be taught" - in mind, here the difference between Jīvas and Paramātman is mentioned in a secondary sense (Gouṇa). But the present doubt is: "Why is it that the Śruti in this manner assumes a difference which is not real and teaches Karma and Upāsana by way of a Gouṇa Vṛitti (in a secondary sense)?" In this doubt the opponent's real intention is indeed: "Instead of assuming that which does not exist and stipulating both Karmas and Upāsanas, why cannot the Śruti directly teach everyone the Ajādvayatattwa (non-dual Absolute Reality) Itself?"

Another point: In some sentences like - "Ātman alone should be seen"; "He should be sought out and cognized"; "One should meditate on Him as Ātman alone" etc. the Śrutis are instructing Jñāna alone, and not as stipulated in the sentence - "He should in this manner Kratu (proposition) - any Upāsana whatsoever which yields a fruit in due course of time. Even so, in those sentences, for the purposes of Ātmadarshana (cognition of the Self), Sādhanas like Śravaṇa, Manana etc. or the Dhyānakrama (method of meditation) called 'Nididhyāsana' have been invariably instructed. If the teaching that - "In the Absolute sense Ātman alone exists" - alone is true, then why at all were these Sādhanas stipulated? - For this doubt too here a solution has necessarily to be provided.

For these the solution is: Because those people who are qualified, are endowed with different grades of viewpoints like Manda (low), Madhyama (middle) and Uttama (superior), they are belonging to different Varnas (castes), having different Ashramas (stages of life); being endowed invariably with the superior viewpoint, all persons, are not of the calibre of superior class qualifiers for Tattwajñāna. People with Mandadrishti means those who desire fruits which accrue in this world of humans as also in the world of the manes (mentioned in the Śāstras); for them Karmas are stipulated as injunctions (in the Vedas). Those with Madhyamadrishti means people who wish to attain Devaloka (world of deities) or through the doorway of Brahmalōkaprāpti (the world of the first-born, four-headed creator called 'Brahma' in the Sastras) eventually attain Atmaprapti; for these high-grade practitioners Upāsanas (meditations) which yield Adrishţaphalas (invisible fruits in other worlds) are stipulated. Although for

certain Upāsanas even Drishtaphalas - meaning, in fruits which will accrue in due course of time in this world itself - do exist, in the main, those people, who are qualified for Upāsanas which yield fruits in the other worlds reached after death, are reckoned here to be those belonging to the 'Madhyamadrishti' category. Those who entertain an aspiration for cognizing Atmatattwa (nondual Absolute Reality), which is devoid of birth and is non-dual, and who are endowed with the suitable qualifications for attaining that objective - they are called 'Utkrishta Drishti Adhikāris' (qualifiers with the best viewpoint). For that reason alone, the Śruti states: "This Manushyaloka is to be attained by means of a son alone, by any other means it cannot be acquired; by means of Karma the Pitruloka (world of manes) and by means of Vidya Devaloka accrue" - (Bri. 1-4-16) - in this manner for those who wish to attain a particular Loka the respective Sadhana is stipulated. Although the sentences like - 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत', meaning -"One should meditate upon Him as Atman alone" - (Bri. 1-4-7); "He alone should be searched out, He alone should be cognized" - (Chh. 8-7-1) etc. which are pertaining to Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) are similar in form to Vidhivākyas (sentences which stipulate various injunctions), they are deliberately, purposefully formulated in that manner - just like the Vidhivākyas - in order to turn the senses - which are externally-oriented (towards the material objects and their enjoyments) - of those, who are desirous of the Paramapurushārtha (the supreme goal of all human endeavour and existence), towards the own innermost Self which happens to be the very core of their Being and the Ultimate, Absolute Reality of Brahman. That is all. For the sake of instructing those Uttamādhikāris who by themselves direct their energies and attention to know Atmatattwa, or those who being prompted by these Vidhirūpa Vākyas turn towards Ātman exclusively these Ātmatattwa Śrutis like - 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' - (Bri. 2-5-19), meaning - "This Atman is Brahman"; 'तत्त्वमसि' (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning - "That Sadbrahman alone are you" - etc. are mentioned. Therefore, Upāsanas and Karmas are mentioned in the Śrutis for the sake of Madhyamādhikāris, as also for those endowed with the lowest grade mind and intellect - but not for the Uttamādhikāris.

Here yet another **doubt** may arise: Why should the Śruti in this manner divide the Śr \bar{o} trus (listeners) into three different categories and instruct J \bar{n} ana, Up \bar{a} sana and Karma to people with different qualifications? Why cannot it instruct J \bar{n} ana to all the people?

To this the answer is: The Sruti has not brought about any difference or division among the listeners. By their very innate nature, and according to their respective Karmas these qualifiers are having different grades of mind or intelligence. In fact, for the Srutis all people are alike; the Srutis' prime purport is: 'Let everyone attain the supreme or the highest Advaitatma Jñana alone!' But that Jñāna is not likely to be grasped all of a sudden by everyone. The mind-set and the background of their mental make-up among people with Manda and Madhyama Drishtis are varied. Therefore, in accordance with their respective qualifications, and based on the universally familiar Dvaita (duality) alone the Sruti has instructed different Karmas and Upāsanas. For, no one among them wants the Moksha which is the Paramapurushartha. Therefore, the Sruti instructs different Kāmyakarmas (rituals meant to fulfil one's desires) of extremely extroverted Kāmis (people full of mundane, materialistic desires). For those people who are having a pronounced proclivity or sense of pride in the Varna (caste) and \overline{A} shrama (stages of life) and thereby who aspire for fruits which accrue only in Paraloka (other worlds to which, they believe, one has to transmigrate after the fall of this body) - to such believers in the Sastraic instructions the Sruti stipulates, by way of injunctions or commandments, Nitya (daily, routine) and Naimittika (incindental to any special cause) fitting their respective Varna and Ashrama. For those who are introverted and aspire for different fruits the Sruti stipulates particular Upāsanas which yield their respective fruits. Those who show a pronounced detachment towards the fruits of this Manushyaloka as also the hereafter Pitruloka - to such people the Sruti instructs Upasanas needed to attain Devaloka. Thus because there exist people who are qualified and are entertaining different kinds of Phaläsakti (pronounced interest in fruits) but devoid of a suitable capability for Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) - merely on the ground that the Śāstra has instructed either Karmas or Upāsanas according to their respective Vāsanas (latent impressions or proclivities), it

does not face any danger of Aprāmāṇya (invalidity) whatsoever; for, although from the empirical viewpoint based on the familiar differences of Kriyā (action) and Kāraka (means of action) the Śāstra stipulates either Karma or Upāsanas, it does not at all propound that this distinctive division of Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala is Paramārtha (absolutely real) as its prime purport; it keeps on instructing in the manner: 'For such and such Purushārtha (human objective) such and such Karma is merely a device.' That is all. Thus because this Sādhya-Sādhana-Sambandha (relationship between the means of action and the result that is possible to achieve) is existing from time immemorial to that extent the Śāstra is verily a Pramāṇa.

For the truth that - 'The Sastra does not at all have any prime purport in stabilising the Sādhakas (seekers, practitioners) either in the Karmas or in the Upāsanas' - the strongest evidence is the fact that in the Jñāna Prakaraņa both Karmas and Upāsanas are condemned invariably. To substantiate this teaching the following Srutis are the authoritative sources : 'यो वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यविदित्वाऽस्मिल्लोके जुहोति यजते तपस्तप्यते बहूनि वर्षसहस्राण्यन्तवदेवास्य तद्भवति' - (Bri. 3-8-10), meaning: "Oh Gārgi, one who without cognizing this Parabrahman called 'Akshara' performs Homa (sacrifice) in this world for many thousands of years, performs Yāga (another kind of sacrifice) and Tapas (austerity, penance) that too will be invariably something having an end"; 'एतच्छ्रेयो येऽभिनन्दन्ति मृढा जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेवापि यन्ति' - (Mundaka 1-2-7), meaning: "Those idiots who are thinking that this Karma alone is propitious or conducive to prosperity and are praising it alone - they are having repeatedly old age and death"; 'यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतम् । तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते' (Kena 6), meaning: "That which cannot be contemplated upon by the mind, but That which, they say, cognizes even the mind - That alone you know to be Brahman; that which (people) meditate upon (making it as an object in the manner) 'this' - that is not Brahman"; 'नैतावता विदितं भवति' - (Bri. 2-1-14), meaning: "Merely by meditating on these Purushas like Āditya etc. alone it does not amount to cognizing Brahman."

Apart from this, it can be discerned on the authority of the Vedānta Vachana (i.e. Upanishadic statements) that both Karma

and Upāsana are Anga (subsidiary) to Jñāna. The following Śruti sentences are expounding in clear terms that, as stated therein, Karmas and Upāsanas are devices for attaining Jñāna : 'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा अनाशकेन' - (Bri. 4-4-22), meaning: "By means of the meticulous study of Vedas, sacrifices, charity (philanthropy), penance of the form of severe fasting Brahmins wish to cognize this .Atman"; 'सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद्वदन्ति । यदिच्छन्तो ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति तत्ते पदं संग्रहेण ब्रवीमि' - (Katha 1-2-15), meaning: "Oh Nachiketa, that supreme abode which alone all the Vedas teach, proclaim as their prime purport, which alone all penances proclaim as their goal and desiring to cognize which (the seekers) practise Brahmacharya (celibacy etc.) - that (Reality) I will tell briefly"; 'यः पुनरेतं त्रिमात्रेणोमित्येतेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमिष्यायीत परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते' - (Prashna 5-5), meaning : "Further, one who meditates upon this Supreme Self who resides in this city by means of Omkara associated with all three parts.....(he) will see that Purusha alone who is Parātpara (greater than the great) and who resides in every body"; 'उक्तोपनिषत्क इतो विमुच्यमानः क्र गमिष्यसि' - (Bri. 4-2-2), meaning: "You, who have heard about and known all the Upāsanas, what fruit are you going to get?" In these two, viz. Karma and Upāsana, Karmas through their being aids in cleansing the mind (Chittashuddhi) and bringing about Antarmukhatwa (introvertedness) are Sādhanas (means of practice) for Jñāna (Self-Knowledge); Upāsanas, which are of the form of Aparabrahmavidyā (meditations on Brahman with various stipulated forms as Its adjuncts) after yielding the fruit of Brahmalōkaprāpti (attainment, i.e. transmigrating to the world of the first-born creator aspect of the four-headed Brahma) in due course of time (i.e. at the end of the Kalpa etc. as mentioned in the Sastra), by virtue of their leading to Jñanaprapti (attainment of Self-Knowledge) are responsible for Paramapurushārthaprāpti (achieving the ultimate goal of human existence); with regard to Upāsanas, especially of the form or nature of 'Nididhyāsana' - here and now while in this body directly they bring about Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge). Especially when Jñāna accrues (dawns i.e. in the form of Intuitive Experience of Pure

Being-Consciousness-Bliss) because all Anātman (not-self) of the nature of Śarirendriya etc. is rendered false, unreal (sublated) - once again the Śruti does not at all teach either Karma or Upāsana whatsoever.

Thus for the Śruti the Jīveshwara Tādātmya Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the identity, unity of Jīva and Īśwara) alone is its prime goal; for the sake of those people who do not possess just now the relevant, suitable qualification, the Śruti - out of compassion, as it were, and with the good intention that those people too should acquire stage by stage the requisite capability for this Self-Knowledge - instructs either Karmas or Upāsanas in accordance with their respective qualifications. This alone is the ultimate, final Vedāntic Siddhānta (spiritual teaching).

5. THERE IS NO OPPOSITION BETWEEN ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY AND DVAITA PHILOSOPHIES

स्वसिद्धांतव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् । परस्परं विरुध्यन्ते तैरयं न विरुध्यते ॥१७॥

Meaning: "Because *Dvaitins* (dualists) have a steadfast (deep-seated) certitude (resolution) in their own respective systems of philosophy, they are opposed to one another. But this (our Vedāntic system) is not opposed to them."

DVAITA PHILOSOPHY IS NOT A PROPER SYSTEM

(Objection): Let it be that because Karmas and Upāsanas are meant for the sake of Manda and Madhyama Adhikāris, the Śruti has its prime purport in teaching Advaita alone; but merely on this ground the fact that this philosophy is opposed to the remaining Dvaitins' doctrines cannot be evaded at all. For, the Dvaita Darshanas (dualistic philosophies) which were established by (ancient and famous sages like) Kapila, Kaṇāda, etc. also have presented their respective philosophies before the Śrōtrus, proclaiming in the manner: "This alone is the proper Jñāna", is it not so?

(Solution): Not so. For, the Advaita Siddhānta that has been propounded so far is in consonance with Śāstra as also Yukti. Hence, because the remaining philosophies are opposed to

Śāstra and Yukti, it evolves that they are Mithyā Darshanas (false, improper systems) alone. Since in the 'Vedāntamimāṃsā' (popularly known as 'Brahmasūtras') in the second chapter it has been proved quite convincingly that philosophical systems like Sānkhya, Vaisheshika etc. are Yuktibāhya (beyond universally accepted reasoning or logic), here there is no need to establish that truth once again. In fact, in this very treatise also the truth that - "Dvaitasāmānya (the genus or generality of dualism) itself is false or unreal" - has been demonstrated. Therefore, in this manner since Dvaita Darshanas are opposed to Śāstra and Yukti there is no scope here to doubt that the Advaita Darshana is opposed to them.

Not only on the ground that the Dvaita Darshanas are opposed to Sastra and Yukti they have to be perforce said to be improper systems, but also because all of them are prone, susceptible to give full scope for $R\bar{a}ga$ (attachment) and Dwesha(hatred) they are not proper systems. To wit: Kapila, Kanada and such other Darshanakāras (system-founders) have decided that their respective Siddhanta itself is the last word (i.e. the final truth, the absolute Reality). Among them there are two categories: (a) One stipulates a rule of law that - "In this manner alone this is said to be the Paramartha (Absolute Truth) and it is not in any other manner possible." (b) The second stipulates a rule of law that - "This alone is Paramartha, not anything else." For instance: Sānkhyans who follow 'Kapila's Siddhānta state thus: "Pradhana which is Trigunatmaka (of the essence. of three qualities) in order to yield or provide endless number of . Jivas Bhōga (enjoyment) as also Mōksha (Beatitude, Liberation) gets transformed into various forms like Mahat Tattwa etc. For the Jagat (world of duality) that alone is the Upādāna Kāraņa (material cause)." On the other hand, Vaisheshikas, who adopt the viewpoint of Kanāda, opine that: "Just as many cotton threads combine together to form cloth, the atoms alone, incessantly producing effects like Dvyanuka (binary), Tryanuka (tertiary) atoms in stages, produce the world of duality." Now these Vaisheshikas do not accept the category or phenomenon of Pradhāna which the Sānkhyans are establishing by inference; the Satkāryavāda (theory that an entity which in the beginning existed in the form of Kāraṇa or cause gets transformed into

Kāryarūpa (form of an effect) which is accepted by Sāṅkhyans is not accepted by these Vaisheshikas.

Further, some disciples of Buddha say that five Skandhas, twelve Ayatanas, 18 Dhātus, the external Adhibhoutika objects and the internal Adhyatmika objects - all these are real in all the three periods of time. According to their methodology formulated by themselves (i.e. not supported by or taught by the Vedas; hence Buddhism is a Vedabāhya Darshana), although they follow or adopt an atomic theory, they do not acknowledge what Kaṇādas (or Vaisheshikans) have propounded as Atman who is a Bhoktru or Iśwara who is omniscient. Some other Buddhists are Kshanika Vijñānavādins. Their doctrine is that all empirical transactions are carried on by Vijnānasantāna (a series of concepts or consciousnesses) alone. Further, Arhatas (Jains) say: Jiva and Ajiva - thus there exist only two entities; existing in various forms, these two only are utilized in our workaday transactions. With regard to all matters of discussion or debate, taking recourse to what they call 'Syādvāda' (theory accepting - 'it may be in this way also') these people aver that there cannot at all be any imposition of a restriction of the type - "Vastutattwa (the essence of an entity or substance) should be in this particular manner alone." Jivātman is of the dimension or proportion of the body; he is of a nature having contraction and expansion. This is their doctrine. In any case, in this manner among the Dvaitins there exist hundreds of systems of philosophy. Among them each one expounds his own respective special methodology saying - "This alone is the Tattwa (the Reality), nothing else; this Tattwa is established only in this manner and not in any other way" - and are deeply identified or attached, showing a pronounced affinity towards their own system; besides, they regard the others as opponents, rivals and despise them and their systems. Because of their taking a steadsast stand and showing an innate identification with their respective systems of philosophy alone, they are forced to become opponents to one another.

Thus although the Dvaitins are associated with mutual opposition among themselves, our this Advaita Darshana, which is in consonance with the teachings of the Vedas, is **not really opposed** to any one of them at all. Just as for one, who has total identification with his whole body, does not at all entertain any

hatred or hostility towards any limb like hand, leg etc., in the same way here too it should be understood, discerned. For, Ātman is the one Ātman to everyone; hence, even though anyone else is staunchly identified with any particular Dvaita Siddhānta, the Advaitin reckons them in the manner - "They too are our own people" - alone. Therefore, since there is no scope or room for Rāga and Dwesha in this Advaita Darshana - this alone is the *Paramārtha Darshana* (the Absolutely real philosophy): This is the implicit purport here. This very opinion was expressed previously in the **Vaitathya Prakaraṇa** also in the manner - "Advayatwa alone is *Shivam* (auspicious)" - (2-33); now, the same opinion is being established through *Upapatti* (justification based on proof, evidence).

अद्वैतं परमार्थों हि द्वैतं तद्भेद उच्यते । तेषामुभयथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विरुध्यते ।।१८।।

Meaning: "For, Advaita is Paramārtha (Absolutely real); Dvaita is said to be its Bheda (division, distinction). For them (i.e. Dvaitins) in both ways it is Dvaita alone. Therefore, this (i.e. Advaita) is not opposed."

TO DVAITA WHICH IS APARAMĀRTHA (UNREAL) ADVAITA WHICH IS PARAMĀRTHA CANNOT POSSIBLY BE OPPOSED

If it is asked: "How is it that this Advaita is not opposed to Dvaitins?" - we answer: For, Advaita is Paramārtha, whereas Dvaita is the distinction, meaning its effect, of the Advaita Tattwa. Just as for the root of a tree, the tree, the branches etc. are effects, in the same way the dual forms are the effects of Advaita alone. For, it is very clearly expounded in the Śruti as: 'सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् तदेशत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽस्जत' - (Chh. 6-2-2, 3) - meaning - "Oh dear, in the beginning Sadbrahman alone, without anything second to It, existed. It imagined in the manner - 'I will become many, I alone will be born as Dvaita (many)' - and created Tejas (fire)" - purporting to suggest that Sadbrahman alone, which is Advayarūpa, came into being as Dvaita like Tejas, Ap, Prithivi etc. Further, there is a Śruti which says: 'सन्यूला: सोम्येमा: सर्वा: प्रजा: सदायतना: सत्प्रतिष्ठा:' - (Chh. 6-8-9) - meaning - "Oh dear, for all these effects Sat

(Reality) alone is the root cause; Sat alone is the support; Sat alone is the end." In states like Sushupti etc. when the mind does not exist at all there does not also exist any Dvaita (duality) whatsoever; when in the dream there exists a mind, Dvaita appears. Therefore, just as in the dream by virtue of the movement of the mind the duality that appears is verily the effect of Advaita, in the same way it evolves that the Dvaita that is appearing now (i.e. in the waking state) also is in its apparent form of appearance is Aparamārtha (unreal in the absolute sense), as also it is the projected effect alone of the Advaitatattwa (non-dual Reality). Thus, it is not proper to say that in this manner Advaita which is the cause is opposed to Its effects which are not Paramartha, is it not so? But, for the Dvaitins especially - in the Absolute sense too it is Dvaita alone, and what is reckoned as Aparamartha is also Dvaita alone. For instance, Dvaita which the Sānkhyans have believed to be Paramārtha (Absolutely real, in the ultimate analysis) is opposed to what they are opining as Aparamārtha but which the $K\bar{a}n\bar{a}das$ (i.e. Vaisheshikans) accept as Dvaita; vice versa, the Dvaita Darshana which the Kāṇādas have accepted is opposed to the Dvaita Darshana which they are proclaiming as Aparamārtha but championed by the Sānkhyans. Anyway, in this manner because both the Dvaita schools are of similar doctrinaire theories, between them one is opposed to the other. This fact becomes evident. In this way, in all the theories of the Dvaitins the opponents' Darshana is Dvaita only as well as the Darshana of the Siddhantin also is Dvaita alone; hence, between those Dvaita Darshanas since one cannot withstand the onslaught of the Yukti (dialectical arguments) of the other, both of them have to be inferred as the philosophies of deluded people indeed. For, it is not possible at all to aver that an object exists in two mutually opposed forms or kinds at the same time; just as it is possible to conjecture that Karmas can be performed in a particular manner as also in some other manner, it is not possible to acknowledge an imagined concept or inference saying that an object may exist in a particular manner as also in some other form also (at the same time). The Siddhanta of any one school of Dvaitins has not been accepted to be the only correct, proper one by the other Dvaitins. If any one of them is accepted as final

and correct, then it could have been concluded in the manner - "Among the various Darshanas formulated by Dvaitins such and such alone is the real one" - is it not so? What about the Advaita Darshana? - For this question the answer is: The universal Intuitive Experience like that of deep sleep etc. is in support of that Darshana indeed. Hence, this Advaita Darshana of ours is not opposed to any Dvaita Darshana whatsoever.

It being so, because it amounts to accepting the fact that - "Dvaita Drishti itself is the Darshana (philosophy) of Bhrāntas (deluded people), whereas Advaita Drishti is of people devoid of that Bhranti" - for this reason alone it amounts to saying that Advaita (non-dualism) is not opposed to those Dvaitins also. The Śruti: 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुष्कप ईयते' - (Bri. 2-5-19) - meaning - "Paramātman by virtue of Avidyāprajñā (consciousness projected by ignorance i.e. misconception) appears in many forms" - is proclaiming that the Bahurūpatwa (manifoldness of forms) appearing in Atman (who is really non-dual) is, in the ultimate analysis, caused by Avidyāprajñas (false concepts projected by ignorance). Because for the Sruti, which declares that in deep sleep there does not at all exist any second thing other than $\bar{A}tma$ Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness of the Self) there is complete support of the universal experience of deep sleep etc., no one can ever possibly affirm that Advaita does not really exist. Besides, the Sruti itself pointedly stresses the truth in very clear terms that in Sushupti (deep sleep) Advaita alone exists when it expresses that 'न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत्' - (Bri. 4-3-23) - meaning - "Therein a second thing apart from Atman does not exist; if it were so, it could have been possibly seen, is it not so?" Therefore, just as when a brave warrior, astride an intoxicated or agitated elephant, is riding along comes across a mad man challenging him vociferously in the manner - "I am also riding on an elephant ; I dare you to let loose your elephant towards mine" - because the warrior has realized that the challenger is a madcap and will not drive his elephant towards him at all - in the same way, since the Jñāni (Realized Soul) who has cognized Advaitātman has realized that all Dvaitins are deluded people, he will not endeavour to argue with them. That Brahmajñāni is verily the Self for them

also, is it not so? For this reason only, the Advaita that we have accepted is not opposed to the opinions or doctrines of those Dvaitins at all.

THE DISTINCTION THAT EXISTS BETWEEN ADVAITA SIDDHĀNTA AND SHŪNYAVĀDA

Here a special feature: The Shunyavadins among Buddhists are not at all Dvaitins; for, they refute all the viewpoints of Dvaitins of the type - Sadvada and Asadvada etc. and those Shūnyavādins have not embraced any Drishti with deep identification, saying that - "This alone is our Darshana." Anyone may here raise a doubt of the type - "Therefore, the doctrine of those Shūnyavādins also, who are Advayavādins, is Aviruddha (unopposed to the Dvaitavada) alone, is it not so? It being so, what is the superior greatness of Advaita Siddhanta?" But Shūnyavādins, on the strength of their own unique doctrine of 'Pratitya Samutpāda' - meaning, depending on one thing another thing appearing as being born or, in other words, dependent origination - following purely a kind of critique of reasoning - propound that - "Dvaita in its entirety is essenceless" - and then with the purport of refuting all viewpoints in toto adopt a vain, dry system of dialectics and try to demonstrate to any opponent Anishta Prasakti (the defect of an undesirable conclusion being arrived at). But for the whole gamut of logical or dialectical exercises duality is the main basis or support; therefore, they are unable to refute Dvaita. It is very clearly evident that for those who have undertaken the ominous task of establishing by logical means alone the doctrine of - 'Logic also is Nisswabhāva (essenceless)' - invariably an unavoidable defect will entail. Further, if those Shūnyavādins strengthen belief, faith - then anyone may raise a doubt of the type - "How come they are saying by virtue of their tenet that - 'Everything is Shūnya' - that it can be objectified by Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) of the nature of Samādhi (trance)?" Now, for reasons that - (a) That kind of (Shūnya) Anubhava is Vaiyaktika (individualistic) - meaning not being a universal experience, equally common to everyone, only occurring somewhere to some people only; (b) Vijnānavādins, who are also Buddhists but opposed to the Shūnyavādins, have from this (essenceless) Anubhava formulated a totally different conclusion by means of Yukti or reasoning: the doctrinaire theory of Shūnyavādins being claimed to be Aviruddha to all other schools of philosophy is rendered to be a mere vain promise or pledge alone, and there is no Sādhakayukti (logical argument sustaining it) whatsoever.

On the other hand, with regard to this Advaita Siddhanta, on the strength of Sārvatrika (universal and equal to each and every person anywhere and at any time) Anubhava (Intuitive Experience - not within the purview of the ego alone), because it is determining the 'Tattwa' (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality) on the strong and unshakable foundation of examining the Avasthātraya (universal experiences of the three states of Consciousness) employing the two strong means of $\overline{A}gama$ (Śāstraic teachings handed down according to a time-tested traditional methodology of pedagogics) and Yukti (unique logic propounded in the Śāstras themselves), here in this Advaita philosophy there does not exist even the least bit of scope for any kind of Vivāda (argument or debate). This is the salient feature of this universally acceptable philosophy. Because all Dvaita Darshanas are mere conclusions drawn on the basis of the waking state viewpoint alone (to wit, it is rendered to be lop-sided, prejudiced and highly coloured, as it were, being based on one part of life's experiences and not their totality), between them, on the one hand, and Advaita Darshana which determines the Ultimate Reality based on the comprehensive, holistic methodology of the Avasthātraya, on the other, there cannot exist possibly any opposition as such, and hence it is not possible to raise any doubt on this count. To the conclusion of the type. - "The object which serves as a source for a reflection is one and one only" - a conclusion, drawn merely based on an appearance, of the type - "The reflections of an object are many" - can never be opposed or contradictory at all, is it not so? Here too we must understand it in a similar way.

मायया भिद्यते ह्योतत्रान्यथाऽजं कथञ्चन । तत्त्वतो भिद्यमाने हि मर्त्यताममृतं व्रजेत् ॥१९॥

Meaning: "This is different because of Māyā alone; in no other manner whatsoever that which is Aja (unborn, birthless)

can possibly become different. For, if it could really become different, then *Amritam* (that which is immortal) will necessarily have to acquire *Martyatwa* (mortality)."

A DEFECT IF IT IS MAINTAINED THAT DVAITA IS REALLY THE EFFECT OF ADVAITA

"It has been propounded that - 'Dvaita is a distinction of Advaita; it is caused by Advaita' - is it not so? In that case, Dvaita also, like Advaita alone, becomes *Paramārtha* (real), is it not so? From a real seed the tree that grows cannot reasonably be said to be not *Paramārtha* (i.e. unreal), is it not so?" - Thus a **doubt** may arise in the minds of some people.

In order to remove this doubt Shri Gaudapada is saying: "This has become different due to $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion) alone." To wit: To the disputant who maintains that Dvaita also is Satyam (real) we put a question: Is it your opinion that the phenomenon of Dvaita is not different from Advayātmatattwa (the Ultimate Reality of non-dual Self) which is Sadrūpa (of the nature of Pure Existence) ? Or is it your opinion that it is different ? Let it be Satyam alone; from this we (Vedāntins) do not suffer any harm whatsoever. For, we are not at all saying that Advaita is not Satyam. If it is not so, just as the tree is quite different from the seed, if you say that Dvaita is different from Advaita - then that is not proper. For, Atman is Niravayava (without parts or components). Just as the seed gets broken up and becomes a tree, it is not possible to say that Advaita gets broken up and gets transformed into Dvaita. A seed with components may get transformed into different parts like bottom (stem), branch, sub-branch or branchlet etc.; in the same way, clay with components may get transformed into various forms like pot, pitcher, lid etc.; for, there is no hindrance whatsoever for a partible object to get disintegrated and get transformed in this manner. But, (Reality) which is Niravayava (devoid of parts) and Janmarahita (devoid of birth) can never get transformed thus in whatever manner. Just as it is said by the Sānkhyans that Pradhāna gets transformed in the forms like Mahat etc. - this Ajātmatattwa can never get transformed; just as the Vaisheshikans etc. propound that atoms in the order of Dvyanuka etc. become the Jagat also, this Ajātmatattwa cannot become Jagat (the world of duality).

Therefore, we have to conclude that - "Just as one and one moon only appears to be many due to the defect of cataract in the eye, and in poor light a rope appears to be of many forms like a snake, a streak of water etc. - in the same way, Advaita (non-dual Reality), which is existing ' $P\bar{a}$ ram \bar{a} rthically' (i.e. in the Absolute sense) due to $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion) alone, appears falsely indeed as Dvaita." No one will ever accept that apart from the one singular moon seen by all the people many moons are really existing and apart from the one rope the false appearances of a snake or a streak of water etc. are really born, is it not so?

(Objection): Just as in the manner the Sānkhyans have propounded, why cannot it be said (accepted) that Advaita has really got transformed into the *Dvaitākāra* (form of duality)? Or just as in the order the Vaisheshikans have propounded that atoms, in the order of *Dvyaņuka* (binary atoms) and *Tryaņuka* (tertiary atoms), become effects - why cannot it be accepted that Advaita has actually become converted into Dvaita?

(Solution): To this the answer is: If it were true that Advaita actually, in reality, acquires the Dvaitarupa and gets born, then necessarily, as a concomitant result of it, Advaita will have to give up, or strip Itself, as it were, of Its Ajatwaswabhāva (essential, innate nature of birthlessness); if it is said: "Let it be" - then it will have to be acknowledged that what is Amrita (immortal) becomes Martya (mortal). The teaching that - "Advaita is Amrita" - is based on the sound reasoning of It being devoid of birth, is it not so ? The purport of the Śruti : 'स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म' - (Bri. 4-4-25) is - "That this Atman is Supreme, more pervasive than all else; is Aja (devoid of birth), Ajara (i.e. devoid of old age); Amara (devoid of death); Amrita (of the essential nature of not getting death, destruction); Abhaya (fearless). For that reason alone He is Brahman." If it is asserted that, in reality, in the beginning Atman was Advaita and later on got Himself divided or broken into the Kāryarūpa, then because it amounts to accepting that He is actually born (in time and space and having causation), He acquires thereby Martyatwa (mortality). To assert that - "It is non-dual, and at the same time It is the cause for Dvaita" - is a self-contradiction. For, in order that an effect should occur, there necessarily have to exist many

requisite things or conditions - externally; or, within the thing itself an inherent nature of becoming another should exist. Both these conditions or stipulations are not applicable at all to an Entity of the essential nature of Advaita. If it is maintained that - "That which is Advaita that alone is *Dvaitayukta* (inherently having a nature of becoming Dvaita or duality)" - then it amounts to saying - just as the statement that fire becomes cold - that the entity gives up its intrinsic, essential nature of Being or Pure existence indeed. Thus this conclusion drawn to the effect that - "An entity's essential nature itself gets transformed into an opposite state or condition" - is not acceptable to anyone at all, is it not so? Therefore, this doctrine which is opposed to all *Pramāṇas* (valid means of knowledge) and which gives scope for all normal empirical transactions to be destroyed or disturbed - should not be accepted.

6. DEFECTS THAT ENTAIL IF JANMA IS ACCEPTED FOR BRAHMAN WHICH IS OF AJASWABHĀVA

अजातस्यैव भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः। अजातो ह्ममृतो भावो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति।।२०।।

Meaning: "To an Entity which is Ajāta (birthless) alone the disputants have accepted a Janma (birth) indeed. An Entity which is Ajāta and Amṛita (immortal) - how at all can It acquire Martyatwa (mortality)?"

THREE SCHOOLS IN JATABRAHMAVADA (THEORY OF BRAHMAN GETTING BORN)

Some people who are the proponents of Jātabrahmavāda (the Absolute Reality of Brahman being born or having birth) aver that for Brahman which is by Its very essence of Being is Amṛita (immortal) has birth. Among them (1) some say: Brahman is of Dvaitādvaitarūpa (dual-cum-non-dual nature); Jīva is the 'becoming or transformation' of Brahman; he is Bhinna (different) at the same time Abhinna (non-different) from Brahman. (2) Some others say: By virtue of an association with an Upādhi (adjunct), although Jīva is of a Bhinnābhinnarūpa (different-cum-non-different form) of Brahman, when the Upādhi gets

destroyed he (i.e. Jīva) becomes one with the Paramātman. (3) Yet some others say: Between Jīvas and Brahman - just as between sparks of fire and fire - there exists a 'Aṃsha-Aṃshī' (part-whole) Bhāvarūpa Sambandha (relationship of such categories).

Thus following various methodologies those who have acknowledged the doctrine that for Brahman who is of Ajaswabhāva too there is Janma (birth) - because they have accepted Janma being there alone, it has amounted to their accepting the doctrine of - "Brahman has Martyatwa". For, to the objection of the type - "That which is born, death occurring is certain; because It is devoid of birth, an Entity which is by dint of its very essential nature alone is Amrita (immortal) - how at all can It acquire Martyatwa?" - those disputants will have to provide a convincing solution indeed. Those disputants too (who are basically logical-minded) do not, nay cannot, accept the theory that - "The essential nature (Swabhāva) itself of a Vastu (entity) changes, mutates" - is it not so? Hence, there exists this defect in their doctrine.

THE PRESENT-DAY JATABRAHMAVADINS

Among the present-day Vedantins some describe the Brahmatattwa in the following manner: "There are two aspects to the body of Brahman, called 'Chit' and 'Achit'. When this Chidachidrupa body is so very subtle that it cannot be said to be anymore distinct from Brahman, then Brahman exists in Kāraṇāvasthā (potent state of being a cause). When this Brahman which is in Kāraṇāvastha is acquiring the Kāryāvastha (state of becoming an effect), because Achidamsha (part of insentient substance), which was existing in the Kāraṇāvastha devoid of any of the phenomena like Shabda etc., with a view to becoming Bhōgya (an object of enjoyment), acquires those Shabda etc. - a mutation called 'Anyathābhāva' (a different substantive nature) occurs to its Swarūpa. Because then Chidamsha has perforce to acquire Bhöktrutwa, which enjoys the fruits of the respective Karmas, it undergoes a change of the type of Jñāna evolving or blossoming. Thus the two forms of mutations called 'Swarūpānyathābhāva' and 'Jñāna Vikāsa' - are called by virtue of being 'Vishishta' (extra-ordinary, special) endowed with special features - Brahman undergoes such a mutation called 'Vishishṭa.' In this way, the mutation of going from Kāraṇāvastha to the Kāryāvastha is common to Brahman who is the *Prakāri* (endowed with the modes) and *Vishishṭa* (that which is endowed with special features), as also to Chidachit which are the *Prakāras* (modes) *Visheshaṇa* (special features). In this manner, in saying that Brahman acquires Kāryāvastha from Kāranāvastha there is no defect whatsoever" - This is the opinion of these disputants.

In the doctrine of these disputants although the Śrutis state that Brahman by Its very nature is Aja (devoid of birth), it amounts to saying that Brahman has really birth - and this fact is very clear. For, although these people are saying that the Visheshanas only are undergoing change but there is no mutation to Brahman, they never accept that Brahman exists independently, giving up Visheshanas, at some time or the other. Therefore, it is tantamount to their agreeing that Brahman also has Vikāra. Suppose a man has pain in the hand, or in the leg or in the stomach, no one will say that his limb only had the pain but not the person, is it not so?

Here these disputants may say : 'स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमरोऽ मृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म' - (Bri. 4-4-25) - from this Sruti sentence it is established that Brahman does not have Vikāras like Janma etc.; we have accepted that only to Chidachit, which are the Visheshanas there is Vikāra. Therefore this objection is not proper - thus these people may argue. But a Sruti sentence signifies to us an Entity which already exists only, it is a Jñāpaka (reminder) ; no Śruti is a Kāraka (creator of a new thing) ; it cannot create anything that does not exist. Therefore, it is not possible to assert merely on the support of a (Sruti) sentence that Brahman is Aja and Nirvikāri. Apart from this, in the above Śruti sentence it has not been stated at all that the Visheshanas (special features) have mutations but not Brahman which is Visheshya (that which is endowed with Visheshanas). It is stated here that - "This Vijnanamaya who exists amidst these Pranas is Mahan (great, all-pervading), Aja (birthless)," - as previously stated in (Bri. 4-4-22), that the Jivatman himself is Ajara (devoid of old age), Amara (deathless), Amrita (devoid of an essential nature of dying), Abhaya (fearless); he is verily Brahman. The fact that

for this above Śruti sentence this alone is the intended meaning is ascertained from the next sentence: 'अभयं वै ब्रह्म भवति य एवं वेद', meaning, - "One who cognizes like this, he verily becomes fearless Brahman alone."

Apart from this, in the Chhandogya Śruti: 'तदेशत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति' - (Chh. 6-2-6) - meaning, "That Brahman wished - 'I will become many, I will get born" - in this manner it mentions about the Sankalpa (volition) that Brahman had wished to become many. According to the doctrine of these disputants merely, on the ground of the Visheshanas becoming many, Brahman especially cannot possibly become many, and hence this sentence will be rendered invalid alone. As otherwise, if it is accepted that Brahman too becomes many - then the Siddhanta (their doctrine) that - "Brahman does not have any Vikāra" - will have to be abandoned. Apart from this, the following Srutis state that, prior to the creation: "All this was Advitiva Brahman alone" - (Chh. 6-2-1); "This existed as Atman alone, nothing else whatsoever existed" - (Aitareya 1-1) etc. and the opponents' doctrine will be opposed to all the above Sruti sentences. For, in the opponent's opinion even then (i.e. prior to the creation) it is accepted that Brahman existed as Chidachid Vishishta alone; but the Sruti is affirming that - "Brahman alone existed."

In the same manner, in Srutis like - "You alone are That" - (Chh); "I am Brahman" (Bri.); "This Ātman is Brahman" - (Māṇḍūkya and Bṛi.) etc. it has been reiterated that Jiva is really Brahman alone, but it has not been stated that - "Jivas arethe Visheshanas only of Brahman". Therefore, this doctrine of the opponent of 'Chidachitprakārabrahmavāda' is opposed to those Srutis. These disputants keep on giving a consolatory explanation for this contradiction: "In the Antaryāmi Brāhmaņa it has been very clearly stated that the insentient, inanimate phenomena like Prithivi etc. and Atman are the body of Paramātman; therefore, there is invariably full support of the Śruti for our doctrine". But this Samādhāna (consolatory explanation) is not proper; for, the Antaryāmi Brāhmana which is in Brihadaranyaka has the prime purport of signifying the Swarūpa of Antaryāmi and not in stating that Prithivi etc. are His body. By depending or rélying upon the Kāryakaraņas

(actions and means of action) of deities like Prithivi, He becomes their Niyāmaka (controller); when the real purport of that sentence becomes fulfilled by indicating that - "Merely in the proximity of that Paramatman who is of the essential nature of Sakshi (Witnessing Principle) all the respective actions and means of actions of everyone are functioning according to regulations" to imagine a discordant meaning of the type that - "Paramātman has a body too" - exposes this doctrine to what is called 'Gourava $D\bar{o}sha$ ' (meaning, when a single meaning, being inferred for a particular part of a text, the intended purport is fully served, needlessly to imagine the meanings of two different sentences a defect entails). Therefore, it is not reasonable to follow the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa, which has no purport at all of signifying Sashariratwa (embodiedness) and to strike down the meaning of Śruti sentences like - 'तत्त्वमसि' - (That thou art) etc. which have the prime purport of preaching Ekatwa (unity, identity) alone. Therefore, this 'Jātabrahmavāda' is not in consonance with Śāstra.

For another reason too this doctrinaire theory can be proved to be Śāstrabāhya (alien to the Śāstra or scriptures). In what way? The answer is: In this very Brihadaranyaka there is a sentence like: 'एवं वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्सनः प्रज्ञानघन एव' -(Bri. 4-5-13). It is very clearly stated here that just as a lump of salt is in all its parts salty only, Brahman is everywhere is of the very essence of Intuition (cognition) alone; as these disputants are stating, there is no statement or relevant sentence which implies that between Brahman, on the one hand, and Jivas and gross objects on the other, there exists a Shariri-Sharira relationship, as also that Brahman has undergone mutations of all kinds. Quite contrary to this, the Śruti sentence : 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यित' - (Bri. 4-4-19), meaning - "One who sees manifoldness in Brahman gets death after death" - stridently condemns those who see manifoldness or many changes (Nānāprakāra) in Brahman. Further, the Śruti is stressing unequivocally in the manner: 'एक धैवानु द्रष्टव्यमेतदप्रमयं धुवम्' - (Bri. 4-4-20), meaning - "Because this Paramātmatattwa is not a Prameya (object for cognition) one should not see manifoldness in It; he

should cognize that It is $Ekar\bar{u}pa$ (of one and the same essential nature)." Therefore, it amounts to saying that this doctrine which acknowledges $N\bar{a}n\bar{a}twa$ (manifoldness) in Paramātman is $S\bar{a}strabahishkruta$ (expelled by the scriptures themselves) indeed.

Apart from this, for the various statements made by these disputants like:

(a) "For Chaitanya, Chidachit are the body"; (b) for the substance called Chit (Chiddravya) Chit is a Guna (quality)"; (c) The quality (Guna) of Chidrupa (of the form or nature of Chit) acquires Samkōcha (involution, contraction) and Vikāsa (evolusion, expansion)" - there is no possibility of any proper meaning being attached or made applicable. For, Chaitanya is, like the empty space, a Tatiwa (Entity) which has no taint or touch of anything else. It is also not possible even to imagine that It has any relationship with anything else. Both the words 'Chaitanya' and 'Chit' have the same meaning of 'Consciousness' (cognition), and it is not possible at all to imagine or infer that in Pure Consciousness too there exists an internal and inherent difference. Usually these disputants argue in the manner that because for objects of brilliance or light like a lamp, gem etc. we see them having a Guna (quality) of Prabha (light, brilliance), for the Dravya (substance) of Chidrūpa (of the form of Chit) also there can be a quality called 'Chit'. But lamp and gems etc. are Sāvayavadravyas (substances having component parts or constituents), whereas Chaitanya is Niravayava (devoid of any parts) and is Sarvavyāpaka Tattwa (Reality which is all-pervading). It being so, it is not possible at all even to imagine that Chaitanya or Chit is a Dravya (substance) or It may have qualities. Apart from this, in states like Sushupti (deep sleep), Samādhi (trance) etc. without there being any contact with anything else Chaitanya alone is experienced (Intuited) by us. Therefore, the Yukti (device) which endeavours to imagine that Dvaita, which is misconceived in Atman from the waking viewpoint, is really existing in Atman - is opposed to Sārvatrika Anubhava (universal or everyone's experience). In the same way, to imagine that even in the Pralayāvastha (state of total dissolution) Chaitanya, which is Nirvishesha (devoid of any special features) exists alone by Itself and unto Itself - will be quite reasonable. For this reason also to imagine Brahman, which is birthless, non-dual as also

Chaitanyarūpa, to give up its Swabhāva (essential nature) and to be born in the various forms of Jivas and Jaḍavastus is Kutarka (vain logic) indeed - which imagines that a Reality, which is of the essential nature of immortality, acquires Martyarūpa (form of a mortal being or object). On this count too this Jātabrahmavāda has to be discarded.

न भवत्यमृतं मत्यं न मर्त्यममृतं तथा।
प्रकृतेरन्यथामावो न कथञ्चिद् भविष्यति ।।२१।।
स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य भावो गच्छति मर्त्यताम्।
कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ।।२२।।

Meaning: "That which is immortal cannot become mortal; that which is mortal cannot become immortal too. For, the essential nature (of an entity) to become something else is not possible in any manner whatsoever. That disputant in whose doctrine an Entity which is by Its very essential nature is immortal becomes mortal, because in that disputant's doctrine that Entity which is said to be immortal is invariably produced (artificially), how at all is it possible for It to exist (always) as It is?"

JĀTABRAHMAVĀDA IS OPPOSED TO ANUBHAVA AS ALSO TO YUKTI

It has already been stated in the previous Kārikā that - 'An immortal thing cannot become mortal.' Therefore, it cannot be acknowledged that Brahman which is ever, eternally of an essential nature of immortality becomes a Jīva who is mortal. Similarly, to assert that Jīva who is of the essential nature of mortality, at some time or the other, becomes immortal is a mere conjecture made, quite opposed to what is seen in our workaday world. In our empirical world of duality none of us has seen at all anybody using any one of, say, a magical gem, a hymn, herb or a root of a plant and converting, transforming a thing which is of the nature of dying into one which is of immortal, deathless nature - is it not so? In case if anybody has, by the employment of magical gems or hymns etc. and by virtue of their magical powers, brought back to life any being or creature that had died,

even there the statement that - 'The being had died' - is itself false; it will have to be concluded that what we had believed to the effect that it had died was itself false. For, the essential nature of a thing, substance can never possibly change. Do any discriminative people imagine that the heat that is the very essential nature of fire has got transformed into a cold state and thereby the fire has become cold? Never at all. The Swabhāva (essential nature) changes means the extinction of that Swabhāva; in other words, that substance itself has been destroyed - this is the real import of it. Similarly, if it is stated that - "Brahman is born as a Jiva" - it means that Brahman Itself becomes extinct, non-existent; whereas, if it is stated that - "A mortal Jiva gets transformed into Brahman" - it means a Jīva's 'Jīvatwa' (soulhood) disappears. Jiva himself becomes non-existent or extinct - it means this alone. Therefore, to imagine that Brahman and Jiva are two different entities, as also that one gets transformed into another is totally wrong, improper. Hence, the common people have misconceived Brahman Itself to be Jiva; although Jiva appears as a Jiva due to Avidyā, even now at this very moment he is verily Brahman - to infer in this manner it is quite rational. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the Sruti sentence 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' - (Muṇḍaka) - as meaning - "Giving up the Jīvabhāva (soulhood) which is projected by Avidyā, a Jīva cognizes, Intuits his real, essential nature as Brahmarūpa by means of Vidyā (Jñāna)" - alone.

Really speaking, the theory that - "Paramātman who is of the Amṛitaswabhāva Himself becomes Jīva" - is not proper at all. For, if that which is in Its essence Amṛita (immortal) is Its very innate nature, then how can it be said that It became Martya (mortal)? The thing which later on becomes Martya should earlier in the beginning too invariably should have been of the essential nature (Swabhāva) of becoming Martya, is it not so? Hence, the statement that - "In the beginning It was immortal" - is also false - we are compelled to deduce. For, a 'Swabhāva' (essential nature, core of Being) never changes. In that case, shall we say - "A Kṛitaka (an artificially produced) Amṛitatwa (immortality) that substance had" - ? That also does not suit; for, to say that first being Kṛitaka, later on a thing has become Amṛita

is itself a conjecture which does not suit anything whatsoever. It becomes an improbable statement indeed like: "Without the King's command they had acquired ministership." In the same way, if it is said: "Jiva in the beginning is Martya; by means of Upāsana he becomes (gets transformed into) Amrita" - it really amounts to saying that that newly-acquired Amritatwa also is Kritaka (artificially produced, i.e. it is false alone); how at all can it be guaranteed that even such a Kritaka Amritatwa in the future will sustain itself? Just as That which is in the beginning Amrita becomes Martya, this 'Amritaswarupa' that has been produced artificially may become Martya - in this manner it is reasonable to surmise, is it not? In any case, in this doctrine neither Jivatwa nor Brahmatwa is Aja (unborn) - meaning - it never exists as it is without any change or mutation. Therefore, it amounts to their saying that - "Amritatwa (immortality) is never Shāshwata (eternal)" - and thereby it amounts to these disputants, saying that there does not exist any Möksha at all!

(Objection): In that case, in your Siddhanta also how can it be accepted that by means of Upāsana Amritatwa accrues? In the Sruti also it has been stated that - "By means of Upāsana Amritatwa is attained; from there one does not return" (Chh.); "To this region of human beings he does not again come back" - (Chh.); "To them there is nothing like coming back" - (Bri.) - in this manner in very clear terms, purporting to signify that - "Immutable Immortality (Nishchala Amritatwa) alone is attained by Upāsana" - is it not so? If it amounts to saying that the Amritatwa that is attained by means of Upāsana is mere Kritaka only, not only in the opponents' doctrine but also in everyone's doctrines, it will amount to saying that for Upasana an immutable immortality cannot possibly be attained at all! Then in that event, does it not amount to our saying, nay accepting, that the Śruti itself which propounds that - 'By Upāsana Amritatwa can be attained' - is Apramāņa (invalid)?

Another doubt: If it is said that the Amritatwa that is attained by means of Sādhana is Kritaka and hence it is not the real Mōksha - then how at all can even the Amritatwa that accrues from Jñāna be Swābhāvika (of an essential nature)? The word 'Swābhāvika' means 'one's eternally existing Swarūpa or essential nature' only; how can it be 'Prāpya' (that which can

be acquired afresh)? That Amritatwa which appears as if it is Aprāpta (not acquired) due to Avidya can be acquired by Vidyā, is it not so? - Thus you (an opponent) may ask. In this theory it amounts to saying - "Avidyā gets destroyed; Vidyā is attained (afresh) - and as a result of this Mōksha accrues." Even in that event, it amounts to saying that - "By means of a Nimitta (cause) alone the Mōkshaprāpti (attainment of Liberation) accrues", is it not so? Are you not saying that anything that is acquired due to a cause is Kṛitaka (artificially produced) alone?

(Solution): The 'Brahmaprāpti' that is attained by Upāsana is the attainment of Brahmaloka (the world of Brahma, the firstborn, Lord of Creation). For the Sruti sentences which say: "From there he does not return to Samsara" - the real meaning is: "As long as the Brahmaloka exists he does not return" alone. Because the Sruti states that - "This human being does not attain Avarta (a state of coming back)" - it amounts to saying (i.e. it implies) that - "There exists another Mānava Āvartaprāpti (attainment of a return to human birth)" - alone. "Here there is no Punarāvritti" - this sentence also has the same meaning; for this kind of sentences we have to interpret them to mean -"These people (i.e. the Upāsakas) return to this Samsāra at Kalpāntara (another Kalpa or duration of world, another creation). "In that case, the fruit amounts to being Kritaka only, is it not so? Can such a thing be called 'Amrita' (devoid of destruction)?" - in this manner one should not doubt. For, in that context the word 'Amritatwa' is used by 'Gounavritti' (in a secondary sense). In the Purāṇa sentence - 'आभूत संप्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते' (Vishņu Purāṇa 2-8-97), meaning - "Until all the Bhūtas (primordial elements get dissolved, the Sthāna (place) which is Shāshwata (eternal) is also called 'Amritatwa' alone" - thus it is mentioned. Therefore, because the teaching that the Amritatwa which is the fruit of Upasana stipulated as an injunction (Vidhi) in the 'Upāsanā Prakaraņa' (chapter devoted to meditations) becomes Kritaka is acceptable to us, it does not amount to your pointing out any defect whatsoever there. Whereas, there are some Upāsanas mentioned in the Jñāna Prakaraņa itself; for them the implicit meaning is: After the seeker goes to Brahmalōka, there in that region itself he gets Jñanaprapti and attains the

Amritatwa in the predominant sense (Mukhyārtha) alone. In the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad it is stated that Yājñavalkya has questioned King Janaka in the manner: 'What is the fruit of these Upāsanas that you are performing? By means of these Upāsanas which Tattwa (Reality) are you reaching?" While explaining the real purport implied in this sentence, Shri Sureśwarāchārya has written (in his Bri. Vārtika):

'उपासनानि सर्वाणि परविद्याधिकारतः। क्रममुक्तिफलानीति क्र गमिष्यसि गीरतः।।
- (Bṛi. Vā. 4-2-13) - meaning - "For all Upāsanas stipulated in the Brahmajñāna Prakaraṇa 'Kramamukti' alone is the fruit; therefore, here Yājñavalkya has questioned in the manner: 'As a fruit of these Upāsanas where are you going?' - ".

Now, a Samādhāna to the doubt - "Even to Jñāna how can the Amṛitatwa in the predominant sense be the fruit? By the cause of - 'Avidyānivṛitti' and 'Vidyāprāpti' you are saying that Mukti accrues, is it not so?" - has remained to be given. Here we have not at all accepted that the extraordinary events like - 'Avidyā really exists in the beginning; Vidyā then is born and removes that' - are really events taking place in time. In fact, we have accepted Vidyā and Avidyā only from the Avidyāvyavahāra Dṛishṭi (the viewpoint of the empirical transactions being carried on due to Avidyā or ignorance) alone.

(Doubt): In that case, you have at least accepted 'Avidyā Dṛishṭi', is it not so? Then is it not your opinion that - 'One who has Avidyā invariably accepts the events of Vidyā-Avidyā' -?

(Solution): This is not proper. For, even the statement that - 'I have Avidyā' - also is verily Avidyāvyavahāra; in the Śruti: 'ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव' - (Bṛi. 4-3-2) - it is implied that both the transactions of Jñāna and Karma are false appearances alone. If it is asked - "Is there no transaction of the type - 'I do not know anything' - ?" - in answer we say: Because Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) by means of which a person cognizes the import of the sentence - 'I do not know anything' - that very Anubhava alone is the real essential nature of Ātman, to say that -'Ātman is the support for Avidyā' - is also not proper; that which is the Vishaya (object) to a particular person's Anubhava - how at all can that Vishaya taint or cling on to Ātman who

is the Vishayi (subject) and Anubhavaswarūpa (of the very essence of Intuitive Experience of Pure Consciousness)? It being so, in the teaching of the Ajātabrahmavādin (i.e. Vedāntin) because Amṛitatwa is verily the essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness of the Jijñāsu (the seeker), it is not possible at all to prove by any method of reasoning that It (i.e. Amṛitatwa) is Kṛitaka.

7. AJĀTIVĀDA ALONE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ŚRUTI AND NOT JĀTABRAHMAVĀDA

भूततोऽभूततोवापि सृज्यमाने समा श्रुतिः। निश्चितं युक्तियुक्तं च यत्तद्भवति नेतरत्।।२३।।

Meaning: "Whether Srishti (creation) is real or unreal - Śruti is equal to both. Therefore, that which is certain and reasonable - that alone can be the meaning or purport of the Śruti and not anything else."

IS THE LITERAL MEANING OF THE SRISHȚI ŚRUTI SUITABLE (AGREEABLE) TO AJĀTIVĀDA?

(Objection): In the doctrine of those proponents who say that Ajātabrahman (unborn or birthless Brahman) alone is Paramārtha how at all can the Śruti which describes Srishţi (creation) be a valid means? The statement that - "Brahman is Aja (birthless) i.e. an Entity which is not born; even so, It by Itself assuming another form gets created" - is a self-contradictory one, is it not so? It being so, it amounts to saying that Ajātivāda is not in consonance with Śruti, is it not so?

(Solution): For the Srishti Śrutis there is no prime purport in describing creation at all; in order to preach or expound Ātmaikatwa the Śrutis use this methodology of creation as a pedagogic device - thus previously itself (3-15) we have mentioned.

(Question): In that case, why is it that here again the topic of Srishti has been raised?

(Answer): This verse undertakes here to deliberate upon and explain as to how the literal meaning of the Sruti which

describes Srishți is agreeable to Ajātavāda. Therefore, there is no defect of repetition.

Here in this context the opinion of the Jātabrahmavādin is: (आकाशः संभूतः) - meaning: "From that Ātman the empty space was born"; (तत्रेजोऽस्जत) - meaning, "That created Tejas (fire)" - etc. - in this manner the words in these Śrutis are signifying a real event of birth - or an action of creation actually taking place; but they are not saying that Brahman exists as It is only; therefore, our doctrine alone is agreeable to the Śruti.

But this is not proper. For, the literal meaning of the Sruti agrees with both the doctrines of Jatabrahmavada and Ajātabrahmavāda indeed. To wit, the action of creation is equally applicable to both - the real Srishti and the false Srishti. For instance, Sriman Nārāyaṇa, the Vishwarūpadhara (the Lord, who has assumed the form of the entire universe) has stated : 'माया होषा मया सृष्टा यन्मां पश्यिस नारद' - (Mōksha Dharma 339-45) - meaning : "Oh Nārada, this My form which you are seeing is one created through Māyā (magical power, illusive power)". Even for a false birth as in the statement - "In a dream from a pole a demon was born and came out" - this expression of creation being used is in vogue indeed. In the Sruti neither a sentence like - "Ākāsha was really born" nor like - "That Sadbrahman really created Tejas" - is used with a special stress on the expression 'really', is it not so? Therefore, there is no scope whatsoever to stubbornly assert in the manner - "The Srishti Sruti propounds a Paramārtha Srishţi alone."

(Jātabrahmavādin): Words have two meanings, called 'Gouṇa' (in a secondary sense) and 'Mukhya' (in a predominant sense); between these, first the Mukhyārtha alone should be adopted; without a proper reason the Gouṇārtha should not be accepted. Is it not so?

(Siddhāntin): Not so. The word 'Srishṭi' itself means - 'the Srishṭi or creation that ensues from the Avidyādrishti.' We call 'Swapnasrishṭi' and 'Māyāsrishṭi' etc. as 'Gouṇa'; the creation of the five elements like Ākāsha etc., of phenomena like mountain, ocean, creatures, human beings, deities etc. we call 'Mukhya'. But whether it is Gouṇa or Mukhya, any Srishṭi for

that matter - just as an earthen pot and the pot-space - are created - due to Avidyā only, creation ensues; and to say that 'Pāramārthically' (meaning, in the Absolute sense, really) creation takes place - there is no Pramāņa whatsoever available for us. For that reason alone, the Sruti is proclaiming: 'मायां तु प्रकृति विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्' - (Shwetāshwatara 4-10) - meaning : "Prakriti is verily Māyā (magical, illusory power), Maheshwara Himself is Māyāvin (the magician)." If we observe from the Paramārtha Drishti the statement that - 'Apart from Paramatman no substance whatsoever is created' - can possibly be established to be true. Atman is devoid of birth; to say that His Swabhāva (essential nature of Pure, Absolute Being-Consciousness) changes, there is no Pramāṇa (valid means of proof) whatsoever. Therefore, it evolves that all creation is verily Avidyaka (a projection of ignorance). For this reason alone, we have previously (3-25) stated that - "The Sruti which describes Srishti is merely a clever device to signify Atmaikatwa which is Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality)."

It being so, although the literal meaning of the Śruti is equally applicable and agreeable to real Srishti and Aparaniārtha (false) Srishti, that meaning in which the Śruti has its prime purport of teaching as also which fully agrees with Yukti (reason) - we should perforce accept it as the 'Śrutyartha' and to stubbornly assert that - 'The Mukhyārtha should agree" and to shun both the Śrutis' Tātparya (prime purport of teaching) and a strong, formidable (inviolable) Yukti is not at all justifiable or rational.

EVEN AFTER DETERMINING THE ŚRUTYARTHA IS THERE A NEED FOR YUKTI?

It was stated at the beginning of this Chapter that - "Yukti has been mentioned here in order to indicate that the meaning of the Śruti is in accordance with valid means." But now in the present context it appears as though it is hinted that even after the meaning of the Śruti is determined, there is a need for demonstrating the support of Yukti. It has to be deliberated upon as to what extent this is correct.

A solution for this doubt is: The philosophical teaching (Siddhānta) is: "By deliberating upon the meaning of the

Śruti sentences and then deciding alone one can attain Brahmātma Vijñāna (the Intuitive Knowledge that Brahman and Atman are one and the same Ultimate Reality) and not by any other means or in any other manner too. It has been taught in the previous Chapters that - "When (the Jiva) wakes up from beginningless $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusory) sleep he cognizes the Advaitatattwa" - (1-16); "Just as one comes to cognize that the rope alone is Paramārtha (really real), to determine that Ātman alone is Paramārtha is the Paramārthajñāna" - (2-18). When a doubt of the type - "This is opposed to the valid means of Pratyaksha etc., is it not so ?" - was raised, it was decided on the strength of Kārikās like - "This Dvaita is merely Māyā (an illusion)" - (1-17); "The truth that - this universe is like $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (magic), Gandharvanagara (a celestial city in mid-air) is (false) - is found in Vedāntas (the Upanishads)" - (2-31) - that the teaching - "In the Vedantas it has been propounded that Dvaita is false" - was determined. When the doubt of the type - "In that case, if the Vedantartha is that Dvaita is false alone, then how can the sentences which describe the birth of the Jivas by mentioning illustrations of clay and metal, as also the sentences which describe the birth of the Jivas' Kāryakarana be reconciled ?" - was raised, we provided a Samādhāna by saying that all those sentences we have to interpret in a different manner - (3-13, 3-10, 3-14, 15, 16). Our own tenet of - "Advaita alone is Paramārtha" - was justified with the support of Śruti Pramāṇa (3-11, 12, 13-18) and it was further depicted that Jātabrahmavāda was opposed to Yukti.

But here how can it be determined that Ajātivāda alone is approved by the Śrutis? There are also Śruti sentences of the type - "From Brahman the empty space (Ākāsha) was born" - etc. is it not so? How to determine that the meaning of the Śruti sentence like - 'स आत्मा स विजेय:' - meaning - "He alone is Ātman, He alone should be cognized" is :- "One should cognize Advaitātman alone who is Nityajñānarūpa (eternally of the essential nature of Intuitive Knowledge or Pure Consciousness) and Nityājaswarūpa (eternally of the essential nature, devoid of birth) alone" -? When there exists a Śruti which expounds the birth of Ākāsha etc. from Ātman, how at all can the meaning of -

'Atman is Nitya and Prapañchōpashama (in whom the world of duality has become extinct or has subsided totally) alone' - itself can be accepted? We should not. Therefore, why can't we imagine that - "Although Brahman is Aja (devoid of birth), because It is endowed with many powers It is born in forms like Ākāsha etc." - ? There are many Śrutis which state that -"Brahman gets transformed in Kāryarūpa (forms of effect)" while the Srutis mention that - "Brahman is Aja" - are a few in number only. Therefore, in accordance with Śrutis like -'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' (Tai. 2-7) (It created Itself by Itself) and as decided in the Brahmasūtra - 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' - (Vedānta Sūtra 1-4-36) - meaning: "Brahman which is Aja also gets transformed" - it is proper for us to assume thus alone. Hence, it appears to be quite proper to imagine that - "Brahman gets transformed both in the forms of Jivas and in the form of the Jagat (world of duality)" - This is the doctrine of the Jātabrahmavādin.

For this the counter-stratagem of Shri Gaudapādāchārya is: "That which is Nishchita (absolutely certain) as also Yuktiyukta (fully in consonance with logic or reason) - that alone can possibly be the Sruti meaning." The real purport behind this statement is: That meaning of the Sruti sentence in which the Śruti has its Tātparya (prime purport) that alone has to be decided to be the real meaning of the Sruti, but without proper deliberation it is not possible to determine any particular interpretation as the real Srutyartha. First of all, Tatparyalingas or the stipulated requisites or symbols of determining the Tatparya of a text - called 'Upakrama' (the promise made in the preamble) and 'Upasamhāra' (conclusion deduced at the end of the exposition) have to be examined and then the meaning of the sentence has to be determined. In the present context, the question that -"Whether the Śruti's purport is to propound that Brahman is Aja alone or is it to indicate that Brahman gets transformed into various forms of Jagat, Jivas etc. ?" - has to be deliberated upon and a proper answer to it is to be determined. To say that the Śruti has its prime purport in teaching both is not tenable; for, in that event it amounts to saying that - "Brahman is of the essential nature of being born" - as also, at the same time, that - "Brahman is not of the essential nature of being born"- it becomes evidently self-contradictory. To say - "In that case, let us assume or reckon any one of these two to be the Śruti's purport" - also, it is not possible; for, in the case of Karma (action), we can imagine, assume in the manner: "This can be done in this way; or it can be done in that other way also." But it is never possible to imagine or infer that - "The Vastustithi (a ground reality) may be like this; or it may be like that also." Here in the present context - when once the Srutis which teach that Brahman is Aja signify their real implicit purport, there does not arise any $\bar{A}k\bar{a}nksh\bar{a}$ (aspiration or hankering after) whatsoever about anything; but Srishtiśrutis are not like this at all. The Śrutis have undertaken the task of teaching exclusively the Brahmaswarūpa in the manner - "That from which these elements, creatures are born That Entity you cognize; That alone is Brahman" (Tai. 3-1); so as not to entertain any aspiration whatsoever, the Srutis have not stated merely - "The elements and creatures are born from Brahman" - and have stopped abruptly. We can possibly assume the Srishti that the Sruti sentences mention to be either Paramārtha Srishţi (the absolutely or really real) or Māyika Srishti (magical, illusory creation); from that kind of assumptions there is no danger whatsoever posed to the literal meaning of the sentence. Therefore, we should interpret the Sruti sentence which pertains to the occurrence of creation in such a manner that it fully agrees with the meaning of 'Ajatwa' that is determined to be the Srutyartha. In the same way, because the Vedanta Sutra is there to determine exclusively the Śrutyartha we have to determine the final purport of the word 'Parināma' (transformation) that exists in the Sūtra to mean 'Māyika Parināma' (illusory transformation) alone so as to be in consonance with the Śruti.

Thus even after the real purport of the Śruti is determined, in order to further establish the veracity of that decision in the manner - "That alone is the subtle (implicit) meaning of the Śruti" - it becomes quite necessary to follow or adopt Yukti (Intuitive reasoning). For, the fruit of Brahma Jñāna has to be in consonance with Intuitive Experience (Anubhava); like the Karma Phala it is not something which accrues in due course of time after death. Therefore, the real

purport of the Śruti should necessarily be determined by Tātparyalingas like Upakrama and Upasamhāra, as stated before; thereupon that purport or meaning that was determined should invariably be tested for obtaining a steadfast, unshakeable conviction by means of suitable Intuitive reasonings or methodologies (described in various Śrutis) in the manner - "Is this determined purport in consonance with Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) or not?" Thus determination (Nishchaya) and Yukti (Intuitive reasoning) - from both these that Śrutyartha which evolves - that alone is the real Śrutyartha. This is the intended meaning, purport behind the Kārikā.

It being so, when the meaning of the Sruti is not determined alone, Yukti becomes invariably a necessity. Those people to whom merely by means of Śruti Vākya Śravaṇa (listening to the scriptural sentences) the truth that - "Atmatattwa is birthless" - is not decidedly, convincingly cognized, such of them should utilize Śrouta Yuktis (Intuitive reasoning or methodologies inbuilt or mentioned in the Srutis themselves) of the type - "The Māyājanma; Jāgrat and Swapna being equal as expounded in the Śrutis" - etc. as also other Loukikayuktis (empirical, workaday reasonings or logical arguments) which are fully in consonance with them, and then only the real purport of the Sruti teaching will have to be determined or dicided. But even then it should not be assumed or wrongly understood that Anumana (inference), Upamāna (illustration), Arthāpatti (inferential conclusion) etc. which the hardcore logicians have accepted calling it by the name 'Tarka' has to be acknowledged. The student of Vedantic spiritual science should invariably interpret all terms like 'Tarka', 'Upapatti', 'Yukti' - to mean 'Śrouta Yukti' (scriptural, Intuitive reasoning) in consonance with Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) only.

8. BRAHMAN WHICH IS AJA, ADVAYA AND AMRITA IS ITSELF THE ŚRUTYARTHA

नेह नानेति चाम्नायादिन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यपि । अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः ॥२४॥

Meaning: "Because of the facts that: (a) "(Here) there is no Nānātwa (manifoldness)" - thus there is a Śruti;

(b) "Indra by virtue of His Māyās (magical powers) - (appears as many" - thus the Śruti states; (c) further it says - "Though birthless He is born in many ways" - (this alone is the Śrutyartha)."

FOR THE ŚRUTI MĀYĀSŖISHŢI ALONE IS ITS INTENDED PURPORT

To the question: "What is the valid evidence to say that in the Sruti, Ajādvaya Tattwa alone is determined?" - the answer is: If it were true that actually, in reality, creation had taken place, then since Nānātwa (manifoldness) becomes real alone the Śāstra which teaches that - "There is no Nānātwa" would not have been valid or tenable; but, the Sruti is stressing in the manner: "Here there is not even the least bit of manifoldness" - (Bri. 4-4-1). Therefore, the creation that was imagined in order to teach Atmaikatwa amounts to be Aparamārtha (not really real) indeed. Therefore, we are induced to determine that this too was - just like the Pranasamvada etc. - a wellimagined device alone and the Srishti Sruti has no intended purport of signifying that actually Srishti occurred at all. In support of this conclusion is the Śruti statement : 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुक्ष ईयते' (Bri. 2-5-19) - meaning : "Indra by virtue of His Māyās (magical powers) appears as many forms" - which has utilized the word 'Māyā' (illusory, magical power) which signifies, connotes that it is Aparamārtha (not absolutely real).

Here in this context the opponent may raise an objection: In the Vedas the word 'Māyā' is used as indicating 'Jñāna' (Knowledge). In Yāska's 'Nirukta' (3-9) (text on Lexicon) among the eleven names given for Jñāna this word 'Māyā' also is to be found. It being so, how can it be concluded that the word 'Māyā' means 'Aparamārtha' (not really real)? For this objection, the solution is: The word 'Māyā' found in this context, though it means 'Jñāna' alone - the author has utilized it to signify Indriya Jñāna (sensory knowledge) which is Avidyākalpita (projected, conjured up due to Avidyā) alone. Although Pratyagātman (the innermost Self) is one and one only, as also Prajñānaghana (the very embodiment of Pure Consciousness like a lump of salt being salty all over), the consciousness (awareness) that is engendered by means of the senses shows or depicts Him

to be-like: (i) the external phenomena; (ii) insentient or gross; (iii) endowed with all kinds of distinctions like Shabda (sound), Sparsha (touch) etc.; (iv) many Jivas who are having different conglomerations of body, senses etc. brought about by Nāma (names) and $R\bar{u}pa$ (forms); therefore, these distinct awarenesses which are Avidyamaya (of the essence of ignorance) are called by the epithet of 'Māyā' (illusion); that is all, and $Praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ (Consciousness or Awareness), which is verily $\bar{A}tmaswar\bar{u}pa$ (the essential nature of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness), is not at all called 'Māyā'. Because of the facts that: (a) the really real (i.e. the Absolute, Transcendencal, totally beyond the empirical) Prajñā (Pure Consciousness) - though being one and one only is signified here in the plural sense by the usage of the word -'Māyās'; (b) in the next part of the sentence: 'युक्ता ह्यस्य हरयः शता दश' - (Bri. 2-5-19) - these Prajñās are called 'horses' and are stated to be Ananta (endless) - and so, for the expression - "by means of Māyās" it becomes certain that the real meaning here is: "by means of Indriya Prajñās (sensory awarenesses or perceptions) which are of the Avidyārūpa (of the nature, form of ignorance)" - alone.

Thus although this Ātman appears to have become many endowed with forms of the phenomena projected by the sensory perceptions, there is no harm or danger whatsoever posed to His Ajādvaya Swarūpa (essential nature of birthlessness and nonduality). In order to specify this aspect the Śruti clearly states: 'अयं वै हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि बहूनि चानन्तानि तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्ममयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूरित्यनुशासनम्' - (Bri. 2-5-19), meaning: "He alone are those Prajñās called 'horses'; this Brahman is devoid of a cause, devoid of an effect; not having an interior nor an exterior; this Ātman alone is the Brahman which is cognizing everyone by means of Anubhava (Intuitive Experience, i.e. Pure Consciousness)."

Further, there is a Śruti sentence: 'अजायमानो बहुषा विजायते' - (Tai. Āraṇyaka 3-13), meaning - "Being birthless alone, He is being born in many ways" - is it not so? In this context too the fact that - 'Janma, which is to become many, is to be discerned as due to Māyā only' - is being indicated in the Kārikā

- 'मायया जायते तु सः', meaning - "By virtue of Māyā alone He is born" - by a significant word - 'Tu'. In one and the same substance both the events, occurrences like - not being born and being born in many ways or forms - cannot take place simultaneously in the real sense (Paramārtha). If it is asserted in that manner - then it is akin to saying - "Fire is hot, at the same time it is cold also" - and thereby it amounts to the Śruti stating something the meaning of which is contradictory to its own earlier statement. In that event, the Śruti will be rendered invalid indeed!

Thus apart from the two reasons of - (i) Dvaita being refuted, negated; (ii) stressing the truth that - "Ātman is Aja alone" - 'since the Sruti mentions a Phala (a benefit, fruit) only to one who has cognized the *Ekatwa* (identity of Brahman-Ātman as also their being non-dual) - it has to be concluded that this alone is correct and certain. Previously too (3-15) it has already been stated that Srishţijñāna (the knowledge about creation) is a subtle device (adopted by the Śāstra) to teach Ātmaikatwa (nonduality of the Self). In this regard the Sruti mentioning a Phalasruti (statement of benefit or fruit) in the manner - 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमन्पश्यतः' - (Īśa. 6), meaning - "To one who has cognized Ekatwa (non-duality) where is any scope for grief or attachment"; as also the Sruti which condemns Bhedajñāna (knowledge of distinction) like - 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' -(Katha 2-1-10), meaning - "One who sees that there exists distinction here, he gets death after death" - should be remembered.

संमूतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते । को न्वेनं जनयेदिति कारणं प्रतिषिध्यते ॥२५॥

Meaning: "Because the Śruti is condemning the *Upāsana* of (meditation on) Sambhūti, it amounts to negating birth. By the sentence - "Who will create him once again" - it amounts to negating any cause."

In the Śruti: 'अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽसंभूतिमुपासते । ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उसम्भूत्या रताः ।।' - (Īśa Mādh. 9) - in this manner the meditation

on Sambhūti (a deity) is condemned. From this it can be discerned that 'Sambhava' - getting born - itself is condemned.

Here an objection: This is a discussion about the purport of scriptural sentence found in the Mādhyandina recension of Īshāvāsya Upanishad. Therein it has been criticised in the manner - "Those who meditate upon Sambhūti (a deity) go to a greater Andhamtamas (pitch darkness) than the one to which those who meditate on Asambhūti go to". But there the criticism has not been made merely for criticism's sake. How is that? To explain: Later on (Īśa. 11) it is stated: 'संपूर्ति च विनाशं च यस्तद्वेदोभय सह । विनाशेन मृत्युं तीर्त्वा संभृत्याऽमृतनभूते ।।' - meaning - "One who discerns both Sambhūti and Vināsha (Karma - action) in tandem and practises - he will conquer or cross over Mrityz (death) by means of Vināsha (Karma) and by means of Sambhūti attains Amritatwa (immortality)." From this it becomes certain that this Śruti has the main purport of signifying the truth that a seeker should combine, blend both these, viz. Sambhūti and Vināsha and practise, as a result of which a superior fruit which is of Amritarūpa (nature of immortality) alone will accrue. Here 'Sambhūti' means 'Devatopāsana' (meditation on a deity) and 'Vināsha' means Karma (action, ritual); those who practise these can never attain Andhamtamas (pitch darkness, greater hell); if it is maintained that the Sruti's ultimate purport is only to condemn (merely for it's sake), then the Sruti will become Apramāņa (invalid) alone. In the same way, in this Sruti too later on with a view to teaching the Samuchhaya (blending, mixing) of Vidyā (meditation) and Avidyā (Karma, rituals) each of them are found to have been criticised or condemned when performed singly. No one who is a Vivekin can ever accept the statement that - "Those people who practise Vidyā (Self-Knowledge) will attain Andhamtamas" - is it not so? It being so, in both these contexts it will be reasonable to adopt the Mimāmsā Nyāya (axiomatic truth propounded, adopted by adepts in etymological science): "The criticism has no real purport in criticising that which is being criticised, but to eulogise that teaching which has to be praised (as beneficial for the student or seeker)". In any case, here there is no room or occasion whatsoever for criticising Sanıbhava (being born); it being so, with the support of this Śruti how at all is it possible to champion your imagination that - "Nothing is born" -?

A solution for this is: True; as you say, here with a view to teaching that both 'Sambhūti' and 'Vināsha' have to be combined and practised together the Sruti has undertaken to expound in this manner. Even so, the real intended purport of the sentence - "By means of Vināsha (Karma) he crosses Mrityu (death)" is: By practising or performing $S\bar{a}straic$ Karmas (rituals, rites) the practitioner crosses the 'Mrityu' which is of the nature of Loukikajñāna (empirical knowledge) and from that what accrues as Loukikapravritti (mundane behaviour). Similarly, by means of the Samuchhaya (blending, mixing) of Sambhūti and Vināsha meaning, combining Devatopasana and Karma if one carries on his spiritual practices, the seeker will, as a result, acquire a Samskāra (a refinement of the mind) and eventually he will attain the fruit of crossing over or conquering the Mrityu of the nature of 'Sādhyasādhanaishana' (a desire for performing those spiritual. Sādhanas which yield a Sādhya or probable result) so that Karmaphalarāga (attachment towards the fruit of the ritual or rite) manifests itself. In fact, this alone is taught by the Mantra part of 'By means of Avidyā he crosses Mrityu'.

Here one doubt may raise its head: If it is true that 'Avidyā' means 'Samuchhaya' (blending) of 'Sambhūti' (Devatā Upāsana) and 'Vināsha' (Karma), then it amounts to saying that it (this Samuchhaya) is really Avidyā alone; for, both Karma and Upāsana are existing or functioning in the Avidyākshetra (region of ignorance) alone, and this is verily the Siddhānta (spiritual teaching). How at all is it possible to practise Samuchhaya by blending such Avidyā with Vidyā? When Adhyātmavidyā (Self-Knowledge), which is like light, dawns Samuchhaya, which is like darkness, cannot at all co-exist, is it not so? For this doubt a Samādhāna (consolatory explanation)¹ is: As stated so far, by

^{1.} Although this discussion about the objection and its solution is not to be easily understood by every one, for the sake of those who wish to learn the quintessence of the teachings of the Bhāshyas this topic is explained here. The real purport of the sentence here is decided in accordance with the Mādhyandina recension of the Īśāvāsya Upanishad. According to that text - with regard to the Śruti sentence - "One who cognizes together both Vidyā and Avidyā" - the absolutely real (Paramārtha) Vidyā and Avidyā alone should be accepted. In the

the Samuchhaya of Devatā Upāsana and Karma - one who crosses over Mrityu of the type of Putra (son), Vitta (wealth) and Karma (ritual, rites) - (Eshana or desire which is of the form of Sādhana or spiritual practice, Eshana of Sādhya or the effect of fruits of Manushya Löka or human world, Pitru Löka or world of manes and Deva Loka or world of deities - both these types of Eshanas) - to him alone, by dint of the spiritual instruction of the Upanishads, Vidyā (Self-Knowledge) will necessarily accrue. For this reason, the Mantra portion of - "One who cognizes together both Avidyā and Vidyā" - with this kind of meaning as its purport signifies it. "Together" here means not 'at one and the same time' at all; it really means 'in one and the same person' - alone. It being so, although for the sentence - "Those who meditate upon Sambhūti go to a higher Andhamtamas (region of pitch darkness or hell)" the fact that it is Arthavāda (a doctrine of secondary importance or by way of an eulogy) alone is decided for reasons like - (a) it is a remaining aspect of Samuchhaya Vidhāna (stipulations pertaining to blending of the two), as also (b) the fruit of Sambhūtyupāsana has been mentioned - since the criticism of Sambhūti that is found here is mere Arthavāda, should we accept for this sentence only Gounartha (i.e. a secondary meaning)? Or because of the facts that - (i) in the sentence - "By means of Sambhūti he attains Amrita (immortality)" - the Absolute, real immortality is not at all signified; (ii) the sentence - "By means of Vidyā he attains Amritatwa" - signifies Mukhyāmritatwa (the really real Immortality) by way of its prime purport - should we accept here the tenet that the Sambhūti, which yields the fruit of Amritatwa projected by Avidya, is really criticised? When such a doubt arises, it is reasonable to assume invariably that this Sambhūti that belongs to the Avidya region itself is really criticised. There-

sentence - "Seeing a tiger in the dream, there existed a sword in the hand of the woken-up person" - just as the dream tiger is not a real tiger at all from the waking viewpoint, similarly the 'Sambhava' (birth, Janma) that accrues from the Avidyā viewpoint is never the real one from the Paramārtha Drishṭi. Therefore, that is negated, sublated by Vidyā Drishṭi in the Śruti; to assume in this manner there is no defect whatsoever. From this Avidyā Drishṭi - meaning - from the Vyavahāra Drishṭi - it does not amount to saying by this that the Devata (deity) has not been born.

fore, here in this context to say that Sambhava (birth) is refuted, negated there is no defect whatsoever.

ŚRUTI IS NEGATING THE CAUSE FOR JANMA

In the same way, the Śruti: 'जात एव न जायते को न्वेनं जनयेत् पुनः' - (Bri. 3, 9-28-7), meaning - "Who is it that makes him born again?" - thus negates a cause which makes Atman to be born. After concluding the topic of Māyā, it is not possible to really make Jīva, created by means of Māyā, to be born once again, is it not so? Similarly, the phenomenon of Manushya (human being) appearing as a Manushya is Avidyā Kalpana (imagination or misconception projected by ignorance); once that Avidyā disappears, the Jiva is verily Paramatman who is of Nityamuktaswabhāva (of the essential nature of eternally liberated one). Then who is there to make him once again to be born? Even in the beginning he was really not born as a Manushya at all, is it not so? The snake that was seen in a rope due to Bhrānti (delusion) was, even during the time of the Bhranti, was not born at all; it being so, after the conviction of the type - "This is a rope only" - is born, who can possibly make that snake be born 'once again'? In the same way, because the Sruti has raised an objection of the type - "Even after determining the truth that the Manushya - who is, by virtue of his very essential nature verily Advitiyātman devoid of birth - realizing in the manner - 'I am verily Aja-Advitiyātman' - by means of Intuitive Knowledge, who can ever possibly make him come back once again as Manushya having birth and death?" - it amounts to saying that the Sruti stresses the teaching that there is no cause whatsoever for birth. Here the real purport of the Sruti teaching is: For a thing, which is born due to Avidya and then which has disappeared due to Vidya, there is no cause whatsoever which can make it to be born again.

Here there is a point which is to be deliberated upon. In the present context the circumstance in which the Brihadāranyaka sentence has appeared is as follows:

यत्समूलमावृहेयुर्वृक्षं न पुनराभवेत् । मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्णः कस्मान्मूलात् प्ररोहित ॥ जात एव न जायते को न्वेनं जनयेत् पुनः ॥ - (Bri. 3-9-28-6, 7).

Here this is a question which was put by Yājñavalkya to

Brāhmins who were in the gathering or conference. It means: "If a tree along with its root is wrenched off, pulled out, it cannot once again be born. If one who is mortal is pulled off by Death (Mṛityu) how can he once again from which root be born? Anyone may raise a question here: 'He has already been born; hence there is no need of his being born, is it not so?' But, "Who is it that can cause his birth 'once again'?" - this is the question raised by Yājñavalkya. In the Bhāshya the real import of the question is described in the manner: "There has to be necessarily a root cause for the Jagat as also for Man to be born over and over again, is it not so? Which is that root cause?" It being so, here (in this context) from where can a Pratishedha (negation) come up? - This doubt may rise in the mind of anybody.

For this the solution is: This part of the sentence can be assumed to be an objection. We can also imagine an interpretation of this sentence in the manner: "That one called 'Manushya' is, in the Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental) sense, verily Paramātman. When the Śruti has rooted out this Martyatwa (mortality) itself of the Martya (mortal being, i.e. Manushya) by signifying this (eternal) truth, once again how at all can he sprout out and from which root? - such an objection itself Yājñavalkya has formulated as a question and has successfully befuddled his opponents" - Here the opinion is: Just as a tree which is wrenched off along with its roots cannot possibly be born again, in the same way the Martyatwa that is totally rooted out by means of Vidya, how at all can it be recreated and from which root? Such a root is not to be found at all, is it not? The real purport behind this sentence - realizing it as an objection - is: "Man appearing as Martya (a mortal) is due to Avidyā; when once the root called 'Avidya' is wrenched off by means of Vidyā, how at all can there remain an event of his being born or dying?" This very opinion is expressed by the Sruti sentence coming in due course in this same Upanishad as follows: "Then the Martya becomes Amrita; here itself he enters into Brahman" - (Bri. 4-4-7).

Now, the purport behind the present part of the sentence viz. 'जात एव न जायते' is: "Being born alone, He remains unborn" - meaning - 'At the very moment when He appears to have been

born, really He is of the Aja-Advaya-Swarūpa.' Such a one - who can ever make or cause him to be born? At the very moment when it is known that He is born, in reality (actually), it mounts to His not being born - i.e. after Avidyā is completely sublated, falsified - where is the question of stressing that He is not born 'once again'? Then, there does not exist any cause whatsoever which can bring about His birth 'once again', is it not so? - This is the real intented meaning or opinion of the author of that sentence, viz Yājñavalkya.

In any case, the real intended purport in the mind of the person who put the question thus: "After Mrityu (death) roots out the Martyatwa (mortality) of the Martya (mortal, human being), once again from which cause does he get born?" - is: "Without knowing the fact that - 'Man is not really of the essential nature of being born' - the Brahmins will get deluded to think that (Yājñavalkya) has asked in answer to this question a cause for Man taking birth and then will endeavour to find one, believing that there must be some particular cause. Then it will amount to my getting complete success in this discussion" - Thus it was Yājñavalkya's opinion.

Anyhow, thus an objection of the type - "Who is it that causes him to be born once again" - was raised and the truth that - "There is no cause whatsoever for birth" - has been fully established in the Śruti. This, in fact, is the real purport behind the Kārikā.

स एष नेतिनेतीति व्याख्यातं निह्नुते यतः । सर्वमग्राह्मभावेन हेतुनाऽजं प्रकाशते ।।२६।।

Meaning: "All that was stated in the beginning in the manner - 'That this one is (Atman) called 'Neti Neti' (Not this, not that)' - is sublated because of the fact that it is Agrāhya (incomprehensible); then Ajatattwa (the birthless Reality) shines by Itself."

SINCE THE SPIRITUAL INSTRUCTION IS MADE BY NEGATING ALL SPECIAL FEATURES ALONE, AJĀTMAN ALONE IS THE MEANING OF THE ŚRUTI

To decide that the *Tattwa* (Ultimate Reality) that the Śruti intends to teach is Ajādvaya Ātman alone, there is yet another

reason indeed. That is: By negating all special features in the manner - 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' - (Bri. 2-3-6), meaning - "Therefore now we state the spiritual teaching or instruction about Brahman - 'Not this, not that'." What the Sruti has taught - viz. that to cognize 'Atman' it is very difficult; keeping this fact in view, the Sruti undertakes to instruct that Reality over and over again adopting various pedagogic devices; thus whatever teachings it has instructed through those devices - all of them the Sruti later sublates, negates. From this extraordinary methodology all those phenomena which may be categorised as 'being born' and which become objects for the intellect (Buddhi) - all those things which are Grāliya (comprehended by the intellect) are rendered thereby to have been negated. To wit: In the Sruti sentence - "Mūrta (with form) and Amūrta (without form) are the only two forms of Brahman" - (Bri. 2-3-1) - for the word 'Satyam' the object that is signified by it is the 'Panchabhūtas' (the five primordial elements of Ākāsha, Vāyu, Agni or Tejas, Ap and Prithivi) and these are divided into two categories of 'Mūrta' and 'Amūrta'; thereby from the two Drishtis (viewpoints) of Adhidaiva (the celestial aspect or part of the waking world), Adhyātma (the corporeal aspect or part of it which is the subjective aspect of ourselves within the body) also the essence of these Mūrta and Amurta are indicated; thereafter calling the 'Amurtarasa' (of the essence of formless phenomenon) as 'Purusha' and teach that these Vishesharūpas (special forms) are having forms of latent impressions like the colour of yellow etc.; then Brahman, which is described as 'Real of the real' - in order to signify Its essential Śruti has stated: 'अथातो आदेशो नेति नेति न होतस्मादिति nature, the नेत्यन्यत्परमस्ति' - (Bri. 2-3-6). Here by means of two negations of the type - "Neti, Neti" - (Not this, not that) - all special features or characteristics are negated; the real purport behind this statement is to help the mind of the Jijñāsu (the seeker) to get fully stabilised, established in Brahman alone which is devoid of any mundane dealings of verbal communication, involving phenomena like Dravya (substance), Guna (quality) etc. - and which is verily a uniform mass of Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness). Even after instructing in this manner the Sruti - fully aware of the fact that all Jijñāsus cannot possibly discern the Swarūpa (essential nature

of Pure Being-Consciousness of Atman) which is devoid of any kind of special features whatsoever and is very subtle - in order that they may be helped to concentrate their mind on such a sublime Reality, adopts repeatedly various pedagogic devices and teaches It through various methodologies. To wit: (i) Because the five primordial elements like Prithivi, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu and Ākāsha are each one subtler than the previous one in that order mentioned here, the Sruti indicates that the previous element is woven as the warp and woof in the next higher (subtler) element; then it teaches that in Brahman which is innermost to all else the subtlest element of $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space) is woven as the warp and woof; that very Brahman is called "Akshara". The Śruti states: "That Akshara (Tattwa) is not Sthūla (gross), not Anu (subtle); is not short, not long" etc. - (Bri. 3-8-8) - and removes all special features. Thereafter, (ii) by means of a system of Sankocha (the contraction) and Vikāsa (expansion) of the Niyantavyadevatas (controlling deities) that very Brahman is once again signified; later on too the Śruti states: 'स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा' (Bri. 3-9-26), meaning - "That this is Atman called 'Neti, Neti' (Not this, not that)." By this, what was earlier (in the beginning) mentioned as a device as in the manner - 'Prithivi etc. are existing as the warp and the woof in It', as also 'The deities are the controlling authorities' - all such superimpositions are rendered to have been sublated. Thereafter, once again, (iii) in the dialogue between King Janaka and Yājñavalkya, on the pretext of teaching the $\bar{A}tmar\bar{u}pas$ (forms of selves) of the type of Vaishwānara, Taijasa etc., since it is signified that the Nirvishesha Brahman alone is what the Sruti describes as - "That this Atman alone is this Atman called 'Neti, Neti' (Bri. 4-2-4) - " all the forms of Vaishwānara, Taijasa Ātmans which the Sruti had indicated by way of a device also stand sublated. Further, once more, (iv) after explaining the truths that Jiva who is full of desires is suffering in Samsāra, and that one who has become Ātmakāma (desirous of the Self) by means of a Sādhana (spiritual practice) of giving up, renouncing all Eshanas (desires) attains Mōksha (Beatitude, Liberation) - then the Sruti drives home the truth, teaching that when that Nirvisheshātman the seeker determines as his own Self (Ātman) he attains Mōksha -

that very Nirvisheshātman the Śruti signifies as - "That this Ātman alone is the Ātman called 'Neti, Neti' - " - (Bṛi. 4-4-22) only. By virtue of this teaching all the previous devices taught earlier stand sublated. (v) Once more in Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa because by means of illustrations like the sound of a drum etc. using the methodology of Sāmānya-Visheshabhāva (categories of genus and particular) as a subtle device, that very Nirvishesha Brahman is pointed out as - "That this Ātman alone is the Ātman indicated as 'Not this, not that' - ". (Bṛi. 4-5-15), it amounts to the device of Sāmānyavisheshabhāva, etc., mentioned earlier are sublated, rescinded.

THE REASON FOR THE SRUTI TO HAVE NEGATED WHAT IT HAD SIGNIFIED OR TAUGHT EARLIER

The answer to the question (that may arise now) that -"Thus what it has taught - all that the Sruti negates; what is the reason for this?" - is: Because the subject-matter which it has undertaken to teach is 'Agrāhya' (incomprehensible to the intellect or mind) - unable to discern the truth that - 'An Upāya (device) is mentioned with the exclusive purport of pointing out the 'Upeya' (the subtle object meant to be pointed out)' - with the fear that the seekers may reckon that all the phenomena like Mūrta and Amūrta forms, Prithivi etc. are spread out as warp and woof etc. just like the Nirvisheshātman - the Śruti starts rescinding, negating all the special features it had deliberately superimposed on the Nirvisheshātman by way of a subtle device. If a question of the type - "Brahman is Agrāhya; therefore, one should not mix up or associate phenomena like Mūrta, Amūrta etc. with Brahman and then cognize It - with this purport alone as its motive the Sruti is negating all that it had mentioned earlier. Now how can this fact be reckoned?" - is raised, then the answer is provided by the Sruti itself in the manner : 'अगृद्धो न हि गृद्धते' - (Bri. 3-9-26 ; 4-2-4 ; 4-4-22 ; 4-5-15). Thus everywhere the Sruti instructs about Atman in this manner alone. The implicit teaching in this methodology is: Atman who has been taught as 'Not this, not that' in Madhu Kānda - that very Ātman alone is being signified in this alternative, different device. Merely on this count, it should not be reckoned that here the Upāya also should necessarily be grasped,

discerned just like Atman, who is the Upeya alone; that is not the purport at all. For, this Atman does not have any adjuncts (Upādhis) whatsoever; He is Agrāhya (not one that can ever be comprehended by the mind); it is not possible to directly comprehend Him by means of any Upāya whatsoever. It is proper indeed to adopt certain devices at certain places; but that is projected or conjured up by Avidya ; a mere misconception indeed. Only by sublating, negating that misconception the Swarūpa of Atman has perforce to be cognized (Intuited). To this extent that plays the role merely of an Upāya (subtle device); but the ultimate purport here too is not to associate or mix it with Ātmaswarūpa which is the goal of the device (Upeya) and then cognize Him. For this reason only, it is being taught by the Sruti in the manner - "This one is that Atman called 'Neti, Neti' (Not this, not that)." Hence, because first that phenomenon which is objectified by the intellect (Buddhi) as something born is being taught by means of (or employing) an Upāya (subtle device) and later all those phenomena are rescinded, negated in the manner - "Not this, not that" - it is implicit that - "One who cognizes the truth that - 'What is signified through Upāya has the Tātparya (ultimate purport, goal) of teaching the Upeya (objective to be known cognized by means of the device) alone; but Atman, who is the Upeya especially, is one who exists everywhere in one and the same form' - to such a person Atmatattwa, which is Aja (unborn) internally and externally, reveals Itself by Itself."

THROUGH THE UPAYA OF A FALSE APPEARANCE ALSO A REAL ENTITY CAN BE COGNIZED

(Question): How is it possible to cognize Nirvisheshātman who is real through a device which is false?

(Answer): To wit, for the purpose of knowing the Upeya (object to be known, inferred through the device) alone the Upāya is needed, but there is no compelling need or pre-requisite at all that the Upāya should necessarily be a really existing entity. Because before the dawn of Jñāna (Knowledge) the Upāya is a Vyāvahārikasatya (empirically a real entity) that may serve as a device indeed. Just as for the knowledge of numerals the written lines on paper which are imagined to represent the numerals, as also for the knowledge of the alphabets

like A, B etc. aids or accessories like paper, like written lines etc., are serving as devices only - similarly here also it should be understood. Apart from this, except for the negation of the special features which are conjured up by Avidya no transaction of using any other Pramana is needed at all for the purpose of cognizing (Intuiting) Atman who is Nirvishesha; for, Atman is Svayamsiddha (self-established). Therefore, any Upāya it may be, it has to be utilized here only for the purpose of relinquishing and sublating the special feature which has been superimposed (Adhyārōpita Vishesha) and not for directly signifying Atman as such and such. When it is said that a particular Upāya is an Upāya for Ātmajñāna, it means that the phenomenon which is supposed to be a Vikalpa (misconception) in Atman is an object which is invariably to be rescinded alone; just as a rope-snake etc. being a Vikalpa is said to be an Upaya for the purpose of cognizing (the reality of) the rope, in the same way here too it should be suitably discerned (to wit, the prime purport of using any deliberate superimposition of a quality or special feature that the Śāstra adopts as a doorway, so to speak, is to guide the seeker to trace back its final cause of the Self which happens to be the innermost Pure Being-Consciousness of the seeker and is self-established and selfeffulgent). To cognize Atman means as soon as the Vikalpa is sublated what manifests by Itself and not what appears as a result or effect of any Pramāṇa Vyāpāra (dealing or usage of any valid means). For, there is no need whatsoever of cognizing through any Pramāņa Ātman who is Swayamprakāsha (self-effulgent) ; besides, these Pramanas etc. are being misconceived in that $ar{\mathbf{A}}$ tman alone and are appearing with His help only.

This truth has been indicated in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Vārtika (of Shri Sureshwarāchārya) as : 'प्रमाणमप्रमाणं च प्रमापासं च यद् पवेत्। चैतन्याकारमेवैतत् प्रथते सर्वमेव तत्।।' - (Bṛi. Vā. 2-4-2, 134), meaning - "Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge), Apramāṇa (invalid means), anything appearing as Prameya (object for the valid means) - in all these forms Chaitanyākāra (an apparent form of Pure Consciousness) alone is appearing indeed." Further it is stated: 'प्रमाणमप्रमाणं च प्रमापासस्तथैव च। कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसंपावना कुतः।।' - (Bṛi. Vā. 2-1-552), meaning - "Pramāṇa, Apramāṇa, appearing like a

Prameya - all these phenomena which are helping us to attain the cognition of that Entity as It is - how at all can a doubt arise that such an Entity does not exist?"

EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE THAT PARAMĀTMAN IS AN OBJECT FOR *PADAVĀKYAS* (WORDS AND SENTENCES TOO)

Here Mandanamishra, the author of 'Brahmasiddhi', and some others are saying as follows: "Because Brahman is the object for all percepts or concepts, It cannot be said to be Aprasiddha (unfamiliar). For, apart from It there does not exist any other Jñeyavastu (known entity) at all. Therefore, it cannot be said that Brahman is not the meaning of the Pada or word. Sāstra indicates Prapanchābhāva (non-existence of the world), is it not so? There, the Padartha (the substance, entity) is that which is known to us, Abhāva (its non-existence) also is a known object only; if both these aspects are joined together the cognition of the Prapanchābhāva ensues, accrues. Despite this, Brahman is said to be Śāstraikavedya (that which is known exclusively by means of the scriptures); for, the fact that there does not exist any difference or distinction (Bheda) whatsoever is to be known from the Sastra alone and this is the reason" - this is one doctrine. Further, another doctrine is as follows: "In a far-off island there exist various queer birds of such and such names; some of them have legs of emerald, some with beaks of ruby, some others with wings of gold and silver - thus suppose there is a sentence; in this sentence there is reference to a genus of birds as also its relationship with extraordinary manifold features which are already familiar to us and are cognized by us by means of several other valid means; since these heterogeneous features being together is not known through any other Pramana except this sentence and hence, just as those queer birds' existence is known exclusively by this sentence alone, in the same way the Kāraṇasāmānya (genus of cause) or Sattāsāmānya (genus of existence, being) known through another relevant Pramana may become an object of knowledge (Prameya) for a sentence; for example, in the Sruti sentence - "From which these elements (Bhūtas) are born" - (Tai. 3-1) - by interaction (Samsarga) among different objects, as also in the sentence: "It is not gross, nor subtle" - (Bri. 3-8-8) by distinction, difference (Bheda), because

it is not an object for another Pramāna but having special, extraordinary features it may become an object for a sentence. For, all sentences in general are capable of signifying any special feature which has not been cognized by our mind so far."

Thus there are two schools of philosophy which champion the cause of the tenet that - 'Brahman is the object for a sentence (Vākyārtha).' But these are not the proper tenets at all; for, these are opposed to the Śrutis like: 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (Chh. 6-2-1); 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह' - (Tai. 2-6) etc. Because Brahman alone exists and there is nothing else second to It, it is not possible to describe It which is devoid of any special features. For, none of the grounds or causes for any Pravritti (conduct, activity) like Jāti (genera), Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), Sambandha (relationship) etc. does exist in It at all. Because in It neither Avidya nor its effects exist whatsoever, there is no scope whatsoever for either difference (Bheda) from or interaction with (Samsarga) another thing which is appearing due to Avidya only. Hence It (i.e. Brahman) cannot possibly become an object for any word or sentence whatsoever. Because Brahman is Advitiya (non-dual) alone, it is not possible at all to imagine or conjecture any of the three differences (Bheda) in It, viz. Sajātiyabheda (difference in its own species), Vijātiyabheda (difference of belonging to other species), Svagatabheda (difference inherent within the thing Itself) and thereby It cannot be imagined either to be a Kāraņa (cause) or Satsāmānya (genus of existence). For this reason alone in the Brihadaranyaka Vartika it is stated: 'भेदसंसर्गहीनत्वात् पदवाक्यार्थताऽऽत्मनः । दुःसम्भाव्याऽत आत्मायमात्मनैवानुभूयते' - (Bri. $V\bar{a}$. 1-4-1408), meaning - "Because in \bar{A} tman there does not exist any particular thing's Bheda or Samsarga, Atman cannot possibly become the meaning (object) for any word or any sentence." Therefore, the Vartikakara (i.e. Shri Sureshwarachārya) has stated that - "Ātman cognizes Himself by Himself by means Anubhava (Intuitive Experience or Pure Consciousness);"

'यस्मादेवमतोऽद्वैतोऽविद्यातत्कार्यलङ्घनात् । न ह्यविद्यादिविरहे द्वैतघीरुपपद्यते ।। द्विघेतं द्वीतिमित्याहुस्तद्भावो द्वैतमुच्यते । तित्रवेघेन चाद्वैतं प्रत्यग्वस्त्विभिधीयते ।। द्विधा त्रिधा वा बहुधा कारणं सद्भवेदिहु ।। तस्याऽऽत्मिन निषिद्भत्वादात्माऽऽद्वैतो भवेत्ततः ।। भेदसंसर्गहानार्थमेवंयत्नामपि श्रुतम् । अनादृत्यान्यथा प्राहुरहोऽविद्या महीयसी ।।" - (Bri. Vā. 4-3-1806, 1807, 1808, 1809) ; 'अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं निःसामान्यविशेषतः । ब्रह्मेति मुख्यवृत्त्येह वस्तु श्रुत्याभिषीयते ॥" - (Bri. Vā. 4-3-1851). The purport implicit in these verses is: Because neither Avidya nor its effects (viz. Mithyāpratyaya and Samshaya) do not exist in Him, Atman is Advaita (non-dual). If there is no Avidya, there cannot possibly exist any Dvaitabuddhi (awareness of duality), is it not so? That phenomenon which is split up, divided into two parts is itself Dvaita (duality); absence of it alone is Advaita. Existing in two, three or many kinds is Dvaita; because this does not exist in Atman, Pratyagatman (innermost Self) is verily Advaitaswarūpa (of the essential nature of non-duality). Thus discarding (or showing such indifference to) the Sruti which has undertaken the task of negating, refuting Bheda and Samsarga and further, alas, these people are interpreting it in a different (distorted) manner; what a great phenomenon this Avidya ! Because the categories of Sāmānya (genus), Vishesha (particulars) do not exist at all, It (i.e. Brahman) has not been associated with anything whatsoever, nor anything has been left out of It; such an Entity (Vastu) is called 'Brahman'.

Some others have opined: The Buddhi (sense of awareness) of the form or shape of Ātman (Ātmākāra) that is engendered by the Śruti Vākya of तरवमिंस - (That thou art) is capable of burning the Ātmājñāna (ignorance about or of Ātman, the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness); but the cognition that accrues from the Śruti sentence of "नेति, नेति" (Not this, not that) is capable of bringing about complete dissolution of distinction superimposed on (Brahman or Ātman), but it does not 'know' how to become Ātmākāra (form or shape of Self). Let it be any Vastu (entity), unless the knowledge of its conceptual form or shape ensues, the Ajñāna (ignorance) pertaining to the entity cannot disappear or be got rid of; for instance, the 'snake' that is brought about due to the Ajñāna of the rope - without the Jñāna that kindles or illumines the rope merely by the negative knowledge (Nishedhajñāna) of the type - "This is not a snake" - it will

not disappear, is it not so? Therefore, only through the examination of the words of 'Tat' and 'Twam' that are to be found in sentences of Vidhirūpa (form of injunctions) like "Tattwamasi" - alone, the statement of the type - "Neti, Neti" - may be capable of yielding the fruit of Mōksha (Beatitude) indeed, but directly the Jñāna that can yield Mōksha cannot accrue from it; or, in the alternative, by the strength or capability of the Jñāna that accrues from the Vidhivākya the Nishedhavākya may just repeat or reiterate the Bādha (sublation, falsification) of Dvaita (duality) that has by itself disappeared; that is all. In our workaday transactions too we get an experience of the type - "This is a rope only, not a snake" - and this is quite familiar too, is it not so?

This opinion is not proper. For, even if by any particular sentence we attempt to signify Atman, the function of using the sentence has perforce to culminate in negating the Upāya (logical device) adopted for indicating Atman. In places where the Nishedhavākyas (sentences used for negation) have been found, as a remaining part of those sentences, nowhere in any Upanishad - whichever it may be - once again a Vidhirūpavākya (a sentence of the nature of an injunction) is to be found. In fact, in all the Upanishads, without exception, it is seen that a common path of signifying Atmaswarupa by means of sublating all special features conjured up by Avidyā is being followed. First and foremost, the objection itself which these disputants have raised, viz. "The Nishedhavākya cannot possibly give rise to Ātmajñāna" - is not proper; for, since Ātman is Swayamsiddha (self-established) there is no need at all for signifying Him; with regard to the illustration of the rope, we may even accept the statement that merely by means of a Nishedhavākya (negating sentence) its real essential nature may not possibly be signified; for, the rope is a Prameya (an object of a valid means of knowledge); it is not Swaprakāshaka (selfeffulgent). But in order to signify Atmajyōti (the Light of Self, of the essence of Pure Being-Consciousness and self-effulgent, self-illumining) why should there be any need and of which Jñāna? If we go deeper into the matter, even in the illustration of the rope, though the rope lies in front and is appearing, the

real, correct cognition of the rope has not accrued, and for this their (i.e., the viewers') Bhrānti (delusion) of the nature of misconception alone is responsible, is it not so? Therefore, it is not proper to assert that even after sublating Anyathājñāna (misconception), in order to signify a Vastu (entity, object) which lies in front there is a necessity of Jñāna (knowledge) arising out of Vidhi (injunction). How at all can there remain anything to be done other than removing the Bhranti that exists pertaining to It in the matter of depicting Brahmavastu which happens to be verily our Atman alone? Even with regard to the Veda Vākya - "That alone are you" - in this same manner we should reckon the Vākyaprāmānya (validity of the scriptural sentence), and this tenet is accepted by Shri Sankara, as evident from his statement in Upadeshasāhasri, poetry 18-4): 'सिद्धादेवाहमित्यस्माद्युष्मद्धमों निषिष्यते । रज्ज्वामिवाहिषीर्युक्त्या तत्त्वमित्यादिशासनैः ॥' - In this text it is very clearly mentioned that - "In Atman who is Swatahsiddha those Anātmadharma (qualities or special features that belong to the not-Self) which are misconceived - by negating or sublating those (adventitious features) alone the Vedāntavākya which is Vidhirūpa (of the distinctive form of an injunction) is a Pramāņa (valid means of knowledge)."

To conclude finally, what we have to discern here is this much only: (a) There is no dispute in regard to the fact that the Nishedhavākyas do negate all special features that are misconceived or imagined in Atma Vastu; (b) it is also possible to interpret that the Sruti Vākyas describing Srishti actually (have the prime purport of) teaching 'Māyāsrishti' (illusory, magical creation). The Sruti is proclaiming in the manner: "Atman by virtue of Māyās (His magical powers) is appearing in manifold forms"; (c) in addition to this, the Sruti stridently negates Utpatti (coming into being, birth) and Nānātwa (manifoldness, duality, diversity); (d) whatever devices the Sruti acknowledges and adopts in order to signify, teach $\overline{A}tmaswar\overline{u}pa$ (essential nature of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) in the beginning all those features are at the end negated, sublated by it; now this methodology, called 'Adhyārōpa-Apavāda' (Superimposition-Rescission), is invariably to be found in all the Upanishads. From all these reasons, we have perforce to decide, determine

that the Śruti exclusively undertakes the task of teaching Ajādvaya Paramārtha Tattwa devoid of any special characteristic whatsoever. For this reason alone we have to interpret Srishtisthitivākya as: 'The whole gamut of Srishti Śrutis teach, exclusively and invariably, Māyika Srishti (magical, illusory creation) - which has not really occurred at all.'

THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN AJĀTIVĀDA AND ACCEPTANCE OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA

सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः। तत्त्वतो जायते यस्य जातं तस्य हि जायते।।२७॥

Meaning: "To Sat (that Entity, really existing) by virtue of Māyā a Janma (birth) becomes proper; but to say really it has Janma - it cannot be proper. In that doctrine of one in which It really is born, it amounts to saying that which is born will again be born."

FOR THE SADVASTU (REAL ENTITY) JANMA (BIRTH) IS BY VIRTUE OF MĀYĀ

On the strength of several Śrutis so far it has been determined that - (i) in all ways Ātmatattwa is devoid of birth; (ii) apart from It there does not exist any second thing or phenomenon whatsoever; (iii) to such an Aja-Advaita-Tattwa of Ātman birth is possible only by virtue of Māyā and not in reality as an actual event. Now once again by means of Yukti also that teaching alone will be decided.

Here for the word 'Sataha' used in the Kārikā we have to interpret it taking Panchami Vibhakti (the ablative case) and then the meaning of the sentence will be - Janma takes place from or is caused by Sadvastu alone; if we assume Shashṭhī Vibhakti (the genitive case) for that word, the meaning of the sentence will be that to the Sadvastu Itself Janma occurs. Because both these meanings are suitable in the present context, both of them will be explained in some detail. In the Absolute, Pāramārthika sense nothing is born; Ātman is Aja (birthless) - this alone is the 'Ajātivāda' that is acceptable to Vedānta. In our empirical, workaday world whatever thing is appearing to be born - all those things are invariably appearing to be born on the basis or

support of an existing thing alone, and not that from an open, empty space it is possible for anything to be born. The fact that - "For any object that is to be born there should necessarily be a particular real cause" - is accepted by all common people as well as logicians. But only 'Shūnyavādins' (followers of Buddhistic theory of non-existence) have acknowledged the Ajātivāda of the type - "Anything being born is itself not there (existing); from anything, whatsoever it may be, nothing whatsoever is born." Hence, their doctrine has to be refuted here. In the previous verse it has been stated that - "Since Atmatattwa is Agrāhya (incomprehensible) - meaning It cannot be discerned by any valid means of knowledge (i.e. It is Aprameya), - the Śruti is negating all kinds of means or devices as 'Not this, not that', is it not so? There a doubt arises: When the teaching that -'Tattwa is ever Agrahya' - is itself true, why cannot we say that It does not at all exist? But this doubt is not proper. For, every body is seeing that in our workaday world Padarthas (things, substances) are being born. Those substances which appear as if they are born may not really exist in their true form; but merely on that count it cannot be said or concluded that they do not have any cause at all. Let us assume that a magician demonstrates as if he has made an elephant, a horse, a cart to come into being afresh. Merely on that score can it be said that none of those objects exists, in any form whatsoever? At least, it has to be accepted that the magician exists really. He makes himself appear in all these forms of magical substances. That is all. In the same way, in order that this Māyā called 'Jagat' (world of diversity) to appear as if it is born, it is reasonable to believe that that world also - seeking the support of Paramatman alone who, like the magician, without revealing Himself, is hiding and who is the Absolute Reality - is appearing. For the illusory or magical effect that the magician has created by means of his magical power has to have perforce a real Sadvastu as its support, substrate. For this teaching there is the support of the Śruti: 'यदेश सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' - (Chh.) - meaning, "Oh dear, this Jagat (world of duality) was in the beginning existing as one Sat alone without anything second to It" - which is affirming that 'From Sadvastu alone this world of duality is caused; in any case, thus one of the meanings is:

When this Jagat is being caused from Sadrūpa Tattwa alone, it is created by virtue of Māyā alone and not in reality.

If we assume the meaning of the Shashti Vibhakti (the genitive case) for the word 'Sataha', then the interpretation of this sentence will be: When the Sadvastu (real entity) like a rope etc. gets (apparent) births of the forms of a snake, a streak of water etc., those births are caused by Māyā (illusion, magic) alone and not in reality. The rope really does not become a snake; merely it appears in the form of a snake. That is all. In the same way, although Ātman is not to be comprehended, grasped through any sense or instrument of knowledge (experience), because Nirvishesha Ātman is Niravayava (without parts or limbs, components) He appears by virtue of Māyā - just like the rope appears like a snake, in the same way - as the form of the Jagat; but He is not born really. This is the second meaning.

This alone is the Vedantic 'Satkaryavada', which means - "That which appears keeping an existing entity as its support or substrate"; or, in the alternative, "The existing entity itself by illusion (Māyā) appears as a false - i.e. in another apparent - form ." The Sānkhyans too have accepted 'Satkāryavāda'; but in their doctrine it is propounded that a phenomenon called 'Pradhāna', which is a Triguṇātmaka Prakriti (primordial matter endowed with three Gunas, called Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas) really existing, really gets transformed, converted into categories like Mahat, Ahaikāra etc.; but they do not at all say that $K\bar{a}rya$ (the effect) of Jagat (world of duality) of the forms of Mahat, Ahankara etc. is a false appearance. Thus in Advaita Vedānta a distinct 'Māyāsatkāryavāda' has been acknowledged; in fact, that Vastu (entity), which really exists, itself appearing as if it has assumed another form is Māyāsatkāryavāda. This theory has been previously, in the Agama Prakarana also, mentioned as: 'प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सतामिति विनिश्चयः' (1-6) - meaning, "Existing in the beginning only, all the existing entities (Bhāvas) get Utpatti (creation, birth)." Whatever effect it may be, existing in the beginning in the form of Prājña alone it comes into being - thus it has been propounded; and in the next Kārikā (1-7) also it has been stated: 'स्वप्नमायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैविकल्पिता' - meaning, "Some

others have imagined that Śrishti or creation is equal to Svapna (dream) and $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion)." Thus it is affirmed that the creation of the world of duality is $M\bar{a}yika$ (illusory) alone.

THE MISCONCEIVED THEORY OF VYĀKHYĀNA VEDĀNTA (PHILOSOPHY PROPOUNDED BY POST-ŚANKARA COMMENTATORS)

Here in this context we should necessarily remember a salient point, which we cannot afford to forget: 'Māyāsatkāryavāda' means merely - "It is not Paramārthasatkāryavāda (i.e. Satkāryavāda in the Absolute sense)"; but it does not at all mean that the Mithyārūpa Jagat (the apparent form of the world of diversity, duality) is actually, really born or created (as an event in time and space). Some present-day Advaita Vedāntins have defined this word 'Māyasatkārya' to mean that this Srishti is verily a 'Mithyāsrishti' which is a 'kind of creation'; although for the sentences like - "From the rope alone the snake is born due to Māyā"; "The rope itself by virtue of Māyā has become the snake" - the intended meaning is that: 'All of us misconceive or wrongly conceive (believe) the rope itself to be the snake (i.e. mistaking one for the other)' - these disputants have imagined that in the rope an apparent snake (Prātibhāsika sarpa) really comes into being by virtue of the material cause (Upādāna Kāraņa) called 'Avidyā' - just as a pot is born out of clay! It is very clear that this queer doctrinaire theory has rendered even the empirically established illustration as a highly controversial topic! For, in our workaday world no one does really believe that - "At the time of the delusion a particular kind of snake is really born and as soon as the Bhrānti (delusion) is falsified, sublated the snake too dies and disappears from sight." Even (delusion) the disputants who are not Advaitins will never at all accept this theory; there is no gainsaying this truth, is it not so?

Let it be. These 'Brahmaparināmavādins' may question in the manner: "Accepting the Māyāsatkāryavada, just like the rope-snake, the Jagat appears in Brahman due to Māyā - meaning, Brahman Itself appears in the apparent form of the world" - this is the Vedānta Siddhānta; without acknowledging this teaching, why can't we imagine, conceive that the Jagat is really born alone?

Prior to Gaudapādāchārya some Advaitavādins had accepted the theory that - "Brahman gets really transformed (Parināma) into the Jagat." Now their tenet is being shown to be wrong in the second half verse of this Kārikā by Yukti (reasoning). In the doctrine of those who opine that Brahman gets transformed, it amounts to their assuming that - "It is not of 'Ajaswabhāva' (of the essential nature of birthlessness); is not Nirvikāra (devoid of mutations)." That means, it amounts to their giving up the Upanishadic teaching of - "Brahman is eternally existing as It is; in It there was no change that occurred, in the past nor there will be any change occurring in the future" - and thereby it will amount to their saying that Brahman is of an essential nature which invariably keeps on changing. Then it amounts to their doctrine giving full scope for the logical defect called 'Anavasthā $D\bar{o}sha'$ (defect of not being able to reach a finality) in the manner: Brahman is the effect (Kārya) of a particular cause (Kāraṇa) which existed prior to It; that cause also was the effect of another prior cause existing; that again becomes the effect of yet another cause - ad infinitum. Therefore, this Brahmapariņāma vāda is not proper; the purport behind the Kārikā is: "Brahman is Aja (i.e. birthless); being Nirvikāra (immutable) It is appearing to our Avidyā Drishti (viewpoint of ignorance) as of the form of the world of duality, diversity also (at the same time). Thus all disputants have to perforce accept.

असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते । वन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्त्वेन मायया वाऽपि जायते ॥२८॥

Meaning: "Asat (that which is itself not existent) getting born either due to Māyā or in reality is not tenable. A barren woman's son cannot possibly be born either really or by means of Māyā, is it not so?"

REFUTATION OF ASATKĀRYAVĀDA

The truth that - "Asatkāryavāda (the theory that a thing is born from an unreal or false phenomenon) is not proper, tenable" - has been, it amounts to saying, established by our acknowledging Satkāryavāda itself; even so, believing it, to be reasonable, to stridently refute the Asatkāryavāda, now it is being undertaken to prove that that theory is not tenable.

'Asat' means that another phenomenon or entity which is of the essential nature that is opposed to Satpadārtha (a real existing entity) - thus opine Naiyyāyikas (followers of one of the famous six Darshanas or schools of philosophy of India). Vaisheshikans (followers of another school of philosophy), Sānkhyans say that the world of duality has come into being from Paramāņu (atoms), Pradhāna (primordial matter respectively. Vedāntins do not acknowledge any kind of Satkāryavāda other than or apart from Māyāsatkāryavāda - to wit, an theory which teaches that from any other Vastu (entity) which is not Brahman the Jagat has come into being - "Such a Satkāryavada is opposed to Śruti and Yukti" - this truth was stated in the previous Kārikā. Now this Kārikā has undertaken the task of refuting the Buddhists' Asatkāryavāda - which propounds that the Jagat is born from a cause which is 'Abhāvarūpa' (of the nature of nonexistence). "Asat means 'Sarvābhāva' (non-existence of everything); before the world was born (came into being) Asat alone - meaning Sarvābhāva alone - existed; from that alone the Jagat came into being" - this theory is not proper; for, to assert that such an Asatpadārtha (unreal or false thing) existed before creation there is no Pramāṇa (valid means of evidence) whatsoever. The theory that - "Asatpadartha really or by virtue of Maya has been born as the world of duality which is Sadrūpa (of the nature of a real entity)" - is beyond all logical reasoning. There cannot possibly exist any difference, distinction whatsoever between a barren woman's son and that 'Asat'. No one can ever accept the statement that a barren woman's son is born as another entity either in reality or by Maya, is it not so?

WHOSE CONCEPT IS THIS ASATKĀRYAVĀDA?

(Objection): To say that Buddhists are Asatkāryavādins is not tenable. For, Vijñānavādins (the Buddhistic Idealists) say that Vijñāna (intellectual consciousness, awareness) alone appears as the external objects; that doctrine especially cannot possibly be Asatkārya, is it not so? Now, Shūnyavādins also are to be accepted by all as not Asatkāryavādins. For, they condemn Satkāryavāda and in the same way, they condemn Asatkāryavāda also. For instance, in 'Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamikakārikā' there is the following verse: 'नैवासतो नैव सतः प्रत्ययोऽर्थस्य युज्यते । असतः प्रत्ययः

कस्य सतश्च प्रत्ययेन किम् । न सन्नासन्न सदसन् धर्मो निवर्तते यदा । कथं निर्वर्तको हेतुरेवं सिति हि युज्यते ।। - (Mā. Kā. 1-6, 7), meaning - "To an existing entity there is no need of a cause; if it does not exist, for which thing is the cause needed? To the existing entity what can the cause do? Because none of Sat, Asat or Sadasat can possibly be born; to say that there should invariably be a cause for its birth, how can it be tenable?" Thus in a very clear manner when the Buddhists have refuted the Asatkāryavāda, is it proper to thrust this Asatkāryavāda on their head?

(Solution): Not so. For, since they have refuted all Vikalpas (concepts) like Sat, Asat etc. alone, it amounts to their accepting Asatkārya only in a different form.

(Objection): Merely on the count that they have refuted, rejected saying - "This is not so" - does it not amount to saying that they have not accepted any doctrine whatsoever?

(Solution): True. Even so, because of the facts that they have not accepted the *Vyāvahārika Janma* (empirical birth), as also they have totally rejected *Utpatti* (coming into being, creation) itself, there is no escape for them from self-contradiction.

(Question): Because they are accepting the fact that the phenomenon of Vyavahāra is mere Samvṛiti (Avidyā, ignorance) it does not fit or is not proper to allege that - "Merely because they have refuted Janma they are affected by the word of Vyāghāta (opposition, contradiction), is it not so? They do not at all accept the fact that Janma (creation, birth), Sthiti (sustenance, maintenance) and Pralaya (dissolution) are really occurring. In fact, they are saying very clearly: 'यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा। तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा पङ्ग उदाहतः' - (Mā. Kā. 7-34, p. 57) - meaning: "Just like Māyā, Svapna and Gandharvanagara, phenomena like Utpatti, Sthiti, Pralaya also should be understood", is it not so?"

(Answer): This is also not proper. In our workaday world those people too, who accept phenomena like Māyā, Svapna etc. to be false, reckon the Māyāvi (magician), those people who have seen or observed Svapna (dream) and such others to be very much existing only. It being so, in complete contrast to universal experience and without accepting the truth that even Māyāvi etc. do exist and then to undertake to exemplify illus-

trations of Māyā, Svapna etc. - such people will not hesitate even to assert that a barren woman's son has a Māyājanma, is it not so? Because it is so only, our calling these people, who have rejected both 'Samvritisatya' (Vyāvahāric reality) and 'Paramārthasatya' (Absolute, Transcendental Reality), 'Sarvāsatkāryavādins' (disputants rejecting everything as Asatkārya) is not wrong. Because we are examining this Shūnyavāda at the time of deliberation on this subject in the next Alātashānti Prakarana, for the present the deliberation on this topic may be stopped here.

Now, Vaisheshikans (the proponents of the indigenous atomic theory) are, in fact, a type of Asatkāryavādins. To wit, the quintessence of their doctrine is: Before it is born, an effect (Kārya) is Asat (false, unreal) alone. Because of the function of the Kāraņa (cause) it is born and by a particular kind of relationship called 'Samavāya' (inherence) between its cause and the Sattājāti (genus of existence, being) it associates itself with them. We should ask them the question: Because Kāryābhāva (nonexistence of the effect) is verily Asat (unreal), how at all can it be born merely on the ground of Kāraṇavyāpāra (dealing, functioning of the cause)? When it has not yet come into being or is not born yet, how at all can there ensue any relationship whatsoever between it and its Kārana as also the Sattājāti? Take the case of the barren woman's son: First in the beginning, he being Asadrūpa (of the nature of unreality) and by the functioning of Kāraka (instruments or means of action) he is born either really or by Māyā; thereafter he becomes associated with or related to either Sattājāti or some other Asadpadārtha (false thing) - thus it cannot be said in his case, is it not so? For that reason alone, on the strength of Yukti alone the Sruti is stating : 'तदेक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सज्जायत । कुतस्तु खलु सोम्येवं स्यादिति होवाच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।।' - meaning, "Some people say that: 'This world was in the beginning Asat alone; it was one alone without anything second to it. From that Asat, Sat was born.' My dear, how at all can this be possible? How at all can Sat be born from Asat? - thus (the father) asked."

(Vaisheshika): Even in your doctrine too if $K\bar{a}$ raṇa (cause) is real, then $K\bar{a}$ rya (effect) too becomes real only, is it not so?

If you contend that it is of a different quality or nature other than Sat, it becomes Asat only, is it not so? Then does it not amount to saying that Kāraṇa is Asat? Is not the Smriti stating: 'नामानो विद्यते सतः' - (Gitā 2-16), meaning, "There is nothing like Sat becoming non-existent" -? There is no illustration to say that from Sat only Sat is born. From one earthen pot, another earthen pot is not born, is it not so?

(Solution): True. For that reason alone, though Sat is Sadrūpa (of the essential nature of Reality) it is quite reasonable to say that It gets birth due to Māyā; thus the Kārikā states. What is a Kārya (effect) is not at all extremely or totally different (Atyanta Vilakshaṇa) from the Kāraṇa (cause); for, its nature or form is such that it can neither be said (or ascertained) to be Kāraṇa itself nor something other than Kāraṇa. Though the Kāraṇa does not lose its Swarūpa (essential nature or core of Being of a thing), because it assumes another form or shape it gets the name of 'Kārya' (effect), is it not so? Therefore, there is no defect in this. Hence, in the opinion (doctrine) of Ajātivādins, Sat Itself gets a Janma by virtue of Māyā; but Asat cannot at all in any manner get a Janma. Therefore, there is no scope whatsoever for Asadvāda here.

यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः । तथा जाग्रद्द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ॥२९॥

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं मनः स्वप्ने न संशयः । अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रत्र संशयः ॥३०॥

Meaning: "Just as in the dream the mind vibrates by virtue of Māyā in the form of duality, in the same way in the waking too the mind vibrates due to Māyā alone. In the dream the mind being Advaya alone appears as if it is *Dvaya* (dual), and there is no doubt about this; in the same way, in the waking too the mind being Advaya alone appears as if it is Dvaya. About this there is no doubt."

HOW IS IT THAT SAT HAS JANMA ONLY DUE TO MĀYĀ?

(Question): Sadvastu has Janma (birth); by virtue of

Māyā alone (i.e. it is a Māyic or illusory birth alone) It has Janma - how is it possible to say this?

(Answer): We will tell you, listen carefully. Just as the 'snake' that appears in the rope, though in its form of appearance, is a Vikalpa (misconception) but in its real form of the rope is Sat (real) alone, this is also similar to that.

Those who discern the truth that even the Vikalpa (misconception) called 'mind' is, in the ultimate analysis, Ātmauūpa (of the essential nature of Self) alone - who is Paramārtha and Chaitanyarūpa - will cognize it (i.e. the mind) too as Sadrūpa (of the essence of Reality) alone. Just as that very Advaya Sadrūpa mind itself appears in the dream as though it is Dvaya (duality) - to wit, in the differentiated forms of Grāhya (grasped, known object) and Grāhaka (grasping agent, knower), due to Māyā - in the same manner, in the waking too the mind, being Advayāvibhakta (non-dual and non-differentiated) alone, by virtue of Māyā, is appearing as if it is Dvaya (dual). In its real form it (i.e. the mind) is Advaya (non-dual) Paramātman (Supreme Seif) alone, but in its apparent empirical form it is appearing to be Dvaya. That is all.

Because it is said that as the mind vibrates duality of the forms of Grāhya-Grāhaka appears, it should never be understood or reckoned that the mind is a particular kind of real entity. What the common people have believed to be the 'mind' is, in reality, Advaya Atman alone. None among us has ever believed that either the elephant etc. - that appear in the dream as Grāhya - or the eyes etc. - which see those phenomena therein as their Grāhaka - really exist. All those phenomena are verily our Atman who is Paramatman indeed; that Atman is Pure Chaitanya (Consciousness) alone which is Kūṭastha (Transcendental, Immutable Reality). That very Chaitanya is appearing in our empirical, workaday transactions as our mind; the fact that - "In the dream the flow and vibration of the mind is itself occurring, flashing in the forms of Grāhya-Grāhaka" - is a statement, truism which all of us will have to accept from the empirical viewpoint indeed. Hence, since it is very clearly determined in the Vaitathya Prakarana that there is no real difference of any kind whatsoever between waking and dream, it evolves that - "In the waking too, because the Paramartha is Advaya it is

Sachhinmātra (Pure Being-Consciousness) indeed; due to Māyā the vibration and flow of the mind, which is misconceived in that Sachhinmātra Ātman alone, is this Grāhya-Grāhaka Dvaita (duality of the forms of the known object and the knowing subject)." Full support is lent to this teaching if we bring to our mind the meaning of the Kārikā (2-12) which says: "Ātman Himself imagines by Himself."

मनोदृश्यिमदं द्वैतं यत्किञ्चित् सचराचरम् । मनसो ह्यमनीभावे द्वैतं नैवोपलभ्यते ।।३१।।

Meaning: "All this Dvaita which is Charācharātmaka (of the nature of movable and immovable phenomena) is appearing to the mind. For, if the mind attains Amanībhāva (the state of no-mind, mindlessness), then Dvaita does not appear at all."

EVIDENCE TO ASSERT THAT DVAITA IS MERE MISCONCEP-TION (IMAGINATION) OF THE MIND

It has been already stated that what is conceived as duality is, just like the rope-snake, a mere appearance of the mind's conjecture, misconception alone. The phenomenon of the rope-snake never exists apart from the essential nature of the rope; even so, in our $Aj\bar{n}\bar{a}n\bar{a}vasth\bar{a}$ (state of delusion, ignorance) it appears as though it is having a different form with a hood, the marks etc.; in the same way, this phenomenon of the mind too, being verily Pure Atmachaitanya, is appearing in the forms of Grāhya-Grāhaka. If it is questioned: "What is the evidence, proof for this?" - the answer is given here by means of a Yukti (logical device) which is of the form of Anvaya (agreement), Vyatireka (contrariety, contrast).

All this is mind alone; for, only when the mind exists this Dvaita is appearing. Only if the mind exists, by virtue of Dvaitajñāna (knowledge of duality, perceptual knowledge) it appears as though we are having Sukha (happiness), Duḥkha (grief). But when the mind is not there, neither the Dvaita nor the Bhōktṛutwa (enjoyership) of Sukha and Duhkha exists in the least. To wit, by means of Vivechana (discrimination) if we repeatedly examine with insight as to - 'What is this?' - then by dint of Abhyāsa (this practice) as also by Vairāgya (sense of renunciation) in the

things of the external world, if we curb, restrain (Nirōdha) our mind - just like we reject or rescind the (reality) of the snake that has appeared in the rope - or, in the alternative, if the mind gets by itself lapsed, merged (Laya) - just like it gets subsided by itself in deep sleep - Dvaita does not at all appear. 'In deep sleep when there is no mind there does not exist any duality therein' - is again a truism known to everyone indeed; similarly by means of Nirōdha (restraint, curbing) also the truth that - 'If there is no mind, there does not at all exist any Dvaita" - is well-known to Tattwadarshins (Realized souls, people who have Intuited the Ultimate Reality of the Self). Thus when there is mind, Dvaita is there; if the mind is not there, Dvaita also is not there - by this kind of Anvaya-Vyatireka methodology it becomes established that - "Dvaita is merely a misconception, queer imagination (Vikalpa) of the mind alone."

9. ATTAINMENT OF AMANĪBHĀVA (NO-MINDNESS) BY MEANS OF ĀTMASATYĀNUBHŌDHA (SPIRITUAL INSTRUCTION ABOUT THE REALITY OF THE SELF)

आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न संकल्पयते यदा । अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्माभावे तदग्रहम् ॥३२॥

Meaning: "When the mind, as a result of the spiritual instruction about the Reality of the Self, rests without imagining (gives up volition), then it becomes no-mind; for, since there is nothing to be grasped it does not comprehend, grasp anything whatsoever."

DEVICE FOR ATTAINING THE STATE OF NO-MIND

Now a doubt may arise: "It has been stated that - 'If the mind attains 'Amanībhāva' (state of no-mindness, mindlessness) Dvaita is not at all seen' - is it not so? To this mind how at all that 'Amanastāvasthā' accrues? If the Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) of the mind remains, then Amanasta cannot be obtained, attained; so, if that Swarūpa itself is destroyed, then especially how at all 'Amanastwa' (no-mind-ness) accrue? In fact, this doctrine that the mind becomes 'Amanas' (no-mind) is opposed to universal empirical experience; for, if it is contended

that one substance attains the Swarūpa of another thing, it amounts to saying that no substance - whatsoever it may be - has a Swarūpa at all and thereby you arrive at Shūnyavāda only; in our workaday transactions in toto we will not have any trust whatsoever. Is it not so? Therefore, how at all is it possible for the mind to acquire Amanībhāva?"

To this a consolation is: By means of Atmasatyanubodha this Amanibhava accrues. To wit: If the Intuitive Knowledge (Experience) of the type - "Atman alone is real" - is engendered by means of the spiritual instruction based on the Sastra and taught by an Achārya (spiritual preceptor), then that instruction is called "Atmasatyānubodha" - in Vedāntic parlance. It is true that from our Loukika Drishti (empirical, workaday viewpoint) the objects are many, and since they exist without getting their respective Swarūpas or essential natures of existence transformed or changed they are real. But from the Paramāriha Drishti Ātman alone is real; all else is $Mithy\bar{a}$ (false appearance) alone. This truth has been taught by Uddālaka to his son (Shwetaketu). Just as when the truth or reality of one substance or object prepared out of clay is cognized, it amounts to having known the reality of all effects, products of clay, in the same way if the Atmatattwa is cognized, it amounts to having cognized the whole of the Jagat (world of diversity) which is Its $K\bar{a}rya$ (effect). For, as stated in the Sruti - 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम्' (Chh. 6-1-4), all that is called 'Kārya' is mere 'name' caused by speech. All the effects produced from clay like pot, pitcher etc. are real in our empirical dealings, being the effects of clay; their names, forms and the action that is produced by them - since all these are different from one another, all those effects are real alone - thus the people carry on their dealings. But observed from the Paramartha Drishti, that thing the essential nature of Being (Swarūpa) of which does never change and remains as it is, that thing alone is said to be real. When we observe from that transcendental (Intuitive) viewpoint, all these various objects which we are calling by different names like pot, pitcher, lid etc. are mere clay alone and not things which exist independently by themselves; therefore, they are not real entities, clay alone is the one real substance in this illustration. Thus all that is called 'Kārya'

(effect) does not exist apart from its $K\bar{a}rana$ (cause) and is real only in its form of cause and hence the Karya called 'Jagat' also is not different from its cause of Paramatmavastu; in fact, it is mere name brought about by mere speech; its reality is verily Ātman. One who discerns this truth culminating in his Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) here and now as depicted by the Scriptures and as explained by the Sadguru (genuine preceptor) who is an Āchārya (one well-versed in the traditional but secret methodology of delineating this subtle truth of Brahman-Atman) to such a person the truth that - "The world in its entirety is Atman" - will spontaneously flash to the mind. Then, as the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) of the type - "The phenomenon of the mind too is verily a distortion, mutation of Atman; verily an effect of Atman - to wit, it is verily an imagined, misconceived appearance in Atman and nothing else" - is engendered as a result of having followed the Śāstra Drishti as also the Āchārya Drishti - the mind does not remain as mind (any more); the truth that - "It is always Atman alone; the common people are misconceiving Atman (i.e. their very Swarupa) as 'Manas' (mind)" - will be Intuited. 'Mind' means misconceiving that things are -"Like that, like this" - and then guessing in various ways. In fact, Sankalpa (imagination, volition) and Vikalpas (misconception) themselves form the essential nature of the mind. But when the truth of the type - "No object seen outside is different from Ātman; Ātman alone is the essence of everything" - gets rooted in our awareness, then because there is no Bāhyavastu (external object) existing for the mind to do Sankalpa (imagination, volition) - just like the fire, in the absence of firewood or any other matter (fuel) to burn, gets extinguished in itself - the mind also, because there is no external object whatsoever necessary for doing or having Sankalpa, becomes quiescent and becomes one with its source or substratum of Atman alone. This alone is called 'Amanibhava'. When in this above manner Amanibhāva accrues, Dvaita (duality) is not 'perceived' at all.

> अकल्पकमजं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाभित्रं प्रचक्षते । ब्रह्म ज्ञेयमजं नित्यमजेनाजं विबुध्यते ॥३३॥

Meaning: "Because of the facts that it is Akalpaka (that which cannot be imagined), Aja (birthless), Ātmajñāna exists without being separate from Jñeya (what is known). For that (i.e. Ātmajñāna), Brahman Itself is the Jñeya. It is Aja (birthless) and Nitya (eternal); one cognizes by means of Jñāna which is Aja, Brahman, which is Aja."

ĀTMAN IS OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF NIRVIKALPAKA JÑĀNA (INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE DEVOID OF MISCONCEPTIONS)

(Objection): The Kathopanishad 'मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यम्' (2-1-11) is stating that - "In order to cognize Atman mind alone is the valid means or instrument". If it is said that - "All duality is false alone and the mind too is false alone" - then there does not remain any Karaṇa (valid means or instrument) to cognize Atman at all, is it not so? Even if we assume that also to be so, by means of what can we at all cognize Atmatattwa which is birthless?

(Solution): True. Before the cognition of the type: "Ātman alone is Satya (real)" - the mind alone is the instrument for Jñāna. But merely on that count it is not possible to imagine that even after Ātmajñāna accrues the mind remains as mind only. What you have exemplified as the authoritative Śruti statement, its real meaning is: Before Ātmajñāna is attained or born the seeker should acquire the requisite Saṃskāra (spiritual refinement) of the mind both from the spiritual preceptor well-versed in the traditional methodology of teaching and the Śāstra and by means of such a refined mind alone the Ātmatattwa should be cognized; in that manner after cognizing that Paramātma Tattwa alone not even the least bit of manifoldness or diversity remains, subsists; for, by then the mind becomes one with Ātman alone.

This Ātmajñāna is Akalpaka (not to be imagined by the mind), meaning, none of the misconceived divisions like Jñātru (the knower), Jñāna (knowledge), Jñāna Karaṇa (the means of knowledge) exist in It. Therefore, this is Aja (birthless), meaning it is not a cognition, Intuition which is of the nature of being born afresh; in fact, It is the very essence of (or substrate

for) cognition (mental awareness) which is eternal. Like the rest of the Jñānas (intellectual knowledges) this is not separate, different from the Jñeya (the object of knowledge, cognition). It is Jñeyābhinna (not different from the known object); meaning, It exists in the very essential nature of Brahman which is Its Jñeya (known, cognized object); the Brahmajñānis are affirming that - "Just as the heat is not separate from the fire, in the same way apart from the Jñeya called 'Brahman'. Its Jñana does not exist." The Sruti is proclaiming that - "For the cognition of the cognizer there is nothing like a lapse, extinction at all" - (Bri. 4-3-2), while the Jijñāsu (one who wishes to know or cognize the Jñeya Brahman) is (practising) learning to cognize the Jñeya Ātmatattwa by means of such a Jñāna, which is verily Aja and his Atmaswarūpa, he should not get deluded to think, since it is stated that just as the Vijñānavādins say - "One cognizes the Aja by means of the Aja" - that Jñana cognizes Itself by Itself. As stated above, when the mind attains the Amanibhāva - just as the sun is shining by himself - Atmatattwa (which is self-existent, self-effulgent to boot) manifests by Itself; this alone is the purport behind the Kārikā. Because this Ātman is Nitya-Vijñāna-Ekarasa-Swabhāva (of the essential nature of Pure Consciousness which is eternal and of one and the same core of Being), there is no need whatsoever of any other Jnana to cognize Him; this alone is the real import of the verse.

10. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ĀTMASATYĀNUBŌDHA AND SUSHUPTI

निगृहीतस्य मनसो निर्विकल्पस्य धीमतः । प्रचारः स तु विज्ञेयः सुषुप्तेऽन्यो न तत्समः ॥३४॥

Meaning: "(The seeker) should cognize (discern) the conduct of the mind of one who is having Vivekajñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) which is opposed to (the common man's mind) and is Nirvikalpa (devoid of any misconception). The conduct (of it) which is in the Sushupti is different; it is not equal to that?"

THE STATE OF THE RESTRAINED MIND IS IN ITSELF OF A PARTICULAR KIND

It has been stated that by means of the Anubodha (following the spiritual instruction) of the type - "Atman alone is real (in the Absolute, Intuitive sense)" - when the mind attains Amanibhava - just as a fire, without any firewood available to burn, gets extinguished - Manonirodha (restraint of the mental functions) will ensue, is it not so? Thus when the mind becomes 'no-mind', duality is not seen; between such a descriptive state of the mind of a Jñāni and the state of the mind that rests in deep sleep what distinction exists has to be discerned now. For, in deep sleep there does not exist any Pratyaya (mental concept) whatsoever; similarly in the Amanibhava that accrues as a result of this Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) which is called 'Ātmasatyānubodha' there does not exist any Pratyaya whatsoever; it being so, what difference at all can there exist between these two states of the mind? - such a doubt may arise in the minds of the Jijnasus. But there is a very great distinction between the Chittanirodhasthiti attained or engendered by Jñāna and the Chittalayasthiti brought about quite naturally by mere sleep.

In deep sleep while the mind gets Laya (merged), existing as it is it disappears for a little while. In the materialistic (extroverted) people's minds, by nature alone Avidyā-Mōha (attachment or delusion, concomitant with ignorance) exists; when they are asleep their mind, without performing any function or action - just as the creatures like crocodiles etc. lie motionless in one and the same state at deep levels in the sea - exists still; that mind does not know or comprehend anything else whatsoever other than (a) to be asleep without doing any function; (b) being active with Pratyayas raising in it. A tiger which is asleep, as soon as it wakes up, out of hunger starts preying upon a deer; in the same way, the mind of the common (ignorant) people, remaining still (functionless) for some time in deep sleep, as soon as it wakes up (i.e. it becomes active) once again commences its usual activities of Pravritti (progressing towards an object) and Nivritti (receding from the object) which are engendered by Avidyāvāsanā (latent impressions, proclivities

brought about by ignorance). Kumbhakarna (a demoniac character mentioned in the epic 'Rāmāyaṇa') who slept continuously for six months in a year - when he got up was Kumbhakarna only, is it not so? In the same way, the mind of those people who have woken up from sleep does not (cannot) get rid of the defects that lurk deep in it merely by going to sleep. But the state of the mind of these Vivekins (discriminative people) who have cognized the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality of the Self, Brahman) following, or on the strength of, the spiritual instructions of the Sastra as well as the Acharya is not like this. For, their mind herefore (i.e. after attaining Amanibhava) does not remain as a mind at all. From the standpoint of the other people of the world (i.e. extroverted, extremely materialistic in their outlook) they (i.e. Jnanis) too may appear as having a mind; but from the standpoint of those Jñānis, apart from Ātman alone no duality whatsoever exists at all. In truth, their mind has become 'no-mind'. Hence, from their viewpoint in that mind which has attained 'Nishkarmātmaswabhāva' (the essential nature of Pure Being, devoid of agentship of action), henceforth there is not even an iota of scope for Loukika Pravritti - Nivritti (mundane, empirical dealings of hankering after outer objects or receding away from them). They are, in truth, of the very essence of Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaswabhāva (eternally pure, eternally conscious and eternally liberated state).

THE WRONG INTERPRETATION, MADE BY SOME PEOPLE, OF THIS KARIKA

Here, in this context, some people have imagined a different kind of meaning for this Kārikā of Shri Gauḍapāda and the Bhāshya written by Shri Śankara on it. They say: In Sushupti (deep sleep) there exists a phenomenon called 'Mūlāvidyā' which is the cause for all Samsāra's travails and tribulations; but in 'Asamprajñātasamādhi' (a kind of trance in which there is no awareness whatsoever of anything else) there does not exist any Mūlāvidyā. Therefore, between the state of mind of Vivekins who have attained Jňāna by means of Asamprajñātasamādhi and the state of mind of people of the world there exists a very great distinction. This is their doctrinaire theory.

In the opinion of some others: The 'Vaidharmya' (difference in quality, degree, calibre) that exists between Sushupti and

Jñānis' Samādhi (trance) is that in Sushupti the mind's Swarūpa (essential nature) remains the same as it is; but in Samādhi it does not exist at all. Thus these two types of commentators have come out with their respective queer interpretations to this Kārikā and both are at variance, having adopted their own dogmatic theories (but in contradiction to Śruti, Yukti and Anubhava) with ours.

Now both these above commentaries (interpretations) are not proper. For, they do not agree either with Shri Gaudapāda's text or with the *Prakaraņa* (topic) that we have taken up for deliberation. In Shri Gaudapāda's Māṇdūkya Kārikās which he has graciously composed for our benefit, nowhere is there any casual reference or mention of this Mūlāvidyā; this fact we have already stressed. Now, what we are deliberating upon here in this context is not pertaining to Pātañjala Yōga Samādhi at all. When the deliberation on Samādhi is itself not relevant here why should the author all of a sudden write anything about the distinction between Samādhi and Sushupti? - How this doubt did not arise or flash in the minds of these commentators - we do not know, we cannot surmise! Therefore, both these commentaries (interpretations) are not tenable here.

Another point: For both Sushupti and Samādhi there exists Samāna (equal) Yōgakshematwa (good and bad features); to wit, whatever Gunas (good qualities) or Doshas (defects) suit for Sushupti, the same Gunas or Doshas are suitable to Samādhi also. There is no support of any valid means to conjecture, surmise that there is a distinction of the type that - "In deep sleep Ajñana, which is the seed (cause) for Samsara, exists, while in Samādhi it does not exist." For, when we experience those Avasthas the fact that duality is not seen is common to both; on waking up (or emerging out of Samādhi) the examination, scrutiny of the type of - "Then I did not know anything" is again common to both states. Hence in this regard there is no increase of a quality in one, nor decrease of that quality in another. For this reason alone Shri Śankara in his Sūtra Bhāshya, in order to establish the truth that - "Though in Pralaya (dissolution of the world, creation) no divisions exist, as soon as creation ensues those divisions may appear" - he has taken both Sushupti and Samādhi as illustrations.. He has written the follow-

ing sentence: 'यथा हि सुषुप्तिसमाध्यादाविष सत्यां स्वामाविक्याम् अविभागप्राप्तौ मिथ्याज्ञानस्यानपोदितत्वात् पूर्ववत् पुनः प्रबोधे विभागो भवति एवम् इहापि भविष्यति' -(Sūtra Bhāshya 2-1-9), meaning - "Although in states like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. (devoid of Dvaita Darshana or appearance of duality) the natural Avibhaga (non-division) has accrued, because Mithyājñāna (misconception) has not been removed, as soon as one wakes up once again, as before, there accrues divisions; in the same way, here too (when Pralaya or dissolution takes place, although there are no divisions, at the time of creation once again the divisions may appear)." This is the purport behind this Bhāshya sentence. Apart from this, the truth that - in Sushupti (from the Paramārtha Drishți) there do not exist categories like Avidyā, Kāma and Karma - is being stated by the Sruti : 'तद्वा अस्यैतदितच्छन्दा अपहतपाप्पाऽभय रूपम्' - (Bri. 4-3-21), meaning - "For this Jiva this Sushupti form is one, which has transcended Kāma (desire), in which the demerit of Dharma (righteousness) and Adharma (unrighteousness), in which the Avidyābhaya (fear born out of ignorance) is not there." Further the Sruti says: 'अत्र पिताऽपिता भवति अनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन तीणों हि तदा सर्वाच्छोकान् हृदयस्य भवति' - (Bri. 4-3-22), meaning - "In this state of deep sleep the father is no longer a father here the merit has not followed or accompanied one, nor has demerit followed one; then he has got over all the miseries of the heart, is it not so ?" Hence, even if observed in this manner too, it becomes certain that the theory of the Vyākhyānakāras in imagining Vaidharmya (different qualities or grades) between Sushupti and Samādhi is not proper, tenable at all

THE DIFFERENCE (DISTINCTION) OF SUSHUPTI MENTIONED IN THE KARIKA

Therefore, here if we interpret the Kārikāvākya (sentence of the Kārikā) to suit the Prakaraṇa (topic which this Chapter is dedicated to expound), then the intended purport will evolve as: Because, while entering the state of deep sleep, the common people have not yet attained the Ātmatattwa Jñāna, at that moment, although the mind obtains the Amanībhāva, it is not the absolute, final (real) Amanībhāva at all. When we have

acquired deep sleep, although the mind goes into the oblivion, so to say, for that much time, because therein lurk invariably Vāsanas (latent impressions of the past actions and enjoyments) which are the cause to engender many calamities which, in turn, are the root cause for Avidyāmōha (attachment, delusion projected by ignorance), the mind has not acquired the capability of attaining the final Amanasta (no-mindness). When we have misconceived the rope to be a snake alone, if the latter for some reason or the other disappears from sight for a while and once again is seen, can we avoid getting deluded that it is a snake? No. For, our misconception of the rope has not been falsified, sublated. Instead of this, if we get the correct knowledge that it is actally a rope and thereby the misconception is falsified or sublated, we get the sense of certitude that it is not a snake at all. Is it not so? In the same way, in the present context too, although it gets submerged in deep sleep and disappears, the mind which had apparently become no-mind (mindless), has never reached the final and absolute culmination of the process. For, we have not acquired or reached the sense of certitude by properly cognizing (Intuiting) Ātman in the manner - "All this is verily Ātman; and not Anātman (not-Self) of the forms of the mind etc." But when we attain the Intuitive Knowledge (Experience) of the type - "Ātman alone (exclusively, non-dually) is Paramārtha Satya (Absolute, Transcendental Reality beyond all vestiges of duality or diversity)" - and simultaneously when the seed of Pravritti (mundane activity) which is the cause for all life's calamities projected or conjured up by Avidyā - in other words, when the Avidyāvāsana (latent proclivities of mind projected by Avidya) - is destroyed as also the quality of Rajas, which is the fountainhead of all miseries like Mōha (attachment) etc. are destroyed, then the plenary, final, consummate Amanibhava is attained. Here, in this context, one important point that we have to remember is: If observed from the Paramartha Drishti, even in Sushupti Atman exists without any association whatsoever with any Klesha (affliction, distress) like Avidyāmōha etc. For, 'अस्यैतदतिच्छन्दाः' -(Bri. 4-3-21) in this manner, as we have already exemplified, from the standpoint of the Sruti when we observe, there too (i.e. in Sushupti also) Ātman exists without Avidyākāmakarma categories. Even so, if we observe from the empirical, workaday viewpoint, - to wit, when we notice from the waking viewpoint - therein the Pravrittibija (seed germinating later on to give rise to mundane, empirical activities) projected by Avidyā invariably exists indeed; for, as soon as we wake up once again the Vāsanas (latent mental proclivities, impressions), which are the root cause for all kinds of miseries, catastrophes of life, do remain, subsist as they are. Therefore, accepting the fact that there exists a distinction between the Manonirodha (restraint, cessation of the mind) by means of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) and the Laya (temporary merger of the mind) in Sushupti, this difference indicating comparative superiority and inferiority has been mentioned in the Kārikā - thus we have to discern. Thus, when we observe from the predominant waking viewpoint, it becomes evident that in Sushupti the form of behaviour or conduct of the mind in merging (Laya) is occurring quite naturally or automatically, so to speak, being Parādhina (dependent on external sources, helplessly). For, the Vishrānti (rest, quietude) alone, which the mind acquires in order to solve or get rid of the strain or exhaustion caused by the performance of Karma, is deep sleep. But, in the waking itself by means of the Jñana of the type - "Atman alone is the one Absolute Reality" - which accrues by means of the spiritual instructions by the Sastra and the Acharya, the mind getting destroyed (falsified, sublated) occurs by selfeffort alone. Therefore, there is a great difference between the Manolaya that occurs in Sushupti and the Manonirodha that accrues from Jñana. Hence, it is said that - "One should discern the behaviour, conduct of the mind (Manah Prachāra) of the form of Amanibhāva that accrues from Jñāna."

लीयते हि सुषुप्ते तित्रगृहीतं न लीयते । तदेव निर्भयं ब्रह्म ज्ञानालोकं समन्ततः ।।३५।।

Meaning: "For, in Sushupti the mind gets merged; if that itself is (by means of Ātmajnāna) made Nigraha (completely controlled, overpowered), then it does not merge. That alone is the Nirbhaya (fearless) Brahman (Ultimate Reality), the Light of Knowledge which manifests, appears everywhere."

THE CAUSE FOR DIFFERENCE IN BEHAVIOUR

We have mentioned the cause for this distinction while explaining the meaning of the previous Kārika. All the distinctive knowledges that accrue in the waking get conglomerated into the form of Vāsana (latent impression) and become a dense mass of Jñāna, so to speak. When we observe from the Paramārtha Drishți, in the waking also Ātman alone exists really; but till the Mithyājñāna (misconception) is sublated and by means of Jñāna this truth is fully established (to culminate in Intuitive Experience), the divisions of the forms of Jñātru (knower)-Jñāna (knowledge)-Jñeya (object of knowledge) - just as to a person having cataract, in one moon alone the divisions like many moons appear - continuously manifest themselves. Although the truth that - "In the dream no division whatsoever exists in reality in Atman" - is acceptable to everyone till one gets awake, within the dream - just as in the waking - it has become certain that an uninterrupted division alone exists invariably; and just as no one then gets the conviction of the type - "This is verily a dream of the form of misconception" - in the same way, in the waking too till one attains Jñāna of the type - "Ātman alone is real" the dealings of divisions like Jñātru-Jñāna-Jñeya verily appear to be real indeed. In the same vein too, in the Sushupti also, observed from the Paramartha Drishti, although Atman alone devoid of any divisions is existing really, till we attain that Jñana, the Vāsana of the divisions which is brought about by Mithyājñāna continues to exist. Thus in the waking Vibhāgajñāna (knowledge of divisions, distinctions), in deep sleep the Vāsana of Vibhāgajñāna - both these features do not disappear for anyone - whosoever he may be - unless and until he attains Atmajñāna. For, both these are caused by Mithyājñāna (i.e. misconception) alone. Therefore, merely by getting Sushupti no one can ever acquire the \bar{A} tyantika (plenary, consummate) Amanibhāva (no-mind state). Especially in Sushupti, neither Śāstrāchārya Upadesha nor Ātmasatyānubodha can ever possibly accrue; for, Sushupti means a state wherein the Nirvishesha Chinmātraswarūpa (essence of non-dual Pure Consciousness devoid of any attributes whatsoever) alone has remained. For that reason alone the Sruti has stated the reasons for no knowledge whatsoever being ever possible to be attained in Sushupti in the

sentence : 'यद्वेतन्न विजानाति विजानन् वै तन्न विजानाति न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्विजानीयात्' - (Bṛi. 4-3-33), meaning - "Therein He does not cognize anything whatsoever, is it not so? Even then (Ātman) having been of the essential nature of a cognizer, He does not cognize (thus it should be understood); for, to the cognition of the cognizer there is never any lapse, loss whatsoever; for, He is Avināshi (indestructible). But, apart from Him, a second thing of any kind does not exist therein. Only if such a second thing were to exist, He could possibly have cognized it, is it not so?" Hence, really speaking, though in Sushupti the Amanībhāva is apparently engendered, the mind has - from the Vyavahāra Dṛishṭi - merged (Laya). That is all. This explanation is reasonable indeed.

When this very mind is fully sublated by non-comprehension or giving up identification with it (Nigraha) in the waking by means of Vivekavijñāna (Intuitive Knowledge born out of deliberation) - it does not merge (Laya); for, then the one who has cognized has already cognized (Intuited) Atmaswarūpa Itself which is never tarnished or tainted in the least by the $M\bar{o}ha$ (attachment, delusion) born out of Ajñana. In truth, then the mind has verily become one with Atman. It being so, the great difference between the Samādhi that is taught in Pātañjala Yōga and this Samādhi of the essential nature of Amanibhāva taught in Vedanta is: The Vedanta Samadhi is verily Atmaswarūpa ever devoid of any relationship whatsoever of phenomena like mind, Prāņa (vital force) etc. When there is no Vivekavijnāna, this (Ātmaswarūpa) exists, remains as if Aprāpta (unattained), but as soon as Vivekavijnāna accrues It appears as though It has been Prāpta (attained) to the Vyavahāra Drishti (empirical viewpoint). But with regard to Pātañjala Samādhi especially, it is of the nature of Chittavrittinirodha (curbing, suppressing the mental concepts, thoughts; it is of the nature of indicating merely the Viveka (discriminative deliberation) with regard to Chitta (mind) and $\overline{A}tman$ (Self); but not \overline{A} tyantika (plenary, consummate).

Thus when the Samādhi expounded by Vedānta Śāstra as of the form of Amanībhāva accrues, the mind verily becomes one with Brahman; that alone is *Nirbhaya* (fearless); for, then the

Dvaitagrahana (comprehension of duality), which is Avidyākrita (projected by ignorance) and is Bhayahetu (cause for fear, anxiety), does not exist whatsoever. The Srutis like Taittiriya (2-7) are teaching that - "That alone is verily the $S\bar{a}nta$ (peaceful) Abhayabrahman (fearless Ultimate Reality)." That very Swarūpa is Jñānālōka (the eternally Witnessing Light of Intuition) which is all-pervading. But in Pātanjala Yōga the Samādhi - which is taught as being attained by Jñānālōka but in increasing gradations like - 'a little clarity', 'medium grade clarity', 'superior grade clarity' - is not of this kind or nature. There the Samādhi that is obtained by means of the light of knowledge brought about by Yoga is propounded; but here in Vedanta what is taught or expounded as Jñānālōka is verily Brahmaswarūpa indeed. It is like the $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space) - Sarvavyāpaka (all-pervading), Svayamjyōti (self-effulgent) Chaitanyamātra (Pure, Absolute Consciousness). In It never at all there is any scope whatsoever for Ajñānatamas (the darkness, indolence of ignorance).

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमनामकमरूपकम्। सकृद्विभातं सर्वज्ञं नोपचारः कथञ्चन ॥३६॥

Meaning: "This is Aja (birthless), Anidra (sleepless), Asvapna (dreamless), devoid of names and forms; always illumining, Sarvajña (omniscient); in no manner there is any trace of any Upachāra (external show or conduct, praise, obeisance, no predication whatsoever)."

ĀTMAJÑĀNI IS KŖITAKŖITYA (ONE WHO HAS ACHIEVED FULFILMENT IN LIFE)

Thus this Ātmatattwa (Transcendental Reality of the Self) determined by Śāstra and Yukti (logical arguments) can be cognized (Intuited) by Ātmasatyānubōdha (spiritual instruction of the Absolute Reality of the Self) alone. (i) Because It has no cause whatsoever for giving birth, It is internally or externally everywhere Aja (birthless). (ii) By virtue of Avidyā alone one begets birth, is it not so? This fact has been explained previously in 3-19, 3-24. That Avidyā gets destroyed by Ātmasatyānubōdha, and hence It is Aja. For that reason alone, It is Anidra (sleepless). (iii) Being caused by Anādimāyānidra (beginningless illusory sleep) called Avidyā, having woken up from Svapna and

having become Advayaswarūpa (of the essential nature of nonduality) this Atmaswarupa is Asvapna. This opinion has already been expressed and explained previously in Agama Prakarana (1-16). (iv) Further this Atmatattwa is Anamaka (nameless) and Arūpaka (formless); meaning, It is Advaita (non-dual). Because the 'waking' of the nature of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) has not accrued, those names and forms were appearing, and were the cause for the deep-seated belief that Atman is Sadvitiya (dual in form), is it not so? Now, because the practitioner has 'woken up' from Māyāsvapna, it is neither possible to call this Brahman by any name nor is it possible to know that It is of such and such a form. For this reason alone It is Anāmaka and Arūpaka. (v) Apart from this, It is Sakridvibhāta, meaning, always (eternally) shining, illuming only. If Agrahana (non-comprehension) called 'Sushupta' occurs, then the Pramātrurūpa (form of cognizership) of Atman does not appear or is not manifested; if Anyathāgrahaņa (misconception or wrong comprehension) called 'Jāgrat' and 'Svapna' occurs, then that Pramātrurūpa of Ātman appears - these two kinds of differences may occur. But even when we are misconceiving Him (Atman) as of the forms of Vishwa, Taijasa and Prājña, for this Ātman who eternally exists in the essential nature of Aja-Advaya alone there is no possibility whatsoever of these $\bar{A}virbh\bar{a}va$ (disappearance) and $Tir\bar{o}bh\bar{a}va$ (manifestation) occurring. Although for the people on the earth the events like day, when the sun appears, and night, when he does not appear, are actually occurring, both of them do not at all pertain to the sun who is Nityaprakāsharūpa (eternally of the essential nature of lustre, brilliance). Is it not so? In the same way, for Ajñas (ignorant people) the 'I' form appearing and not appearing do occur incessantly just like day and night. The reason for the Turiya (Paramātman who is Transcendental beyond the three states) - who is eternally, self-effulgent - not illumining or shining is Agrahana (non-cognition, non-comprehension), Anyathāgrahaņa (misconception, comprehending It in a different, wrong form) - these two kinds of wrong knowledges alone. When the Atmasatyanubodha accrues especially, because that wrong knowledge (misconception) is not there at all and that Turiyātmarūpa is Nityachaitanyaswarūpa (of the essential nature of eternally Pure Consciousness), It is 'Sakridvibhāta' (eternally

shining) - this statement is reasonable. The Śruti: 'सकृद्धिभातो ह्रोष नहालोकः' - (Chh. 8-4-2), meaning: "This world called 'Brahman' is eternally shining" - is the supporting, authoritative source or proof for the conclusion.

In any case, in this manner removing or negating the misconception of the forms of Avasthatraya, that Aja-Advaya Ātmatattwa, which was expounded in the Agama Prakarana, that very Tattwa has been shown to be Advaita which is Shiva (auspicious, sacred) by proving that all Dvaitavyavahāra (empirical dealings of duality) are \bar{A} vidyaka (projections, effect of ignorance) in the Vaitathya Prakarana; once again the same Tattwa is being shown to be Aja by means like Sruti and Upapatti (logical arguments) and the topic is being concluded. Once such a Brahmaswarūpa is cognized on the strength of Ātmasatyānubōdha 'there does not remain in any manner any Upachāra', meaning - nothing else remains to be done; but for such of those who have not been fortunate enough to have had such 'Atmabodha' - as we are going to describe herefore - just as there remains a duty of attaining Samādhi, in the same way, for one who is an Atmajñāni there does not remain anything to be done or any duty to be discharged whatsoever. This purport is implied in the Kārikā.

EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY THAT TATTWAJÑĀNI ALSO HAS PERFORCE TO ACQUIRE SAMĀDHI

Some people are saying that - "Even one who is a Tattwajñāni (Realized soul), in order to wear out the miseries of life, has necessarily to acquire Asamprajñāta Samādhi. Their this understanding is verily a delusion (Bhrānti) indeed. For, since by means of Ātmasatyānubōdha the mind becomes nomind and there does not at all remain any Kartrutwa (doership or agentship of action), there is no scope for or possibility of any duty to be performed then. Even after the Kartrutwa which is conjured up in Chidātman (Self as Pure Consciousness) is removed by means of Vidyā (Self-Knowledge), because in the adjunct of Antahkaraṇa (inner instrument of mind) which is endowed with Chidābhāsa (reflective consciousness), there subsist invariably thousands of mutations; since the self-

established Kartrutwa continues to exist as long as the Manodravya (the stuff of mind) exists, those disputants have opined that that much portion of Kartrutwa remains for Tattwajñāni also. But this theory is not proper. For, to entertain the concept that - 'There exists Kartrutwa' - the cause is verily Adhyāsa (misconception) brought about by Aviveka (lack of discrimination) of the type of not having distinguished between the essential natures of the two terms 'Atman' and 'Manas'. When observed from the Paramartha Drishti, neither to the Pure Atman there is Kartrutwa, nor to the mere mind too there is any Kartrutwa; for, Chidatman is devoid of mutations (immutable), while the mind is Achetana (insentient); if we go still deeper into the matter and observe, because the mind appears only due to Avidya, for such a thing Kartrutwa cannot possibly be made applicable in any manner whatsoever. Besides, nowhere in the Upanishads it has been taught that by practising Patanjala Yoga etc. Mukti accrues.

Here one objection can be raised: It is true that once Tattwajñāna accrues, for Mōksha there is no need of any Sādhana (spiritual practice) whatsoever. Even so, in order that the mind gets peace, quietude, Klesha (misery) should get emaciated, worn out; for that purpose, we can say that Samādhi should be acquired or atrained, is it not so?

(Solution): This objection is not proper. For, as long as the mind really exists the Jñāna of Ātmatattwa which is Aja-Advaya cannot possibly be attained at all. Just as the Sāṅkhyans say, viz. "One should deliberate upon and know both Ātman and Manas (mind) and that alone is Tattwajñāna" - the Vedāntins have not accepted that doctrine at all. In truth, Advitiya Ātman alone is Satya (real) and this is verily Tattwajñāna; therefore, when that Jñāna accrues the mind really does not subsist; neither does the Sādhana that is to be practised in order to attain Samādhi for the sake of its quiescence also subsist. Therefore, once the Jñāna of the type - "Atman who is of Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaswabhāva alone is the Paramārthasatya (Absolute Reality)" - accrues, there does not remain any Kartavya (duty or responsibility) that has yet to be discharged. This alone is the Vedāntic Siddhānta.

सर्वाभिलापविगतः सर्वीचन्तासमुत्थितः ।

सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः समाधिरचलोऽभयः ॥३७॥

Meaning: "One devoid of Vāk (speech), one who has got over all worries or anxieties, one who is extremely peaceful or quiescent, self-effulgent Light of Consciousness, Samādhi (mind having become one with the Self), unmoving, fearless."

HOW COME THAT ATMATATTWA IS OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ANAMAKATWA ETC. ?

In the previous Kārikā it has been delineated that Ātmatattwa is Anāmaka (nameless), Arūpaka (formless), Sakridvibhāta (selfeffulgent Light of Consciousness) and Sarvajiia (omniscient) - is it not so? For all those natures the reasons have been mentioned here in this Kārikā. This Ātman is Sarvābhilāpavigata, meaning one who is devoid of all speech. Here speech is exemplified in a representative sense. Because He is devoid of speech, Atman is name-less; not only this, but also because He has no Bāhyakaraṇa (external sense organs) whatsoever, it amounts to saying that qualities like Shabda, Sparsha etc. are not there in Him. This Atman is Sarvachintasamutthita, meaning in Him there is no rising of Buddhivritti (intellectual concepts) whatsoever; to wit, He is devoid of Antahkarana (Mind in its entirety). Therefore, 'He is Arūpaka (devoid of form)' - this statement is justified. In any case, the meaning of the first half of this verse is that - "Atman is devoid of any special features like Vyākrita (manifested) and Avyākrita (unmanifested) forms."

Thus, because He is devoid of any special characteristics whatsoever this Ātman is Suprashānta, meaning, of the form in which the world of duality or diversity has completely subsided, merged; further, He is Sakṛijjyōti, meaning, eternally of the essential nature of Light of Consciousness; to wit, He is Nitya Chaitanyarūpa; for that reason alone, 'Sakṛidvibhāta' is used previously. He is 'Samādhi', which means keeping or maintaining a refined mind in a quiescent, peaceful state; because by means of Prajñā (Consciousness) which is the cause of that 'Samādhi' this Ātman is to be cognized, He too is known as 'Samādhi'. The Śruti sentence: "One who is Ashānta (devoid

of mental peace or equipoise) and Asamāhita (having no control over his mind and senses)......cannot cognize Him by means of Prajñāna (Intuitive Knowledge)" - (Katha 1-2-24) - is an authoritative sentence in support of this conclusion. Or, in the alternative, because only when the mind gets established in Atman it attains Samādhāna (peace, tranquillity), Ātman is called 'Samādhi' - in this manner also the purport behind this adjective can be explained. For, unless and until the mind attains to Atman, who is eternally of the essential nature of Nirvishaya (devoid of features), it cannot possibly attain Samādhāna. For that reason alone, Ātmatattwa is 'Sarvajña' - meaning, having Himself become everything, He is of the essential nature of Nitya Nirvishaya Chaitanya - thus it was stated in the previous Kārikā. For that reason alone, this Atman is Achala, meaning, one who is devoid of mutations, who is devoid of any cause giving rise to Vikshepa (projection, scattering of the mind). In this manner because He is Vikriyārahita (immutable), this Ātman is 'Abhaya' (fearless). Because a Jñāni's Ātman is of this essential nature alone, the Brahmatattwa that he has attained by means of Amanibhava is stated by us in the previous Kārika to be of the essential nature of Anāmaka etc. This is the whole purport of this Kārikā.

HERE THE DISCUSSION OF SAMADHI IS NOT RELEVANT; IT SHOULD NOT BE

Because here the expression - 'Samādhirachalaha' - is used, some modern scholars have conceived that "Here the 'Achalasamādhi' alone, which is popular in Buddhistic philosophy, has been examined". But this does not suit, or fit in, even the least bit, here in this context. For, this is a Prakaraṇa (Chapter) devoted to Ātmasatyānubōdha; for that topic, what these people propound as the 'Samādhi' of the Saugatamata (Buddhism) does not possibly suit even the least bit. Apart from this, in the context of describing the Ātmaswabhāva which is Kūṭasthanitya (Transcendental and eternal) how at all can this 'Samādhi' which is said to attain quiescence for a while become suitable? Whichever Samādhi it may be, being Anvartha (having a meaning easily deducible from the etymology of the word, i.e., true to the sense) can it become 'Achala'? Never. Therefore, here Ātmaswabhāva alone, which is of the very

essence of Kūṭasthanitya Chaitanya, is called 'Samādhi'. For this reason alone in the previous Kārikā it was stated that herein anything going by the name of Kartavya (duty) does not suit in any manner. It has been stated: 'नोपचारः कथञ्चन' - (3-26). Therefore, being deceived by the mere word 'Samādhi' the seeker should not raise the topic of Samādhi (trance) here in this context.

ग्रहो न तत्र नोत्सर्गश्चिन्ता यत्र न विद्यते । आत्मसंस्थं तदा ज्ञानमजाति समतां गतम् ॥३८॥

Meaning: "Where there is no worry, there is no grasping, nor giving up. Then $J\tilde{n}ana$ (Consciousness) has come to a standstill (is established) in $\bar{A}tman$; becoming $Aj\bar{a}ti$ (birthless) It has attained equipoise."

HOW CAN THE ASSERTION - 'AFTER THE ATTAINMENT OF BRAHMĀTMAJÑĀNA THERE IS NO DUTY TO BE PERFORMED' - BE JUSTIFIED ?

We have mentioned the grounds for the four adjectives of 'Anāmakam', 'Arūpakam', 'Sakridvibhātam', 'Sarvajñam' used in the previous Kārikā. Now, to the question -'नोपचारः कथञ्चन' ('Performing any duty does not suit in any manner') - 'How is this proper?' - an answer remains to be given. For that purpose this present Kārikā is forwarded.

Brahmātman Himself is Samādhi; this truth has been already stated, is it not so? For that reason alone in such Brahmaswarūpa there is no 'Graha' (grasping); nor 'Utsarga' (giving up). Where there is change or an object of change, there is such Loukika (empirical) or Vaidika (scriptural) transaction. There may be activities like Hāna (giving up) or Upādāna (acquisition); but in Brahman who is Sarvavyavahārātīta (transcending all empirical transactions) both those transactions cannot possibly exist. For, apart from Brahman who is Advitīya there cannot possibly be any cause for change; Brahman Itself also is not having any mutations. Therefore, here both Hāna and Upādāna do not exist - this is the implication here. In this Brahman there is no worry or anxiety whatsoever; for, since the mind has become no-mind and there being no external object at all for Jñāna (Pure Consciousness); it (i.e., the mind) has

become Atmasamstha, meaning, it has become one with Atman i.e. it has attained the Atmarūpa or essential nature of Pure Consciousness.

EXAMINATION OF VIJNĀNAVĀDINS' THEORY

Here Vijñānavādins like Vasubandhu etc. say that : 'यदा त्वालम्बनं ज्ञानं नैवोपलम्रते तदा । स्थितं विज्ञानमात्रत्वे ग्राह्मामावे तदग्रहात् ॥' - (Trimshikā - 28) - according to this Trimshikāvachana - 'When Vijnāna (intellectual awareness) does not have any Grāhya (object to conceive) that remains in a purely Vijñānarūpa (of the form of intellectual awareness); in Samādhi because Vijnāna (Intelligence) does not have any $\bar{A}lambana$ (object) - none whatsoever - then it becomes pure Vijnana alone' - this is the doctrine of Vijnanavadins belonging to 'Yogachara' school. But this opinion is not in consonance with reasoning. For, in the doctrine of the Vijnanavadins there is no Grahya (object) whatsoever apart from Vijnana in reality; they have accepted that Vijnana experiences itself by itself, is it not so? It being so, how at all even in Samādhi Vijnāna cannot have any object? Vijnāna has been called 'Vijñāna' because it invariably has a Grāhyāmsha (aspect of grasping an object) of the form of Vijneya (object of knowledge) indeed. Therefore, if it is stated that it (i.e., Vijñāna) does not have any Grāhya, they will have to perforce accept that its Vijñānatwa (the capability of being aware of anything) itself will vanish. It being so, to imagine that Vijñāna, which is Kriyārūpa (of the nature of action) and of Grāhakaikaswabhāva (the exclusive essential nature of comprehending or grasping), becomes Nirvishesha (without any special features) in Samādhi is analogous to saying that for a river there exists a particular state of not flowing or moving. A river means a phenomenon of the essential nature of flowing. It being so, how at all can it acquire Sthiratwa (steadiness, immovable or motionless state)? If it acquires such a state, does it not amount to its destruction itself? Therefore, in this Chapter there is no scope, even the least bit, for 'Vijñānamātratāvāda' (theory of pure Vijñāna existing by itself). Because Vijnana or Chitta (mind) is Vikalpita (misconceived) in Ātman, who is the Witnessing Consciousness for even Vijnāna - which has many special features like being born, getting destroyed, manifoldness etc. - as also who is

Kūṭastharūpa (of the essential nature of Transcendental Reality), when the mind becomes Ātmasaṃstha owing to Ātmasatyānubōdha - meaning when the Intuitive Knowledge that - 'Ātman alone is the Absolute Reality' - dawns or accrues, then Jñāna becomes 'Ātmasaṃstha' - this is the implicit meaning of the third part of the Kārikā.

CONCLUSION OF AJĀTIVĀDA

So far what was stated, viz., "Although Ātmaswarūpa is eternally Aja, Advaya and Amrita alone, from the viewpoint of the Ajñas (ignorant people) That also appears to be born; therefore it was stated: 'अतो वस्यान्यकार्णयमजाति समतां गतम्' - meaning, 'Because It is eternally of the essential nature of not getting born and It is of the essential nature of being without any changes of increase or decrease whatever; only if this truth is cognized one gets Akārpaņya (absence of helplessness or destitution); how it is I will tell' - (2-2) - thus what was stated in the beginning was established on the strength of Śrutivākyas and Yukti; now here with the fourth part of the Kārikā, viz. 'अजाति समतां गतम्' it is being concluded.

What was described so far as Ātmasatyānubōdha is itself Akārpaṇya; all else is Kārpaṇya, a subject-matter of people who have superimposed upon themselves Dinatwa (helplessness, destitution) - thus it has been stated here. For that reason alone, in the Manusmiti it has been stated: 'एतिंद्ध जन्मसाफल्यं ब्राह्मणस्य विशेषतः । प्राप्तेतत् कृतकृत्यो हि हिजो भवति नान्यथा ॥' - (Manu 12-93), meaning - "Cognizing this Tattwa alone is the cause for Janmasāphalya (fulfilment of Life's purpose) for man, especially a Brahmin. One who attains this alone is called a Kritakritya (one having fulfilled Life's purpose), as also Dwija (twice-born)."

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः । योगिनो बिभ्यति ह्यस्मादमये भयदर्शिनः ॥३९॥

Meaning: "This has become popular (famous) as 'Asparshayōga'. This is something not being seen by any Yōgins. Although it is fearless, Yōgins, seeing fear in it, are afraid of it."

FEAR ABOUT ĀTMAJÑĀNA FOR THOSE WHO ARE NOT QUALIFIED

Thus this Paramārthadarshana (Intuition of the Transcendental Reality of the Self) is capable of yielding Samādhi (equipoise of the mind, Amanibhava) which is Achala (immutable), Abhaya (fearless). This has been called 'Asparshayoga' - meaning, Yoga devoid of any relationship whatsoever with anything second to It - in the Upanishads. In the Upanishadic sentences like - "Oh Maitreyi, I am not saying anything which is confusing, deluding. This Atman is Avināshi (indestructible); He has no quality or nature whatsoever of being extirpated or eradicated. When Jñāna accrues, since the relationship or association with Bhūtamātras (primordial elements) is lost (He has no particular knowledge of the type - 'I am so and so')" - (Bri. Mā. 4-3-14, 15); "If He is cognized, there is no more taint of the demerit or defect of the form of Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit)" - (Bri. 4-4-23); "That this Atman is Mahānta (supreme) and Aja (birthless). He is Ajara (undecaying), Amrita (immortal), Abhaya (fearless), verily Brahman; Brahman is fearless, is it not so? He who cognizes this truth in this manner, he becomes verily fearless Brahman" - (Bri. 4-4-25) etc. - it has been propounded that when Atmajñana accrues to a seeker he has verily become Advitiya Brahman, devoid of any Sparsha (touch or taint) of anything else whatsoever.

Even so, this cannot be acquired by those who do not have attained the Jñāna expounded in the Vedānta Śāstra. Ajñānis - meaning, those who are having identification with Parichhinnajñāna (the distinctive knowledge) of the type of 'misconceiving' Ātman to be the object for the 'I'-concept - when they listen to this topic of Yōga of the form of this Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) which is Nirbhaya (fearless), they become afraid thinking that - "When this Jñāna accrues, since the Ātmarūpa (nature of Self) of the empirical form of 'I' itself vanishes, it amounts to the destruction of Ātman (one's own being)." The experience of the type - 'Aham' (I-concept) - even this form is not there for Ātman in deep sleep; then, without there being any grief or misery whatsoever, Paramānandaprāpti (attainment of supreme Bliss) itself is attained. This truth is there invariably in everyone's

experience indeed. Although they are seeing or witnessing this daily as their experience, the common seekers or practitioners of spiritual disciplines are afraid of 'Asparshayōga' which is of the essence of this Samyajjñāna (Intuitive Knowledge), fearing that - "If Amanasta (Amanībhāva) is attained, I myself will get destroyed or will die!" This is the intended, implicit meaning here.

'ASPARSHAYŌGA' IS NOT ANY SPECIAL KIND OF YŌGA

Here in this context, some people are deluded to think or believe that a particular type of Yoga (related to Patanjala Yoga practices) called 'Asparsha Yōga' is taught. But for those who have discerned facts about the real purport of the Prakarana as also the earlier and later spiritual instructions (i.e. in what context this Yoga is taught) it will become clearly understood as to which Yoga has not been taught, and that the Darshana (Intuitive Experience) of Aja-Advaya-Paramārtha Tattwa alone has been called by the name of 'Yoga' - that is all. Just as when we are awake there is Sparsha (touch, contact) with external objects or phenomena, in the Yōga Samādhi (trance as taught in Pātañjala Yōga philosophy) there is no contact whatsoever with the external objects, is it not so? In the same way, this is not a Samādhi Vishesha (special kind of trance) devoid of any contact or touch with external things; in truth, this is verily the essential nature of Aja-Advaya Atmatattwa. In order to signify that this has no birth or destruction at all, Samyajjñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self, Pure Being-Consciousness) has been called 'Asparsha Yoga'. The other Yoga types - let it be of any duration of being without any contact with external objects - it is invariably $K\bar{a}laparicchinna$ (distinctive in time, an event in time); such Yoga Samadhi having been attained by anyone - whosoever he may be - the fathomless depth or sublimity of this Asparsha Yoga (of Vedantic spiritual science) of the nature of 'Samyajjñāna' is not known; thus in order to eulogise the greatness of this Jñāna the commonplace variety of Yoga has been criticised here; thus it should be reckoned.

11. FOR ATTAINMENT OF ĀTMAJÑĀNA THE DEVICE CALLED 'MANŌNIGRAHA'

मनसो निग्रहायत्तमभयं सर्वयोगिनाम् ।

दुःखक्षयः प्रबोषश्चाप्यक्षया शान्तिरेव च ।।४०।।

Meaning: "For Yōgins by means of Nigraha (complete hescission of identification) with the mind alone Abhaya (fearlessness), Duhkha-kshaya (destruction of misery), Jñāna (Intuitive Knowleldge of the Self), Akshaya Shānti (indestructible Bliss) - all these accrue."

THE SEEKER SHOULD ATTAIN ĀTMAJÑĀNA BY MEANS OF MANŌNIGRAHA ALONE

"Those people - who are endowed with an excellent viewpoint (Uttama Drishti) and to whom neither the mind nor the senses etc. really exist at all apart from Ātman who is of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Brahman, and who have gained conviction that all those phenomena are, just like the snake (appearing) in the rope, imagined in Ātman - since they have Intuited the truth that - 'Brahman of the very essence of Nitya Shudda Buddha Mukta is verily myself' - by means of Ātmasatyānubōdha, and since the Akshayashānti (eternal Bliss) called 'Mōksha' is established in their very essence of Being - for such people there is no Sādhana (spiritual practice) whatsoever that remains to be practised" - (3-36) - thus we have stated, is it not so?

Different from such people with superior viewpoint, those people who have adopted a Sādhanamarga (path of spiritual practice) and are endowed with low-grade or middle-grade viewpoints - meaning, people who have believed that - "Apart from Ātman but associated with Ātman there exists a thing called 'Manas' (mind)" - and for that reason alone getting disturbed by the sickleness and waywardness of the mind, they are desiring to get rid of the sense of identification with the body seen in the manner - 'I am verily the body, the senses etc.' - to all such Yōgins (seekers of spiritual solace) who are not having the benefit of Ātmasatyānubōdha the

great fruit of Abhaya (fearlessness) can be attained exclusively by Manonigraha.

In this Chapter for the sake of such Manda-Madhyama-Dṛishṭi people 'Manōnigraha' form of spiritual practice will be instructed in order that they may achieve Amanasta state and attain Nishṭhā (fully rooted, established state) in Advaitātman. Those who are endowed with Ātmasatyānubōdha - since they are Kṛitārtha (those who have achieved the fulfilment of Life's purpose) and since for them Manōnigraha is self-established and hence readily available, this is verily a Lakshaṇa (a significant hallmark) for them. In fact, what is Lakshaṇa for Kṛitārthas - that alone is recommended as a Sādhana for the rest of the seekers by the Śāstra. For, the others have to perforce acquire through concerted efforts alone. Hence, here also for the benefit of those who wish to attain Ātmajñāna by the device of Manōnigraha its methodical details are being taught.

(Objection): Sādhana of the type of Chittanirōdha (restraint or cessation of the mental functions) etc. has been taught in the Yōgashāstra (Patanjali's school of philosophy), is it not so? If that itself is practised here, merely on that count does it not amount to procuring or providing a Sādhana for Ātmajñāna? In that case, here once again why should Manōnigraha be taught?

(Solution): Not so. For, Pātanjala Yōga is a device for mere Nirōdha (restraint, suppression) of Chittavritti (mental concepts); therefore, it does not culminate or achieve its fruitition in Advaitātma Darshana (Intuitive Experience of non-dual Pure Being-Consciousness of the Self). The Śruti (i.e., the whole gamut of Upanishadic lore) is affirming that apart from Vedic Ātmaikatwa Darshana by no other means Mōksha can be attained at all. Therefore, for that Jñāna as a device Vedic Dhyāna (contemplation) alone has been taught in the Upanishads. That Dhyāna has other names like 'Adhyātma Yōga' etc. also. That alone has been instructed by the name of 'Manōnigraha' and not the Dhyāna that has been taught in Yōgashāstra at all; for, that has perforce to culminate, end up in Dvaita invariably. Not being opposed to Vedas, those aids like Āsanas etc. which are useful for this 'Manōnigraha' and which are taught

by the followers of Yōgadarshana (i.e., Patanjali's Yōga philosophy) - since using those aids is proper here too - by that selective adoption there is no harm done at all. It should be discerned that although Manōnigraha has been instructed here in this manner, because it has been instructed to the low-grade and middle-grade qualifiers invariably keeping in view the Avidyākalpita Dvaita (duality projected by or conjured up by ignorance) which is universally popular, this teaching will not cause any hindrance whatsoever to Aja-Advaita tenet.

BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM MANONIGRAHA

Let this incidental topic be kept aside. In this Kārikā the answer to the question - "What are the benefits accruing from this Manonigraha?" - is provided. Because as long as the mind exists the Dvaitadarshana (appearance of duality) invariably exists, fear is unavoidable; but by the Nigraha (full renunciation of identification) with the mind - (a) fear will be got rid of. Similarly, for the seekers (b) Duhkhakshaya (riddance from or destruction of grief) also will accrue from Manonigraha alone, and (c) Ātmajñāna also will accrue from this Manonigraha. The belief that the mind belongs to, or is associated with, Atman is caused by Mithyābhimāna (wrong or misconceived identification) only; therefore, if the mind is fully conquered this Dvaita disappears; (d) Advaitātmajñāna also will be gained. In the same way, (e) Akshayashānti (eternal Bliss) - Mōksha or Liberation by this nomenclature also will be attained by means of the Manonigraha alone. Because Manonigraha is a Sādhana (spiritual exercise, practice), the Mōksha that is caused, engendered by a Sādhana will be rendered Anitya (non-eternal), is it not so? thus we should not doubt. For, Manonigraha does not at all mean fully conquering (Nigraha) a mind which really exists; on the other hand, it means: Although Atmatattwa is Advitiya alone, due to Avidyā a misconceived identification (Mithyābhimāna) that a mind which exists apart from Atman is associated with or tagged on to Atman is entertained. Therefore, an effort to get rid of that mind with a false appearance is itself called 'Manonigraha'. Hence, there is no possibility whatsoever of any harm being caused to Advaitasiddhanta merely by the Sadhanopadesha (instruction of a spiritual practice).

उत्सेक उद्येर्यद्वत्कुशाग्रेणैकिबन्दुना । मनरगे निग्रहस्तद्वद्वद्यरिखेदतः ॥४१॥

Meaning: "Just as the siphoning or measuring out of the sea, drop by drop, by means of the tip of a blade of grass, in the same way (by means of a relentless effort) without any disgust or tedium the Nigraha (conquering) of the mind will ensue."

(A) FOR MANŌNIGRAHA NOT ALLOWING THE MIND TO GET DIMINISHED IN VIGOUR OR TO DECAY AS A DEVICE

To the question - "How can this Manonigraha be achieved?" - the answer is: By means of a steady, steadfast attempt - analogous to drying up a sea of all its water by pouring it out drop by drop by the tip of a blade of grass (i.e., seemingly impossible Herculean task) - of not allowing the mind to get disgusted and without allowing it to sag or decay by means of such a supreme concerted effort the mind will become fully possessed, conquered, as it were. For that reason alone in the **Bhagavadgita** (6-25) it is stated: "By means of an intellect fully gripped by *Dhṛiti* (alertness, awareness) one should step by step recede within unto oneself"; "That Yōga should be practised by means of a *Chitta* (mind) without any disgust, tedium" - (6-23).

उपायेन निगृह्णीयाद् विक्षिप्तं कामभोगयोः । सुप्रसन्नं लये चैव यथा कामो लयस्तथा ॥४२॥

Meaning: "One should hold firmly the mind which is spread out (i.e., drawn out and scattered by distractions) in Kāmabhōgas (manifold desires and enjoyments). If it merges or disappears and becomes Suprasanna (goes to sleep), it has to be Nigrahīta (fully controlled and awakened). Just like Kāma (desire), similarly Laya (merger) too (is a hindrance)."

(B) METHOD OF GETTING RID OF LAYA AND VIKSHEPA

Merely making an effort without any disgust is not enough; if the mind gets *Vikshipta* (distracted or disturbed) either by any desire or by the enjoyment of an object of desire or if it gets spread out and squanders its faculties, then that mind

should be brought under full control (Nigraha), meaning, should be tied down to the Self and it should be subdued. And if the mind gets into Laya, meaning deep sleep in which it becomes Suprasanna (merged), then that mind - to wit, if the mind without any contact either with the objects or the senses becomes unruffled, undisturbed, gets stabilised in the Pure Consciousness (Self) and becomes clear or pure devoid of any thoughts, identifications etc. - then that sort of a pure mind should be gripped firmly. If it is asked: "When it gets clear why should it be controlled?" - the answer is: "Just as $K\bar{a}ma$ (desire) is a hindrance to this Yoga, in the same manner if it gets (merged in sleep), then also it becomes a hindrance indeed; for, Laya is the cause for Vikshepa (distraction). Therefore, just as the mind which has been distracted, disturbed due to Kāma has to be controlled, the mind having a proclivity towards Laya (getting merged in sleep) also should perforce be controlled. This is the implicit meaning here.

दुःखं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य कामभोगात्रिवर्तयेत् । अजं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य जातं नैव तु पश्यति ॥४३॥

Meaning: "Realizing the truth that everything is Duhkha alone, (the mind) should be turned away from $K\bar{a}ma$ (desire) and $Bh\bar{o}ga$ (enjoyment); if it is cognized that everything is Aja (birthless) alone, then nothing that is born is seen."

(C) GETTING RID OF KĀMA (DESIRE) BY MEANS OF PRACTICE OF VAIRĀGYA (RENUNCIATION) AND JÑĀNA (INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE)

By an *Upāya* (subtle ruse, device) the mind should be fully controlled - (3-42) - thus it was stated, is it not so? Which is that subtle ruse? - this fact is being stated here. After ratiocinating or ruminating over the subtle truth - "All duality, diversity is invariably misery only" - in our mind and cognizing it with complete conviction, we should withdraw the mind from Kāma and Bhōga. In fact, all Dvaita is the *Vilāsa* (pastime or diversion) alone of Avidyā. The following Śrutis signify that Dvaita is the effect, projection of Avidyā: "Where it appears as though there exists another object there one will see another" - (Bṛi. 4-3-31). "(In the dream it appears as though) someone is beating

me as also captivating me" - (Bri. 4-3-20) etc. From the Smritis it becomes known that Dvaita is the cause for Duhkha. "Oh Kounteya (son of Kunti), the enjoyments or pleasures that accrue from Vishayasparsha (contact with external objects) are verily the cause for Duhkha; in those things which have a beginning and an end a Vivekin does not take delight" - (Gitā 5-22) - such Smritis can be exemplified here. In this world the truth that from Adhyātmika (internally within the body), Adhibhoutika (external objects) etc. Kānias (desires), Bhōgas (enjoyments) giving rise to their respective Duhkhas (miseries), which are unavoidable, are known to be caused to each one of us indeed; in the same way, we can imagine or infer that in other worlds too enjoyments are the cause for Duhkha alone. The purport implicit in the Gita sentence is: Not only during the period of enjoyment alone but also before they accrue we suffer from an anxiety of the type that - 'They have not yet been acquired' - as also after they are lost or gone we suffer from resentment of the type that - 'They are not there now' - thus they are the causes for Duhkha alone. Bringing all these facts to our mind if we feel a sense of Vairāgya (renunciation), then the mind remains without opting for Bhoga. Another device for Manonigraha is the Jñāna Abhyāsa (repeated practice of Intuitive Knowledge), which is nothing but constantly remembering or ratiocinating the Sastraic instructions along with the Yuktis mentioned in this Prakarana to cognize the truth - "All this is verily Aja-Advaya Brahman"; by means of this Jñānābhyāsa we attain the conviction or sense of certitude that there is no worthwhile object for the mind at all, and the hankering after Kāma and Bhōga will disappear.

There is a marked distinction between the Jñānābhyāsa mentioned here and the Abhyāsa that is taught in Pātanjala Yōga. There in Pātanjala Yōga an Abhyāsa (repeated practice) of Sātvika Ekāgrata (mental equipoise of the quality of Satva) being repeated often endowed with the Samskāra (mental proclivity, refinement) of the Nirōdha (suppression) of Chittavritti (mental thoughts or concepts); but here in Vedāntic teaching although Dvaita appears as real, in reality all this is verily Aja-Advaya Brahman - thus Abhyāsa of Jñāna born out of Śāstra-Āchārya instructions has been signified. It is true that this Abhyāsa is

not Sulabhasādhya (easily to be attained) for everyone. Even so, as being taught now step by step we should merge the senses, the mind, the intellect one into the other in that order and finally we should endeavour to get established in Brahman alone of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Ātman. The Adhyātma Yōga mentioned in the Kaṭhōpanishad, the Dhyāna Yōga taught in the sixth chapter of Gītā are the Sādhanas meant for this Aja-Advaya-Ātmajñāna alone. Only the external aspects of Āsana (posture) etc. mentioned in Pātañjala Yōga are helpful here also; this fact we have mentioned previously itself.

लये संबोधयेच्चित्तं विक्षिप्तं शमयेत् पुनः । सकषायं विजानीयात् समप्राप्तं न चालयेत् ॥४४॥

Meaning: "If it gets merged, the mind should be woken up. If it becomes distracted or disturbed, then once again the mind should be brought under control. We should cognize that (mind) which is associated with Kashāya (the potent or latent Vāsanas or proclivities attached to external objects) and if it attains equipoise, then it should not be disturbed, shaken up."

(D) EXAMINATION OF LAYAVASTHA (STATE OF MERGER)

Thus even after avoiding, or escaping from, Vikshepa, there is a chance of the Chitta (mind) getting into the sleep state and thereby getting Laya (merged) due to the potency of the seed form of Avidya, Kama etc.; because that is also the cause for Anartha (undesirable miseries), then the mind should be woken up, activated. The principle reasons for the mind to get into sleep are: (i) insufficient sleep; (ii) food not being digested and remaining in the stomach; (iii) exhaustion - from these, as also (iv) neglecting Vivekābhyāsa (practice of Intuitive deliberation, discrimination) without putting in concerted efforts. Therefore, having enough sleep, eating Sātvika food which is quickly digestible observing frugality, not doing any work which is too strenuous - all these features being introduced in our life style and routine, constantly practising Vivekābhyāsa we should keep our mind alert and attentive - this is the implicit meaning of the Kārikā.

If we observe properly and deeply, in the Sushuptāvasthā Jiva has become one with (merged in) Aja-Advaya-Ātman's Swarūpa. The Śruti describes this as: "Just like pure water He is clear, Advitiya (non-dual), Sākshichaitanya (Witnessing Pure Consciousness), Ekaswarūpa (of the essential nature of unity). Oh Emperor, this alone is the Brahmalōka - said Yājñavalkya" - (Bṛi. 4-3-22). It further explains: "For this Jiva this alone is the Paramagati (Supreme Absolute state), this alone is his Paramasampat (extraordinary wealth), this alone is his Paramalōka (Supreme Transcendental abode); this alone is his Paramānanda (Absolute Bliss), from one part of this Reality the rest of the creatures are thriving" - (Bri. 4-3-32). Even so, merely by deep sleep no one ever acquires Paramapurushārtha (the Absolute Supreme Goal of Life, i.e., Mōksha). For, since all Jivas are becoming one with Brahmaswarūpa quite naturally without finally, consummately getting rid of Avidyā by cognizing (Intuiting) Brahmaswarūpa, they are waking up again and again in their respective Jiva Rūpas in accordance with their respective Karmas. From this viewpoint alone in the Śri Bādarāyana's Vedānta Sūtras it is written: 'पुंस्त्वादिवत्तस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात्' (Ved. Sūtra 2-3-31), meaning - "Just as the Pumstwa (manliness), which invariably was latent in the childhood, manifested itself in the youth state - the association with Buddhi, which invariably existed in a seed form in the deep sleep state, once again manifests itself in the waking." Therefore, from the standpoint of the practitioners who wish to practise and attain Manonigraha to get Laya (merged in deep sleep) also is verily a defect.

Thus when there is Layaprāpti (acquisition of sleep) even after the mind is woken up once again it may get Vikshipta (distracted, disturbed); then as stated previously with the aid of Vairāgya and Abhyāsa again and again the mind should be brought into equipoise.

(E) KASHĀYA PARIHĀRA

Even when both Laya and Vikshepa are not there, and when a state, which is in between these extreme states, is acquired the mind may be Sakashāya, meaning embedded in or associated with the seed of latent impressions of previous pleasures or enjoyments; even then, with the help of devices like

Viveka, Abhyāsa, Vairāgya - the mind should be purified, cleansed of its dross.

(F) ACQUISITION OF EQUIPOISE IS DESIRABLE

The mind which is rid of these three defects (viz. Laya, Vikshepa and Kashāya) is fit to acquire 'Samaprāpti' - meaning, it is turning towards equipoise; then if it is stabilized without disturbing it, in due course it acquires Ātmarūpa (the essential nature of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss). This has been stated in Kārikā (3-37): 'समाधिरचलोऽभयः'.

This Kārikā sentence has been written by Śri Gauḍapādā-chārya following a sentence of Maitreyanātha in his work called 'Mahāyānasūtrālankāra' which runs like : लीनं चित्तस्य गृहणीयादुद्धतं शमयेत् पुनः, शमप्राप्तमुपेक्षेत तस्मित्रालम्बने पुनः' which is also accepted by Yōgāchāras (Buddhists) - Thus the author of 'Āgamashāstra', Śri Vidhushekhara Bhaṭṭāchārya has surmised. But the 'Shama' of Chitta that the Buddhists have acknowledged is 'Nāsha' (destruction); in the present context what Śri Gauḍapāda has propounded is Aja-Advaya-Ātmajñāna; there is no relationship whatsoever between these two approaches or viewpoints. Here 'Samaprāpta' is the correct text; for, in the Kārikā (3-2) 'अजितिसमत्तं गतम्' - it is proclaimed that - "We are stating Aja-Ātmatattwa which is immutable (devoid of any distinctions like increase and decrease)."

'नास्वादयेत् सुखं तत्र निःसङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत् । निश्चलं निश्चरच्चित्तमेकीकुर्यात् प्रयत्नतः ॥४५॥

Meaning: "The happiness that is acquired there should not be tasted; without having any association or contact one should be fully aware (with Pure Consciousness); if the non-vibrating or still mind goes out outwardly, by a concerted effort it should be brought back and unified with (merged in) Pure Consciousness."

(G) GETTING RID OF SUKHĀSVĀDA

Thus, if by means of Vishayavairāgya we manage to see that the mind does not become extroverted and practise

Vivekābhyāsa, then in the mind, which is directed towards the (innermost essence of Being) Self, if the Kashāya also is got rid of, then it will become fit for Samaprāpti (equipoise). Here at this stage it appears as though all the defects or impurities are removed and the practitioner is likely to be deluded that that state itself is the one essential nature of Sukha. But discerning in the manner - "This Sukhābhāsa (a mere reflection of happiness) is projected by Sattwaguṇa, conjured up by Avidyā which is devoid of Vivechana (discrimination) between Vishaya and Vishayi" - he should remain without association with it. In this Sukhābhāsa (reflection of Bliss) which accrues at the beginning of Samādhi, only after we give up our association the mind attains Ekībhāva (unity, consummate merger) in Ātman, who is the really real Ānandarūpa (nature of Pure Biiss).

(H) ESTABLISHING THE MIND IN ATMAN ALONE

Thus even after all kinds of hindrances, impediments (impurities) are removed, the mind abruptly - by virtue of (due to) some remnants of previous latent impressions - may wander out towards the external objects of the world at large. Then again by a concerted effort it should be made to merge in the Self alone and stay put there. "यतो यतो निश्चरित मनश्चञ्चलमस्थिरम् । ततस्ततो नियम्यैतदात्मन्येव वशं नयेत् ॥" (Gītā 6-26) - meaning - "Whenever due to external objects like the Shabda, Sparsha etc. the mind wavers and wanders out, then and there by means of Vivechana (discrimination) decide that it is all Āvidyaka (conjured up by ignorance) and drag the mind back, as it were, towards the Self and establish it there." This is verily the implicit purport of Bhagavān in the Gītā verse.

(12) BRAHMABHĀVA (SENSE OF UNITY WITH BRAHMAN) ALONE IS THE FRUIT OF MANŌNIGRAHA

यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः । अनिङ्गनमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ।।४६।।

Meaning: "When the mind remains without getting merged, but without again getting distracted outwardly, with-

out any vibration, without any $\bar{A}bh\bar{a}sa$ (reflection of anything) whatsoever, then it has verily become Brahman."

IF BY MEANS OF MANŌNIGRAHA THE MIND BECOMES PRASHĀNTA (EXTREMELY QUIESCENT) THEN IT IS BRAHMATWAPRĀPTI

By virtue of Viveka-Vairagya, as mentioned before, without giving any scope for Vikshepa, after waking up the mind which has got Laya (sleep), without shaking even the least bit, without getting any Ābhāsa either of the external or the internal objects - if the mind rests still in that supreme state, then it should be reckoned to have become one with Brahman (the Transcendental Reality). In this Kārikā though Kashāyatyāga (giving up latent proclivities of past pleasures) has not been mentioned, on the strength and authority of the previous texts that too can be safely included. Just as a person realizes the truth that what was appearing as a snake is really, in its essence, a rope only, the Jiva giving up his separated, distinctive form as an entity, attains Amanibhāva, then he remains in his essential nature of Paramārtha Brahmātma Rūpa. This is the implicit meaning of the Kārikā. As stated previously in (3-32) that by means of Ātmasatyānubodha the mind becomes 'no-mind', by means of this device of 'Manonigraha' also that very same 'Amanasta' - meaning, Intuiting quite clearly as a profound transcendental Plenary Experience of that Ultimate Brahmātmaswarūpa - will be realized.

MARKED DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FRUIT OF MANONIGRAHA AND ASAMPRAJÑĀTA SAMĀDHI

In the Yōgashāstra (of Patanjali Rishi), according to the method of Chittanirodha taught by it, all the thoughts (Vrittis) disappear and the mind being endowed with the remnants of Samskāras attains 'Asamprajñāta Samādhi'. In the Sādhana called 'Manōnigraha' in that Śāstra, it has been propounded that by the three devices, viz. (a) Dhāraṇa, meaning to stabilise the mind in a special region (Deshavishesha); (b) Dhyāna - there in that region alone keeping the mind in one and the same form (uninterruptedly like Taila Dhāra, or stream of oil); (c) Samādhi - there in that region itself the mind appears as though it is not existing in its very essence - the 'Asamprajñātasamādhi' is attained.

fested as Brahman" - is it not so? This Brahmananda is not, like the Vishayasukha, something that culminates in Duhkha; nor is it that which appears as 'Kritrimasukha' (deceptive happiness) prior to acquiring or going into Samādhi (trance); for, it is one which manifests itself by virtue of Atmasatyanubodha. 'Manonigraha' means not only keeping the existing mind in full control, but also the mind after acquiring Amanibhava finding its culmination in Atmasatyanubodha alone. By means of that 'Bodha' alone this Sukha (Bliss) will become our Intuitive Experience (Anubhava); for, It is 'Svastha' (still, quiet), to wit, in Its essential nature of the Self It has remained still and steady; It is 'Shanta' meaning, It exists in a form in which all the 'Anartha Prapañcha' (the whole gamut of the miseries of the world of duality) is destroyed; It is 'Sanirvāna', meaning, It exists in the essential nature of Kaivalya (Transcendental Reality); since It is Advaita (non-dual) It is Shivarūpa (of the essence of auspiciousness); It is also 'Akathya', meaning, It cannot be determined in the manner - "It is such and such" and be described or signified by any word as It is of Nirvisheshaswarūpa (of the essential nature which is devoid of any special features or characteristics); It is 'Uttamasukha'; It is the Ananda (Bliss) which is Intuitively experienced by superior type of Yogis who are totally immersed in Aja-Advaita-Anusandhāna (Intuitive practice of getting established in birthless non-dual Self of the essential nature of Pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss). It is non-different from 'Jñeyabrahma' (Brahman to be known through the Upanishadic teachings) who is verily our own Swarūpa devoid of birth; It is 'Sarvajña' (omniscient); since It is everything and Nitya Chaitanyarupa, that Sukha is Brahman alone - thus the Brahmajñānis affirm. The Sruti statement: "That which is Vijñāna and Ānanda is verily Brahman" - (Bri. 3-9-27-7), as also the Smriti sentence expressed by Shri Kṛishṇa Bhagavān : 'प्रशान्तमनसं होनं योगिनं सुखमुत्तमम् । उपैति शान्तरजसं ब्रह्मभूतमकल्मषम् ॥' - (Gitā 6-27) - meaning, "For the Dhyānayōgi who has become one with Atman the Rajoguna has completely vanished; he has verily become Brahman; he is Nishkalmasha (devoid of any impurity whatsoever); he gets immensely great Sukha", - is in truth this very state of the Jñāni. In the sixth

On the other hand, here in Śri Gaudapāda's Advaita Vedānta, because on the strength of the spiritual instructions by both Śāstra and the Acharya, the practitioner examines Intuitively Vastutattwa (the Ultimate Reality in Its Transcendental, Absolute essence) Itself, the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) of the type - "Everything is verily Brahman" - accrues. Therefore, between both these Sādhanas and their respective Phalas (fruits) there exists a great distinction. Even so, neglecting this marked difference some adherents of Vyākhyāna Vedānta Prasthāna (method of approach of the post-Sankara commentators) calling themselves Advaitins (Vedāntins) are asserting that 'Śravana', 'Manana', 'Nididhyāsana' taught in the Śrutis are verily 'Dhārana', 'Dhyāna' and 'Samādhi, respectively, and that 'Darshana' means 'Samādhi' alone. Here because Atman is Sākshāt (directly, immediately) Aparōksha (Intuitively) Brahman alone, there is no scope whatsoever for ' $\overline{A}tmas\bar{a}ksh\bar{a}tk\bar{a}ra$ ' (materialisation of the Self) - this eternal truth they have forgotten. It becomes very clear from the Bādarāyana Vedānta Sūtra (3-2-24) that what is taught therein as 'Samrādhana' is not 'Samyama' that is propounded in Yogashastra (of Patanjali) which is evidently, unequivocally a Dvaita philosophy. This fact is clearly brought out in that Sūtra-Bhāshya itself. Therefore in this Prakarana 'Brahmanishtha' that is taught here is to be determined in the manner that it is just like for the Adhyārōpita (superimposed or misconceived) snake, Nishpatti (birth, projection) of Rajjwamsha (apparent reality lent, as it were, by the real rope) is imagined - following the Vedantic methodology.

स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्वाणमकथ्यं सुखमुत्तमम्। अजमजेन ज्ञेयेन सर्वज्ञं परिचक्षते ॥४७॥

Meaning: "This is quiescent, peaceful, endowed with liberation from mundane existence - thus having determined, it is being described (in the Śāstra) that It is indescribable supreme Bliss, birthless, Abhinna (non-different) from a Jñeya (known entity) which is Aja (unborn), Sarvajña (omniscient)."

THE FRUIT OF MANONIGRAHA IS SWARUPĀNANDA

In the previous Kārikā it has been stated: "Then it mani-

Mantra of Māṇḍūkyōpanishad what is described as Turiyātmasthiti should be compared with this opinion expressed in this Kārikā.

(13) CONCLUSION OF AJĀTIVĀDA

न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः सम्भवोऽस्य न विद्यते । एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किञ्चित्र जायते ॥४८॥

Meaning: "No Jiva is born; such a contingency is not there at all. In That in which there is not an iota of birth, That (Entity) alone is the *Ustamasatya* (profound Reality) indeed."

AJĀTABRAHMAN ALONE IS THE PARAMĀRTHASATYA

Whatever has been stated so far like Manonigraha, Srishti by means of illustrations of clay, metal etc., Upāsana - all these are mentioned as subtle devices to cognize, Intuit Paramārthasatya alone and, in truth, none of them are really real entities. For, then for reasons that: In the theory propounding that the mind should be fully controlled (Manonigraha) the difference of the type - the mind as a distinct entity apart from Atman; the difference of -Ishwara who creates and the world that He creates; the differences of - the person who meditates, Upasana and Ishwara who is Upāsitavya etc. - invariably exists - and thereby it will amount to saying those differences or distinctions themselves are Paramarthasatya and the Vedantic teaching of - "Brahman which is Aja, Advaya is alone the Paramārtha (Absolute Reality)" - will be vitiated. But in the doctrine that all these are taught merely as devices to cognize Paramartha, they do not become Paramārthasatya at all; all that is taught by the Sruti as a device over and over again and it reiterates that "That Atman who is negated in the manner - Not this, not that' is Itself this one"; thus because the Sruti negates repeatedly in this manner - as it is stated in a part of the Kārikā (3-33), 'अजेनाजं विबुध्यते' - the Aja-Advitiya-Atmatattwa alone will manifest Itself in the seeker's Intuitive Experience.

It being so, what is 'Paramārthasatya' (the Absolute Truth) is: No Jīva is really born; nor the Kārya Kāraṇasanghāta

(conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) which is an adjunct for him is born. We have already mentioned that - "At a few places the Jivasrishti (creation, birth of Jiva) which the Sruti has instructed is - just like the birth of Ghatākāsha etc. - a Māyikajanma (illusory birth) and is mentioned as a device for the purpose of teaching the Tattwa to Jijñāsus (seekers) of the low-grade intellect". Therefore, for Atman who is by His very essential nature Aja - 'Sambhava' (a cause for His birth) - is not existing at all; hence, the fact that - "No Jiva has birth" - is itself the Absolute truth (Paramārtha). In the previous portion of the treatise among all the Vyāvahārikasatyas (empirical truths) mentioned as a device to signify the Tattwa the 'Uttamasatya' (the most profound truth) s: "In Brahman who is Satyaswarūpa nothing in the least, even as iota, is ever born". The Śrutis like "The Real of the real - is Its name" - (Bri. 2-1-20); "That which is Satyam, Jñānam and Alantam is verily Brahman" - (Tai. 2-11) - etc. are the authoriative sentences for this conclusion.

IV ALĀTASHĀNTI PRAKARAŅA

1 RELATIONSHIP (RELEVANCE) OF THIS CHAPTER

THE GIST OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS

On the pretext of determining the meaning of Omkara in the first Prakarana it has been taught that - "Advaita alone is Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality)." There it was instructed (spiritually) that - "Ōmkāra, devoid of Mātras (metres) or Pādas (quarters), is verily Turyatman, who is not having any relationship with the qualities or special features of Atman, of the Avasthās like waking, dream, who is related to the Avasthās; further that Turyātman alone is verily Advaitātman who is Shiva (auspicious, sacred)." In the second Prakarana this same meaning (purport) was established by proving on the basis of Yukti (reasoning) of the type - "All the internal and external objects or phenomena are 'Vitatha' meaning 'false appearances' aone". There it was demonstrated that both the waking and the Iream are states of one and the same kind and therefrom i was established that - "All Dvaitavyavahāra (transactions of quality, diversity) is Avidyākalpita (projected, conjured up by ign¢ance) in Atman"; thereby it was concluded that from all this it volves that - Advayātman (non-dual Self), who is Prapañchōpashana (in whom the world of duality is completely merged), is Hmself verily Paramartha". In the third Prakarana once more by means of Sastraic statements (teachings) and Yukti (Intuitive reasning) directly, meaning Intuitively, Advaita (non-dual Self) was determined. There in the following order several important enets were revealed: (i) Though Jivas and their adjuncts of laryakaraṇasaṅghātas (conglomeration of the body, the senses tc.) just like the Ghatākāshas and Ghatas, like the objects see in a dream - are appearing to be born, that Janma is verily Nayika (illusory) - this truth is explained; (ii) the Śrutivākyas hich describe the Srishti (creation) are merely a device to smify, teach the subtle truth of \bar{A} tmaikya (unity of the Self) - indating these by means of *Upapatti* (reasoning); and thereby establhing the fact that the Srutis have the ultimate purport of teaching AjaAdvaya-Brahman alone; (iii) because the whole gamut of duality is merely Manōdrishya (a projection of the mind), Advaita alone is the Uttamasatya (supreme, profound truth); (iv) Manōnigraha, Srishti, Upāsana etc. are subtle devices which are merely Āpekshikasatya (relatively true) - thus it is concluded. Anyway, thus in the previous three chapters through the doorway of Anvaya (comparison-agreement) it has been taught that Advaita alone is Paramārtha.

THE SALIENT TOPIC OF THIS PRAKARANA WORTH DELIBERATION

Now in this fourth Prakarana through the doorway of Vyatireka (contreriety, contrast) also that very Tattwa is being established. For this Advaita Darshana the principal opponents arc Sānkhyans etc. who are followers of Astikadarshana (philosophy which believes in the authority of the Sastra i.e., Vedas) as also Buddhists (who do not acknowledge Vedas as authoritative sources). Because they oppose one another in their arguments, Dvaita which gives full scope for Raga (attachment, affinity to one's own philosophy and preceptor), Dwesha (hatred towards other schools of philosophy) and Klesha (miseries) is a Mithyādarshana (false, unreal spiritual precept) - this fact was indicated in the previous Chapter (3-17); because Advaita Darshana (non-dual philosophy) is not opposed to those philosophies and does not give any scope for any Kleshas, it is verily the Samyagdarshana (the correct, real spiritual philosophy) - thus this philosophy has been eulogised also (3-17, 3-18). Therefore, this Prakarana has been written to analyse in detail and refute the Dvaita Darshanas on the ground that since they are mutually opposed to one another they are not the correct (Samyag) Darshanas and thereby, by contrast, conclude that Advaita Darshana alone is the Samyagdarshana.

THE AXIOMS THAT ARE UTILIZED IN THE CHAPTERS

In the previous three Prakaraṇas for reasons like: (a) By an examination of Avasthātraya, Advaitatattwa alone is Paramārtha and the rest of the Vikalpas (imaginations or misconceptions) are appearing each by leaving out another; in states like Sushupti etc. their essential nature itself does not exist and hence they are shown to be Asatya (unreal) on the strength of Anubhava (In-

tuitive Experience) and (b) then it has been established that -"Advaita alone is Paramartha" - on the basis of Yukti in consonance with (or subsidiary to) Intuitive Experience - in those Chapters the axiom that is adopted is Vita (Anvaya, agreement) $Ny\bar{a}ya$ (axiom); on the other hand, in this Chapter, for reasons that Dvaitins are arguing one against another and that nc one's Yukti (reasoning) remains established or sustained, it is shown that Dvaita Darshana is not Yukti Yukta (in keeping with reasoning); thereby the truth that - "Advaita alone is sustained" is proved meaningfully; hence it is said that here Avita (Vyatireka, contrast) Nyāya is utilized, that is all; but it should not be misunderstood here that merely on the basis of Anvaya-Vyatireka-Anumāna (inference based on the axiom of agreement and contrast) - Advaita is established. Like the other Darshanas (schools of philosophy) here mere logic or reasoning is not believed; in truth, Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) alone is important.

WHY THIS NAME OF ALATASHANTI?

For this Prakarana the name 'Alatashanti' is given with a purport behind it. To wit, Alāta (a firebrand, torch) - when it is being swung round, the light of the fire draws, as it were, various kinds of figures and all of them are appearing falsely indeed to create an illusion. When observed properly the light exists in its singular form always (i.e. devoid of any multiple, manifold shapes of light) and it has never any taint or touch whatsoever with those shapes or forms. Is it not so? In the same way, although Atmatattwa, which is Aja, Advaita, appears to be born, to move, to get divided into Grāhya-Grāhaka categories due to Avidyā, from the Vidyā Drishti It always (eternally) remains or subsists as Shānta, Shiva and Advaita. This truth is elucidated and established here. Anyway, thus through the device of showing the various defects found in other alien Darshanas, the eternal fact that - 'Advaita Darshana is truly the Samyagdarshana' - is being concluded and thus the name of - 'Alātashānti Prakaraņa' is a fitting nomenclature in all respects.

2. MANGALĀCHARAŅA (INVOCATION)

ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान् यो गगनोपमान् । ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥१॥ Meaning: "I salute that Purushashreshtha (the greatest, holy man) who has cognized by means of $J\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ (Intuitive Knowledge), which is like $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space) and non-different from $J\tilde{n}eya$ (the object of knowledge) those $Dharm\bar{a}n$ (J $n}\bar{a}nis$, Realized souls) who are also like the $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$."

THE GIST OF THE TEXT ON THE PRETEXT OF AN INVOCATION TO THE PRECEPTOR

The reason for this invocatory verse written at the beginning of this Prakarana is given by Shri Sankara to be: "The Advaita Darshana Sampradāya Kartru (the founder of the traditional methodology of teaching of the school of philosophy of Non-dualism) - in order to salute Him with Advaitaswarūpa alone this first verse is composed. By this veneration of Acharya at the beginning of a treatise one's purpose is fulfilled by it". The intended purport of this comment is: For all these four Chapters. Advaita alone is the subject-matter. In the previous Chapters Advaita has been propounded by means of Sruti and Yukti; in order to create a high sense of reverence in the minds of Mumukshus (seekers of liberation) by signifying the truth that Advaita Darshana (the school of philosophy of Non-dualism) is one that yields the Purushārtha (the goal of human existence) which is of the essence of Shānta (peace), Shivaswarūpa (auspicious nature) without giving any scope for Rāga (attachment) and Dwesha (hatred) - the invocation, which salutes Paratattwa (Absolute, Transcendental Reality) as Advaitarūpa (in the form of non-duality) alone, has been composed here; because all the four Prakaranas are propounding Advaitatattwa alone, though the whole treatise itself being called a 'Sastra' is reasonable, since the very quintessence of Vedānta Śāstra has been provided in a concise and concentrated form in this fourth Chapter Shri Sankara has conceived this Prakarana alone as a compact 'Śāstra' (scientific text) and eulogised it.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF 'BHAGAVANTA' WHO IS SALUTED

"I salute Īśwara who is called 'Nārāyaṇa', that *Purusha-shreshṭha* (the supreme, Absolute Being) who is (a) all-pervading like Ākāsha; (b) non-different from Atmans (Selves) who are

Jñeya (known objects); (c) like the heat of the fire and light or brilliance of the sun, non different from these selves but verily their Swarūpa; (d) who ever cognizes the Dharmān meaning Ātmans (Jivas) and the external objects who by virtue of their Jnana are also all-pervading like Ākāsha alone.

The Vyākhyānakāras (post-Śankara commentators who profess to be his followers only) refer to a legend that Shri Gaudapādāchārya in the past did long and intensive penance keeping as his Upāsya Devata (Deity to be meditated upon) Bhagavān Shri Nārāyana (popularly known as Shri Mahāvishņu) in Badarikāshram, which was the residential abode of Nara and Nārāyaņa sages; a highly pleased Bhagavān then matenalized before him and blessed him with 'Brahma Vidya'. Secondly, it is mentioned in the epic 'Mahābhārata' that Shrimannārāyaņa (i.e. Shri Mahāvishņu) incarnated in four forms of Nara, Nārāyaņa, Hari, Krishna in order to keep alive Dharma (righteousness, ethics, morals); among them Nara and Nārāyaṇa were highly dedicated to do penance, and Nārāyaṇa had a dialogue with Nārada (a divine sage) and taught Nārāyana Tattwa (the Reality of Nārāyaṇa); there, in the Mōksha Dharma Parva 335-1, it is found that Nārāyaṇa is called by the epithet 'Dvipadām Varishtha'. Because Shri Sankara Bhagavatpada belongs to the traditional lineage of spiritual teachers of (Nārāyaņasampradāya) of Nārāyaņa, even to this day at the beginning of the Shantimantrapatha of Śānkara Bhāshya the followers of Shri Sankara recite a verse pertaining to the Guruparampara beginning with Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, even if anyone of the above two theories is assumed, it can be stated unequivocally that the author is revering and invoking Shrimannārāyaņa Bhagavān who is of the essential nature of nonduality.

Anyway, this invocatory verse signifies Advaita darshana which is extremely different from the doctrines of the rest of the Darshanakāras who invariably propound that Jñātru-Jñāna-Jñeya are three distinct categories.

THE TOPIC FOR THE AVĀNTARA TATPARYA (EXTRANEOUS, EXTRA PURPORT) OF THIS CHAPTER

In this Prakarana Shri Gaudapādāchārya has refuted all those who have followed or championed the cause of the reality

of external world of duality by adopting Yuktis (logical devices or arguments) in consonance with Vijñānavāda (Idealism of Buddhists) and thereafter he has refuted Vijñānavāda itself by adopting the Yuktis forwarded by those disputants in their own Siddhānta (philosophy); even though he has adopted the Yuktis of Shūnyavādins (Nihilists among Buddhists), in order to drive home the idea that - 'The rest of the doctrinaire theories can be refuted' - he has exemplified here and there Yuktis of Shunyavadins; even so, he has continually but invariably pointed out that -(a) Aja-Advaya-Siddhānta (i.e., Advaita Vedānta) is not merely to be comprehended by means of dry logic; (b) on the contrary, It has to be perforce cognized, Intuited by means of Yuktis in consonance with Anubhava (Intuitive, Transcendental Experience of the Pure Consciousness) alone. Thus with the intention of demonstrating the fact that - 'Quite distinct and different from the logic that is acknowledged and adopted by the extroverted disputants is this Shrouta Tarka (logic which is in-built, adopted in the Śrutis or Upanishads)' - he has vociferously, stridently proclaimed (that less-known but implicit) fact by utilizing common words which are suitable to both Buddhistic doctrines and Vedanta philosophy in this invocatory verse.

To wit: Since Vijnāna (intellectual ideation) is Nirvishaya (without any object), it is like $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space), Asanga (devoid of any relationship) - thus opine Buddhistic Vijñānavādins; since Ākāsha is Nihswabhāva (devoid of any essence); it is Shūnya (essenceless); in the same way Jñāna (objective knowledge) also is Nihswabhāva (essenceless) - thus the Buddhistic Shūnyavādins assert. Refuting both these Buddhistic doctrines, and taking the support of the Sruti which expounds: "Ātman is like Ākāsha is Sarvagata (all-pervading) and Nitya (eternal)" - it is propounded in this Prakarana that - "Because Bhagavān is all-pervasive and Advitiya Chaitanyaswarūpa (of the essential nature of non-dual Pure Consciousness) His Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) is 'Akāshakalpa' (imagined to be like empty space)." The implicit meaning of the expression - "the Dharmas (external objects) which are akin to Akasha" - in the sentence is: 'Dharmas' are verily the transformations of Vijñāna (intellectual ideation or knowledge) and are not independent entities; and hence they exist just like Akasha. This is the doctrine of

Vijnānavādins. Because they (i.e. external objects) are Nihswabhāva (devoid of any essence) they exist just like $\overline{A}k\overline{a}sha$ (in an essenceless or unsubstantial form). This is the doctrine of Shūnyavādins. Brushing aside or discarding both these disputants, the Siddhantin (Shri Gaudapadacharya) draws his conclusion that - "Dharmas, meaning $\overline{A}tmans$ (Jivas), are also Advayabrahmaswarūpas (of the essential nature of non-dual Brahman); they are appearing to be different or distinct from one another due to their different Upādhis like the body, the senses etc. alone" - on the strength of Śrutis like - "एवं धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यंस्तानेवान् विधावति" (Katha 2-1-14) ; 'न हि सुविज्ञेयमणुरेष धर्मः' - (Katha 1-1-21) and thereby he has explained here that - "They too (i.e. Jivas) are really existing like Akasha." In this part of the sentence itself it amounts to having said that - "Those Dharmas which exist in the forms of the external objects or phenomena are also existing just like Akasha." For, all of them are mere Vikalpas (misconceptions, imaginations) and hence in the essential nature of Advayātman who is their substratum they exist just like $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space) alone. From Sruti statements like - "All this is verily Ātman" - (Chh. 7-25-2) etc. it evolves in this manner.

From this, it amounts to having signified the implicit meaning of the qualifying phrase - "By Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) which is Jñeyābhinna (non-different from the object of knowledge)". To wit, because there is a rule of law that both 'Jñāna' and 'Jñeya' are known conjointly (simultaneously) - Jñāna is Abhinna (non-different) from Jñeya - thus say Vijñānavādins; since both of them are Swabhāvashūnya (devoid of any essential nature of Being), Jñāna is Abhinna (non-different) from Jñeya - thus opine Shūnyavādins. Now both these doctrines are refuted and discarded and the Siddhāntin has concluded: "Because everything is verily Aja-Advaya-Ātmaswarūpa, Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) is Abhinna (non-different) from Jñeya (the known object)". This conclusion can be known from the explanation of the Kārikā (3-33): 'आकल्पकमणं ज्ञानम्'.

In the same manner, the implicit meaning of the qualifying phrase - "Sambuddhaha" should be discerned. To wit: Just as in the doctrine of Buddhists it has been stated that as a result of Sādhanas like *Dhyāna* (meditation, contemplation) etc. the

lower categories of Avidya were transcended and step by step the Sambodha (Intuitive Knowledge) pertaining to all the Vastus (substances, entities) existing in time-space accrued to Buddha here, in Advaita Vedānta Siddhānta, Bhagavān's Jñāna does not accrue (as a resultant effect); on the contrary, because of the facts that: (a) He is devoid of Vastupariccheda (divisions of various entities, substances) in time and space; devoid of divisions like Jñātru, Jñāna, Jñeya; Nityātmaka (eternally of the essence of Pure Being-Consciousness) and Nityabōdhaswarūpa (eternally of the essential nature of Intuitive knowledge); (b) the categories of Bōddhru (Intuitive Knower) and Bōdha (Intuitive Knowledge) - etc. are, in truth, special empirical forms of that very Bōdha (Ātman's Intuitive Knowledge or Pure Consciousness), - it is stated that the one who has cognized ('Sambuddhaha') all the Dharmas (external empirical phenomena) by means of Jñāna which is Jñeyābhinna is this Nārāyana who is Samyagboddhru. This is said by Gounavritti (in a secondary sense) alone. For this conclusion there is support of Vyāsa's statements also:

"यत्त कृत्स्नं लोकतन्त्रस्य धाम वेद्यं परं बोधनीयः स बोद्धा । मन्ता मन्तव्यं प्राशिता प्राशिनीयं घाता घ्रेयं स्पर्शिता स्पर्शनीयम् ।। द्रष्टा द्रष्टव्यं श्राविता श्रावणीयं ज्ञाता ज्ञेयं सगुणं निर्गुणं च । यद्वै प्रोक्तं तात सम्यक्प्रधानं नित्यं चैतत् शास्रतं चाव्ययं च ।।" - (Mōksha Dharma 351-17, 18).

In these verses it has been very clearly stated that *Grāhya Grāhaka*, *Saguṇa* (with qualities), *Nirguṇa* (without qualities) - all these are *Paratattwa* (Absolute Reality). Previously in (1-12) it was mentioned that Turiya is always *Sarvadarshi* (Witness of everything), is it not so? That very truth has been affirmed in the manner - "He has cognized by means of Jñāna which is non-different from Jñeya" - in so many different words.

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः । अविवादोविरुद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥२॥

Meaning: "I salute that Darshana which is instructed in the Śāstra and which has a name of 'Asparsha Yōga', which is blissful and beneficial (benign) to all creatures and which is devoid of any arguments and any opposition."

EULOGY OF ADVAITA DARSHANA YÖGA

Here salutation (reverence) to Advaita Darshana has been signified with a view to eulogising it. That which has no Sparsha (touch, contact) - no relationship whatsoever with anything - is called 'Asparsha Yōga'. The reason for calling this 'Yōga' is to stress the fact that this alone is the true Yoga - what the other disputants have accepted is not the Paramārtha Yōga (i.e. the really real Yoga). It has been stated previously (3-39): "This is not possibly to be seen by all Yogins" - is it not so? This is popular by the name of "Asparsha Yoga" in the Upanishads. 'तत् केन संस्पृशेत्' - (Therein with what can he touch what ?) - this Sruti is an authoritative source for this conclusion. This is Sarvasattwa Sukha; the Śruti: 'एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति' - (Bṛi. 4-3-32) meaning: "By virtue of a part of this Bliss alone the other creatures are thriving" - is a Pramana for this conclusion. Or, in the alternative, although the Sadhana of Tapas (penance) is the cause for a greater happiness it is of the nature of Duhkha (misery); but this is Sukha (easy) for all creatures. Just as examining or scrutinizing and cognizing the real worth of a gem is possible without any strain, in the same way this can be easily acquired. In our workaday world the enjoyment of an external object - though it is Sukha (easy) - is not Hita (beneficial); but this is Sukha as well as Hita; for, It is of the essential nature of Kūṭastha (immutable, steadfast Transcendental Reality) which never shakes or vibrates.

Apart from this, It is Avivāda (indisputable); with regard to this Tattwa (Transcendental Reality) there is no necessity whatsoever of debating or arguing, assuming viewpoints in favour and against. For, this Reality is also Aviruddha (unopposed); to wit, there is nothing else existing which is second to It. For, all that is different from Brahman is, in the Absolute sense (in the ultimate analysis), not existing at all; because the duality which is appearing is Avidyākalpita (imagined due to ignorance), it is Asadrūpa (of the nature of unreality). There is no possibility of any opposition whatsoever between this Yōga which is Sadrūpa and Dvaita which is Asadrūpa. Although previously it was stated in 3-17 that - "This is not opposed to the doctrine of the Dvaitins", since Advaita is Paramārtha (Transcendental Reality),

It is the substrate for all *Dvaitavikalpas* (misconceptions of duality); there in that context it was only stated that - 'The philosophies of Dualists are founded on *Mithyābhinivesha* (false sense of faith in a doctrine cherished for a long time, misplaced sense of affinity to a teaching)'; but here, the salient feature is - in order to depict the fact that - 'Because, in addition, among the Dvaitins there are mutual debates and arguments, this Yōga is, in truth, Avivāda and Aviruddha' - this topic is once again broached here.

Because it is stated that - "Salutation to that Samyagdarshana which has been instructed, taught as such a Yōga in the Śāstra" - it amounts to saying that those who are Mumukshus should perforce aspire for cognizing this Yōga alone.

WHAT IS MEANT BY ASPARSHA YŌGA?

To this Advaita Darshana the name of 'Asparsha Yoga' suits well; for, in the state of duality conjured up by Avidya it is possible to touch the external object which is Grāhya by means of the senses which are Grāhaka; in the Advaitāvasthā there is no scope for this transaction at all. Because the name Asparsha Yoga is very popular among Buddhists, some people have imagined that that Asparsha Yoga itself must have been reviewed in the Kārikā by Shri Gaudapāda; but that is purely a wild imagination indeed. For, in this text which has dedicated itself to the task of explaining and expounding the Vedanta Siddhanta to say that the Buddhistic doctrine is accepted submissively and with reverence (salutation) is simply ridiculous. Since shortly we are going to justify or vindicate the strong reasons for the usage of the technical terms and certain individual sentences of Buddhists in Alatashanti Prakarana, this topic need not be taken up. The word 'Sparsha' with the connotation of - 'to touch or contact the objects by means of the external senses' - is seen being used in Gitā verses - 'मात्रास्पर्शास्तु कौन्तेय' (Gitā 2-14) ; 'स्पर्शान् कृत्वा बहिबंह्यान्' - (Gitā 5-27) etc.; hence, where there is no contact between the Indriyas and the Vishayas there that 'Advaitanubhava' (Intuitive Experience of non-duality) Itself can be called 'Asparsha Yōga'; with this opinion in his mind alone Shri Gaudapāda has written that - 'Asparsha Yoga is popular'; this is reasonable indeed to conclude in this manner. Even calling this Darshana

'Yōga' is popular, familiar in places like 'इमं विवस्वते योगम्' - (Gitā 4-1) etc. Therefore, there is not the least scope here to imagine that 'Asparsha Yōga' is a particular kind or special type of Samādhi (trance) which the Buddhists propound.

THE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO AFFIRM THAT ADVAITA DARSHANA ITSELF IS 'AVIVADA'

The implicit purport behind the usage of the two qualifying expressions like 'सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः', 'अविवादोऽविरुद्धश्च' is : Buddhists also have claimed that their philosophy alone is pleasant, easy (Sukhakara) for Sarvasattwas (all creatures), as also it is Hita (beneficial); for, being pleasant to the majority of the people, gives rise to beneficial, benign influence. "That alone is Avivāda (indisputable, indebatable). For, Vivāda (a dispute) arises from opinions like 'Asti' (exists) 'Nāsti' (does not exist); 'Shuddhi' (purity), 'Ashuddhi' (impurity) is also Vivāda; if we accept Vivāda, then Duhkha (misery) cannot become Shānti (peace), and from Avivādaprāpti (attainment of indisputability) Duhkha is got rid of" (Samādhirāja 9-28) - thus it has been clarified in Buddhistic texts. But because using mere Yukti (logical devices) they refute the opinions of 'Asti' and 'Nasti' etc. it is not possible to convince everyone that their Darshana (philosophy) is Aviruddha and Avivada. Similarly, it cannot possibly be acceptable to everyone if they assert, on the strength of individual experience of the type of 'Nirodha Samādhi', that their Darshana is Sukhakara and Hita to Sarvasattwas.1

In the Advaita Darshana, on the other hand, Advaitātman, who is devoid of any divisions of time and space whatsoever, has been conclusively depicted on the strength of Yukti in consonance with universal Intuitive Experience, based on an in-depth examination of the three states of Consciousness so as to culminate in everyone's experience. Therefore, it is the firm opinion of Shri Gauḍapādāchārya that what is expounded here as the two special features (viz. Sukhakara and Hita) are fully applicable exclusively to Advaita Darshana alone.

^{1.} In the book - "Āgamashāstra" - a commentary in Sanskrit on Kārikās by Vidhushekhara Bhaṭṭāchārya this doctrine is dealt with in full detail.

3. BY THE EXHIBITION OF THESE DISPUTANTS' DISSENSIONS OR DISPUTES AJĀTIVĀDĀ GETS ESTABLISHED

भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः केचिदेव हि । अभूतस्यापरे धीरा विवदन्तः परस्परम् ॥३॥

भूतं न जायते किञ्चिदभूतं नैव जायते । विवदन्तो द्वया द्वोवमजाति ख्यापयन्ति ते ।।४।।

Meaning: "Only a few disputants agree that an existing entity has birth; some other brave (wise) people agree that a non-existent thing has birth. None of the existing things is born, nor the non-existing thing can ever be born. Those Dvaitins who are debating with one another in this manner are, in truth, commenting on Ajāti (birthlessness)."

THE QUARREL BETWEEN SADVĀDI AND ASADVĀDI

Here it has been mentioned that *Dvaitins* (dualists) are always disputing with one another taking opposing views. Only a few disputants, viz. Sānkhyans, agree that - "Only to an existing thing there is birth"; all Dvaitins do not accept this tenet. For, some others who have been calling themselves as Prājñas (wise people) - viz. Vaisheshikas and Naiyāyikas accept the doctrine that - "A non-existent thing alone is born". Thus these disputants debating and opposing with one another are trying to conquer one another in arguments. Vaisheshikas etc. who are Asatkāryavādins point out defects in Satkāryavāda of Sānkhyans etc. To wit: Anything that exists already - whatsoever it may be - cannot be born; for, as it is already existing, where is the necessity for it to be born? - This is their opinion. Apart from this, if an existing thing can be born, then it amounts to saying that Atman also may once again be born; but Sānkhyans do not at all accept that Atman is born; the Sruti is also saying that \bar{A} tman is Aja (birthless). Therefore, what is existing cannot

^{1. &#}x27;Advayāha' - assuming this text here instead of 'Dvayāha' Vidhushekhara Bhattāchārya has totally misinterpreted this verse. Refer to Introduction.

be born - This is Vaisheshikas' doctrine. In the same way, the Sānkhyan too blames the Asadvāda accepted by the Vaisheshikās and others belonging to their group. To wit: What is non-existent can never be born; a hare's horn which is totally non-existent in the beginning itself - how at all can there ensue a change like birth? To an entity in which any new change or mutation can take place categories like Kāraṇa (cause) and Kārya (effect) can be made applicable, is it not so? Any great change having taken place if an effect comes into being, then it amounts to saying that that which was Asat (not existing, unreal) becomes Sat (existing, real); there is also a Śruti saying - "From Asat (unreal) how can Sat (real thing) come into being?" Therefore, that which is not existing can never be born - This is Sānkhyans' doctrine.

Thus the Dvaitins, disputing with one another, have been following doctrines mutually opposed to one another. In fact, whether in the case of Satkaryavadins or in the case of Asatkāryavādins - it is not possible at all to solve the defects that are pointed out by their opponents; for a thing that is already existing there is no possibility whatsoever of a birth; to say that a thing, which is Asat (unreal, non-existent), is born is not at all reasonable. To say that in Yathārthajñāna (a knowledge of the ground reality) there is a dispute - is never tenable. It is a quite popular belief or truism that - "All those who say that substances are born - among those disputants there will invariably be disagreement." Among these disputants - whether he is a Sānkhyan or whether he is a Vaisheshika - no other logician has accepted anyone of them as - 'Sarvottama Dārshanika' - (the best among philosophers); only if it is so, we can possibly say that - "Such and such a person's tenet alone is the correct Jñāna (Knowledge)" - is it not so?

AS A RESULT OF THE DISPUTE AMONG JĀTIVĀDINS AJĀTI (BIRTHLESSNESS) GETS ESTABLISHED AS YATHĀRTHA (GROUND REALITY)

Because these disputants are thus engaged in raging debates with one another, what gets disclosed and established from their arguments is: As a result of these Dvaitins arguing thus among themselves (without arriving at a final decision) it evolves that both Sat and Asat do not have birth and thereby it amounts to

accepting that 'Ajāti' - meaning, nothing whatsoever is really born - is itself the *Paramārtha* (Absolute truth). In fact, barring these two theories, viz. Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda, no other theory can possibly be imagined, is it not so? The implicit fact to be discerned here in this context now is: It amounts to saying or admitting that - 'From all these various arguments forwarded by these two factions, by virtue of their mutual squabbles alone they have established (indirectly) that *Ajātivāda* (the theory that nothing is ever born) is correct.'

Here we should keep in mind an important point, viz.: For an existing thing or an entity by virtue of $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion) a birth may be possible (3-27) - although this $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}satk\bar{a}ryav\bar{a}da$ (theory that a thing, which is already existing, due to illusion may appear to have a birth) has been accepted already by the $Siddh\bar{a}ntin$ (i.e. Advaita Vedāntin), Dvaitins who are $J\bar{a}tiv\bar{a}dins$ (professing various theories of birth) have not acknowledged this doctrine or theory of Māyāsatkārya. Because 'Māyājanma' means 'Ajanma' (birthlessness) alone, it should be discerned that it is stated here that as a result or consequence of the Jātivādins' mutual squabbles this Ajātivāda alone gets established.

4. HOW CAN THERE BE AVIVĀDA IN AJĀTIVĀDA?

ख्याप्यमानामजाति तैरनुमोदामहे वयम्। विवदामो न तैः सार्धदुविवादं निबोधत ॥५॥

Meaning: "We too take delight in welcoming or consenting to the Ajāti which those (disputants) reveal, and we are not at all arguing with them. Know that in our doctrine thus there is Avivāda (absence of dispute)."

BECAUSE AJA-ADVAITA IS SARVĀNANYA (NON-DIFFERENT FROM EVERYTHING) IT IS DEVOID OF VIVĀDA

Thus by dint of their mutual quarrel what they have unconsciously, as it were, revealed is Ajāti - i.e. the fact that both of them have unavoidably accepted Ajāti itself to be correct - we have acknowledged; but not that we, like them, have propounded or championed yet another argument and are opposing them.

Without being able to resolve the defect pointed out in their own doctrine by the opponent, both have been rendered helpless, as it were, and thereby they have themselves helped project, evolve the fact that Jātivāda is Ayukta (irrational, unjustifiable); their decision itself we too have accepted that is all; and not that we have propounded or projected a different doctrine at all.

5. WHY IS IT THAT AMONG THE JATIVADINS' THEORIES THERE IS A DISPUTE?

अजातस्यैव धर्मस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः। अजातो ह्यमृतो धर्मो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ।।६।।

न भवत्यमृतं मत्यै न मर्त्यममृतं तथा । प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथञ्चिद् भविष्यति ।।७।।

स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य धर्मो गच्छति मर्त्यताम् । कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ।।८।।

Meaning: "Disputants are acknowledging a birth to a Vastu (entity) which is Ajāta (birthless) indeed. How at all can a Dharma (entity) which is Ajāta (birthless) and Amṛita (immortal) acquire Martyatwa (mortality)? What is Amṛita cannot become Martya (mortal); in the same way, what is Martya cannot become Amṛita; to say that Swabhāva (essential nature of an entity) becomes another is not possible in whatever manner. In the doctrine of one - that Vastu (substance, entity) which is Amṛita, in its very essential nature itself, is Martya - then in his doctrine how at all can that entity which is artificially immortal remains as Nischala (immutable)?"

DEFECT IN JATIVADA

The proponents of Jātivāda, championing the cause of mutually opposed doctrines or theories, have revealed the truth that this Ajātivāda alone is fully rational and justifiable; for, all these Jātivādins - whether they are Satkāryavādins or Asatkāryavādins - have acknowledged a Janma for Ātmatattwa which, by virtue of Its very essential nature of Being, never gets born and is

Ajātavastu (birthless Reality). The word 'Janma' connotes that a thing or entity begets a transformation, is it not so? But how at all can there be any Martyatwa to the Amṛitavastu which is of Ajaswabhāva (of an essential nature of birthlessness)? In the Advaita Prakaraṇa (3-2, 21, 22) these three verses were mentioned with a view to refuting the doctrine of some 'Vedāntins' who accept that - 'Brahman Itself, which is of the essential nature of Aja-Amṛita, is born as Jīva'. Here especially it has been exemplified once again with a view to pointing out that this defect is common to the doctrines of all kinds of Jātivādins.

IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF SHRI GAUDAPADA TO SAY MERELY THAT THERE IS NO BIRTH AT ALL

Since here the qualifying phrase like - "To a Vastu which is Ajāta alone" - has been used, what is being stridently emphasized or stressed here is: Here we do not accept the Ajātivāda which is acknowledged by Buddhists. How is that? To wit: Those disputants are asserting that - "Because all Dharmas (things) are being born on account of Parāpeksha (dependence on another external thing), it is proper to say that they are not born by virtue of their essential nature; this alone we call 'नैस्वापाव्य' of Dharmas." In fact, in order to establish this doctrine of theirs they are refuting Jātivāda. But Shri Gaudapāda has undertaken the task of dislodging in this Prakarana the doctrinaire theory of - "Dharmas are Nihsswabhāva (essenceless)" and then propound expressly and exclusively (the Advaita Vedānta) teaching that - "They (i.e. Dharmas) are, in the Pāramārthic (Absolute) sense of the essential nature of Amrita (immortality)." For this reason alone here an objection has been raised; "How at all can there be any Parinama (transformation) of the form or nature of Martya (mortality) to a Vastu (entity, Reality) which is of the very essence of Amrita (immortality)?" The Yukti (logical device) that is used here is: "For the Prakriti (essential nature) of a Vastu there can never accrue another form". In this context the implicit purport of the Acharya is: All Jātivādins - since they are invariably imagining a Janma for Brahmavastu which is of Ajātaswabhāva and is Amrita - are misconceiving various kinds of birth of the type - 'What is existing is born', 'What is not existing is born' - and thereby

they are becoming victims of this defect; each group is facing the onslaught of the other group's logic, with the result all of them are receding or moving far away from *Paramārtha* (the Absolute Truth). The doctrinaire theory that - 'A Vastu which is in its very essential nature Amṛita becomes Martya' - is self-contradictory, is it not so? In our Vedāntic Siddhānta especially, we never swear by any doctrine and try to establish it; but we are giving our consent to the Ajāti alone which gets established by their mutual dispute or debate, that is all.

सांसिद्धिकी स्वामाविकी सहजा अकृता च या। प्रकृतिः सेति विज्ञेया स्वमावं न जहाति या।।९।।

Meaning: "Prakṛiti is said to be Sāmsiddhika, Swābhāvika, Sahaja, Akṛita. That Prakṛiti can never give up its essential nature."

IN OUR WORKADAY WORLD TOO PRAKRITI (NATURE) EXISTS UNCHANGED

Let us keep aside the question of the Absolute viewpoint (Paramārtha Drishţi); even if we observe from the empirical viewpoint Prakriti (Nature) remains without changing. Which is this Prakriti? It is 'Samsiddhika Prakriti'; to wit, that which is caused or has come into being by proper Siddhi (mystic power); for example, the Animādyaishwarya Prāpti (attainment of the excellence of mystic powers like becoming microscopic in form etc.) of Siddha Yōgis (mystics). That Prakṛiti does not change whatsoever in all the three periods of time viz. past, present and future. In the same way, Swabhavika Prakriti (nature in its own essence) i.e., Prakriti which exists in its substantial form of primordial matter; for example, the heat and light of fire etc. That Prakriti which is Sahaja (natural) born alongwith oneself is called 'Sahaja Prakriti'; for example, the capability of birds etc. to fly and wander about in empty space is called 'Sahaja Prakriti'. Apart from this that Prakriti which exists by itself without being caused by anything else is 'Akrita Prakriti' ; for example, water flowing down to a lower region without any effort is called 'Akrita Prakriti'. All such Prakritis (natural principles or laws) do not give up their essential natures.

Anyway, it is a universally accepted topic that even among the empirical Mithyākalpita Vastus also Prakriti remains unchanged. It being so, where is the need to say that in Atmatattwa, which is a birthless, Absolute, Transcendental Reality, Prakriti (Its essential nature of Pure Being) cannot possibly change? - This is implied here. This truth that - Atmatattwa is in Its very essential nature Aja, Amrita - is popular in the Upanishadic lore: For example - "That this Mahānta (great) and Aja (birthless) Ātman, is devoid of old age, death and is of a nature which cannot possibly have any taint of death, fearless, is Brahman" - (Bri. 4-4-25); "This Atman who is omniscient is not born, nor does He die" - (Katha 1-2-18) etc. Therefore, though Jivas and other objects are, in the Paramarthic sense, of an essential nature of Aja-Amrita, they appear as if they are having birth - this truth is established as a result of the dissensions among these disputants.

HERE FOR THE DHARMAS CALLED 'ĀTMANS' IT IS TAUGHT THAT BRAHMĀTMAN ALONE IS THEIR PRAKRITI

Here the secret is: Although Shūnyavādins (Buddhists), who are Avaidikas (people who have rejected the Vedas as an authoritative source) as also are Mahāvaināshikas (champions of the doctrine of ultimate essencelessness), are asserting that - "For Prakriti the category of Anyathābhāva (another apparent existence) can never be suitable, applicable" - (Mādhyamika Kārikā 15-8, Vritti, p. 97), they are not saying thus accepting the doctrine - "All Bhāvas (existing things) invariably have a Prakriti"; on the contrary, in order to create an Anishtaprasanga (inconvenient, undesirable situation) for their rivals they are forwarding a logical argument thus asserting that - unlike the Prakritivadins who propound that there is a Prakriti - for all Bhavas there is nothing like a Prakriti in an absolute sense. Chandrakirti, who has written a commentary on Mādhyamika Kārikas of Nāgārjuna, has made an emphatic statement which is signifying this fact. He says: "What is that Dharmatwa (essenceness) of Dharmas (existent entities)? - The answer is: The Swabhāva (essential nature) of Dharmas. Which is this Swabhava? - Prakriti. Which is this Prakriti? - Shūnyatwa (essencelessness) alone, Naihswābhāvya (nothingness as the essential nature) indeed. What is

meant by Naihswābhāvya? Tathata. What is meant by Tathata? Tathābhāva, meaning, being devoid of mutations, always remaining steady. With regard to fire and such other phenomena their nature of always, perennially not being born - without desiderating anything else and not being artificial or affected (unnatural) - is itself called 'Swabhāva' (essential nature of being), is it not so ? So far what we have stated amounts to: As a result of the aftereffects of the disease of cataract called 'Avidya' the whole gamut of objects are seen or appearing; but they are not witnessed by one who has got rid of this Avidyātimira (defect projected falsely by ignorance) by means of his Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being) and in this unseen (falsified, sublated) form it is being witnessed by him Intuitively; that 'Swarupa' alone is said to be their Swabhāva (their essential nature) - this truth is established. For that entity this is a Lakshana (significant mark, symptom). Āchārya Shri Nāgārjuna has established the truth that - 'अकृतिमः स्वभावो हि निरपेक्षः परत्र च' (Mādhyamika Kārikā of Nāgārjuna 15-1) - meaning - "Akritrimaswabhāva (essential nature which is not artificial or affected) is not desiderating anything else". Thus we have to discern here. Since this Bhavaswabhava which is unborn is not existing whatsoever, it is merely an Abhāva (non-existent thing) and hence it is Aswabhāva (that which is devoid of any essential nature) alone. With this purport in mind we must understand or discern that - "Bhāvas (entities) do not have any Swabhāva (essential nature) - (Mā. Kā. Vritti 15, p. 94-95).

But in this our Oupanishad Darshana (Upanishadic or Vedāntic philosophy) especially, in order to establish the teaching that - "All Bhāvas have Brahmatwa alone which is Aja and Amṛita as their Swabhāva" - in this Kārikā it has been stated that - "That which is Amṛita cannot become Martya; that which is Martya cannot become Amṛita; for Prakṛiti the phenomenon of Anyathābhāva can never be made applicable in any manner." Therefore, it is not possible here to doubt that there is any Sānkarya (admixture, intermingling) whatsoever between this (Vedāntic) Ajātabrahmaswabhāva Vāda and the doctrinaire theory that - "No Bhāva whatsoever has any Swabhāva" - which the Buddhists who are Mahāvaināshikas (staunch Nihilists) have accepted.

जरामरणिनर्मुक्ताः सर्वे धर्माः स्वभावतः । जरामरणिमच्छन्तश्च्यवन्ते तन्मनीषया ॥१०॥

Meaning: "All Dharmas by their very nature are devoid of Jarā (old age), Maraṇa (death); even so, accepting these Jarā-Maraṇa and with the same belief they (Dharmas, i.e. Jīvas) are slithering, slipping down."

FOR JĪVAS AJA-ADVAYA BRAHMAN ALONE IS PRAKŖITI

This truth alone the author has been vociferously stating here: For which entity the disputants are imagining a transformation to occur, which is that Prakriti? What is the defect in imagining in that manner? - Providing answers to these principal questions alone is the instruction that is implicit here.

'Jarāmarana' (old age and death) - both these symptoms have been mentioned here by way of representation, symbolically; the intended purport is - 'those who have no mutations whatsoever.' 'All Dharmas' means 'all Atmans'; in the invocatory verse they were referred to as - 'those who are like $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space)' those very people; they are in their very essence without any changes, mutations; although they are endowed with such an essential nature of Pure Being (Swabhava) - just like mortals who desire, wish for old age and death akin to imagining a snake in a rope - they go on misconceiving all kinds of changes like Jarāmarana etc. in Ātman and identifying themselves with such misconceptions of having old age, death etc. - they are slipping down from their Swabhāva - meaning as if (they appear to be) slipping down. For, to the Swabhāva (essential nature of Being) of any entity there can never be any Chyuti (slipping down, fall) - thus it has been already pointed out. Therefore, the real intended meaning of the sentence is: Imagining or misconceiving Paramātman, who is in His very Swabhāva 'Aja', to appear as if He has become, or has assumed the apparent forms of, many Jivas - and due to that Avidya - those apparent, misconceived forms of Jivas are experiencing Samsara. For this conclusion Śrutis like - 'जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेवापियन्ति - (Muṇḍaka 1-2-7), meaning - "They are again acquiring (are associated with) old age and death"; 'अविद्यायामंतरे वर्तमानाः' - (Mundaka 1-2-8) - meaning, "They are within Avidyā (delusion)." Smritis like - 'सदा तन्द्रावपावितः' (Gitā 8-6) - meaning, "Always believing in those concepts (he identifies with, becomes that alone)" - etc. are in support of this teaching.

Here the secret is: In states like Sushupti (deep sleep), Pralaya (dissolution of the world at the end of a Kalpa) the categories like time and space too become one with, or merge in, Prājñātman, is it not so? Because of the facts that - (a) That Prājñātman is Niravayava (devoid of parts, limbs); (b) has attained Samatwa (equipoise) - to such an Aja (birthless) Prājña the category of Kāraṇatwa (causation) in the real, Absolute sense - does not suit or is not applicable whatsoever in any manner; in the same way, in the waking state also and in the state of sustenance, to Atman, who is the Witnessing Consciousness of all kinds of concepts like time, space, causation etc. and who is of Chaitanyaikarasaswabhāva (essential nature of Pure Consciousness as His one and only non-dual nature), this category of Kāraņatwa does not suit in any manner; it being so, it gets evolved from this that - "To Atman - who is eternally devoid of Kāryakāraņabhāva (categories of cause and effect) - being verily Aja (birthless), Ajarā (devoid of old age), Amrita (immortal) is His Swabhāva (essence, core of Pure Being). Even so, in order to strengthen this teaching, taking recourse to two Yuktis like - (a) neither the mutual dissensions between Satkāryavādins and Asatkāryavādins, (b) nor the Anyathābhāva of an entity's Swabhāva will in any manner be applicable - an elaborate debate has been carried out to teach that Atman is Aja and Amrita for the benefit of people with a low-class intelligence and not with any intention of teaching that Atman's Ajatwa, Amritatwa etc. are established merely on the basis of Tarka (logic, dialectics)."

6. REFUTATION OF SATKĀRYAVĀDA

कारणं यस्य वै कार्यं कारणं तस्य जायते । जायमानं कथमजं भिन्नं नित्यं कथं च तत् ॥११॥

Meaning: "In whose doctrine cause itself is the effect, in his doctrine the cause itself is born. That which has birth,

how can it be Aja (birthless)? If it is different or seperate, how can it be Nitya (eternal)?"

IN SAJJĀTIVĀDA THE RATIONALE BASED ON THE CATEGORIES OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

Thus it has been shown that - "In the Jātivāda the defect of accepting that Swabhāva itself changes or gets transformed is unavoidable"; and thereby any Ajātivāda, which is evolved and established due to their mutual opposition, has been demonstrated to be strengthened by means of Yukti; that is all, and not with the intention of arguing with them. Now here it is being demonstrated that by virtue of their opposite opinions with regard to the relationship between categories of cause and effect too those disputants are implicitly revealing the fact that Ajātivāda alone is correct.

Among these disputants Sānkhyans who are Satkāryavādins attempt to establish their point that - "Even prior to birth Kārya (effect) exists" - in the following manner : 'असदकारणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंगवाभावात् । शकस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम्' - (Sānkhya Kārikā 9). The purport of this verse is : For reasons that - (a) what is not existing cannot possibly become a cause; (b) we have to perforce reckon as a rule of law a particular Upādāna (material cause) for its respective Kārya (effect); (c) from everything, everything cannot possibly be born; (d) from a capable (probable) cause alone the capable effect is born, or a pot-maker etc. who is capable is invariably producing the possible effects like Ghaṭa etc.; (e) Kārya has the same Swabhāva of the Kāraṇa - the Kārya exists even prior to its birth or production.

The Vaisheshikas point out as to how the argument of these Satkāryavādins as mentioned above is unreasonable. The meaning of the doctrine that - "In whose doctrine the cause itself is the effect" - is: Just like the clay for the pot, the Pradhāna which is the material cause ($Up\bar{a}d\bar{a}na\ K\bar{a}rana$) and which gets itself transformed into the form or shape of the effect. Although the Sānkhyans say that between the Kārana and Kārya there exists a relationship of the $\bar{A}shraya$ (support) and $\bar{A}shrayi$ (the thing resting on the support), for them (i.e. Sānkhyans) the real purport lies in asserting that the subsequent or later form of the

cause is itself the effect. But the usage of 'the supported' and 'the support', especially, is meant for the purpose of merely denoting that for categories like Prakriti, Mahat etc. there is invariably a different form. Hence, that aspect is not very important for them. With this fact in mind, they have stated that - "In whose opinion Kāraṇa itself is getting transformed into the Kārya" - Thus we have to understand this. It means, then, it amounts to saying that the Sāṅkhyan, who opines in this manner, affirms that - "The Pradhāna which is Aja itself has acquired the form of the Kārya." The objection raised by the Vaisheshika is: Thus if the Pradhāna is being born in various forms of Mahat, Ahaṅkāra etc. how at all can it be reasonable if it (Pradhāna) is said to be Aja (birthless)?

Here the Sānkhyan may answer in this manner: Because Pradhāna is not born from any other thing, it is said to be 'Aja', but we are not saying that from it another Kārya is not born at all, is it not so? For that reason alone, the Śruti is stating: 'अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्टाम्' - (Shwetāshwatara 4-5) - meaning - "Pradhāna which is Triguṇātmaka (of the essence of three qualities like Satwa, Rajas and Tamas) is 'Aja' - " - is it not so?

The solution for this is: To say or assume that this Sruti is referring to Pradhana which is accepted by the Sankhyans, there is no valid proof, evidence. It has been determined in the Brahmasūtra text that the Śruti in question is mentioning 'Avyakta' (unmanifested seed form) which is within the control of Parameshwara and which is imagined in Him. But the Sānkhyans are also asserting that Pradhana which is independent (Swatantra) is itself Aja and from it categories like Mahat, Ahankara etc. are produced. Therefore, it has to be concluded that they are trying to establish on the basis of Anumānapramāņa (inferential logic as a valid means of knowledge) alone that category of 'Pradhana'. But if it is contended that from the cause of Pradhana effects like Mahat etc. are produced, then it amounts to agreeing that one part of Pradhana gets split up and becomes Mahat; in that event, how at all can it be reasonably sustained that it (i.e. Pradhana) is 'Nitya' (eternal)? To say that thus there is a possibility of it splitting up, but at the same time it is Nitya - is Vyāhata vachana (a self-contradictory statement), is it not so? How can

it be proper to say that a Vastu (entity) which is Niravayava (devoid of parts) is born in different form?

(Sānkhyan): Let us agree that because Pradhāna means the state of equilibrium among the three qualities (of Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas) it has these Avayavas (parts) which are of the nature of qualities! By virtue of Vinyāsavishesha (special, extra-ordinary structure) of Avayavas (parts) let it be said that Pradhāna may also have Utpatti (birth)!

(Refutation): This is not proper, reasonable. For, how at all this statement to the effect - 'Sattwa etc. are verily Nitya (eternal), they are also born in the forms of Mahat etc.' - can be reasonably sustained? If they are to be born, how at all can it be maintained that they are Nitya?

(Sānkhyan): (The Sānkhyans have accepted that the Swabhāva of these Guṇas is wavering, fickle; they rise up by rejecting or discarding one another). Because getting transformed is itself their Swabhāva and a sense or awareness of the type - "They themselves are these" - follows continuously, they may be Nitya also, is it not so?

(Solution): This is not proper. For, if there exists any Nityāṃsha (aspect of reality) they cannot be born at all; when observed from the standpoint of the aspect of birth, they are verily Anitya. Therefore, there is no solution whatsoever for the objection: "If it is being born, how at all can anything be Aja as well as Nitya?"

कारणाद्यदान्यत्वमतः कार्यमजं यदि । जायमानाद् हि वै कार्यात् कारणं ते कथं घुवम् ॥१२॥

Meaning: "If it is contended that Aja is that which is non-different from Kāraṇa, how can the Kāraṇa which is born in the form of Kārya be *Dhruva* (eternal)?"

TO SAY THAT CAUSE-EFFECT ARE NON-DIFFERENT IS NOT TENABLE

Because the cause of the form of Pradhāna is born in the shape of effects like Mahat etc., Kāryakāraņa are mutually non-different - in this Sānkhyans' doctrine to say that Kāraņa is Aja as well as Nitya is Ayukta (not reasonable). This fact we have pointed out. In order to clarify, elucidate that very fact now Shri

Gaudapāda is saying: "If it is contended that the Kāryas like Mahat etc. are Ananya (non-different) from the cause of Pradhana, then since it amounts to saying that Kārya is verily Kārana it amounts to the Kārya being Aja. Now yet another defect of the type - 'It is Kārya and also it is Aja' - is faced by your doctrine. Previously it has already been revealed that there is a contradictory statement of the type - 'Kāraṇa is born, (at the same time) it is Aja and Nitya.' What we are pointing out now is another defect: 'It is a Kārya, even so you are saying that it is Aja!' If you say - 'Kārya is non-different from Kāraņa' - then this defect entails you. In the concept that - 'Kāraṇa is non-different from Kārya' - especially, how at all can it be justified to say -'Kāraņa which is non-different from Kārya which is born is Dhruva (eternal)' - ? All that is born should necessarily be Adhruva or Anitya (non-eternal), is it not so? It is not possible to assert that different or distinct from the part that is born a separate Nityāmsha (eternal part) invariably exists. It is not possible to say that a part of a hen is kept for cooking and from its other part a chicken may be born, is it not so? Such a silly defect alone will entail these disputants if they assert that - 'One part of Pradhana is Nitya, another part is born as effects like Mahat etc.'

BECAUSE IN VEDĀNTA A MĀYIKA (ILLUSORY) KĀRYA-KĀRAŅA-VĀDA IS ACCEPTED THIS DEFECT IS NOT THERE

Here there lurks a secret: Vedāntins too are Satkāryavādins alone. For, it is stated in the Śruti that - "Sat, without a second to It, alone existed; It imagined in the manner - 'I will become many, I will proliferate' and created Tejas (fire)" - (Chh. 6-2-1, 2). They say that the cause of Brahman Itself gets transformed into the shape of the effect, as also that Kārya is not different from Kāraṇa. 'ऐतदात्य्यिदं सर्वम्' - (Chh. 6-8-7), meaning, "For all this, this alone is Ātman" - thus the Śruti says. 'तदन-यत्वम्' - (Ved. Sūtra 2-1-14), meaning, "Kārya is Ananya (non-different) from Kāraṇa" - thus the statement of the Sūtrakāra also is there. Even so, in this philosophy (spiritual teaching) the defects that the followers of Vaisheshika philosophy point out are not to be made applicable. For, in this Siddhānta it is acknowledged that - "By

virtue of the distinctions of forms, which is itself Māyika (illusory), called Nāma (names) and Rūpa (forms) which is projected by Avidyā and is appearing in Vyākrita (manifested) and Avyākrita (unmanifested) forms, which cannot be defined either as Brahman Itself or something other than That - by virtue of such a Rūpavishesha (extraordinary form) Brahman becomes the object for all empirical transactions like Parināma (transformation); even It being called 'Sat' (real) is within the purview of Avidya alone. But from the standpoint of Its own essential form or nature Pāramārthika (Absolute, Transcendental) especially, Brahman has exceeded all empirical transactions and exists as Aja (birthless) and Advaya (non-dual)." This truth has been mentioned also in this treatise 'सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः' (3-27). But in the doctrine of those who claim and profess that they are true Vedantins and propound that - "For Brahman which is Aja changes like Parināma (transformations) etc. which are Pāramārthika (i.e. in the Absolute sense)" - the defects pointed out above get attached or stuck like a very hard cement coating. Since such a defect has been explained in detail in the previous Prakarana itself, here it is not necessary to deliberate upon it again.

अजाद्वै जायते यस्य दृष्टान्तस्तस्य नास्ति वै । जाताच्च जायमानस्य न व्यवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१३॥

Meaning: "In whose doctrine a Kārya is born from one that is Aja, he does not have any illustration (to substantiate his theory). If it is said that from a born thing that object is born, then it amounts to saying there is no finality only."

WHETHER KĀRAŅA IS SAID TO BE JĀTA (BORN) OR AJĀTA (BIRTHLESS) EVEN THEN THERE IS INVARIABLY A DEFECT

Apart from this, if in the doctrine of a disputant it is propounded that from a Vastu which is Aja and hence not born a Kārya is born, that disputant will have no illustration whatsoever to adduce. The inference that from an Ajavastu also birth, production may take place cannot be correct, propor in the

absence of or without the support of a proper illustration. From this, on the basis of a literary meaning, it becomes established that - "From Ajavastu nothing can possibly be born." Instead of this, if it is accepted that - "From a born thing a Kāryavastu (a thing as an effect) is born" - then that thing from another Jātavastu (born entity), that in turn from yet another Jātavastu is born - thus without reaching any finality the logical defect of 'Anavasthā Dōsha' gets entailed. In order to avoid this defect, let us accept that - "From an Ajavastu alone a Kārya is born alone! Otherwise, the categories of Kārya, Kāraņa themselves cannot possibly be established, is it not so ?" - thus it is not possible to doubt. For, the Vastusthiti (ground reality based on universal experience) does not exist so as to fulfil our whims and fancies. It is our aspiration that the categories of Kārya-Kāraņa should invariably be established; therefore, although there is no Yukti (logical device) whatsoever, to assume whimsically a doctrine that - "From a birthless Kāraņa also a Kārya is born" - so as to satisfy our ambition can never be proper. We have already pointed out the defect that - "In whose doctrine it is propounded that from an Aja Kāraņa birth takes place - in that doctrine there is no illustration whatsoever to adduce."

THE DEFECT IN ASATKĀRYAVĀDA

So far the defects that the opponents point out in the doctrine that - "Kāraņa itself is born in the form of Kārya" were explained and demonstrated. Because the doctrine of Vaisheshikas, who are Asatkāryavādins, especially can never be tenable in any manner - here we are not showing the defects lurking in that doctrine. If observed from a particular viewpoint, since Vaisheshikas are propounding that the Kārya, which is endowed with parts, starts functioning (\bar{A} rambha) as a result of the Samyoga (contact, association) between the Karya and the Dravyas (substances) which have accompanied it, in the doctrine of those disputants also first (in the beginning) the Arambhakadravya (the functioning or motivation) having been there, they get transformed into their Kāryarūpa - thus in another dubious or devious manner they too have accepted. Though this defect can be easily shown in their doctrine, many more irrational, improper doctrines of the type - "The Kārya itself which does not exist

before its birth, after its birth by virtue of a particular relationship called 'Samavāya Sambandha' (inherence) with its Kāraņa it exists in the latter seeking its support; it thus acquires a 'Sattāsambandha' (relationship with the genus of reality)" - etc. are imagined by them, and this, in the main, is a great defect in their theory. Is it possible to imagine in our mind a birth for a substance or thing which is as unreal as a hare's horn, cause for it, relationship of being a cause inhering or lurking in it? Therefore, even though it is not desired by them they too have been compelled to accept a doctrine that Paramāņus (atoms) themselves get transformed into forms of binary and tertiary atoms (Dvyanuka, Tryanuka) etc. Even the present-day (modern) empirical scientists by valid means like Parikshana (examination or investigation), Prayoga (experiment), Samvādikaraņa (comparison, analogy) etc. are establishing the atomic theory, and using methods of chemical reactions, they are arguing that from a compound comprising several atoms another new substance with another combination of atoms with its own new extraordinary qualities is 'born' or 'produced'. They too will have to accept inevitably, helplessly Satkāryavāda alone. For, the Yukti that we have mentioned above cannot be refuted reasonably by them also. Because we have pointed out defects even in the doctrine that - "Satkāryavāda is verily Pāramārthika", "For a Vastu (entity or substance) which exists in the beginning itself due to $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion, magic) a birth ensues" - this tenet alone is capable of being sustained. Even the particle physicists, who have discovered the nuclear atoms, extremely microscopic beyond electrons, protons and neutrons, and who have determined that they are all effects of nuclear energy by way of their fission or fusion and all such matter is 'abstruse' only, have in a different manner fully established Māyājanma alone.

In any case, because in this manner both Satkāryavādins and Asatkāryavādins demonstrate their staunch sense of pride and predilection towards their own doctrine and point out defects in each other's theories, it amounts to their revealing Ajātivāda; this theory which we had stated at the outset alone stands out as inviolable.

7. SINCE THE CATEGORIES OF CAUSE AND EFFECT DO NOT SUIT HETU-PHALA ALSO AJĀTIVĀDA IS ESTABLISHED

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिहेंतुः फलस्य च।

हेतोः फलस्य चानादिः कथं तैरुपवर्ण्यते ।।१४।।

Meaning: "Those who have accepted that *Phala* (fruit of obtaining the conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) itself is the cause for *Hetu* (merit and demerit) and for Phala Hetu is the cause, how at all can it be proper if they adduce *Anāditwa* (beginninglessness) to both Hetu and Phala?"

ATMAN IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF HETU AND PHALA

We have mentioned so far that in this manner in the doctrines of Jātivādins, because of the facts that: (a) The predicament that an entity's esential nature itself gets changed arises; (b) it is not possible to decide about the exact relationship between Kārya and Kāraṇa, it amounts to saying that those disputants have indirectly demonstrated that Ajāti itself is correct. Now it will be shown conclusively that because it is not possible at all to determine that Ātman is of the nature of Hetu and Phala, Ajātivāda alone gets evolved out of it.

We had so far merely shown the Anishtaprasakti (resulting in an undesirable situation) that - "If it is accepted that Brahman gets transformed into a Samsārirūpa (form of a mortal, transmigratory soul), it amounts to imagining that an entity's Swabhāva (essential nature) too gets changed" - in the doctrine of the Jātivādins. But now a special feature is: Questioning in the manner - "Samsāritwa (transmigratoriness) which is of the nature of Hetu (merit and demerit), Phala (fruit of obtaining the conglomeration of body, senses etc.) is itself not established first of all; it being so, how at all can there be any scope possible for an imagination of the type that - 'Brahman gets transformed into a Samsārirūpa' - ?" - we will further strengthen the refutation of the doctrine of preaching a birth for Brahman. In the Śruti: 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवामूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत स एव नीति नेत्यात्मा' - (Bri. 4-5-15) - it is proclaimed that from the standpoint of those (Jñānis)

who have utilized the Paramārtha Drishţi (Intuitive Experience or Absolute viewpoint) and cognized the Ekātman (non-dual Ātman) alone there is no Dvaita whatsoever of the nature of Kriyā (action), Kāraka (means of action) and Phala (fruit of action) in Ātman. With the intention of refuting the categories of Kārya (effect) and Kāraṇa (cause) for Hetu-Phalas by drawing full support from this Śruti statement in this Kārikā Shri Gaudapāda has stated thus:

Those people whose doctrine is: "For Hetu, meaning Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit), Phala, meaning the conglomeration of the body, the senses etc. is the $\bar{A}di$ (cause)" - and those people whose doctrine is: "Hetu is the cause for Phala" - thus for these disputants who are propounding Anyonya Kāraņatwa (mutual causation) between Hetu (merits and demerits) and Phala (acquiring the fruit of having a conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.), how at all can the defect of Vyāghāta (self-contradiction) remain without confronting them? The purport implicit in the Sruti sentence is: To Atman who is Ananta (without an end) the form of a fruit or resultant of acquiring a conglomeration of the body, the senses etc. can never be applicable in any manner whatsoever. If it is contended that - "As a result of the Dharmas and the Adharmas that he performed he may possibly get this fruit of the form of Sanghāta conglomeration of body, senses)" - then without first establishing the truth that - "To Ātman this Sanghāta exists really, absolutely" - it cannot at all be established that - "Atman is a Kartru (agent of action) for Dharma and Adharma"; by means of a doctrine, which is itself not established, one cannot possibly decide, prove another unestablished doctrine, is it not so? In the present context, in order to establish that - "Atman is a Kartru of Dharma and Adharma" - they have perforce to assume that Atman has the adjuncts like the body, the senses etc. In order to establish the truth that - "Atman has a body, senses etc." - they have to assume that - "Atman has the Kartrutwa of those Dharma and Adharma." Therefore it is clearly evident that for these disputants the logical defect of 'Anyōnyāshraya' (mutual dependence) will attach itself unavoidably.

(Objection): It is verily our doctrine that - "Samsāra is Hetuphalātmaka (of the nature of merit-demerit giving rise to the

fruit of acquiring a conglomeration of a body, senses etc.) is Anādi"; therefore, this defect does not entail us at all, is it not so?

(Solution): Here a question: (1) Are you saying that between Hetu and Phala each one is $An\bar{a}di$ (causeless, eternal); or (ii) are you saying that these Hetu-Phala mutually having the relationship of cause and effect each with the other - is itself Anādi; or (iii) since both these are existing with a relationship of cause and effect are you saying this Hetu-Phala-Santāna (continuum of these two categories of Hetu and Phala) is Anādi? Here, first having accepted that there is invariably an $\bar{A}di$ (beginning, causation) between Hetu and Phala and later to say that each one of these two is $An\bar{a}di$ (beginningless, causeless) - how at all can it be proper? Is it not a contradictory statement?

(Prima facie opponent): Because this \bar{A} tman Himself who is of the nature of Hetu-Phala, is Anādi, we say that Samsāra, which is also Hetu-Phalātmaka, is also Anādi. But what is the defect in saying - "For Hetu, Phala is the \bar{A} di (cause) and for Phala, Hetu is \bar{A} di (cause)"?

(Siddhāntin): In the first place, the statement that - 'Ātman is Himself of the nature of Hetu and Phala' - is not correct. For, He is in His very essence (Swabhāva) $K\bar{u}tastha$ (Absolutely immutable devoid of any changing categories like causation etc.). Ātman who is $K\bar{u}tastha$ (Absolute) and Avichāli (immutable) cannot possibly be said to be a Kartru for a Kriyā like Dharma and Adharma, is it not so? Only if this condition or pre-requisite is possible, it can be said that He has any relationship with the Phala of the type of having a body, is it not so?

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिहेतुः फलस्य च । तथा जन्म भवेत्तेषां पुत्राज्जन्म पितुर्यथा ।।१५।।

Meaning: "Those people in whose doctrine Hetu has Phala as its cause and Phala has Hetu as its cause - for them Janma will be as reasonable as saying from the son the father was born."

A DEFECT ENTAILS IF MUTUAL CAUSATION IS ACCEPTED BETWEEN HETU AND PHALA

Now let us examine the second theory among those we

have mentioned above. In this doctrine wherein for the Hetu the cause is Phala, and for the Phala the cause is Hetu - it becomes as ridiculous as saying from the father the son has Janma and from the son the father has Janma.

संभवे हेतुफलयोरेषितव्यः क्रमस्त्वया। युगपत् संभवे यस्मादसंबन्धो विषाणवत्।।१६।।

Meaning: "If there is birth or production of Hetu and Phala, you should perforce admit an order. For, at one and the same time if they are to be born like two horns, it amounts to saying verily that they do not have any mutual relationship at all."

HETU AND PHALA CANNOT POSSIBLY BE BORN TOGETHER

If you reckon that the defect mentioned above is not proper, then an order in the birth of these Hetu and Phala in the manner - "Hetu is born first and Phala is born later" - you will have to perforce accept. If it is not accepted that from one thing only another thing is born, then it is not possible to neglect or discard any order. For, if they were to be born together, it will amount to saying that there is no relationship whatsoever between the categories like cause and effect. For this an illustration: 'Like two horns'; just as between the two left and right horns of a bull there is no mutual relationship whatsoever - in the same way, here too there cannot be any relationship. This is implied here.

फलादुत्पद्यमानः सन् न ते हेतुः प्रसिध्यति । अप्रसिद्धः कथं हेतुः फलमुत्पादियष्यति ।।१७।।

Meaning: "If in your doctrine Phala alone is born, then Hetu is not established; a Hetu which is itself not born - how at all can it create Phala?"

FOR UNESTABLISHED HETU AND PHALA THERE CANNOT BE ANY RELATIONSHIP OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

How can it be said that there is no relationship whatsoever? - if this question is asked, the answer is: If from a Phala, which is yet to be born and which is not yet born, just like a hare's horn etc., anything is to be born from Asat, then Hetu cannot possibly be established, cannot possibly be born. Therefore, just like the unknown or unfamiliar, unborn hare's horn etc. how at all can Hetu, which is itself non-existing, give rise to Phala? Nobody has seen anywhere a relationship being there between two Asatpadārthas (false, unreal things), which are to be born mutually each from the other, themselves unestablished - which are just like the hare's horns - either of cause and effect or any other kind of relationship, is it not so?

यदि हेतोः फलात् सिद्धिः फलसिद्धिश्च हेतुतः । कतरत् पूर्वनिष्पन्नं यस्य सिद्धिरपेक्षया ।।१८।।

Meaning: "If you say that for Hetu birth is from Phala and for Phala birth is from Hetu alone, then between these two which was born first? Because it was born first, from it the other has to be established, is it not so?"

FOR HETU AND PHALA THE TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIPS OF 'PRIOR' AND 'LATER' DO NOT EXIST

Thus even after we have refuted the dogmatic theory in the manner that - "Because there is no relationship whatsoever between Hetu and Phala, there cannot possibly exist any cause-effect relationship between them" - if you are still going to contend that they do get mutually established each by the other, we will ask the questions: Between Hetu and Phala which is born first? Which of the two was born first due to which the other came into being? - Answer these queries. The implicit meaning of this argument is: Without the temporal order of the type - 'prior' and 'later or posterior' - one cannot be established by means of the other, is it not so?

अशक्तिरपरिज्ञानं क्रमकोपोऽथवा पुनः । एवं हि सर्वथा बुद्धैरजातिः परिदीपिता ॥१९॥

Meaning: "Among the three (defects) - 'Ashakti' (incapability), 'Aparijñāna' (though the question is understood, the proper answer has not flashed) or 'Kramakōpa' (infringement of rule of order) - one will get attached. In this manner

in all respects Buddhists have - it amounts to saying - brought to light Ajāti alone."

IF IT IS NOT DECIDED AS TO WHICH OF THE TWO - HETU AND PHALA - IS FIRST ESTABLISHED, THEN A DEFECT ENTAILS THAT DOCTRINE

As otherwise if your opinion is that it is not possible to determine as to which of these two is first established, then you suffer from 'Ashakti' (incapability), 'Aparijñāna' (lack of comprehensive knowledge). It will amount to saying that this is a Moudhya (stupidity or dullness) of the nature of not being able to distinguish the Tattwa (Reality) in that though you have cognized, understood what I have said, the correct answer did not flash to your intelligence. This is reckoned by Naiyyāyikas as a Nigrahasthāna (state of non-comprehension) called 'Apratibha'. As otherwise, if you still maintain that - "No one can possibly decide as to which of these two gets established first" - it may amount to the defect of 'Kramakopa' (bringing about disorder in the orderliness). You first said that - "From Hetu, Phala is established and from Phala, Hetu is established"; the orderliness of the type 'one after another they are born' - is made topsyturvy, is upset. Having first accepted the orderliness of the type - "One after another they are born" - later, your statement to the effect - "The question of 'prior' and 'later' is not possible to be decided" - will not go without contradicting your promise, solemn declaration, is it not so ?

By these disputants who are thus pointing out defects in one another's doctrines and who are staunchly believing and professing themselves to be erudite scholars it amounts to affirming the truth of $Aj\bar{a}ti$ (birthlessness) alone publicized and popularized. Among them the $L\bar{o}k\bar{a}yatikas$, believing or imagining that when the elements get transformed into the shape of a body - just as intoxication is produced - all the functions of vital force like breathing etc. as also cognitive faculty are produced automatically, they say that the body itself is $\bar{A}tman$. This doctrine is not accepted by the other disputants. For, cognition (consciousness, awareness) etc. do not exist till the body exists - just like the $R\bar{u}pa$ (form) etc. which last till the body exists - Chaitanya (Pure Consciousness) cannot possibly be a quality of the body - this

is their Yukti (logical argument). Vijñānavādins (Idealists among Buddhists) are asserting that apart from Vijnana (intellect) neither the external object nor another Atman who is related to Vijnana exists. For, their Yukti is: Associated or bound with the intellect alone there occur the dealings of Pramāņa (valid means of knowledge) and Prameya (objects of knowledge) within the body. On the other hand, the Mādhyamikas (another school of Buddhists) aver that - "Atman is neither one that exists, nor one who does not exist; he is of the essential nature of Shūnya (essencelessness)." Karma Mimāmsakas especially say: Because there is a Śruti sentence: 'स एष यज्ञायुधी यजमानोऽंजसा स्वर्ग लोकं याति' - (?) - meaning -"This Yajamāna (performer of a sacrifice) who is equipped with the weapon of a Yajña (sacrifice) goes directly to Svargalōka (heaven)" - quite different from Vijnana (intellect) there exists an Atman. But in their doctrine because between Hetu and Phala the question as to which is first has not been determined, the statement that between them there exists a relationship of cause and effect is not tenable - thus the other disputants point out a defect in their doctrine. Thus all these disputants who are supposed to be accepted as erudite scholars are propounding or following doctrines which are opposed to one another and hence it amounts to their evolving the truth that - "Jeevātman is not really born" - alone. Therefore, the truth of Ajāti alone which gets evolved out of their debate we have acknowledged - this is Shri Gaudapāda's opinion here.

बीजाङ्कुराख्यो दृष्टान्तः सदा साध्यसमो हि सः । न हि साध्यसमो हेतुः सिद्धौ साध्यस्य युज्यते ॥२०॥

Meaning: "The illustration with the nomenclature of 'Bijānkura' (seed-sprout) is always equal to Sādhya (a thing that is possible to be attained through an effort). A Hetu (cause) which is Sādhyasama (equal to an effect, resultant of effort) cannot be suitable or proper thing to establish a Sādhya (effect of an effort), is it not so?"

TO SAY THAT HETU-PHALA SANTĀNA (CONTINUUM) IS ANĀDI (BEGINNINGLESS) IS NOT REASONABLE

Now the third theory that we had mentioned in the com-

mentary on the 14th Kārikā is being taken up for consideration (Hetu, Phala - both these are Anādi is the first theory; Hetu-Phala - both these have a relationship of cause and effect mutually between them - is the second theory; the Santāna or continuum of Hetu-Phala is Anādi is the third theory - which is being taken up for deliberation).

(Jātivādin's doubt): It is our statement that there exists a relationship of cause and effect between Hetu and Phala. Clinging on to our mere statement without understanding fully our real intended purport, now you are pointing out 'Chhala' (obduracy, doggedness) in our statements in the manner - "Just like the father being born from the son" (4-15); "Like the horns of a bullock they do not have any mutual relationship" - (4-16) etc.; now the Naiyyāyikas say that - "To imagine a meaning different from the real intended purport of a speaker by taking the meaning of a statement without its later explanatory portion is called 'Vākchhala' (obdurate statement)" - (Nyāya Sūtra 1-2-112). Here what we merely stated as: "Between Hetu and Phala there exists a cause-effect relationship" - is without any special reason, purport behind it. You have, in fact, imagined that there exists a mutual cause-effect relationship between these two phenomena, as also between these two which are born together alone there exists a cause-effect relationship - thus quite a different, alien opinion you have imagined and you are pointing out these above-mentioned defects. But you have not taken into account our intended purport at all. We have not at all stated anywhere either that from an unborn or unestablished Hetu the Phalasiddhi (the birth of Phala) or from unborn, unestablished Phala the Hetusiddhi (the birth of Hetu) takes place; on the other hand, we have acknowledged the theory that like the Bijankura (seedsprout) between these two (i.e. Hetu and Phala) there is a causeeffect relationship. Here what is the defect? Point out.

(Siddhāntin): We will explain, listen. It is our opinion that the opponent mentions the illustration with the name of Bijānkura - that illustration is always Sādhyasama (equal to the effect produced by a Sādhana or effort). For, that is also not established; in fact, it has yet to be established. Even the question of - "Whether there exists a cause-effect relationship between Bija-Ankura (seed-sprout) or not?" - is itself to be decided.

(Objection): The fact that there exists a cause-effect relationship between the seed and its sprout is actually perceived by our senses, is it not so?

(Solution): Not so. Just as you have accepted the fact that there is an Adi (beginning) for Hetu and Phala, in the same way you have accepted that between Bija and Ankura - to the preceding one in a series - there is invariably an Adi. Just as the sprout that is just now born is born from the seed and hence it is one with a beginning, since that seed also is born from another sprout it is invariably with a beginning - thus you have perforce to agree. Therefore, to imagine Anāditwa (being without a beginning, i.e., birthlessness) to individual units like the Bija-Ankura - amounts to a path being verily followed by a line of congenital blindmen. Similar is the case also with the theory that between Hetu and Phala there exists an Anādi (beginningless) cause-effect relationship. As otherwise, if you still contend that - "We are not saying that each of the individual Bija or Ankura is Anadi; the Bija-Ankura Santāna (continuum) alone is Anādi and this alone is our intended purport" - then that too is not proper. For, there does not at all exist 'Ekatwa' (unity, oneness) here. To wit, the individual units of Bija and Ankura, especially, are many; they are not evidently a 'Santati' (a series, continuum), is it not so?

These Anadivadins are not arguing that - "Apart from the Bija and Ankura, quite separately, independently - different from those two individual units - there exists a Bijānkura-Santāna." In truth, these individual units of Bija and Ankura themselves when endowed or associated with a relationship of the type of 'the previous one' and 'the later one' - they appear to be or conceived by us as 'Bijānkura Santāna' - that is all. Therefore, neither the seeds nor the sprouts are Anadi; in fact, apart from these Bija and Ankura there does not at all exist a Padārtha (substance, entity) called Bijānkura-Santāna. It being so, in the illustration there is nothing whatsoever which is Anādi. The illustrated example also we should discern in the same manner. Hence, what we asked in (4-14) as: "How at all your statement that there exists Anāditwa between Hetu and Phala is correct, proper!" is verily reasonable. In the same way, what we stated as: "Just as from the son the father is born"; "Just as the two horns they are unrelated alone" - also is not 'Vākchhala' (obdurate statement). For, the theory or concept of mutual relationship of cause and effect and theory of cause-effect relationship for simultaneous birth itself are not tenable; this truth we have already demonstrated by means of Yukti (logical devices) indeed.

It being so, since the illustration of Bijānkura is Sādhyasama it is not a proper illustration. In the Kārikā the expression that - "It is a Hetu which is Sādhyasama" - is used in the sense or with the meaning of - "an illustration which is Sāmyasama (having similarity)"; for, here the opposing disputants have not illustrated the Bijānkurasantāna as a Hetu (cause) at all; they have, in fact, used it as an illustration itself. Therefore, just as a Hetu which is Sādhyasama and unestablished is not a proper cause, in the same way an illustration which is Sādhyasama is not a proper, legitimate illustration. With this purport in mind it is stated that a Hetu which is Sādhyasama is not helpful for the establishment of the Sādhya (theory to be proved). This alone is the purport behind the Kārikā indeed.

8. CONCLUSION OF THE DELIBERATION ON HETU-PHALA

पूर्वापरापरिज्ञानमजातेः परिदीपकम् । जायमानाद्धि वै धर्मात् कथं पूर्वं न गृह्यते ।।२१।।

Meaning: "Not to cognize the facts as to which is the previous one and which comes into being later - brings out, evolves in its wake Ajāti alone. How can it be proper to say that - 'When one *Dharma* (entity) is being born, its precedent is not being known' -?"

NOT TO KNOW THE $P\overline{U}RVA$ ((PREVIOUS, PRIOR) AND APARA (LATER, POSTERIOR) PROJECTS AJĀTI ALONE

Previously in 4-19 it was stated that - "Buddhists - who are disputants with a high sense of pride thinking that they themselves are erudite scholars - are bringing to light $Aj\bar{a}ti$ (birthlessness) in all respects" - is it not so? How can it be said that they are projecting $Aj\bar{a}ti$ alone? - To this question the answer is: Inability to cognize as to which of the two viz. Hetu and Phala, is existing first and which is born afterwards - illumines and

and shows up Ajāti; to wit, how can it be proper to say that the thing that exists prior to the *Dharma* (entity) is not known? Those who find out (cognize) in the manner - "This thing is born" - should invariably come to know the cause that gives rise to that birth, is it not so? For, only after knowing the relatonship that exists between the *Janya* (born object) and the *Janaka* (that which gives rise to the birth) the fact that - "This too is a *Janya* (born object)" - is cognized. Although cause and effect are *Nityasambaddha* (eternally related), merely on the ground of some saying - "We do not know the cause" - it amounts to their agreeing that - "Ajāti alone is the real truth."

THE PURPORT BEHIND REFUTING HETU - PHALA CATEGORIES

Here the secret is : 'पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन'- (Bri. 3-2-13) meaning - "One who performs righteous, meritorious deeds is born in a meritorious birth, while one who performs unrighteous, sinful deeds is born in an inauspicious, low birth" ; 'योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यंते' - (Katha 2-2-7), meaning - "Some people, for the purpose of obtaining a body, attain a separate birth; some others attain Sthāvaratwa (stationary existence)"; 'यथा कर्म यथा श्रुतम्' - meaning - "As per one's Jñāna (knowledge) - Karma (deeds) - Vāsana (latent impressions, proclivities) (transmigration is taking place)" - etc. - from all these Śrutis it is to be known that Atman is 'Hetu-Phalātmaka' (of the nature of cause and effect). Just as it is stated in the Mantra - "सूर्याचंद्रमसौ घातापूर्वमकल्पयत्" - meaning - " The Creator created the sun and the moon as before" and "न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते नान्तो न चादिनं च संप्रतिष्ठा" - (Gitā 15-3), meaning - "For (this tree of) Samsara no form is seen, no end is seen, no beginning also is seen; the middle state also is not seen". - according to this Gita Smiriti sentence; the Siddhantin also has accepted the fact that - 'Samsara is Anadi'. But all these tenets the Siddhantin has accepted accepting 'Mayika Janma' (illusory birth) alone as an ' $Up\bar{a}ya$ ' (subtle device) alone so as to teach that - 'Atman alone who is Aja and Advaya is Paramārtha (the Absolute, Transcendental Reality)' - and not that in the Absolute sense the empirical entities have a birth, accepting

thereby Jātivāda. When observed from the Paramārtha Drishti, the Sāstra does not at all accept Jātivāda. For, it is stated in the Śruti: 'स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म' - (Bri. 4-4-25) stressing that the Jivātman is Aja-Advaya Brahman alone; 'अपरं हि वै ब्रह्म भवति य एवं वेद' - (Bri. 4-4-2) - signifying that by means of Jñana alone one can attain the state of fearless Selfhood. For this reason alone, in various verses of the Advaita Prakarana too it has been taught that - " While dying or being born, he exists like Ākāsha"; "Now, all Sanghātas (conglomeration of the body, the senses etc.) are like those of the dream" - (3-10); "The different kinds of creation are mentioned in order to teach the Tattwa and to prepare the intellect (to be receptive)" - (3-15); "This has become distinct or separate due to Māyā" - (3-24); "Though Atman is not born, He is born due to His Maya" -(3-24); "That this one is the Atman who is said to be Neti, Neti" - (3-26) etc. But here with a view to acknowledging Ajātivāda which is evolved, deduced from the mutual contradictions of the disputants who accept the doctrines that - "The Jiva is really of the nature of Hetu-Phala" - as also - "The Santana (continuum) of Hetu and Phala is really Anādi" - their doctrinaire theories are refuted. "यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मेवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् " - (Bri. 4-5-15), meaning - "Where to Him everything has become Ātman alone, there with what can he see what ?"; 'न कर्तृत्वं न कर्मणि लोकस्य सृजित प्रभुः । न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते' - (Gitā 5-14), meaning "Parameshwara has not created for the people either their Kartrutwa or their Karmas; nor has He created any relationship between Karmas and Phalas; the Avidyāsvabhāvá itself is behaving (functioning) in that manner" - thus in the Śāstra also it has been clarified that any Vyavahāra of the type of Hetu-Phala etc. whatever it may be - does not exist from the Paramartha Drishti.

HOW COME THIS DIVISION OF VYĀVAHĀRIKA AND PĀRAMĀRTHIKA DŖISHŢIS ?

(Question): What is the authoritative proof, support for having divided these two *Drishtis* (viewpoints) as *Vyāvahārika* (empirical) and *Pāramārthika* (Absolute, Transcendental)? Why should it not be accepted that Ātman is really Hetu-Phalātmaka?

(Answer): For this the answer is: Since the waking state is the support or substrate for all Vaidika (religious, Vedic) and Loukika (mundane, workaday) transactions, it is called 'Vyāvahārikāvasthā'. That viewpoint in which that state alone is kept or taken predominantly as the ground reality (basis) is verily Vyāvahārika Drishţi. In fact, it has taken only one part of the Jñeya (phenomena to be known or objectified). We have acknowledged that all pervasive (Intuitive, Absolute) Drishti as Pāramārthika Drishți which - without entertaining in the least any partiality or preferential consideration with regard to any matter pertaining to the three universal states of experience of Jagrat (waking), Svapna (dream) and Sushupti (deep sleep) - objectifies everything completely or comprehensively. For, apart from these three states of experience there does not exist any Jñeya (object of knowledge) whatsoever. The truth that by the Intuitive examination of the Avasthatraya how the Siddhānta (spiritual teaching) that - "Ātman who is Aja, Advaya and of Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaswabhāva is Himself the Paramārthasatya (the Absolute Reality)" - is established, has been demonstrated in the Agama Prakarana. First showing by means of Yukti as to how the two states of Jagrat and Svapna are in all respects equal, then the truth that all Drishya (object of perception) is really Māyika (illusory, Vitatha or false) was proved in Vaitathya Prakarana. In the Advaita Prakarana it was shown as to how there is no opposition between Ajātivāda and Māyikajātivāda. Now in this Alātashānti Prakaraņa especially, because observing merely from the exclusive limited (parochial) viewpoint of the waking state those disputants, who have accepted the categories of cause and effect to be absolutely real, cannot possibly determine as to which of the two, viz. cause and effect is first, prior and which is later or posterior - and since this fact has been acknowledged - from their viewpoint also - it amounts to bringing to light Ajāti alone; thus it has been proved by means of Avita (Vyatireka) Nyāya, and hence what we have mentioned as the distinction of Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika Drishtis is irrefutable, inviolable indeed.

> स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिद् वस्तु जायते । सदसत्सदसद्वापि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु जायते ।।२२।।

Meaning: "No entity or object - whatsoever it may be - either by itself or from another is born. Sat (real), Asat (unreal) or Sadasat (real as also unreal) - in whatever manner - no Vastu whatever is born."

TO ACCEPT JANMA TO BE REAL ALONE IS IN ALL RESPECTS OPPOSED TO LOGIC (REASONING)

There exists yet another Yukti (logical device) to assert that - "Nothing whatsoever is born". That is: If an object is to be born, then in any one of the following six ways it should be: (i) Itself by itself; (ii) from another; (iii) both joining together it is born; (iv) Sat (that which exists); (v) Asat (that which does not exist); (vi) Sadasat (existing yet non-existing). Barring these ways in no other manner whatsoever an object can possibly be born. Now let us examine each one of those ways of birth one by one: Here (i) first of all any object, entity - whatever it may be - cannot possibly be born from itself. For, it is already established as existing. Now there is no need whatsoever for it to be born afresh. This is too evident a fact. For example, an earthen pot cannot possibly be said to be born from itself, is it not so ? (ii) The fact that one object cannot be born from another is also very clear; the object called 'pot' - how can it possibly be born from another object called 'cloth'? Or from one piece of cloth how can another piece of cloth be born? (iii) Now, to say that one particular object from itself and from another - thus from both it is born - this is especially an impossible event or matter; for, it is a contradictory statement. For example, a pot is born both from itself and from a piece of cloth which is different from itself - thus no one utters a blatantly contradictory statement, is it not so? It is very clear that just as from both Ghata (pot) and Pata (piece of cloth) a pot being born is not possible at all, in the same way jointly from both a piece of cloth being born also is not possible at all.

(Objection): It is perceptible that from clay a pot is born, from a father a son is born - is it not so? Even when one particular object being born from another is seen, how can you reasonably refute the method or type of birth like - "One object is born from another" -?

(Solution): True. There is an empirical transaction among

the ignorant, deluded people of the form of the usage of an expression - "is born". Without examining anything - whatever it may be - to conclude that it is real is not proper at all, is it not so? Therefore, those persons who are discriminative have perforce to examine the usage of an expression by those deluded persons to find out whether it is like that really or not. The object for those Shabda Pratyaya (word-concepts) which is called 'Kārya' (effect) - does not exist at all; thus it becomes decided. On the strength of the Śruti: 'वाचारंपणं विकारो नामधेयं मृतिकेत्येव सत्यम्' - (Chh. 6-1-4) - if we examine the Kāryavastu (the entity or object which is an effect of a cause), we can discern that that thing is merely a name alone and not a real entity. Hence what we have stated that - "Nothing can possibly be born from another" - is proper indeed. Therefore, there is no defect whatsoever in what we have stated.

Now the question - "Whether the Vastu that is born is Sat (existing), Asat (not existing) or Sadasat (though existing not existing) ?" - is to be decided. (iv) That is especially not Sat; for, if it were Sat and it is already existing, it cannot be born; for, about already existing clay, father etc. to say that they are born again is nonsensical. Sat means that thing which is already born, is it not so ? (v) If it is Asat, even then it is reasonable to say that it is not born; for, like a hare's horns etc. where is the question of a thing which is never existing being born? (vi) Now especially if it is said that it is Sadasat, then it is not possible for such a thing to be born in any manner whatsoever; for, Sat and Asat which are opposed to each other - these two qualities existing in one substance alone is not possible at all. Thus it amounts to saying that among the six ways which we have imagined above, not in any one of those ways a Vastu can possibly be born. Barring these six ways no other method of birth exists. Therefore, it evolves that - "No entity - whatsoever it may be - is possibly born in any manner".

EVEN IF NO CATEGORIES OF THE TYPE OF SAT, ASAT ETC. ARE APPLICABLE TO AN OBJECT TO BE BORN, IT IS IN ITS ABSOLUTE FORM OR NATURE BRAHMAN ALONE

Here, on the face of it, it appears as though Shri Gaudapāda has followed, adopted a Buddhists' Yukti alone. For, in the

doctrine of the Shunyavadins it has been propounded that "न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः । उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः क्रचन केचन ।। -(Mādhyamika Kārikā 1-1), meaning - "Whatever objects they may be - either from themselves or from others they are not born; since for these two reasons and since no Hetu (cause) whatsoever exists, objects which are born do not exist anywhere and none whatsoever; as also they are asserting that "न सन्नासन सदसन्धर्मों निर्वर्तते यदा । कथं निर्वर्तको हेतुरेवं सित हि युज्यते ॥" - (Mā. Kā. 1-7) - meaning - "When it evolves that an existing, not existing or though existing not existing - no such entity can possibly exist, then how can it be proper to say that a Hetu (cause) which brings about a Kārya (effect) exists? Even it being so, here in the present context what is relevant is only this much: It is merely stated here that for objects in their forms of cause and effect does not become rational or justifiable in any manner whatsoever. In the doctrine of the Buddhists 'Pratityasamutpāda' (if one thing exists another is born - the theory of dependent origination) theory is followed and it is deduced that in no way whatsoever as Sat, Asat etc. there exists for objects any Sattwa (existence) whatsoever. In their doctrine it has been stressed that - "No entities ever exist at all"; "They do not exist with any substrate whatsoever" (Mādhyamika Kā. 1-1) - thus in both ways they do not have any existence whatsoever. But in the Vedāntic teaching especially it has been acknowledged that there exists a 'Māyika Kāryakāraņabhāva' (illusory cause-effect relationship) first; then utilizing the tenet that - 'Since all phenomena in the form of Kārya (effect) are mere Vāchārambhana (forms projected by mere speech or words), they are invariably non-different (Anyōnya) from Kāraṇa (cause) and not that they among themselves have any cause-effect relationship whatsoever; for, they do not possess any independent existence whatsoever' - finally, it is taught that - 'Brahman alone which is the substratum for everything is the Paramasatya (Absolute, Transcendental Reality).' "That alone is Satya" - (Chh. 6-8-7) is the Śruti which supports, substantiates this teaching. Thus we must discern that there exists a very great difference between the Buddhistic 'Shūnyavāda' and Vedānta.

THERE IS NO SYSTEMATISATION OF HETU-PHALA CATEGORIES IN THE DOCTRINE OF KSHANIKAVIJNĀNAVĀDINS AMONG BUDDHISTS

We have so far exposed the defect that among all the proponents of the doctrines propounding that in this manner the Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala are different categories - there is no relationship whatsoever between Hetu and Phala. Now those who accept the doctrine that - "Janma itself is born" - and thereby a kind of unity or identity among Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala is accepted as also it is propounded that an object (Vastu) exists invariably in a Kshanika form (momentarily) - all these Buddhists are far away from Yukti. For, in their opinion barring the Kshana (moment of time) which decides in the manner - "This is like this" - the Vastu does not exist for another moment at all. In their doctrine the commonplace transaction of the type - "I did this action then and now I am experiencing its fruit" - which is of the essential nature of a memory of a past experience (Anubhava-Smriti-Rūpa) is itself untenable. Although all the common run of people are familiar with the 'Pratyabhijñāna' of recognizing at present an old or past object or phenomenon and reckoning in the manner -'That thing alone is this' or 'That person alone am I' - this is not applicable in their doctrines. For, since they have accepted that any object - whatever it may be - is destroyed in a moment - no Anubhava (experience) whatsoever is possibly applicable in their doctrine; nor the memory of a thing which is not experienced also is possible, is it not so? Thus it is not possible for them to say - "The transaction of the type - 'Similar to that thing is this' - may occur from Sādrishya (similarity, analogy)"; for, no one gets the Pratyabhijñāna of the type - "Similar to that thing is this" - at all; however empirical transactions are definitely occurring in the manner - "That alone is this"; "That person alone am I" - alone.

A DEFECT IN THE DOCTRINE OF THE PRESENT-DAY VIKĀRAPRAVĀHAVĀDINS (PROPONENTS OF THE FLOW OF CHANGE)

The present-day followers of a theory of Bergson say: All the phenomena - both within the body (corporeal) and what is seen in the external world - are of the form of a flux of change alone; a thing which is absolutely in a stationary state is not

existing at all. In truth, the Vastu Tattwa (the Ultimate Reality) is verily what is changing prior and posterior to the moment when we decide in the manner - "This is like this." This too is an unreasonable doctrine; for, in this theory there is no purpose, benefit whatsoever from Tattwajijñāsā (pursuit of Reality). Although phenomena which are stationary and those which are moving are, in the experience of all people, opposites, it evolves from their doctrine that all that is mere Bhrānti (delusion) alone. Really speaking, if there is no object or entity whatsoever which is steady or stationary, how at all is it possible to say that the cognition - "It is so" - is a delusion? Besides, in their doctrine it is not possible even to conjecture, imagine in one's mind as to what is meant by 'movement'; for, as a substrate for movement they have not accepted even an empty space. Especially to accept movement for the Akasha also is not possible at all. In the same way, to imagine that there exists a movement which does not desiderate any time factor is also an impossible proposition. For, the experience of movement has necessarily to occur in the manner - "From that time to this moment it was moving"; if not, for the word 'movement' there is no meaning at all. Apart from this, if everything is only movement, it will amount to saying that there cannot be any experience whatsoever of two movements; or, in the alternative, that also will amount to being a delusion alone. And one movement is faster than another or slower - to say thus also it is not suitable or applicable in this doctrine. Although it is in everyone's experience in the manner - "Movement occurred in a particular moment of time and movement towards a particular direction; movement has come to a standstill" - such universal experiences they will perforce have to deny. Because in their doctrine categories like time, experience, vital force - all become one and the same phenomenon, it will have to be concluded that this doctrine itself is opposed to universal experience. Therefore, this theory of a flux of change is, in all respects, to be declared as unreasonable, irrational alone.

> हेतुर्न जायतेऽनादेः फलं चापि स्वभावतः । आदिर्न विद्यते यस्य तस्य द्यादिर्न विद्यते ।।२३।।

Meaning: "Hetu cannot possibly be born from Phala

which is Anādi (beginningless) or since it (Hetu) is itself Anādi; Phala also due to its essential nature cannot possibly be born. For, a thing which has no Ādi, it cannot possibly have birth."

SINCE THEY ARE ANADI ALONE BOTH HETU AND PHALA ARE AJA

Another point: By your acceptance of the fact that Hetu and Phala are Anādi alone, you have perforce to accept that Hetu and Phala are not at all born. We have already in 4-14 refuted the theory that Hetu and Phala are Anādi by saying: "How can you say that Hetu and Phala have Anāditwa?" Now, by accepting that they are Anādi we point out this defect: If that is so, it amounts to your accepting Ajātivāda alone. How is it? - To this the answer is: From a Phala, which does not have Ādi, Hetu cannot possibly be born; you have not accepted at all that from a Phala, which is Anādi and which is not born at all, Hetu is born - is it not so?

(Doubt): What is the defect if it is said that from a Phala alone which is established as Anādi Hetu is born?

(Solution): Not so. For, without any proper reason a Phala, which is established to be Anādi by its very nature, is born in the form of Hetu - thus you do not agree, is it not so? For, if you say so, it amounts to saying that it will have perforce to continue being born all the time, or if you contend that Phala itself is of an essential nature of being born, then it will amount to saying that it is not Anādi.

For this part of the verse, yet another meaning can be adduced: Hetu is not born; for, it is Anādi. In the same way, Phala also is not born; for, it is in its very essential nature Anādi, that means, it has no beginning. This is the implicit meaning.

Therefore, because you have accepted Anāditwa for both Hetu and Phala it amounts to your accepting Ajātivāda alone. For, that thing which has no Ādi, meaning Kāraṇa (cause), that has no Ādi, meaning - Janma (birth) is not there at all; in our workaday transactions people will accept the fact that - "That thing alone which has a Kāraṇa, has a Janma" - but no one will

ever accept a Janma for a thing which has no $K\bar{a}$ rana (cause). This is the implicit meaning here.

In any case, in this manner whether it is accepted that - (a) a mutual causation between Hetu and Phala exists; or (b) both of them are born together (simultaneously); or (c) it is assumed that the Santāna (continuum) of Hetu and Phala categories is Anādi, it is unavoidable to be entailed with various types of defects in Jātivāda. Especially if it is contended that both of them are Anādi in their very essential natures, it amounts to acknowledging Ajātivāda alone. Thus the Jātivāda being rendered untenable in any manner, it finally amounts to the Jātivādins revealing the truth that - "Ajāti alone is the Siddhānta".

FOR THE WORLD WHICH IS KRIYĀ-KĀRAKA-PHALĀTMAKA THERE CAN BE MĀYIKAJANMA ONLY

Here there lurks this secret: Because between the waking and the dream states of Consciousness there does not exist any distinction whatsoever and though the phenomena that appear internally and externally in both of them are false, within these two states the phenomena appearing in their respective Avastha seem to be having the distinctions of 'false' and 'real' indeed. As per their respective places, both the 'Chittakāla' (mentally formulated time category) and the 'Bāhyakāla' (external time category) are appearing along with the category of ' $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ ' (empty space) seen to be the support. Further, all the phenomena that are seen in these time-space as substrates appear to be of the forms of Dravya (substance), Guna (quality) and Kriyā (action). Besides, when the Kriya (action or movement) of the forms of Parinama (transformation) and Parispanda (hectic vibrations or pulsations) appearing therein is compared to some other Vastus which remain steady or stationary as they are, then it appears as though in certain Vastus the two forms of Parinama and Parispanda do exist. This whole world which is beset with such wonders as three periods of time viz. past, present and future and the concomitant categories of Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala does not exist without any traces or taint of it left behind and subsides in Sushupta Avasthā (deep sleep state) and becomes one with the Prājñātmarūpa (state of unalloyed Pure Consciousness). Even so, it exists therein (in such a subtle but potential form) without

vitiating Atman in the least by its Dharma (qualities); further it is being witnessed by everyone that from that Prājñātman alone, without bringing about any change whatsoever in that $\overline{A}tman$ (i.e. Prājñātman), the world of diversity or duality is attaining a 'Māyika Janma' (illusory or magical birth or creation) both in the waking and the dream. All this has been clarified in the previous three Prakaranas. In this manner, without cognizing the truth of life that - "Ātman, who is never at any time is born in the form of Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala, apparently acquires a Māyājanma" - the various disputants, observing merely from the Jāgrat Avasthā Drishti (viewpoint of the waking state experience only), are assuming or putting on, as it were, the Mithyābhimāna (false pride or egoism) to believe that - "All the perceived objects are really being born (in time and space with some causation)." Thereupon they are refuting one another's doctrines arguing in the manner - "The objects are born in this particular manner only and not in that manner" - and they are all revealing the truth that Ajātivāda alone is correct. This much alone is clarified here.

9. AS A RESULT OF THE QUARREL BETWEEN VIJNĀNAVĀDINS (IDEALISTS) AND BĀHYĀRTHAVĀDINS (REALISTS) AJĀTI STANDS REVEALED

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा द्वयनाशतः । संक्लेशस्योपलब्धेश्च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ॥२४॥

Meaning: "Any cognitive knowledge must have a cause; otherwise, *Dvaya* (duality) will become non-existent. Since extreme distress or anguish is also seen, it is our opinion that there is dependence on another."

OBJECTIONS RAISED BY REALISTS AGAINST IDEALISM

It has been stated so far that by the opposing opinions or doctrines of disputants who have been following Satkāryavāda and Asatkāryavāda etc. Ajāti itself is established. With a view to strengthening this tenet further the contradicting doctrines of the Idealists and the Realists have been exemplified here.

The Vijñānavādins' (Idealists') doctrine is: Apart from the

intellectual awareness (Vijnāna) externally no other really real (Paramārtha) object whatsoever exists. For, only if Vijnāna is there the external object appears, if not it does not appear. Therefore, it amounts to saying that Vijnāna itself is appearing in the dual form as the form of cognition and the form of an object.

The objection, against this doctrine, by the Bāhyārthavādin (Realist) is: For Prajñapti (cognitive knowledge) - meaning for cognition or becoming aware of an object - externally, outside there should necessarily be a cause. Nimitta here means an external object. Apart from the cognitive knowledge there should necessarily exist an external object; for, without any object being there externally the cognitive knowledge of sound, touch etc. cannot accrue or occur. As otherwise, if it is accepted that without there being any object whatsoever externally cognition (consciousness) may occur, then it amounts to saying that cognition, without the external objects being there, has itself the capability of depicting, showing phenomena like sound, touch etc. Then, in that event, "At all times the cognitive knowledge of all objects may take place" - it will amount to admitting such a ridiculous principle. Another reason also can be adduced here. If it is not so, you will have to agree that there is no duality whatsoever; Dvaya means various types of Pratyayas (concepts with a stamp of certainty or percepts occurring); if there is no external cause for them, then it evolves that these various Pratyayas should not have occurred. As per the doctrine of the Vijñānavādins none of the following: The variety or diversity of Shabdapratyayas (percepts of sound) which are appearing in various forms of pleasing, harsh, loud or soft sounds; the variety of Sparshapratyayas (percepts of touch) which are appearing as being hot or cold; the diverse Rūpapratyayas appearing as black, yellow, red etc.; the variety of Rasapratyayas appearing as sweet, sour, bitter etc.; the variety of Gandhapratyayas appearing as fragrant, stinking etc. - can possibly occur. Especially to say that - 'Pratyaya Vaichitrya (variety of perceptual knowledge) does not at all occur' - is opposed to universal experience, is it not so? Besides, since cognitive knowledge is of one and the same form or nature without the external objects like sound, touch etc. there cannot possibly be any cause for such variegated percepts occurring in

this manner. In a clean crystal - without there being any external adjuncts with colours of red, black etc. - no variety of forms can possibly be seen, is it not so? Therefore, in order that such variegated percepts occur or appear, it is quite reasonable and proper to imagine, surmise that there should necessarily exist a Bāhyārtha (external object) which is the cause for such perceptual knowledge. This indeed is his opinion.

The Buddhists are using the word 'Prajñapti' not only with the meaning of cognitive knowledge but also with the meaning of 'sound'. Even then, if there have to be a variety of sound which is used for the naming purpose, the corresponding external objects which are meant (signified) by those words should necessarily exist distinctively; if not, this Shabdavaichitrya (variety of sounds) cannot possibly exist - thus a meaning for this part of the Kārikā has to be imagined. For the expression -'Dvayanāshataha' - if a meaning of - the categories of Grāhya (comprehended object), Grāhaka (comprehension)' for the word 'Dvaya' (dual) - is assumed, then it will have to be perforce accepted that in order that a cognition of the categories like Grāhya-Grāhaka of the type - 'Prajñāna' (cognition) 'Prajñāta' (cognizer); 'Prajñapti' (the final cognitive knowledge), 'Prajñāpya' (the named external object) - to accrue or occur - there invariably exists an external object as a cause; if not, it amounts to saying that this distinction of Grāhya-Grāhaka should not appear at all. In this manner a meaning will have to be imagined for this part of the verse.

Paratantra (dependence on another thing) - which is the opponent's doctrine - is proper and as they say - "Apart from Vijñāna there should necessarily be a Bāhyārtha (external object)" - to assert in this manner there is another Yukti too; as the Vaibhāshikas (a buddhistic school of philosophy) and the Vaisheshikas (Indian school of philosophy propounding atomic theory) assert that apart from Vijñāna for an external object to exist 'Saṅklesha' - meaning, grief being experienced - is a strong evidence. If there are no causes like fire etc. in the external world why at all should an Anubhava (experience) of the appearance of Duhkha, brought about by touching fire, occur? In the same way, if there is no contact or association with the benefit accruing from an external object why or how at all can there occur

Sukha? For these questions there is no consolatory answers in the philosophy of Vijñānavādins. Besides, Vijñānavādins have propounded: "Klesha (grief), Karma (action), Janma (birth) - these three together are called Saṅklesha" - (Trimshikā, a Buddhistic text, p. 28) - thus they have also accepted a doctrine. It is their opinion (theory) that due to Saṅklesha (defilement of the mind) Samsāra and due to Vyavadāna (by purification of the mind) Mukti occur.

In any case, it is the doctrine of the Bāhyārthavādin (Realist) that the Bāhyapadārtha (the external object) which is the cause for Pratyayavaichitrya (variety of percepts), Grāhya-Grāhaka Bheda (distinctions of the comprehended object and the comprehension) and Sanklesha Anubhava (experience of grief) - should necessarily exist.

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्विमध्यते युक्तिदर्शनात् । निमित्तस्यानिमित्तत्विमध्यते भूतदर्शनात् ।।२५।।

Meaning: "For Prajñapti (cognitive knowledge) there should necessarily be a cause - this fact you have accepted, being convinced by Yukti (reasoning). The fact that - 'Nimitta (cause) is not Nimitta' - has been accepted by us on the ground of Bhūtadarshana (cognition of the Ultimate Reality)."

THE REASON GIVEN BY VIJÑĀNAVĀDIN TO SAY THAT THE BĀHYĀRTHA DOES NOT EXIST

Thus for the objection raised by the Realist the Idealist's answer is: All right, there is the Pratīti (long-cherished, deep-seated belief) of Dvaya-Sanklesha (grief from duality or external objects) - on the basis of this Yukti you are trying to prove that in the external world, apart from Vijñāna (intellectual awareness), there should necessarily exist an object which is the cause, is it not so? But we are saying that that Nimitta (cause) is not really the cause based on Paramārtha (the ultimate reality). To wit, what is called a 'pot' does not exist at all (separately, independently) apart from the form of clay; in the workaday world the common people believe that apart from a horse a he-buffalo exists; but in that manner we do not see at all these phenomena of Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) and Bāhyanimitta (the external cause) existing separately. In the same way, the phenomenon of a piece

of cloth is not seen as cloth at all by those who have cognized the truth that cloth is entirely the cotton threads alone. Similarly, those threads too are not seen separately apart from the cotton staples. In the same strain of reasoning, those who examine anything existing as it really (in its real material form) exists if they pursue till both 'the sound' and 'the percept' end up there is nothing at all that is seen as an external 'Nimitta' (cause) whatsoever.

THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT BY BAHYARTHAVADIN

(Objection): Thus even after you have resuted phenomena like Ghata (pot), Pata (cloth) etc. something or the other invariably remains as a cause, is it not so? Then how do you say that no cause whatsoever remains? Besides, to assert that apart from Vijnana nothing ever exists is not reasonable. The fact that the appearances (percepts) of the type - "This is Vijnana; this is an object" - distinctly is in everyone's experience, is it not so? Merely on the ground that the Vijnana accrues in the forms of 'Ghaṭavijñāna' (pot-awareness), 'Paṭavijñāna' (cloth-awareness) as a separate awareness for each object, you do not deny in the manner that that kind of distinctive awareness also does not exist at all, is it not so? Therefore, just as in the manner of witnessing (perceiving) an object alone Vijnana has to thrive, in the same manner the external object too has necessarily to appear as an object for Vijñāna, and to this extent alone you should perforce accept (the reasoning) in accordance with the Vastusthiti (ground reality). For, Vijñāna and Vishaya are both appearing endowed invariably with a relationship of Vishayi-Vishaya, respectively. For this reason alone we have to acknowledge, in consonance with universal experience, that the objects like Ghata, Pata etc. exist in many numbers as also those who know or cognize them also exist in many numbers. For, even when the Vijñāna is unitary or singular in our workday transactions, the objects like pots, cloth etc., are seen separately, distinctively; as also the knowers or cognizers of these objects are also seen separately and distinctively. If it is contended that there is no other cognizer (than oneself), then consequently, you will have to perforce agree that there are no differences of the type - 'Instructing about the Vijñānavāda' and 'Cognizing or understanding it' - etc. Apart

from this, because the phenomenon of - 'The existence of an object' - is an object (percept) for the Vijnana, it is to be accepted as separate only; for, only after a relationship between an already existing entity or object and Vijnana is brought about the Vijneyatwa (the ability to be aware or conscious of something) ensues - thus to conclude is reasonable. Astitwa (existence) is Tattwa (ground reality) which is found in an entity or object (Vastu) without any desideration of or dependence upon another thing; but it becoming a Vijneya (an object of awareness, cognition) especially is a thing that accrues only after it is related to the Vijñāna (cognition, awareness) of the Vijñātru (cognizer). Therefore, what you said: "Having seen or realized the Paramārtha (ultimate reality) we are saying that a Nimitta is really not a Nimitta" - is not proper. For, you have perforce to acknowledge - even if you don't desire so - the fact that -"Only when Paramārtha is seen, then only the Bāhyārtha exists" - is it not so?

SOLUTION TO THIS OBJECTION PROVIDED BY THE VIJNĀNAVĀDIN

To this the solution that we provide is: You said that whether it is any object of the form of pot or cloth etc., or whether it is the cause for it of the form like the clay or cotton thread etc., they are invariably an object to the Vijñāna - is it not so? Even in that illustration also, you too will have to perforce acknowledge that - without assuming any special feature in the Vijnana of the type - Ghata Vijnana, Pata Vijnana - those objects of Ghata, Pata etc. existing is not tenable; and so there exists a Vijnāna of the form or shape of the Vishaya or object ; only after accepting that Vishayākāra (form or shape of the object) merely on that count it amounts to having realized the Tattwa (the ground reality) of the categories of Vishya-Vishayi, and so why should we at all acknowledge another object external to or outside Vijnāna? You further said that - "There exists a phenomenon called 'existence' associated with a Padartha object) and it is distinct from Vijneyavishaya (cognized object), is it not so?" Since that fact that - "There exists a phenomenon called 'existence' - has perforce to be imagined by Vijnana and then has to be cognized, it amounts to saying (accepting) that

apart from Vijñāna there is nothing else whatsoever existing and so from this it does not amount to your showing any defect at all in our doctrine! Even for the arguments which you forwarded in the manner: "Vijñāna (cognition) and Vijñeyapadārtha (cognized object) - since both these are to be known or cognized mutually being dependent on (related to) each other, you will have perforce to accept that - both those phenomena (viz. Vijnāna and Vijneyapadartha) do exist, objects are many, those who cognize them are also many" - it amounts to our providing merely an answer by this above counter-argument alone; for, apart from Vijñāna we are not seeing any of these whatsoever. The defect of the type - "In that case, if you contend that there does not exist another Vijñātru (cognizer), the empirical dealings of instructing about Vijñānavāda, understanding it etc., will have to disappear" - cannot also be possibly forwarded; for, even when asserting that externally there exist some objects, without any relationship with Vijnāna being there no empirical transaction is possible at all; it is enough if it is agreed that all these transactions are caused due to an excessive or abundant change alone in the Vijñāna.

ANOTHER COMMENTARY TO THE SECOND HALF OF THE VERSE

For the latter half of this verse a different version like ईश्यते अभूतदर्शनात् can be adopted by separating words (Padachheda) and another commentary also in the following manner may be made: Nimitta (the cause) is really not a Nimitta - thus we say because there is "Abhūtadarshanāt" - meaning - an object, which is not real in the ultimate analysis, appears. For this the illustration is : In things like rope etc. what appears as snake etc. Because when phenomena like the rope-snake, a celestial city, dream, Māyā etc., are appearing, without there existing any object: externally, the forms or shapes of Grāhya-Grāhaka are seen; in the same manner, even in situations where you say - "Really we are seeing Ghața, Pața Vishayas" - it is reasonable to infer that there do not at all exist any real objects outside. For, the fact that - "Externally objects appear to be existing" - is common (equal) to both the illustration and the illustrated example. Since what you are calling 'Nimitta' (cause) is invariably an object for the illusory

appearance (a delusion), it can be rightly said to be not a real cause. For, when the *Bhrāntidarshana* (illusory appearance or delusion) of a rope-snake etc. does not exist, apart from the *Nityanirmala* (eternally pure) *Vijñānaswarūpa* (essential nature of awareness, cognition) no external object whatsoever is seen at all. It can be said that this is just like the knowledge of the mad people; those objects which appear to mentally deranged persons are not seen as such by people who are not mad, is it not so? Because a 'cause' that is imagined in the manner - 'In this way it should necessarily be in our workaday transactions" - is not to be seen whatsoever in states like deep sleep etc., it has to be realized that our seeing objects is merely a *Bhrāntidarshana* (illusory appearance or a total delusion) indeed."

Further, even if we interpret the word 'Prajñapti' to mean Shabdaprayoga (usage of word), then also it amounts to saying that 'Nimitta' is not a Nimitta (cause) alone. For, it is realized by us that the ground reality (in the ultimate annlysis) is like that alone. To imagine a rule of law in the manner - "Wherever there is a usage of words there should necessarily be a Padārtha (material object) which is Shabdavāchya (signified by the word)" - there is no cause whatsoever. In the Lankāvatāra Sūtra (a Buddhistic text) it is said: "Oh great intellectual (wiseman), it is seen (in the workday world) that Asatpadārthas (false, unreal objects) are being dealt with or signified using words; to wit, 'a hare's horns', 'a tortoise's body-hairs', 'a barren woman's son' - etc. are indicated by words by people in general; Oh great wiseman, they are neither real objects nor are they unreal objects too; even so, they are communicated by means of words. Therefore, what you stated that - 'Because there is a transaction of words, all entities or objects do exist' - that argument is not proper - (Lanka. Sutra P. 104).

By this it amounts to our refuting 'Dvayadarshana', 'Sanklesha Anubhava' (4-24) - of doctrines; for, Dvaya (Pratyayavaichitrya, Grāhya-Grāhaka Bheda) Sanklesha (suffering brought about by an object) - there is no Pramāṇa whatsoever to prove that these phenomena exist apart from Vijñāna; because that they are not seen by people who are in deep sleep and such other states, it evolves that their appearance is mere Bhrānti (delusion) alone;

and hence they occur with regard to Abhūtārtha (non-existing, unreal phenomena) alone. Thus also it can be concluded.

चित्तं न संस्पृशत्यर्थं नार्थामासं तथैव च । अभूतो हि यतश्चार्थो नार्थामासस्ततः पृथक् ॥२६॥

Meaning: "The Chitta (mind) does not touch the object; for that reason only it does not touch the Arthābhāsa (the reflection or appearance of an object). For, Padārtha (an object) is verily Abhūta (not really existing); therefore, apart from it Arthābhāsa also does not exist."

IT IS AN ESSENTIAL NATURE OF CHITTA (MIND) TO SIGNIFY AS IF THERE EXISTS AN EXTERNAL OBJECT

(Objection): If there is no object whatsoever externally, why is it appearing? If distinct, or a variety of, objects are not at all existing, then how at all is it possible for some among them to appear to be near and some far away, as also for them to appear to desiderate sufficient temporal, spatial and causal relationships among them? If it is true that all these phenomena lurk within the mind alone, all these should have perforce appeared within the mind internally alone; objects which have distinctions like being near or far-off should not have appeared to exist outside at all, is it not so?

(Counter-argument): Even if we assume that externally objects do exist, you answer the query - 'How does the mind cognize the respective distinctive features of the objects?' In fact, you have already acknowledged that - 'Chitta exists internally (to the body) and the Artha (object) exists outside, externally' - alone, is it not so? When the Chitta touches the object, let there be various, distinct Vrittis (concepts) engendered in the Chitta; even then, that Vaichitrya (variety) of those Vrittis has perforce to be cognized by the Chitta, but it should not cognize the external objects with the shapes of Ghaṭa, Paṭa etc. Even so, though the Chitta cannot cognize the special features themselves that lurk within it, is it not a great wonder that the Chitta does invariably cognize the external object in the distinct manner - 'This is such and such a thing' -?

(Objection): All the people have believed that - "The external object alone appears in all such ways" - alone; how

is it possible to refute, discard what is thus seen in our experience by a mere Yukti deducing that it is not tenable? The Chitta cannot by itself possibly create the object, is it not so? No one is thinking in the manner - "In my Chitta (mind) a tree or a hill is created", - is it not so? A mental concept to the effect - "That which is existing alone is appearing to me" - is engendered. It cannot also be said - "All this is Bhrānti (delusion)" - for, since Saphalapravritti (an empirical progress with the tangible fruit) is caused, it becomes certain that it is a valid transaction alone. Even knowledgeable people are saying: 'प्रमाणतोऽर्धप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात् अर्थवत् प्रमाणम्' (Nyāyasūtra Bhāshya 1-1-1) alone. Based on the belief that it is a fire, when people hold out their hand and if the fruit of burning accrues (is experienced), then all the people decide that their belief was Pramānika (valid), is it not? Naiyyāyikas describe the sequential order of causes for a Pratyaksha Jñāna (perceptual knowledge) in this manner: "Atman gets the Samyoga (contact) with the mind; the mind gets the contact with the senses; the senses get in contact with the Artha (external object) - only then Pratyaksha (Jñāna) accrues". It being so, why is it that the fact that - "The external object really exists" - is not becoming comprehensible to you?

(Counter-arguments): Because of the solitary, exclusive reason that all the people are thus thinking, are you saying that the Bāhyārtha (external object) is real, or because the Chitta does not have capability of showing the external object, are you saying thus? Or, because the well-wishers like Naiyyāyikas are thus affirming alone, are you saying that the Bāhyārtha is Satya (real) ? In any manner, it appears to us that this your doctrine is unreasonable alone. To wit: (i) If it is maintained that for the exclusive reason that it is appearing thus to all people, then to this we have already (4-25) given a counter-argument like: "Nimitta is not really a Nimitta"; we have also pointed out (4-24) that the Dvayasanklesha (misery from duality) appear due to Bhrānti. Merely saying that - "To all the people it is appearing in that manner alone" - there is no prominence or greatness acquired by cognition at all. (ii) Your second Yukti that - "If there is no external object the Chitta cannot show it" - is also not proper-; for, in the dream though there is no Bāhyārtha, the

Chitta is seen showing an external object in that manner. In any case, thus because there is no cause of an external object, it (Chitta) does not signify the external object by touching it; even to say that it shows a phenomenon which appears like an Artha (object) also is not proper. In the dream there does not exist any Artha whatsoever; therefore, therein the Chitta does not show any Arthābhāsa (reflection of an object) also; in fact, it is itself appearing as Arthābhāsa. In the same way, because the Jāgrat Chitta (the waking mind) also is verily a Chitta, here (in the waking) too without touching either Artha (object) or Arthabhasa (reflection of an object) the Chitta itself appears as the Artha - to conclude thus alone is reasonable. Here a doubt: It is proper to say that in the dream due to sleep the exhausted mind, though there is no object, by virtue of Bhranti shows or projects Artha; but in that manner there is no scope for the Jagrat Chitta to show Arthabhasa at all, is it not so? To this doubt, a consolatory answer is: We have already shown that - "There is a Yukti to affirm that the phenomenon of an object itself does not exist"; for the sake of an illustration, we have exemplified the (universal) experience of a dream also. Therefore, because the Jāgrat Chitta also is invariably a Chitta alone, it is proper indeed to say that it has no contact, touch with Artha; for that reason alone it is also proper indeed to conclude that apart from Chitta there does not exist Arthabhasa also. When Artha itself does not exist, wherefrom can Arthabhasa come into being? Therefore, just as if a particular woman states that - 'I embraced a Vandhyāputra (a son of a barren woman)' - it becomes a meaningless, ridiculous statement, in the same way even if there does not exist any Artha, to assert that to the Chitta there occurs an actual contact with an Arthabhasa is a meaningless statement indeed. Therefore, to say that for Pratyaksha Jñāna there should necessarily exist either Artha or Arthabhasa is not proper. This truth is now established.

Now (iii) you had quoted the statement of the well-wishers $(\bar{A}ptas)$ called $Naiyy\bar{a}yikas$ (in support of your doctrine), is it not so? On the basis of the above Yukti that statement (quotation) too gets established as Ayukta (unreasonable) alone. Even if we agree that apart from Chitta there exists a certain $Arth\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa$ (reflection, shadowy phenomenon appearing as an entity), we will

have to say that what those people, supposed to be well-wishers, had described about the methodology of Pratyaksha (perceptual knowledge) is not tenable at all. For, Atman is not one who belongs to the species of the mind, He is devoid of Sparsha (touch) etc; how at all can He acquire any contact with the mind ? Even if we accept that somehow this contact also takes place, then we will have perforce to answer the query - "Why should Ātman in one particular known, stipulated moments of time alone get in touch with the mind?" - with a proper reason. For, without any reason whatsoever if any Samyoga (contact) were to take place, then all through Atman will have to be getting in contact with the mind, or, in the alternative, He may not at all get in touch with it - it amounts to saying thus. Even though at a particular moment of time there is no Pravritti (progress or motivation) in Atman and there is no Samyoga whatsoever, the Artha (object) itself through the medium of the senses may get prompted or induced (Pravritta) and may become an object for perceptual knowledge - thus also we cannot possibly surmise even. For, in that event there is no reason to say that - 'Among the many objects in the external region only one particular known object at one particular moment of time (that one object) alone through the medium of the senses proceeds or progresses.' Therefore, it seems to us that what you quoted is merely an 'Anaptokti' (non-beneficial, unhelpful statement of a so-called well-wisher). Apart from this, you too will have to perforce agree that in this matter to exemplify $\bar{A}pt\bar{o}kti$ (statement of a well-wisher) also is not proper. For, those very Aptas have verily opined that -"Pramiti (the end fruit of cognition i.e. knowledge) is a thing which has to culminate in Pratyaksha (perceptual knowledge); once after the object or entity is perceived by means of Pratyaksha, Jijñāsā (the ambition or desire to know) ceases" - (Nyāyasūtra Bh.1-1-3)

With regard to the present topic we have already established the truth that - 'Artha (object) is Abhūta - meaning, Aparamārtha (unreal); we have also demonstrated that the Chitta (mind) has the capability of appearing in the form of an object on the strength of the illustration of the dream. By this line of argument alone it amounts to our refuting totally the present-day (modern) empirical, physical scientists' theory that: "The change

or mutation in the eyes brought about by the returning, reflecting rays of light from the Artha (external object) pass through the nerves of the eyes and reach the brain and give rise to (cause) the knowledge of the respective or particular external object in the mind". For, in the dream although no such materials or instruments whatsoever exist, the Chitta appearing in the form or shape of the external object is is everyone's experience. For this a Pramāṇavachana (authoritative statement) is : "Abhūta (unreal) Parikalpa (phantasmagoria) is neither a Grāhaka (comprehending subject) nor a Grāhya (comprehended object) for anything whatsoever; on the other hand, it is merely a Vastu (entity) devoid of any Grāhya-Grāhakatwa (categories of cognizer-cognized). Just as in states like dream etc., - apart from $Vij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ (consciousness), outside (in the external region) $R\bar{u}pa$ (form) etc., (i.e. the five kinds of sensations or perceptual knowledges like sound, touch, form, taste and smell) are not seen in the waking too. In fact, Vijñana itself in the forms or shapes of appearances of these five-fold sensations is engendered (transformed) indeed. To say that - 'That which is the cause for a particular thing, without that cause it is formulated or engendered' - is not reasonable. Therefore, just as in states like dream and such other experiences, in the waking too the Vijnana (consciousness) due to Sarvabijaparipāka (the ripening or fruition of all the seed forms) - is born as Arthābhāsa (an apparent appearance, reflection of an object) - thus alone it should be discerned".- (Madhyānta Vibhāga Sūtra Bhāshyatīkā, p. 10 of Sthiramati's sentence). [This is the sentence which Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattāchārya has exemplified in his commentary (Vritti) on 'Agamashāstra']

निमित्तं न सदा चित्तं संस्पृशत्यध्वसु त्रिषु । अनिमित्तो विपर्यासः कथं तस्य मविष्यति ॥२७॥

Meaning: "The Chitta does not ever touch whatsoever the Nimitta (cause) in any of the three ways. Without any Nimitta how at all can there ensue any Viparyāsa (contrariety, error, delusion)?"

CONCLUSION OF VIJNĀNAVĀDA

(Doubt): It amounts to saying that without a Nimitta

(cause) like a pot etc., to say that it appears just like pot etc., is mere Viparyāsa - meaning Bhrānti (delusion). If that is so, then you will have to perforce say that - "Aviparyāsa (absence of delusion) is (exists) in such and such a place". Has not the Nyāyabhāshyakāra (commentator on the Nyāya Sūtra) stated that - " In order to determine what a particular thing is not in the manner - 'such and such an entity', there should necessarily be a causal support or substrate; to wit, when determining a pole, which is not a human being, to be a man, there should be a Pradhāna (a causal support); without having seen a man, to determine a pole, which is not a man (Apurusha), to be a man, it is not possible at all, is it not so ?" - (Nyāya Sūtra Bhāshya 4-2-32). Although in the waking the objects like Ghata etc. are not existing, if it is to be assumed that Chitta appears as the Ghața etc. - then for that Bhrānti there should necessarily be an 'Abhrānti' (non-delusory entity) existing as a substrate. What is it? - You have to say.

(Solution): To this our answer is: In all the three periods of time, viz. Bhūta (past), Bhavishyat (future) and Vartamāna (present), in none of them the Chitta (mind) touches the Artha (external object) at all. If we were to say that - by assuming an object like Ghața etc., as Nimitta - in any one particular moment (point) of time the Chitta appears as of the form or shape of Ghata etc. then when compared to that thing the Chitta appearing in a different place in the shape of the Ghata etc. would have amounted to a Viparyāsa (delusion). But it is not like that at all. What we have said is that - "The Chitta does not at all touch or have contact with either the Ghața or the Ghațabhasa" - is it not so? If being so, how can it possibly amount to saying that - "Without the cause of Ghata the phenomenon of the appearance of the shape of Ghața is a Bhrānti" - ? In fact, without there existing any Ghațādi Padārtha (entity of the type of a pot etc.) to appear in the form of Ghata etc, is itself the essential nature of the Chitta. For this the authoritative statement is: In the Lankāvatārasūtra [This statement is quoted in 'Āgamashāstra Vritti' by Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya on page 101] there is a statement that - "Because Viparyasa alone really exists, whatever things are being seen all those phenomena are verily

Nihswabhāva (essenceless) indeed; those are not existing at all" - (Lankāvatārasūtra 10-123).

10. REFUTATION OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDA AND SHŪNYAVĀDA

तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते । तस्य पश्यन्ति ये जाति खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥२८॥

Meaning: "Therefore, Chitta is not born, nor is the Chittadrishya born; those who see its birth, they are seeing the imprints of steps in empty space only."

VIJÑĀNA ALSO IS ASAT ALONE LIKE BĀHYĀRTHA

Beginning with the Kārikā - 'प्रज्ञातेः सनिभित्तत्वम्' - (4-25) up to now Shri Gaudapāda has accepted the methodology of the Buddhist who is a Vijñānavādin (Idealist) in refuting the doctrine of the Bāhyārthavādin (Realist). Now keeping his Yukti (logical device) itself as the reason, he begins to refute the doctrine of the Vijñānavādin himself.

Because what the Vijnanavadin has stated, viz. "Without the Ghata etc. being there the Chitta itself is appearing in the forms or shapes of the Ghața etc." - is agreeable to Paramārtha Darshana (the philosophy of the Transcendental Reality of Vedanta) - ['Vijnanavada is agreeable to Paramartha darshana' - means, it suits or is in consonance with Yukti (logical arguments). For, without Vijñāna (empirical consciousness, awareness) the Vastu (object) is never seen at all. But from the Vyāvahārika Drishți both Vijñāna and the object of Vijñāna have invariably to exist. But from the Paramartha Drishti both these do not exist whatsoever apart from Atman] - it is agreeable indeed to us (Vedāntins) also. For this very reason we opine that - "Even the Chitta appearing as if it is born should necessarily have occurred without any real birth - to deduce thus is reasonable. Therefore, Chitta is never born at all. The doctrine that - 'The Chittadrishya (appearance as an object for the mind) is not born' - is acceptable to both, is it not so? In the same way, Chitta also is not born. It being so, though that Chitta is not born, the Vijnanavadins have imagined - 'It is really (actually) born, as also that it is

Kshaṇika (momentary, ephemeral), it is $Duhkh\bar{i}$ (miserable), it is $An\bar{a}tman$ (not-Self)' - is it not so ? In that event, they are capable of tracing the signs, or imprints of the steps of the birds etc. in $\bar{A}kasha$ (empty space)! Just as it is impossible to keep track of the imprints of the steps of the birds who have flown away in the sky, in the same way to see the birth of the Chitta in the Nirmala Chinmātraswarūpa (Pure, Absolute essence of Consciousness) Ātman is also not possible at all for any Vivekin (discriminative person)."

(Vijnānavādin): Because Vijnāna is of the essential nature of light, to say that it experiences itself by itself is not at all contradictory; in that manner alone we are cognizing, is it not so?

(Siddhāntin): Not so; for, in that event even though the doctrine of the Bahyarthavadin that - "Because the external object is appearing distinct from Vijnāna, that too should be accepted to be real alone" - had died away, it may amount to your having once again resurrected it by sprinkling Amrita (ambrosia)! On the other hand, if you contend that - "Because the object is appearing being under the control of the Vijnāna alone, apart from that Vijnāna it is not a separate entity" - then you too will perforce have to agree, though you don't desire so, that - "Because Vijnāna too is appearing being within the control or purview of Kūṭastha Chaitanyarūpa Vijnānasākshi (Absolute, Witnessing Consciousness of Vijnāna and of the very essence of Pure Consciousness) alone, apart from that Sākshi (Witnessing Pure Consciousness) it (i.e. Vijnāna) is not distinct."

(Doubt): In that case, why should anything 'illumine' Vijnāna which is of Prakāshaswarūpa? When both Vijnāna and Sākshi are of the Prakāshaswabhāva, how at all can it be reasonable for you to stipulate a rule of law that - "Vijnāna alone is Bhāsya (that which is illumined) and Sākshi alone is Bhāsaka (that which illumines)" -?

(Solution): Although a light is of the essential nature of brilliance, it has necessarily a *Chaitanya Grāhyatwa* (the ability of being comprehended, cognized by Pure Consciousness) which is distinct from it, is it not so? Although Vijñāna without being able to illumine itself by itself is illumining all external phenomena, it needs *Ātmachaitanya* (Pure Consciousness of the Self) to

illumine it; because Ātmachaitanya which is illumining it is by virtue of a rule of law of the very essence of illumining (all else), It is not a *Grāhya* (a thing which is comprehended or cognized) for anything else whatsoever; It is always *Grāhaka* (cognizing agent) alone - Thus what we stipulated as a rule of law is proper indeed.

Thus if it is contended that - "Because a Vastu is being cognized alone, it exists" - then because both Bāhyārtha (the external object) and Vijñāna (intellectual or empirical awareness) are invariably perceived alone - you should agree that both exist. As otherwise if you argue that - "That which is perceived by another, which is distinct from itself, does not at all exist apart from the Grāhaka which cognizes it" - then you will have to perforce agree that both Vijñāna and Bāhyārtha are Asatpadārtha (unreal phenomena) indeed. Thus the arrow unleashed by the Vijñānavādin is likely to boomerang and hit him alone. For this reason what we said, viz. "Therefore, Chitta is not born; Chittadrishya too is not born; those who say that we are seeing that Chitta being born in Chidātman are verily those who are seeing the imprints of the steps of the birds in the sky" - is quite reasonable indeed.

AS A RESULT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN VIJNĀNAVĀDINS AND SHŪNYAVĀDINS TOO AJĀTIVĀDA GETS ESTABLISHED

Here by virtue of a sentence mentioned to the effect: "Therefore Chitta is not born......" it amounts to Shri Gauḍapādāchārya vociferously (unequivocally) declaring that - "Because the votaries of the various Nikāyas (schools of philosophy) within the Buddhistic fold are disputing mutually among themselves, it amounts to bringing to light Ajātivāda which is acceptable to Vedāntins indeed."

To wit, the Shūnyavādins' doctrine is: "Just as the Vijñānavādins are refuting the birth of objects on the ground that the Chittadrishya is not seen apart from the Chitta in all the three periods of time, in the same way the birth of the Chitta, which these disputants (i.e. Vijñānavādins) propound, can also be refuted; for, the birth of the Chitta also is not seen. In the Āryaratnakūṭasūtra it is stated: "Oh Kashyapa, howevermuch you search for the Chitta, it is not found. That which is not

found, that thing is not seen. That which is not seen, that is not Bhūta (an entity existing in the past), not in Bhavishyat (an entity coming into being in the future) or not a thing existing at present; that which is not in the past, not in the future or one that is not existing now - such a thing has no Svabhāva (essential nature of Being) at all" - (Mādhyamika Sūtra Vritti p.12) etc. [This is the quotation from Chandrakirti's "Mādhyamika Sūtra Vritti."] - Therefore, since it is not seen in all the three periods of time Chitta also is not born. The Vijñānavādin may say here that - "Because the Chitta appears to itself by itself, the defect that - 'The Chitta is not seen' - does not affect us" - but that argument too is not proper. For, to say that - "A thing itself sees itself" - and thereby imply both Karmatwa (to be an action) and Kartrutwa (the agentship of an action) to one and the same object is not reasonable. This fact has been signified in the following manner in "Āryaratna Chūdaparipricchā": If there is an object, the Chitta is born, is it not so? If that is so, then do you say that the object is different, Chitta is different? Or, do you say that that entity alone is Vishaya, that alone is Chitta? First of all, if you say that the object is different and Chitta (mind) is different - then it amounts to saying - Chitta are two in number. Instead of this, if you maintain that - that which is the Vishaya (object), that itself is Chitta, then how is it possible to see Chitta by Chitta? It is also not possible to see Chitta by Chitta itself. An illustration for this: Just as it is not possible to cut the edge of a sword by the edge of the same sword, just as by the tip of a finger to touch the tip of the same finger, it is not possible - in the same way by the Chitta to see the same Chitta it is not all possible" - (Mā. Vri. p.16).

For this the counter-argument of some Vijñānavādins is: If it is properly observed - there are no categories of Grāhya and Grāhaka at all. The form that is not possible to be cognized by means of another is indicated by negating that which it is not. Where there is no other light seen, that alone is indicated in the manner - 'The light illumines itself by itself' - that is all; for, not to be illumined by another is itself its Swarūpa (essential nature of Being). When the light etc. are illumining, other thing does not have Prakāshatwa (the ability to illumine). For that reason alone, we give the illustration of a light or lamp

for Vijñāna. Even when the sense organ of the eye is functioning in the dark, the Artha (object) is not seen; but in the vicinity of the light it appears and hence it is said to be 'Dīpaprakāshya' (that which is illumined by the light). However, the light etc. are not so; therefore, we say that they illumine themselves by themselves. Here it cannot be said that the sense organ is a Grāhaka. For, it is by dint of its very Swarūpa (essential nature), illumining (Pramāṇa Vā. Bhā. p.426).

For these Navina Vijnānavādins' doctrine too in the Kārikā portion of - "Chitta is not born" - it has amounted to our providing a solution. To wit, if the ultimate ground reality is observed, then since that Chitta too is Sākshigrāhya (cognized by the Witnessing Consciousness) that too is to be known as not born. In states like Sushupti (deep sleep) etc. Chitta apart from Sākshi Chaitanya has not at all been seen by anybody. The Vijnānavādin may say: "What we call 'Ālambana Vijnāna' is itself being called 'Sākshi' by you; here only the name is different but not the opinion." But this is not proper; for, 'Alambana Vijñana' means the Kshanika Vijñana Santana (the serial flow of momentary awareness of the mind); to say that it exists in all the three states of Consciousness there is no Pramāņa (valid proof, evidence) at all. If it is affirmed like that, then there is no Upapatti (reasonable argument) whatsoever to answer the question: "How is it the Chittaswabhava that is seen in Jagrat (waking) and Svapna (dream) is quite queer each from the other?" Everyone has accepted the truth that in both these states the Svabhava of the mind is distinct. Hence it is not possible at all to deny or refute that truth. In the doctrine of these Kshanika Vijnanavadins it is not possible to make the observed fact of - 'I who slept alone have woken up' - tenable by means of Yukti. Therefore, these disputants' doctrine is verily the bravado of seeing the imprints of the steps of the birds in the sky!

By refuting the doctrine of the ancient Vijñānavādins of our country it amounts to our refuting the present-day Western Vijñānavādins' or Idealists' theory. The half verse with the meaning - "Therefore, Chitta is not born, nor Chittadrishya too is born" - is verily a thunderbolt of a weapon sufficient to refute their doctrinaire theory; for, the Yukti of the type - "Chitta is

not capable of cognizing itself by itself" - is based on universal experience. No type of disputants who have endeavoured to examine the special features of Chitta (mind) can ever possibly refute or deny that Sarvasākshi (Witnessing Consciousness of everything) which is witnessing, cognizing that Chitta itself; for, if anyone denies, refutes Its existence, it amounts to denying any support or substrate whatsoever for the examination or consideration itself of the essential nature of the mind, psyche.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SHŪNYAVĀDIN IS OPPOSED TO UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE

The Shūnyavādins (Nihilists) - who are, while they are seeing the phenomenon of everything being 'Shūnya' (essenceless), asserting that their cognition also is Shūnya are showing more bravado than the Vijñanavadins indeed. We may say that they are people who can catch hold of the empty space (Akasha) in their clenched fist. Atman who is witnessing both the Vijnana and its Abhava (non-existence) is of an essential nature which is all-pervading like the empty space, never having any lapse (of Pure Being or Existence) and Chitanya Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Consciousness). Any attempt or effort which undertakes either to objectify Him or to determine that He is of Shūnyaswarūpa is - just like the attempt of catching hold of the sky or empty space in one's clenched fist - an extremely impossible task indeed. For this assertion the Sruti sentences - "You cannot see Him who is witnessing the Drishti (vision) itself" - (Bri. 3-4-2); "To the Drishti of a Witness there is nothing like getting destroyed at all" - (Bri. 4-3-37) - which are in consonance with universal experience (Anubhava) - are the authoritative sources.

THE STATEMENT THAT MADHYAMIKAS ARE MAHAVAINASHIKAS (GREAT NIHILISTS) IS NOT A MERE ALLEGATION OR DEFAMATION

(Doubt): Alleging that Shūnyavādins opine that - "Everything is Shūnya" (essenceless) and their philosophy also is Shūnya" - is merely a vain, shallow blame of loading something which they have not accepted on their head, indeed! Just as they have been refuting Astitwa (existence) they have been refuting Nāstitwa (non-existence) also, is it not so? Has not Nāgārjuna in his

Mādhyamika Kārikā 5-8 stated: "Those people of low-grade intelligence who are - like the Astitwa, seeing Nāstitwa also they do not know the Shivatattwa devoid of any Drashtavya (sight) whatsoever" -? The commentator of this text, Chandrakirti also has explained the original text in the following manner: "Those, who have a steadfast belief in, or affinity towards, the categories of Astitwa and Nāstitwa because they are of low-grade intelligence, do not see Nirvāņa (Beatitude) which is Drashtavyōpashama (wherein the perception has come to a standstill), which is Mangalakara (benign, auspicious), devoid of any Kalpanājāla (ramifications of thought-constructs), of the very essence of Jñāna-Jñeya Nivritti (liberated, freed from all knowledge and objects of knowledge), devoid of old age and death, Nishprapañcha (devoid of the world of duality), Shūnyatārūpa (of the form of essencelessness)" - (Mā. Kā. Vritti p.40). It being so, how at all can it be proper for you to heap unreasonable allegations on them falsely?

(Solution): This is not a false or unreasonable accusation at all; in fact, it is a genuine repetition or quotation of what those Shūnyavādins have said. For, those Shūnyavādins have stated in the following manner very clearly: It is declared that - "Because it is cognized that without there being the cataract of the eye called 'Avidya' the \overline{A} ryans (virtuous people) are not seeing - that Swarupa Itself is the Swabhava of these phenomena." 'अकृत्रिमः स्वभावो हि निरपेक्षः परत्र च' - (Mā. Kā. 15-7) - meaning, "Not desiderating another entity is itself a Swabhāva (essential nature) which is Akritrima (genuine, not deceptive or affected)" - thus our preceptor has decided. "Because this Swabhava of the type of - 'Bhāvas (entities) not being born' - is nothing whatsoever (i.e. non-entity, unsubstantial), merely it is Abhāva alone and hence by virtue of their being Aswabhāva (essenceless) alone, the Bhāvas (objects, entities) have no Swabhāva (essential nature of Being) at all" - thus it should be reckoned. - (Mā. Vri. p. 95).

Thus those disputants who are saying that no *Bhāva* (entity) - whatsoever it may be - has any *Swabhāva* (essential nature of Being) at all - it amounts to their saying that their own Ātman also does not have any Swabhāva whatsoever. Apart from this, they raise a doubt of the type - "Bhāva-Abhāva categories do

exist, is it not so? For, one - who has begun to examine their Swarūpa - does exist indeed?" - and answer it saying - "If Bhāva does not exist, then we should ask - 'Of which thing is this an Abhava?' One who is totally different from the categories of Bhāva and Abhāva and who is capable of cognizing - how can he cognize Bhāva and Abhāva categories themselves?" (Mā. Kā. Vri. 5-6, p.40). Thus nothing whatsoever exists. One who examines them, i.e. 'I', also does not exist. Because they say thus, what we have stated that - "They opine that everything is Shūnya and their own Darshana also is Shūnya alone - thus they argue" - especially is not at all a false, unreasonable allegation or accusation at all. This fact is established now. Further, they say: 'स्वभावं परभावं च भावं चाभावमेव च । पश्यन्ति न पश्यन्ति तत्त्वं हि बुद्धशासने ॥' - (Mā. Kā. Vri. 14-6, p. 96). meaning - "Those who say that they are perceiving Swabhāva as well as Parabhāva, Bhāva as well as Abhāva - they are not cognizing the Tattwa (Reality) of Buddhōpadesha (instruction of Buddha)" - thus they are even criticising their own people as not being Agamajñas (those who know the traditional method of teaching). 'न शून्यं नापि वाऽशून्यं तस्मात् सर्व विधीयते' - (Mā. Kā. Vri. 160) - meaning - "We do not say whether it is Shūnya or Ashūnya. One should perforce say it is Shūnya; it may be said to be Ashūnya also; both are there, both are not there - thus for the sake of empirical dealings we have stated." (Mā. Kā. 22-11, Vri. p. 94-169) - thus they say that even 'Shūnya Darshana' is Shūnya only; "Although the sky or empty space, a hare's horns, a barren woman's son - all these do not exist at all, they appear; in the same way, all Bhavas are being imagined by people" - (Mā. Kā. Vri. p. 196) - thus if we have called these disputants who are asserting that all Bhāvas are extremely condemnable - 'सर्वश्रन्यवादिनः' - it is in consonance with their doctrine alone. In this there is no defect or mistake whatsoever committed by us. Thus we should properly discern.

THE INFERENCE THAT SHŪNYA MEANS THE TATTWA WHICH IS THE SUBSTRATE FOR ALL MENTAL CONCEPTS IS NOT HAVING ANY TRUE SUPPORT, EVIDENCE

In recent times some scholars - [This opinion is expressed

in Prof. T.R.V.Murthy's 'Central Philosophy of Buddhism' which is a treatise describing or explaining the doctrines of Mādhyamika Tattwa Darshana] - have conjectured in the manner: The Shūnyavādins are calling the Paramārtha alone which is non-conceivable by the intellect or beyond the ambit of the intellectual knowledge by the name 'Shunya' and not calling either Sarvābhāva (a phenomenon devoid of all essence) or Tucliha (something contemptible) Shunya. For this assertion the authoritative or supporting statement is : 'बुद्धेरगोचरस्तत्त्वंबुद्धिः संवृतिरूच्यतेः -(Bōdhicharyāvatāra 9-2) - meaning, "That which is not conceived by the intellect (Buddhi) is itself the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality); Buddhi itself is said to be Samvriti (cover, concealment)" - thus it is the meaning of the half verse. For this Paramartha another name is 'Prajñāpāramita'. It becomes Abhivyakta (clearly manifested, revealed) as one's experience only after determining the truth that all the *Dharmas* (entities) are seen or appearing by virtue of the system of Pratityasamutpāda (dependent origination). Therefore, the allegations made against the Shunyavadins is indeed a mistake, which is unreasonable. One should not doubt in the manner: "In that case, it will amount to saying that Prajñāpāramitā itself is Tattwa and thereby Shūnyavāda also will be rendered to be a particular *Drishți* (viewpoint) alone, is it not so ?" For, 'Prajñāpāramitā' is of the Swarūpa (essential nature of Pure Being) which examines, analyses all viewpoints; how at all can that be included among the Vimrishya Drishtis (viewpoints which are themselves being examined or analysed) ? Because it is itself a Vimarshaka (examining agent or subject) alone, it is not another viewpoint - thus it gets evolved. For this his opinion this new researcher quotes certain authoritative, substantiating statements and they are : 'शून्यता सर्वदृष्टीनां प्रोक्ता निःसरणं जिनै: । येषां तु शून्यता दृष्टिस्तानसाध्यान् बभाषिरे ॥'- (Mā. Kā. 13-8, p.88) meaning, "Shūnyatā (essencelessness) is one which invariably refutes all Drishtis (viewpoints); it being so, those to whom Shūnyatā also is meant to be a Drishti they are impossible (i.e. outrageous or intolerable) people" - this is the meaning of this Nāgārjuna's Kārikā. Further, to say that - 'Prajñāpāramitā' is itself Paramartha the authoritative quotation is : 'प्रज्ञापारमिता ज्ञानमद्वयं

सा तथागतः' - (Abhisamayālankārālōka Sūtra, p.28) - a statement of Dinnāga; here both the words - 'Prajñā' and 'Tathāgata' are said to be one and the same entity alone - this is their (Shūnyavādins') opinion. "न खलु पुनिरमं भिक्षवः सत्कायं कायं मन्यध्वम् । धर्मकायपरिनिष्पत्तितो मां भिक्षवो द्रक्ष्यन्त्येष च तथागतकायो भूतकोटिप्रभावितो यदुत प्रज्ञापारमिता" - (Abhisamayālankārālōka Vṛitti, p.94). Here too Prajñāpāramitā is called 'Bhūtakōti' and hence it is saying that it is 'Paramārtha Tattwa' - this is the new researcher's (i.e., Prof. T.R.V.Murthy's) opinion. It is his surmise that this being called 'Buddhamātṛu' is a significant pointer to conclude that Prajñāpāramitā itself is the Paramārtha (Ultimate Reality).

In this regard our considered opinion is: This researcher's surmise is not proper. For, Nāgārjuna and others having described in their works that Prajñāpāramitā is 'सर्वप्रचीपशमशून्य' is not to be found anywhere. (i) To the question: 'If the fact that - Prajñāpāramitā is the substrate for all Vikalpas (concepts) - were itself their opinion why did they not stress this fact?' - there is no possibility of an answer being met here.

- (ii) 'शून्यता सर्वदृष्टीनां' the meaning that this examiner has given to the Nāgārjunakārikā : is not the proper one. For, this verse has been written to remove the wrong belief in case anyone reckons that Shūnya also is a Bhāva (entity, existing real thing). Chandrakīrti also has written a commentary expressing the same opinion. His relevant statement is : "How to remove, and by what, Bhāvābhinivesha (steadfast belief that real objects exist) in the minds of those who have a deep affinity in believing Shūnyatā also to be a Bhāva (real entity)? Those people who are smearing or tainting a defect on to the great medicinal herb have been invariably refuted by Tathāgatas who are supreme diagnosticians and great medical experts" (Mā. Vṛi. p.88). Therefore, this evidence which the Professor has adduced is not the genuine supporting proof at all.
- (iii) 'प्रज्ञापारिमता ज्ञानमद्वयं सा तथागतः' Especially with regard to the statement : The fact that it is endeavouring to determine the question 'For the word 'Prajñāpāramitā', which is the Gouṇārtha (secondary meaning or sense) and which is the Mukhyārtha (predominant meaning) ?' is known from the Vākyashesha

(remaining portion of the verse): 'साध्यातादर्ध्ययोगेन ताच्छब्द्यं ग्रन्थमार्गयोः' - is the latter half part. Both Advayajñāna and Tathāgatatwa are Sādhya (possible to be achieved); therefore, the word 'Prajñāpāramitā' signifies both those in the Mukhyavritti (predominant sense); Grantha (text) and Mārga (path) - both these are signified in the Gounavritti (secondary sense); for, as Tādarthya - since it is wanted, needed for Sādhya - both those are called in that manner. The statement - "A plough is life" - means - "It is a valid means for living" - is it not so? In the same way, here too the word 'Prajñāpāramitā' indicates both the text and the path in the secondary sense only - this is the implied meaning of the sentence. Therefore, here to say that - 'Paramārthatattwa (the Absolute Reality) Itself is Prajñāpāramitā' - there is no support seen. It being so alone, in the text called 'Abhisamayālankāra' there is a sentence: "प्रज्ञापार्यमता ज्ञानमद्वयं सा तथागतः"; on the validity of this sentence - "Here Prajñāpāramitā means Tathāgata alone" - (Abhi. Sam. p.153) - thus it is stated. Haribhadra has quoted this sentence in Abhisamayālankāra and has exemplified: "प्रज्ञया भगवान मायोपमं ज्ञानमद्वयम्"- (Abhi. Sa. p.28) - the purport being -"Because it is vociferously, stridently stated that Advayajñāna is 'Māyopama' (an illustration for magic or illusion) - how at all can it be accepted that such a Jñana is 'Paramartha' (Absolute Reality)? Haribhadra himself has at another place - it is to be found - stated : ' $R\bar{u}pa$ (form) etc. are phenomena devoid of Swabhāva - how come?' - thus raising a doubt, he has answered: "Because it has been propounded that Prajñāpāramitā is something that is Swabhāvashūnya (devoid of any essence), it amounts to propounding that the rest also are devoid of any Swabhāva" - and in support of this he further says: "Prajñāpāramitā is something which has neither Sāmānyarūpa (genus of form); nor is it something which has any Vishesharūpa Lakshana (symptoms indicating any special form)" (Abhi. Sa. p.59).

(iv) "एष च तथागतकायो भूतकोटिप्रभावितो यमत प्रज्ञापारमिता" - By means of this, it amounts to our clarifying the intended purport of the (above) sentence. For, there it is stated expressly that Dharmakāya alone, in the predominant sense, is Prajñāpāramitā. This has been mentioned in the Abhisamayālankāra itself in the following

- manner: 'प्रज्ञापारिमता ज्ञानमद्वयं सा तथागतः' by virtue of this Nyāya (reasoning, axiom) in the Mukhya Vritti (predominant sense) Tathāgata who is Dharmakāya is Himself Prajñāpāramitā Shabda-vāchya (the object indicated by the word 'Prajñāpāramitā'); therefore, because by worshipping the 'Mātru' (mother) which illumines that, it amounts to worshipping Dharmakāya who is Sarvajña Jñāna (omniscient) a very great merit accrues" (Abhi. Sa. p.181).
- (v) To the question "Is it that Prajñāpāramitā is called 'Buddhamātru'?" - it is said that - "It is not for the reason that it is the Paramartha which is the Upādānakāraņa (material cause) for Buddha also; on the other hand, we have called it like that for the mere purport of indicating that - 'If it is practised, 'Buddhatwa' is attained' - thus it may be understood. Apart from this, it is further stated that: "Because in the 'Bodhisattwavastha' by the practice of Matru one attains Buddhatwa, by that means Sarvajñatwa also accrues. While one is in the Buddhāvasthā, by exhibiting or demonstrating Prajñāpāramitā to the disciples Prajñāpāramitā is influenced by Sarvajñajñāna - in this manner since there is a relationship of Hetu (cause), Phala (fruit, effect) between these two, if one salutes, invokes Prajñāpāramitā it amounts to invoking Sarvajñajñāna alone" - (Abhi. Sa. p.298) - thus it has not only been stated that Prajñāpāramitā is the cause for Buddhatwa, but also that the fruit, benefit of Buddhatwa being instructed is to be seen - and hence in what manner we have adopted (stated) their doctrine is the correct one - this fact is decided beyond doubt now.
- (vi) Further, even Tathāgata also cannot possibly be said to be the Paramārthatattwa. For, in the textual portions like "One who has come into being by desiderating another Bhāva (entity) he cannot be reckoned to be Ātman; one who is not at all Ātman how at all can that Tathāgata exist?" (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. 22-3, p.158); "Tathāgata has no Swabhāva (essential nature of Being); this Jagat (world) also does not have Swabhāva" (Mā. Kā. Vṛi. 22-16, p.162) etc. it has been propounded in such portions of the Mādhyamika Śāstra that Tathāgata also is of Nihswabhāva (devoid of any essential nature of Being).
 - (vii) Merely on the one ground of having called by various

names like "Bhūtakōṭi" etc., it cannot possibly be asserted that Prajñāpāramitā is Paramārtha; for, by indicating it also these names might have come into vogue. This fact also Haribhadra has expressed clearly also: "The phenomenon of Bhūtakōṭi is Dharmadhātu (origin of Dharma); because it signifies it Prajñāpāramitā has gained that name" - From all these several reasons it is established that in the Buddhists' Śāstra - the doctrine that - "There exists a Paramārtha which is the substrate for all concepts (Vikalpas)" - is without any authoritative or convincing support or evidence.

THE EXAMINATION OF PRAJNĀPĀRAMITĀ

Whatever all this may be. Even if we assume that the Buddhists affirm that - "Prajñāpāramitā is the substrate for the entire Vikalpa Prapañcha (imagined world of duality)" - alone, then the defect of their giving up their doctrine of Nairātmya (absence or non-existance of Atman) entails them; besides, it amounts to their accepting that very Sarvātmavāda (theory that everything is Atman alone) alone which is acknowledged (nay, expounded by) Vedāntins who say : 'स एषोऽणिमैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्' -(Chh. 6-8-4), meaning - "This extremely subtle Reality is there, is it not so? That alone is the essence of all this world." - etc. This is not acceptable or desirable at all at anytime to the Shunyavadins. As otherwise, if it is contended that this 'Advayaparamārtha' (non-dual Absolute Reality) is quite different from that which the Vedantins propound as 'Advaitaparamartha', even then it may amount to saying that it is verily Vijñāna which their fellow-Buddhists Vijnanavadins propound. For, that 'Prajna' is invariably to determine that no Dharma (object, being) whatsoever it may be - is not born, is it not so? Because it exists along with Dharmas which are Parasparāpeksha (mutually dependent upon one another for their existence) only, the doctrine that it exists is itself untenable. Just as Vijñāna cannot survive or thrive without the Bahyartha, in the same way with regard to this Prajñā also we have to conclude. "Because 'Prajñā' means the Dharmatwa (essential nature of being) of the Dharmas (beings, entities), this defect cannot possibly taint our Siddhanta (philosophical teaching)" - thus too it cannot be argued; for, Vijnanavadins also can contend in the same manner. Some

Vijñānavādins (Idealists) are also asserting always that - "The impurity of the form of Grāhya-Grāhaka is appearing due to Avidyā alone; but Vijnāna is Nityanirmala (ever pure)." To say that - "One can attain the experience of Prajñāpāramitā in a particular kind of Samādhi which is got by means of the Shūnyabhāvana (feeling of essencelessness)" - also will not become an uncommon feature of Shūnyavādins; for, the Yōgāchāra Vijnanavadins (yet another school of Buddhists) also invariably propound that Vijñāna is experienced in a particular Samādhi. It being so, the defect of 'keeping or taking an individualistic experience which is not acceptable to everyone equally as their supporting evidence' is faced equally by these two disputants indeed. Apart from this, just as this Prajñāpāramitā, which is not of an ascertained, settled nature of Dharmas, is formulated in the waking state, in the same way, according to any other particular disputant's doctrine, the Prajñāpāramitā's Siddhi (attainment) also may become possible in the dream state wherein it is of a fixed or settled form of Dharmas existing therein. The fact that that Prajñāpāramitā should necessarily be quite different from the Prajñāpāramitā of the waking state is to be accepted by everyone indeed. It being so, for the doubt of the type - "Between these two, which Prajñāpāramitā should be enthroned and hailed as the real one?" - there is a great deal of scope to be raised in this doctrine.

Let this too be there. Only after deciding, on the basis of Yukti (reasoning) only, the fact that there is no Swabhāva (essential nature) whatsoever for Dharmas (entities, beings) - this Prajñā is established on the basis of Parishesha Nyāya (aphorism according to which a verdict is based on the remainder of a statement in a text), is it not so? The genuine doubt that - "Without the support of Sārvatrika Anubhava (universal experience) how at all can this be installed on the high pedestal of Prajñāpāramitā?" - may also be anticipated reasonably. It is not possible to raise an objection of the type - "Even that Anubhava - whether it is real or unreal, false - how can we say? - since there is a scope for such a doubt to arise, this counterargument is not proper" - also. For, no one can ever say that this Sārvatrika Anubhava itself does not exist, and hence that Yukti alone which has its (i.e. Sārvatrika Anubhava) support is

to be necessarily accepted by everyone as 'Sadyukti' (proper, real logical device); if not, if by means of any particular Yuktyābhāsa (shadowy, fake reasoning) another Yukţi is struck down, we may have to accept that too (such a pseudo-reasoning also) to be a Sadyukti! Therefore, it becomes established that this Darshana (philosophy) which the Shūnyavādins have imagined, conjectured in order to stabilize their this dogmatic theory of - "All the Dharmas are verily Shūnya" - is not to be acknowledged at all.

SHŪNYAVĀDA IS OPPOSED TO SĀRVATRIKĀNUBHAVA

Because this Shūnyavāda is opposed to Sārvatrika Anubhava also this should not be accepted by those people who aspire for Shreyas (Beatitude). To wit, because, with regard to the two states of waking and dream, when one exists or is experienced the other is not there at all - the truth of life that both those states are evidently unreal or false appearances indeed is evolved on the basis of universal experience alone; it being so, it evolves from this that the $S\bar{a}kshi$ (Witness) to these two states is $\bar{A}tman$ who is Nirvikalpa (beyond any imagination object or concept) at all and that He alone is verily everyone's Atman. In spite of this universal truth, discarding such a clincher as this Sarvatrika Anubhava, these disputants have obstinately affirmed that Atman too is verily Shūnya. But to insist that Atman does not exist it is not possible for anyone - whosoever he may be; for, he who persists in saying that Atman does not exist - he himself 'exists' as Atman. Here in this context anybody may say: "Svapna (dream) means an Anubhava which is cognized only by a particular individual; it being so, how at all can it be reasonable, proper to say that Atman is established on Sārvatrika Anubhava?" This objection is not proper. For, everyone has acknowledged that Svapnānubhava (the experience of dream) does exist, and hence there is no room whatsoever for any difference of opinion to arise with regard to it. Here we are not at all endeavouring to prove that the Bhāvas (objects, phenomena) which appear within the dream are either real or false, unreal on the support of Sārvatrika Anubhava. On the other hand, we have undertaken the task of merely signifying the truth that -"One who witnesses both the waking and the dream is Atman for everyone" -; that is all. To say that - Atman who is

established in this manner does not exist - is not possible whatso-ever. Merely on this count it evolves that Shūnyavāda is opposed to Sārvatrika Anubhava. If observed deeply, to prove that - 'The waking is a state which is common to everyone, while dream especially is an uncommon state experienced by that particular person or individual' - is not possible at all for anyone; in every Avasthā (state of Consciousness) the world that appears lurks, subsists within that particular Avasthā alone - this truth has been already demonstrated in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa; in the forthcoming verses too this truth will be proved. Therefore, it stands established that this methodology of Shūnyavāda is certainly opposed to Anubhava.

THE TATTWA (PHENOMENON) OF PRAJNĀPĀRAMITĀ

Here in this context there is an important point which has to be pondered over carefully and discerned: Here the Buddhists have endeavoured with great gusto to prove that - "Prajñāpāramitā helps determine the Naihswābhāvya (essencelessness) of all Dharmas (beings, things)" - is it not so? It is not our intention to show that in this doctrine there is not the least bit of truth at all. For, what these disputants have accepted as this Prajñā (awareness) is merely a Vritti (concept) of the Antahkarana (mind) alone; this is depicting everything always being associated with the $\bar{A}bh\bar{a}sa$ (reflection, shadow) of $\bar{A}tman$ who is Prajñānaghana (a veritable lump or homogeneous mass of Consciousness, Awareness) indeed. What is seen there (i.e., in the Mind or psyche reckoned in its entirety) - of whom it is an Ābhāsa - that Ātman is verily Prajňānaghana; for, He is of the Chaitanya Swarūpa which is Kūtastha (Absolutely existing) and Avyabhicharita (immutable). Merely in His vicinity, as it were, the Antahkarana (i.e., Mind) becomes Chidvyāpta (pervaded, permeated by Pure Consciousness) and Chidābhāsa (reflected as if it is Consciousness, awareness) and assumes various mental concepts or thought forms and acquires various names of 'Prajñāna' etc. In the Śruti: 'यदेतद्भृदयं मनश्चैतत्। संज्ञानमाज्ञानं विज्ञानं प्रज्ञानं मेधादृष्टिधृतिर्मनीषा जूतिः स्मृतिः संकल्पः क्रतुरसुः कामो वश इति. सर्वाण्येवैतानि प्रज्ञानस्य नामधेयानि भवंति ॥' - (Aitareya 3-2) - Ajñāna, Vijñāna, Prajñāna - etc. all these are also stated to be the various names of

Prajñana. For that reason alone, the people by virtue of their $Praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ (awareness) are deluded to think that all this is totally ascertained, determined. That Prajñā which is being called by various names like Chitta, Buddhi, Vijñana etc. is - from the Vyavahāra Drishți - one each for every person; for, it has perforce to function with a particular adjunct (Upādhi) being alone. According to the methodology which the Yogis have accepted, that (i.e. Prajñā) increases by Bhāvana (meditation or contemplation) and when it reaches its consummate stage it becomes extremely pure and radiant and yields particular Siddhis (magical or mystic powers). Those who have attained such Siddhis and who are endowed with Vishuddha (supremely pure) Sattwas (those having such Chitta) are called 'Sarvajña' and 'Siddhas'. Because in this Avastha having attained Dhaimas (excellences) like being extremely pure and immensely subtle one remains in close vicinity to Atman, not only may this Prajña be capable of determining the Paramartha of all Dharmas (beings, objects) but also the Yāthātmya (essential nature of Pure Being as It is) of Paramātman who is really Asanga (unattached); but for that the Saṃskāra (refinement) especially gained through the Upadesha (spiritual instruction) by an Achārya (preceptor) who has acquired the $\bar{A}gama$ (traditional methodology of teaching the Reality in accordance with the time-tested Sastras and Sarvatrika Purna Anubhava) has yet to accrue. Now, this Prajñā which is there as the $\overline{A}bh\bar{a}saswar\bar{u}pa$ (the very essence of Being for this reflection), being an $\bar{A}tman$ (Self, the very core) alone for all Prajñās (various empirical awarenesses), quite different from all of them, being Sarvasākshi (the Witnessing Principle of everything), is it not? - That alone is the Pratishthā (substrate) for the whole universe. For this conclusion the Sruti sentence : 'सर्व तत्प्रज्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञाने प्रतिष्ठितं प्रज्ञानेत्रो लोकः प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म' - (Aitareya 3-2), meaning, - "All this has an eye called Prajñā. It is established in Prajñana; the people are the Prajña eyes; Prajñā Itself is the Pratishthā (substrate); Prajñāna Itself is Brahman" - is the authoritative source for it. This Prajñā which is Nirvishesha (devoid of any special attribute), which is Nirañjana (devoid of any blemish), which is Nirmala (devoid of any impurity), Nishkriya (devoid of any action), Shiva (auspicious),

Shānta (blissfully quiescent), Eka (unitary), Aja (unborn), Advaya (non-dual) is Itself Brahman (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality); because It is the Ātman for everyone, It cannot possibly be and in any manner either rejected or acquired by anyone - whosoever he may be. Therefore, what we said earlier that whether it is any attempt of making or converting this Ātman as a Karma (action) [i.e., any attempt at predication of Him], or whether it is an attempt to reduce Him to Shūnya (essenceless) alone is akin to the vain endeavour of catching the empty space in one's fist is proper indeed. In this matter nothing more remains to be said in detail.

THE TEACHING WITH REGARD TO PRATĪTI (CHERISHED BELIEF) ABOUT CHITTA (MIND) AND CHITTA DŖISHYA (OBJECTS SEEN BY THE MIND)

Here there lurks a secret: It is a well-known fact of life that all of us know indeed, viz. in states of Adarshanavrittis (absence of any mental concepts) like Sushupti, Samādhi etc. wherein there are no concepts whatsoever of distinctions like external and internal, nor distinctions of Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) or Vijñeya (object of intellectual awareness) - Advitiya Ātman alone who is verily Prajñānaghana (a homogeneous mass or lump of Pure Consciousness), is in one's Anubhava (Intuitive plenary experience). In such a kind or species of Avasthas - it is stated in the Srutis that - the whole universe of the form of duality has blended and become one with Vijñānātman (Self, Pure Awareness or Consciousness) which is of the essential nature of Paramārtha (Absolute, Transcendental Reality): 'स यथा सोम्य वयांसि वासोवृक्षं संप्रतिष्ठंते ऎवं ह वै तत्सर्वं पर आत्मनि संप्रतिष्ठते.....' - (Prashna 4-7) etc., meaning - "Oh, Soumya, just as the birds return in the evening to their respective residing nests in a tree, in the same way all that (i.e. the diverse phenomena of the universe) return to Paramatman and become one with Him. Prithivi (earth) and its Tanmātra (subtle element) of Prithivi, Ap (water) and its Tanmātra, Tejas (fire, light) and its Tanmātra, Vāyu (air) and its Tanmātra, Ākāsha (empty space) and its Tanmātra, the Indriya (sense organ) of Chakshus (eyes) and the seen object, the sense organ of Shrötru (ear) and the object of hearing, the sense organ of Ghrāna (smell) and the object of smell, the sense organ of Rasana (taste) and its object, the sense organ of Twak (touch) and its object, the organ of $V\bar{a}k$ (speech) and the VaktavyaVishaya (object of speech), hands and the objects they hold, the organ of Upastha (procreative organ) and its object of pleasure, Pāyu (the excretory organ) and the matter which it excretes, Pādas (legs) and Gantavya (going), Manas (the mind) and Mantavya (that which is thought about), Buddhi (intellect) and the object that is to be cognized by the intellect, Ahankara (ego) and the act of owning, Chitta (memory) and the object to be remembered, Tejas (fire) and the object to be illumined, Prāṇa (the vital force) and the object to be upheld - all these have become one with Paramātman; This Purusha (Being) who is Vijnānātman and who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, cognizes, does any act, - He too merges in the Paramatman called 'Akshara'. That Tattwa (Reality) which is Advaya, Eka, Shiva and Shanta and which is being experienced in these Avasthas like Sushupti (deep sleep) etc. - that is Ātman alone. This Ātman alone who is devoid of any changes of increase or decrease, devoid of divisions like Pramātru (cognizer), Pramāņa (valid means of cognition) and Prameya (the object of cognition) - is being realized by those who observe (Intuitively) deeply within the dream and the waking experiences - thus it is stated. It is not possible to think or fancy that for the Vyākrita (manifested) and Avyākrita (unmanifested seed-form) Prapañcha (world of diversity) which keeps on appearing in all the three Avasthas there may be another cause which is its substrate. Even the Prapañcha which appears in the diversified form of Pramatru, Pramana and Prameya - at the very time of its appearance too - is being illumined by Sākshi Chaitanya alone and appears as if having an existence totally depending, relying on It (i.e. the Witnessing Pure Consciousness) alone and not existing by itself independently at all. Therefore, because it becomes tantamount to saying that - this Atman alone, who is of the essential nature of Advitiya, Aja, Advaya imagines or conjectures Himself by Himself in a manner which is impossible to be argued out and settled in the form of the world comprising Pramatru etc. it evolves that - "Atman both in the form of Chitta (mind) and in the form of Chittadrishya (objects seen by the mind) is manifesting Himself - all this is verily Māyika (illusory)

indeed." Thus alone it has been taught in the Sruti sentence: 'एष योनिः सर्वस्य' - meaning "He alone is the cause (the womb) for everything." Shri Gaudapādāchārya also has explained, clarified the real purport of the Upanishadic sentence in his Kārikas like - "This is the essential nature of the Deity" - (1-9); "This Dvaita (duality) is Māyāmātra (merely illusory)" - (1-17); "The deity called 'Atman' is conjuring up Himself by Himself by His Māyā" - (2-12); "Inside (internally) those which are Chittakālas (mental temporal concepts) are merely imaginary" - (2-14); "First He imagines the Jiva" - (2-16); "This is that deity's Maya alone" - (2-19); "Everything is that which is created by $\bar{A}tmam\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (Ātman's illusory, magical power) alone" - (3-10); "This is separate only by dint of Māyā" - (3-19). Here we have elaborately explained and demonstrated this much only: Without realizing, cognizing this *Tattwa* (Transcendental, Absolute Reality of Brahman-Ātman) Buddhists like Mahāvaināshikas (Nihilists) Vijnānavādins (Idealists), Bāhyārthavādins (Realists) - just like the four congenital blind people who touched the various parts of an elephant and made wild, bizarre conjectures - have been imagining this Atmatattwa in all sorts of ways, arguing with one another and finally have helped reveal this Ajātivāda.

11. THE CONCLUSION OF THE YUKTI WHICH ESTABLISHES THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR SVABHĀVA TO CHANGE

अजातं जायते यस्मादजातिः प्रकृतिस्ततः । प्रकृतेरन्यथामावो न कथंचित् भविष्यति ।।२९।।

Meaning: "That which is not born is itself born, is it not so? Therefore, Ajāti is Prakṛiti; to say that Prakṛiti changes is not possible in any manner."

NOT BEING BORN IS ITSELF THE SVABHAVA OF CHITTA

Because we have proved, demonstrated that none of Kārya-Kārana Sambandha, Hetu-Phala Sambandha, Vijñāna-Bāhyārtha Sambandha - (relationships) can possibly be justified, defended, it has been thereby established that Brahman is devoid of birth and *Eka* (one). Now, it was stated at the beginning (4-6) that -

"For the Ajāta Dharma alone the disputants are saying there exists Jāti (birth), is it not so? That was established by taking recourse to the Yukti - "To adduce Anyathābhāva (an alien, unnatural existence) to Prakṛiti (essential nature of Being of a thing) is not proper", and then the resultant effect of that logical device is being concluded here.

Chitta means Ajātabrahman alone; this truth we have already indicated by making it tenable by means of Yukti. Because the disputants are imagining that this Ajātabrahman alone is 'born' in the form of Chitta, it amounts to saying that Ajāti alone - not being born itself - is its Prakriti (essential nature of Being). Because to affirm that the Tattwa, which is of the essential nature of not being born, is born in the form of Chitta - amounts to saying that for Prakriti itself there exists another alien, unnatural existence (Anyathābhāva) - it is not proper, reasonable. The name 'Prakriti' is not suitable, applicable to the Swarūpa (essential nature of Being) of an object which keeps on changing, is it not so? Hence, all disputants who champion Janmavāda perforce have to agree that 'Jāti' - 'being born' - is Māyika (illusory) alone. This fact we have already explained in the commentaries on 4-6 and 7; that should be adduced here too and understood. For, here too on the pretext of refuting the Buddhistic tenets the Ajādvayabrahmavāda alone has been concluded and not merely the refutation of Jātivāda - meaning, - the doctrine that entities (Vastus) are born - alone is not the ultimate goal.

12. IN PARAMĀRTHAJĀTIVĀDA (THE DOCTRINE OF THE ULTIMATE REALITY BEING BORN) BANDHA-MŌKSHA ARE NOT ESTABLISHED

अनादेरन्तवत्वं च संसारस्य न सेत्स्यति । अनन्तता चादिमतो मोक्षस्य न भविष्यति ।।३०।।

Meaning: "It cannot be established that Samsāra which is $An\bar{a}di$ (beginningless) has an Anta (end). Mōksha which has $\bar{A}di$ (beginning) cannot also be established to be Ananta (endless)."

YET ANOTHER DEFECT THAT LIES IN JATIVADA

In the doctrine of those disputants who say that - 'Samsāra (i.e. Bandha)-Mōksḥa, which occur to Ātman, do really exist' - there lies a defect of the type that - 'Prakriti acquires another (alien) nature' - this fact has been signified so far. Now Shri Gauḍapāda is pointing out yet another defect in their doctrine.

If it is contended that both Bandhavastha and Mokshavastha are Paramārtha (Absolutely real) alone, then it has to be agreed that they occur one after another; for, just as the acts of standing still and wandering about are not possible at one and the same time, in the same way Bandha-Mōksha - which are mutually opposed to each other - cannot possibly exist to one and the same person always. If it is contended that they occur one after the other, then it will have to be conjectured either they have a cause or there is no cause whatsoever, is it not so? First of all, (i) especially it is not possible at all to say that Bandha-Mōksha occur without any Nimitta. For, if Bandha is accepted to be Nirnimitta (devoid of a cause) then it amounts to saying that it can never be got rid of; if Mōksha is assumed to be Nirnimitta. then it amounts to accepting that there is no need whatsoever of practising any Mōkshasādhanas. Then, in that event, Bandha being Heya (that which can be discarded, given up), Mōksha being Upādeya (that which can be acquired) - this distinction itself will be rendered untenable, inapplicable.

(ii) Further, if it is contended that they have another cause, then they themselves become non-existent and it amounts to saying that they are not Paramārtha alone. As otherwise - (iii) If it is further contended that - 'Samsārabandha being Anādi exists 'at the beginning itself, whereas Mōksha, occurring after that, is Nitya (eternal); for, by means of Jñāna alone Mōksha has invariably to accrue' - then, that way also it does not suit. For, to say that Samsāra which has no beginning will come to a standstill - is not possible to be established by Yukti; for, in our workaday world there is no illustration to show or support the theory that a thing which is Anādi is having an Anta (end). It is not possible to doubt in the manner: 'The seed-sprout continuum - though it is Anādi - is one that has an end, is it not so?'; for, the phehomenon of 'Santati' (continuum, series)

is not a Vastu (entity) - thus we have already provided a solution. Therefore, that which is Anādi - for it there is no possibility of an Anta occurring.

In the same way, when Jñāna, which has an Ādi, accrues - for the Moksha - which is born or caused - Anantatwa (endlessness) does not become suitable, applicable. If it is said that - 'Just like the destruction of Ghata etc., though it is having an Ādi it may be Ananta, is it not so?' - that is also not proper; for, the phenomenon of 'Vināsha' (total destruction) is not a Vastu (entity), but Mōksha is Bhāvarūpa (of the nature of an existing entity). Therefore, to assert that - 'Mōksha, which has an Ādi, may be Ananta' - Vināsha cannot be an apt illustration; for, then the undesirable theory of - 'Mōksha is not Paramārtha (absolutely real)' - entails it. Apart from this, Nāsha is not an entity at all; because, just like the hare's horns which are not entities at all, Nāsha (destruction) too is Avastu (nonentity), the theory that - 'It has Adi but no Anta' - is not tenable. The concepts like - Prāgabhāva (non-existence prior to birth), Pradhvamsābhāva (non-existence after destruction) etc. in Abhāva (non-existence) which are imagined, conjectured by logicians are mere phantasmagoria indeed; for, there does not at all exist special features of the type - 'It is such as this; it is such as that' - in Abhāva (non-existence).

> आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा । वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥३१॥

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते । तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥३२॥

Meaning: "That thing which does not exist in the beginning and at the end, it does not (exist), in the same manner, in the present time too. The objects, being equal or common to what is false alone, are appearing as if they are not false. To think that they have benefit is like giving scope for a contradictory opinion in the dream. Therefore, because they have a beginning and an end they are said to be false alone."

SINCE THE OBJECTS SEEN IN THE WAKING ARE FALSE ALSO BANDHA-MÖKSHA DO NOT EXIST

In the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa (2-6 and 7) for these very verses a commentary had been given. Because - (a) in the waking for the various objects there exist beginnings and ends; (b) their being endowed, invested with Artha (existence), Kriyākāri (capability of acting, functioning) gets falsified in the dream, it evolves that they (i.e. objects) are false, unreal alone - with the intention of driving home the truth that - 'Both Bandha and Mōksha, that have necessarily to accrue (occur) in the waking alone, are verily false, unreal' - here once again those very same verses have been repeated. That is all.

सर्वे धर्मा मृषा स्वप्ने कायस्यान्तर्निदर्शनात्। संवृतेऽस्मिन् प्रदेशे वै भूतानां दर्शनं कुतः।।३३।।

Meaning: "All the beings or objects (Dharmas) which appear in the dream are verily false; for, they appear within the body. How at all is it possible to see those Bhūtas (things) in this limited or restricted space?"

SINCE THE CAUSE OF BANDHA DOES NOT EXIST ALSO SAMSĀRA ETC. DO NOT EXIST

From this verse uptil - 'ग्रहणाज्जागरितवत्' (4-37), in all these verses there exists an explanation alone of the expression "We say Nimitta is Animitta indeed" - (4-25). In order to clarify that statement alone here the illustration of the dream has been adduced. Although Shri Sankara has taken up the dream illustration in the Bhāshya on the Kārikā (4-26) : 'चित्तं न संस्पृशत्यर्थम्' - in the original it is not seen; especially here, on the other hand, the Kārikākāra himself has shown the fact that between the waking and the dream there exists a similarity in all respects, and on the strength of that evidence - wanting to conclude the prime purport of the Prakaraņa of 'Ajātivāda' - this Avasthāsāmya (equality, similarity of the two states) has been explained. Apart from this, incidentally with a view to showing that Samsāra and Mōksha do not really exist, it is being established that - "Jāgrat (waking) too is, like the Svapna (dream), Mithy \bar{a} (unreal or false)." This is being explained in these verses. Therefore, adducing the dream illustration here in this context is quite apt and reasonable.

All the Ātmans (beings) who appear to exist endowed with special attributes of Kāryakaraṇasaṅghāta (the conglomeration of body, senses, mind etc.) in the dream are verily false; for, they appear within the body only. How is it possible to see so many creatures in such a restricted space? Just as in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, we should discern that here also from the waking viewpoint alone this illustration has been given. Really speaking, in the dream neither the Chitta (mind) nor its cause exists in substance; neither Dvayadarshana (perception of duality) nor the experience of Samklesha (misery) exists substantially (i.e. in reality) therein. In the same way too, in order to drive home this truth 'that - In the waking also neither the Chitta (the mind) nor the Chittadṛishyas (mental concepts) exist whatsoever' - it is first stated that the substantial conglomerations of body, senses etc. do not exist therein.

न युक्तं दर्शनं गत्वा कालास्यानियमाद् गतौ । प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ।।३४॥

Meaning: "It is not proper to say that they go therein and see the objects; for, in order to travel therein the sufficient temporal regulations do not exist in that space or region. Besides, no one who wakes up - whatsoever he may be - exists in that region (of the dream)."

IN DREAM THERE DO NOT EXIST ANY GATI (GOING) AND $\overline{A}GATI$ (RETURNING)

Just as there exists in the waking a rule of law with regard to the question as to how much time is needed for anyone to go anywhere and again return - in that manner there does not exist any rule of law in the dream to the effect that the same time is needed for such an event. For, the time therein is not that long or protracted at all; the space is limited, restricted. Therefore, it is not possible to assert that therein one really travels to another region and sees various objects.

मित्राद्यैः सह संमन्त्य प्रबुद्धो न प्रपद्यते । गृहीतं चापि यत्किञ्चित् प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥३५॥ Meaning: "One who has had a discussion with friends and then who got awakened, does not believe (that). And if he had taken or borrowed something, the one who has woken up does not see (it)."

WHAT IS SEEN IN THE DREAM DOES NOT EXIST IN THE WAKING

Just as to go to another place there does not exist sufficient time or space, in the same way in order to see an object the necessary organ of sight or the action does not exist therein (i.e. in the dream) - thus it has been stated here. A person often discusses with elders or subordinates etc. and decides to do a particular thing in a particular manner, is it not so? In the waking it is realized that that particular discussion itself did not really take place; by such decision or action what was to be achieved that fruit also is not found in the waking. Even for a different reading of 'संबुद्धी न प्रपद्धते' the same meaning is there. Gold or any other valuable thing that is acquired in the dream is not to be found in the waking. For this reason too, in the dream a person has really gone to another place - this phenomenon is rendered false.

In any case, it has been evolved, established that because thus there does not exist at all any Karaṇa (valid means of action) for Dvayadarshana (perception of duality) or the Kriyā (action) necessary to achieve a particular action, or the Anubhava (experience) of the Saṃklesha (misery) that is engendered by performing a particular job - there is no cause whatsoever (which is real and rationally viable, feasible) entertained or envisaged for the Svapnachitta (the dream mind). Apart from this, because the Chitta that exists in the dream is invariably of a quite different essential nature than that of the Jāgrat Chitta (waking mind), immediately on waking - the dream mind by itself becomes non-existent, and for this reason also it is false indeed.

Thus the two verses that are mentioned here have a meaning which was previously explained in the commentary on - 'अदीर्घत्वाच्च कालस्य' (2-2); even so, in order to demonstrate the truth that - "That which appears as a Nimitta (cause) for Chitta (mind)

is really not a Nimitta at all" - these verses have been mentioned again. Hence there is no defect here of repetition.

स्वप्ने चावस्तुकः कायः पृथगन्यस्य दर्शनात् । यथा कायस्तथा सर्वं चित्तदृश्यमवस्तुकम् ॥३६॥

Meaning: "The body that is there in a dream is verily unreal; for, another body which is different from it is being seen. Just as the body, in the same way all that is *Chittadrishya* (seen by the mind) is Asatya alone."

THE BODY ETC. WHICH ARE SEEN IN THE DREAM ARE ALL FALSE INDEED

The body which appears to be wandering about in the dream is false indeed; for, apart from it, in the region of the dream itself, the waking body often appears. It is not possible at all to imagine that for one and the same person especially two bodies exist, is it not so? Just as the body seen in the dream is unreal, in the same way for the same reason - to wit, another (a similar) body is being seen in the waking also and as soon as we wake up it gets falsified or sublated - the whole gamut of the objects seen by the dream mind is determined, established to be Asatya (unreal) indeed.

Thus it is now established that all the *Drishya* (scenario) seen outside (or externally) and inside (or internally) in a dream is verily false, unreal. In the same way, in the waking too everything is false only; for, it is also Chittadrishya (that which is seen by the mind) alone. Therein (i.e. in the dream) what is stated as 'Chittadrishya' is only for the sake of Upalakshana (as a representative example); here (i.e. in the waking) not only the Drishya (what is seen) but also since Chitta (mind) is itself Chittadrishya, it is Asatya (unreal) alone - thus we should conjecture. In the original the intended purport behind the word - "Avastuka" is: All that which is seen (i.e. object for the mind) exists without any substantiality alone. We have perforce to determine by the usage of the 'Ka' pratyaya (the suffix of 'Ka') that therein there does not even exist the Vāsana (subtle impression or taint, proclivity) of any Vastu (entity) apart from the Drastru (seer). Because the waking too is equal or similar to dream in all respects, it is also verily Asat (unreal) alone - this is the real import of the *Prakaraṇa* (whole Chapter).

THE UTILITY OF (PURPOSE SERVED BY) HAVING ADDUCED THE DREAM ILLUSTRATION

Here what we have to discern is: Assuming what is established (or rather staunchly believed by everyone) in our workaday transactions (Vyavahāra) that the states of waking and dream are different, distinct states - alone and then further assuming for the time being that the dream beings, as also the dream body, senses etc. are false and according to that same line of argument or reasoning and adopting the tenet that the waking is also false, unreal - this Yukti which the Vijnanavadins use - we utilize (follow) here too and have concluded that - 'Chittadrishya - all of it - is false'. However, the Vijnanavadins - keeping as their objective the doctrine that - 'The Svapnachitta does not have an object at all' - and on that analogy that - 'The waking mind too does not really possess an object at all' - are attempting to establish on the basis of inferential logic. Although in the Vaitathya Prakarana in the Kārikā portion of - 'स्वप्नजागरितस्थाने होकमाहुर्मनीषिणः' - (2-5) etc. after it was propounded that: "There is no difference whatsoever between the waking and the dream; for, both these 'exist within (internally)' - (अन्तःस्थानात्) - although the Parama Siddhanta (final spiritual teaching) of - 'कल्पयत्यात्मनात्मानम्' (2-12), meaning - "Atman Himself has imagined, conceived in Himself the Jivatwa etc. forms" - has been depicted, there it was undertaken to mention that - "The Aja-Advaita-Atman, who is instructed through the traditional Śāstraic methodology (Āgama), can also be taught by means of Upapatti (reasonable arguments)." However, here the cause or reason for assuming this different methodology is only to show the fact that: First, according to the method of the doctrine of Vijñānavādin refuting the Jātivāda (doctrine of birth) which is acceptable to the Bāhyārthavādins (Realists), and then, by utilizing that same Yukti of Vijñānavādins (Idealists) alone with a view to refuting their doctrine of - "The Utpatti of Chitta (the birth of the mind)" which is acceptable to them - the mere Anumānaprakriyā (inferential methodology) itself which is approved by them only is adopted; from this the truth

that - "As a result of the debate among these disputants even, the truth that Advayātman is verily (birthless)" - gets evolved.

13. BECAUSE THERE IS NO MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAKING AND DREAM ALSO AJĀTIVĀDA GETS ESTABLISHED

ग्रहणाज्जागरितवत्तद्धेतुः स्वप्न इष्यते । तद्धेतुत्वात्तु तस्यैव सज्जागरितमिष्यते ।।३७।।

Meaning: "Because it appears just like the waking alone, the dream is felt to be having that alone as its cause. Because it is endowed with the causation of that, to him alone the waking exists - thus it is felt."

THE WAKING STATE IS NOT COMMON (SIMILAR) TO EVERYONE

So far we have - following the dream illustration - established the truth that - "Ajāti alone is Paramārtha" - by showing that though the waking world appears with the differences of Grāhya-Grāhaka invariably, it is Asatya alone. Now in order to indicate the truth that - 'By means of establishing the fact that there does not exist any mutual relationship between the waking and the dream also Ajātivāda alone is established' - this forthcoming textual portion is dedicated.

First of all, because the waking state is common experience to everyone it is quite different, bizarre from the dream and thereby the deep-seated belief of those people who have reckoned it (i.e. waking experience) to be Paramārtha (Absolutely real) alone is being refuted. The intended meaning of the verse is: To say that the waking object is not really existing this too is a cause. Because the dream - just like the waking - is appearing with forms like Grāhya-Grāhaka, some people have believed that for that dream experience the waking itself is the cause. Because the dream is the effect of the waking alone, we should invariably infer that one who sees the dream - he alone has the waking state and should not assert that for the rest of the people too it is common. In fact, one who sees the dream - to him alone the dream experience exists and not to the others -

thus all of us have invariably agreed, is it not so? Even so, that dream appears to all those people who exist therein as if it is 'common experience' at that particular time (i.e. during the dream time), is it not so? In the same way, the waking too which is its cause, though it appears to be a common experience to everyone (those who are within the waking state), really it just like the dream - belongs to the one individual (who is awake), indeed; to believe that it is common experience to everyone there is no valid reason whatsoever. Here we should discern the secret that in this context, assuming the Vyāvahārikasattwa (the empirical reality of things or phenomenon) alone and on the basis of the axiom (Nyāya) of Adhyārōpa-Apavāda (Superimposition and Rescission) it has been stated that - "To him alone it is Sat or real" - thus we have to reckon. However, here from the Paramartha Drishti it has not been acknowledged at all that really the waking is the cause for the dream. [In fact, there cannot be any mutual relationship inferred between two phenomena which never co-exist in one and the same time-space continuum and there is no possibility whatsoever of those two co-existing at any future period of time].

उत्पादस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादजं सर्वमुदाह्रतम् । न च भूतादभूतस्य सम्भवोऽस्ति कथञ्चन ॥३८॥

Meaning: "The phenomenon of being born itself being Aprasiddha (not established), it is being said that everything is Aja (unborn). Because this is the truth, to say that a non-existing thing is born can never be tenable in any manner whatsoever."

TO SAY THAT DREAM IS THE EFFECT OF WAKING ALSO IS NOT TENABLE

As stated in the previous Kārikā thinking that - some people may believe that the statement that the dream is an effect of the waking is itself the absolute truth - here it is shown that that statement is not one that can be acknowledged.

Here the opponent may raise a doubt of the type: Even if we agree that the waking is the cause for the dream, it cannot possibly be said to be, just like the dream, false only. For, dream

is merely a Vikalpa (wild imagination); but, on the other hand, the waking, being a common (experience) to everyone, is an entity which really exists. Although, since the dream is caused, brought about by the $V\bar{a}san\bar{a}$ (sutble impression) of the waking, it may be said to be verily the effect of the waking - one who is in the waking and due to whose Vāsanā alone the dream is caused - his alone is that Vikalpa indeed. A rope may be the cause for an imagined snake; one who imagines it also may be said to be its cause; merely on that count, it does not amount to saying that the rope also is false and the person who imagines it also is false only - is it not so? Apart from this, it is seen also that there exists a great difference between waking and dream; to wit, dream is extremely fickle, unsteady; for, it keeps on changing from moment to moment. One person alone in one day alone may see many dreams which are extremely bizarre, each from the other. But waking is not like that at all. Everybody - those who are in the waking - are recognizing it in the manner: "That alone is this" - is it not so?

(Solution): To this our answer is: For the Avivekins (non-discriminating people) this alone is proper; but from the view-point of the Vivekins (discriminating people) it is not established that - "Any object whatsoever is born." Therefore, because 'birth' itself is not established, in the 'Vedāntas' (i.e. Upanishads) it is stated that - "Everything is Aja (birthless) indeed." We have already mentioned in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa a proper consolatory explanation for the doubt raised about the difference (or contradiction, opposition) between the waking and the dream - which the opponent also has agreed. That same solution should be remembered here also.

Now, what the opponent has reckoned that - "From the waking the dream has been caused (is born)" - that understanding too is not proper. For, in our workaday world no one has seen a false thing having been born from a real entity; none of us has ever seen anywhere non-existing hare's horns etc. being born, is it not so? For the illustration of the rope-snake which the opponent had mentioned we have already given a counterargument. Neither is a snake born from a rope, nor it merges in the rope; neither in the dream the snake is born, nor does it merge; neither from both these it is ever possible for it to be

born. Hence, it is merely a misconception (wild imagination of the mind) alone - thus we have already stated. Therefore, even if we accept that waking is real, from it a non-existing dream can never possibly be born; it being so, to say that - 'From the waking, which is itself non-existent, a dream that is non-existent being born is not possible in any manner' - where is the need at all?

THE BENEFIT FROM THE YUKTI THAT IS EXEMPLIFIED HERE

Here this aspect should be carefully discerned and imbibed. When it is established that - "Between the waking and the dream there does not exist any relationship of cause and effect" - by the reasoning of the type - "All this is Aja (birthless) alone" even after such an extremely satisfying consolation, explanation has been provided - the reason for having provided yet another Yukti (logical device) is: It is indeed the intention that - "To those who have a great fascination for logical, dialectical arguments let there be a firm conviction created with regard to any subject-matter that is established by the valid means of $\overline{A}gama$ (Śāstra or a traditional methodology of teaching)". That is all, and not that by means of this purely inferential or syllogistic logic the Ajātivāda can be established. In all the three previous Prakaranas too it has already been propounded in a more detailed and clearer manner the truth that there is no relationship whatsoever between the waking and the dream. Even after we have demonstrated, proved by means of some Upapattis (logical arguments) of the type - (a) Both the waking and the dream are verily Viparyāsa (delusion, mistake) by means of the reason that they are both having Adi and Anta; (b) they are the support or substrate for objects or phenomena which have Chittakala and Dvayakāla; (c) both those states are merely the Manahspandana (vibration of the mind) caused by $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (illusion) etc. - if there are any persons who are not able to comprehend the teaching that there is no relationship whatsoever between the two states of Consciousness - for such people how at all by merely listening to the bare singular Yukti of the type - "From that which is existent a non-existent thing cannot be born" - any abiding, lasting faith be created?

असज्जागरितं दृष्ट्वा स्वप्ने पश्यति तन्मयः । असत् स्वप्नेऽपि दृष्ट्वा च प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥३९॥

Meaning: "Seeing what is unreal in the waking and getting engrossed in it, a person sees that in the dream also. (But) seeing that which is unreal in the dream, one who has woken up does not see it."

WHAT KIND OF A CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN WAKING AND DREAM?

(Doubt): You only had said that - "For the dream that (i.e. waking) alone is the cause" - (4-37), is it not so? It being so, now your saying that - "Utpatti (being born, coming into being) is something which is unestablished" - is opposed to that, is it not so?

(Solution): Please listen, we will tell you as to what kind of Kārya-Kāraņa-Bhāva has been accepted by us in our doctrine, teaching. Seeing an Asatpadārtha (unreal object) which is wildly imagined - just like the rope-snake - in the waking, getting completely engrossed in it and thinking about that alone in the dream too he sees Asatpadarthas alone in the forms of Grahya-Grāhaka. And in the dream having seen the unreal object alone, on waking up he does not see it. Because in the original text of 'Drishtā Cha' the word 'Cha', meaning - 'and' - which is a word signifying or connoting a link or combination, has been used, what is seen in the waking is often not seen in the dream - there is such a possibility - this meaning should also be added here. In any case, thus what Asatpadartha alone one sees in the waking he sees that kind of a phenomenon again in the dream; merely on this ground we have stated that the waking is the cause for the dream but we have not stated it at all invariably assuming that - (a) whether the cause or the effect is absolutely existing ; (b) the object which one sees in one particular state an object equal to that alone he sees in another state. Everywhere all Drishya (seen objects) is Kalpita (imagined) alone - thus we have previously (2-16) stated too. Therefore, from the Paramartha Drishti the tenet that - "There is no relationship whatsoever between the sets of objects seen in the waking and the dream" - is itself our Siddhanta (spiritual teaching) indeed; for,

between two objects which are unreal - like between a barren woman's son and bow made out of hare's horns - there is no relationship whatsoever, is it not so? In the same way, the fact that there does not exist any relationship whatsoever is reasonable also.

नास्त्यसद्धेतुकमसत् सदसद्धेतुकं तथा । सच्च सद्धेतुकं नास्ति सद्धेतुकमसत् कुतः ।।४०।।

Meaning: "An Asat (unreal) thing which has a Hetu (cause) which is Asat does not exist; neither there exists a Sat (real object) which has a Hetu (cause) which is Asat (further), a Sat which has a Hetu which is Sat also does not exist; then how can there exist an Asat which has Sat as its Hetu?"

THE PHENOMENON OF 'JANMA' WHICH IS SUBSTANTIAL ITSELF DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL

Having accepted the theory that between the waking and the dream there exists a cause-effect relationship which is Māyika (illusory), we have said like this. But from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi, for any object or thing there being a possibility whatsoever of any cause-effect relationship existing with any other object in any conceivable manner is not tenable, suitable at all.

To wit: A hare's horns etc. - such an Asat object being a cause for another Asat - for example, for a flower in the sky etc. - there is nothing of this kind at all anywhere. In the same way, for an existing earthen pot etc. a hare's horns etc. which is Asat being an effect is not seen in our workaday world. In the same way, we have not seen a Satpadārtha (a real entity) also for which Sat alone is the cause. Then, where is the question of seeing an Asatpadārtha (unreal object) which is the effect of a Sat (real object)? There is no other manner or method whatsoever in which this relationship of cause-effect can possibly exist; nay, even to imagine that a relationship exists it is not possible at all. Is it not so? Therefore, from the viewpoint of discriminating people the relationship between cause and effect categories is itself not established - this is the implied meaning here. In the

Kārikā: 'स्वतो वा परतो वापि' - (4-22), keeping in mind the essential nature of a Vastu (entity) that is being born it was stated that - "It cannot possibly be born by itself or from another" - etc.; here, after stating that the types or kinds of objects, which may possibly have the cause-effect relationship, are so many only (i.e. enumerating and exemplifying them) the teaching that - "Among those kinds, in no manner whatsoever, an entity, object ever is born" - alone has been justified in another method. Hence there is no defect of repetition here.

Shūnyavādins too have written a Kārikā - "It is not possible for an object (Bhāva) to be born from a Bhāva" - (Mādh. Kā. 21-12, p. 151) etc. which has this very same opinion, and have depicted their own Siddhanta saying in the manner - "Disputants (Vādins) are always arguing among themselves, one with the other, and hence nothing whatsoever is born; this doctrine alone evolves from it." But between these two doctrines (viz. that of the Vedantins and of the Buddhistic Shunyavadins) the salient differences between them are: "In the Nagarjuna Karika the Jātivāda (doctrine of birth) has been refuted from the viewpoint of the waking alone and there itself it has come to a standstill; but here because it is decided that - 'Between the waking and the dream there does not at all suit any causeeffect relationship in any manner' - the truth that both the states are merely wild imaginations has been signified in everyone's experience; further, our methodology has reached out, extended up to the Sākshi (Witnessing Pure Consciousness) which is totally different from those two states indeed.

Although in the Vedānta Siddhānta also the teaching that - "Ajātabrahman also is born in an illusory (Māyika) manner" - has been acknowledged, it is not opposed to Ajātivāda; this fact we have already stated in the past. Especially those who assert that - "In the Absolute sense alone (i.e. in the Pāramārthika viewpoint alone) there is birth" - for such people it is not possible at all to justify or provide any proof for 'birth' in any manner whatsoever; therefore, from their doctrine also it has amounted to their having evolved Ajātivāda alone; this particular fact has been established here. Hence, the Yukti that is mentioned is inviolable, incontrovertible indeed.

विपर्यासाद् यथा जाग्रदिचन्त्यान् भूतवत् स्पृशेत् । तथा स्वप्ने विपर्यासाद्धर्मास्तत्रैव पश्यति ॥४१॥

Meaning: "Just as in the waking due to misconception beings which cannot be imagined are touched (contacted) by him as if they are real, in the same way in the dream too due to misconception only he is seeing the beings therein only."

IN WAKING AND DREAM NON-EXISTENT THINGS ONLY ARE WILDLY IMAGINED

'Although the waking and the dream are unreal alone they have a cause-effect relationship' - thus those who say, their doubt is once more solved and thereby Ajātivāda is being firmly established here; due to Viparyāsa - meaning, because one has not deliberated upon the extreme difference (Vailakshanya) that exists between the Vastu (entity) which is Sadrūpa (of the very essence of Reality) in the Absolute sense, on the one hand, and the waking and dream states, on the other - the misconception (Viparitabhāva) that is caused has got itself embedded, rooted in the mind - and hence just as any one in the waking state imagines that he is coming in contact with phenomena like the rope-snake etc. which are Achintya - meaning, which can neither be imagined as things having changes like birth and destruction etc. nor as things having a particular cause - as if they are Bhūtavastus (really existing entities) - through the respective senses - in the same way due to Viparyāsa (misconception, delusion) he is seeing therein only the various beings; in fact, he is wildly imagining (Vikalpa) that he is seeing; really speaking, they are not born out of the waking.

Here the reason for exemplifying objects like rope-snake etc. only which are Achintya (unthinkable, for which it is not possible to imagine any birth and death, nor having a particular thing as their cause) alone is: In order to refute the theory (doctrine) that - 'The dream is born or caused by the waking' - the example that is given should necessarily be common both to the general run of people and the examiners; that is all, and not at all for any reason like - 'For misconceptions of the type of a snake etc. objects like rope etc., which are the substrate, are Suchintya (capable of being imagined, conceived by the mind)

Prakaraṇa (2-6) it was stated: "It exists as equal alone to the objects which are false and appears as if real" - and thereby it was affirmed that - "All objects are false only" - is it not so? Therefore, all the objects that exist in the waking and the dream are verily Asat alone; for them it is not possible at all to imagine any kind of cause-effect relationship whatsoever. This alone is the implied purport here.

Here an important point that should necessarily be remembered is: Objects like rope-snake etc. are Achintya; neither their essential nature of Being nor their cause can possibly be imagined by the mind - thus Shri Gaudapādāchārya has stridently, vociferously stated. It is not possible at all to imagine that these are born from either the external things like the rope etc. or the internal mind, or even from both these together. Therefore, these are mere (wild or weird) mental imaginations alone - thus Shri Śankarāchārya, the Bhāshyakāra, also has written. It being so, the present-day commentators (called Vyākhyānakāras) have misconceived and misinterpreted these authoritative and traditional teachings to say: "In the rope the snake etc. have (actually) taken birth after being transformed (Parināma) as a result of a particular type of Avidyā (which they have newly, erroneously coined as 'Mūlāvidyā')." Thus having forwarded a new conceptual theory which even the common run of people cannot possibly believe, they have erected a huge barrier, as it were, to genuine Vedāntic Intuitive deliberation. Since this new-found doctrine is opposed to Ajātivāda - the teaching that - "Whether it is Sat (real), or Asat (unreal), or Sadasat (real as also unreal), nothing is ever born at all" - this present-day dogmatic doctrine (of Mūlāvidyāvāda) should be shunned by every discriminative seeker; thus a conclusion gets established by itself.

14. THE REASON FOR ADVOCATING THE EXISTENCE OF BIRTH IN THE VEDĀNTIC SIDDHĀNTA ALSO

उपलम्भात् समाचारादस्तिवस्तुत्ववादिनाम् । जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैरजातेस्त्रसतां सदा ॥४२॥ Meaning: "For the sake of those who are saying that the Vastu exists because it is appearing as also because of religious duties, practices and for the sake of those who are always afraid of Ajāti the tenet of Jāti (birth of things) is being instructed by the Buddhas (knowledgeable people)."

JANMA IS INSTRUCTED AS A DISCRIMINATIVE DEVICE FOR THE BENEFIT OF AVIVEKINS

Knowledgeable Advaitavādins too are instructing about Janma, is it not so ? 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायंते' - (Tai. 3-1), meaning -"From which these creatures are being born" - etc. - by such Śrutis also; 'अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवः' (Gitā 10-8), meaning - "I am the cause for everything to be born" - etc. - by such Smritis also ; 'स सर्गकालेच करोति सर्वम्' - (Mōksha Dharma 30-2-12), meaning -"He creates everything at the time of creation" - by such Puranavachanas - it has been stated even by Jñānis that Janma exists, is it not so? But all these are not instructed to indicate that really (in the Absolute sense) there exists a phenomenon of birth. On the contrary, it is taught by way of a subtle device (Upāya) to Astikas (believers in the Sāstras) of limited ability of discrimination (Alpavivekins) who have staunchly believed that the objects really exist, because the objects appear in the external region and they are accessorial aids, instruments for performing or observing the religious duties as per the scriptural Varṇāshrama Dharmas - so as to enable them to cognize, Intuit the Aja-Advaya Tattwa. "Let them first assume this Janma to exist; after they follow and practise Vedantic teachings, automatically the truth that - 'Aja-Advaya Itself is the Tattwa (the Ultimate, Absolute Reality)' - will be Intuited, cognized" - this alone is the purport behind all these teachings and not what is instructed just now i.e. 'Janmavāda' is itself the Paramārtha (Absolute Truth).

In that case, if it is asked: "For those Jijnāsus why is it that directly the Ajāti itself has not been taught?" - then we answer: "Because they are always afraid of Ajāti." Because those Shrōtriyas (people who listen to the scriptural texts) are endowed with Sthūlabuddhi (gross, indiscrete intelligence), they have staunchly believed that Ahampratyayagamya (what people are saying - 'I', 'I') Ātman alone is the really real Ātman as also

Kriyā-Kāraka-Phala (action-means of action-its fruit) are Paramārtha alone; therefore, for them Aja-Advaya-Vastu means 'fear' always. To wit: Their fear lurks in the manner - "If Ajāti alone is real, then why should Srutis like - 'A Brāhmin should perform sacrifice'; 'One who is a Svargakāma (desirous of attaining heaven) should perform $Y\bar{a}ga$ (sacrifice)' - etc. will be rendered invalid! Even the empirical transactions will have to be treated as false only, is it not so? In that case, we ourselves - it amounts to saying - do not exist, is it not so?" Therefore, according to their level of understanding the teaching about the existence of 'Janma' has been imparted. That is all, and not that this instruction of the existence of Janma is meant to indicate it to be verily Paramārtha (i.e. Absolutely real); "Because this entire world of duality is born from Brahman alone, exists in Brahman alone and finally merges in Brahman alone, it is verily of Brahmaswarūpa - let this Viveka (discrimination) dawn in them too in stages, gradually!" - with this prime intention alone this phased-out methodology of teaching is adopted. It has already been stated that - "This is verily a Upāya (device) for coming down to the level of the intellect (i.e. it becomes within the purview of the common man's level of intelligence, comprehension); but there is no distinction whatsoever" - (3-15), is it not so? The same tenet is being mentioned in a different manner as: "The reason for the knowledgeable people to have instructed Jāti is that it is meant for those who are afraid of Ajāti." That is all.

INSTRUCTION ABOUT 'JANMA' IS NOT AN ERROR ON THE PART OF JÑĀNIS

(Doubt): Although the phenomenon of Janma itself is really existing, why is it instructed that it exists? From this does it not amount to their (i.e. Jñānis, the knowledgeable traditional teachers) being verily cheats?

(Solution): Not so. Because they keep in mind, or take into consideration, the level of understanding, comprehension of the seekers (who wish to qualify for this highest, sublime knowledge) and then instruct in this manner, it is not possible - not reasonable - to level this kind of a defect, blame whatsoever against the Jñānis. In fact, it is a subtle attempt on their part to have first assumed that very staunch belief of those who have

given full credence to the deep-seated belief that - "Because the object is appearing and is an instrument for the performance of Karmas, it is really existing" - as a subtle device and then to have taught the Paramārtha (the Ultimate Reality). They have first accepted the Janma which is established in cir workaday transactions and then they have taught in the manner that - "All this is a Māyika (illusory) Srishti (creation) caused by Brahman alone; it is not at all created by insentient things like Pradhana (or Prakriti) etc." Because this *Upadesha* (spiritual instruction) based on the Adhyārōpa Drishti (viewpoint of deliberate Superimposition) is rescinded, sublated later on in the Upadesha on Aja-Advaya-Tattwa, there does not exist any error whatsoever in their teaching. With this very purport in mind the knowers of the Sampradāya (traditional methodology of spiritual instruction) have stated: - (Gitā Bhāshya, 13-12), meaning - "By virtue of the axiom of Adhyārōpa-Apavāda (Superimposition and Rescission) Tattwa (Reality) which is Nishprapañcha (devoid of any world of duality) is taught in full detail."

(Doubt): Even if it is so, does not the defect of having uttered a lie entail them? Even though the phenomenon of birth does not really exist, they have taught that it exists, is it not so?

(Solution): Not so. For, they have not at all instructed, preached so in the *Pāramārthika* (Absolute) sense. Although the *Shishyas* (disciples) have believed firmly that the Dvaitavastu really exists, in the Absolute sense, none of the *Dvaita-Vikalpas* (misconceptions of duality) of the type - 'Śāstra', 'Shishya', 'Guru' etc. does exist whatsoever in reality; this alone is the *Paramārtha Siddhānta* (the Absolute philosophical or spiritual teaching of Advaita Vedānta). It being so, the fact that the knowledgeable people (i.e. Jñānis) are teaching 'Māyika Janma' is also mentioned from the Avidyā Dṛishṭi alone. For that reason alone, we had previously stated: "This doctrine was taught for the purpose of Upadesha" - (1-18). Therefore, it is not possible at all to doubt at any time any defect whatsoever being there in Aja-Advaya-Vāda.

अजातेस्त्रसतां तेषामुपलम्भाद्वियन्ति ये । जातिदोषा न सेत्स्यन्ति दोषोऽप्यल्पो भविष्यति ॥४३॥

Meaning: "Those who are afraid of Ajāti because the Vastu is appearing and have given it up, for them the defect of having accepted Janma is not established; even if there is a defect, it will be a small one indeed."

FOR THOSE WHO HAVE TAKEN TO THE VEDIC PATH EVEN BY ACCEPTING JANMA THERE IS NO DEFECT

(Question): Why should the Jñānis instruct those qualified seekers who are *Vaidikas* (following the Vedic tenets) and who have obstinately held on to the belief that *Bheda* (difference, distinction) does exist? If they affirm that there exists Janma, how at all can it be said that by that a defect does not arise?

(Answer): Those who - out of a deep-seated belief that the Vastu exists because it appears as also it is an instrument, implement needed in the performance of righteous scriptural rituals - have discarded Aja-Advayavada and are behaving contrary to its teachings - to such people who are afraid of Ajāti no defect will entail them because of their belief in the existence and of Jāti, because they have full faith (Shraddhā) in Vedaprāmānya (authority of the scriptures as valid texts) and they have taken resort to a sacred path which is Vedōkta (stipulated by the Vedas). For, they have followed a Vivekamārga (a path of discrimination) alone which removes the defect of Jāti (birth). For that reason alone, the Karmas and Upāsanas stipulated in the Vedas are instructed for their benefit, is it not so? The real intention behind this scriptural instruction is: "Let Chittashuddhi (purification of the mind), Antarmukhatwa (introvertedness) these qualities be engendered in them and systematically, step by step, they will consider the source of Vedanta; let this Ajati Tattwa alone flash in their hearts!" For that reason only, since they are invariably guiding along the royal (safe) path which in the ultimate analysis will enable them to reach Aja-Advayavāda alone - they are not affected by the Jātidosha (defect of accepting, believing in Jāti or Janma); to wit, at least in the end they will unfailingly reach the Paratattwa (the Absolute Reality). Although a small defect to the extent that in them the Ajāti Drishti (the viewpoint of birthlessness) which yields the fruit of Sadyōmukti (Beatitude, Liberation here and now) has not dawned yet a small defect does occur in them, they will

certainly reach (attain) Brahman either (i) through the path of deliberating upon the Vedāntopadesha in accordance with the level or standard of their respective understanding or comprehension and by the method of deciding the truth that the Kārya (effect) is Ananya (non-different) from the Kārana (cause) and such other methods or (ii) by the path of Parameshwara Upäsana (meditations on the Supreme Lord) attaining Kramamukti (phased out Liberation i.e. attainment of Brahmaloka). Whereas, the Nāstikas (atheists, sceptics and non-believers) - will according to the sentence - 'मामप्राप्यैव कौन्तेय ततो यान्त्यधमां गतिम्' - (Gitā 16-20), meaning - "Without attaining, reaching Me, they obtain a low, wretched state alone" - they go down to a miserable state of being. But these people (i.e. those who have taken to a Vedic path) - as per the Lord's assurance - 'कौन्तेय प्रतिजानीहि न मे भक्तः प्रणश्यित' - (Gitā 9-31), meaning - "Oh son of Kunti, My devotee never gets destroyed, this truth you know to be certain" - at the end at least they will surely attain Sadgati (a Blissful. state).

उपलम्भात् समाचारान्मायाहस्ती यथोच्यते । उपलम्भात् समाचारादस्ति वस्तु तथोच्यते ॥४४॥

Meaning: "Because it is invariably appearing and in the same way our scriptural rituals are being performed also - just as the Māyāhasti (illusory, magical elephant) is believed to be a real elephant, in the same way since it is also appearing and by virtue of Dharmācharaṇa (observance of religious rituals and disciplines) also the external object appears to exist indeed."

THAT DVAITA IS NOT REAL IS ITSELF PARAMĀRTHA

(Doubt): Why should it not be decided that the object which is appearing outside is really existing alone since it is appearing as also it is an accessorial aid for Dharmācharaṇa?

(Solution): Not so. For, though an object is appearing and is an accessory for performance of duties, still it may not be really existing. For this an illustration is: The elephant conjured up by $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ (magic) as also the elephant that appears in a dream

do appear to exist; they too - just like a real elephant is used as accessorial means for a ride etc. by mounting upon them and for such other purposes are used. Merely on that count, no one believes them to be really existing elephants. Therefore, whether anything is appearing or whether it is being used as an accessory for certain acts or whether being called by any name - none of these can possibly be the proper reason for deciding that a *Vastu* (object) really exists.

IN THE ILLUSTRATION THE APPEARANCE AS WELL AS THE UTILIZATION ARE MERELY ABHINIVESHA (PERSEVERANCE OF BELIEF ALONE)

Here the purport behind giving Māyāhasti, dream elephant as illustrations is to indicate the truth that - "Merely on seeing that both appearance and utilization seem to exist, it cannot be said that the Vastu really exists" - and not with any intention of signifying that either Māyāhasti or Svapnahasti really appear or there really exists their utilization for any particular job. This fact will be mentioned later on in the Kārikā: 'अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति' -(4-73), meaning - "There exists an Abhinivesha (perseverance of belief) in a non-existing thing and not that there exists any duality"; in the Vaitathya Prakarana too it has already been stated that - "The wise people in Vedanta have determined that this world is unreal, false just like dream and Māyā as well as Gandharvanagara (a celestial city)" - (2-13). The same fact is being utilized to prove here also that as a result of the dispute and disagreement among the disputants the truth that - 'Ajāti alone is real' - gets evolved.

15. AS A RESULT OF DISSENSION AMONG THE VARIOUS DISPUTANTS AJĀTIVĀDA ALONE IS EVOLVED - CONCLUSION OF THIS TEACHING

जात्याभासं चलाभासं वस्त्वाभासं तथैव च । अजाचलमवस्तुत्वं विज्ञानं शान्तमद्वयम् ॥४५॥

Meaning: "Although it is Jātyābhāsa (merely a reflection of birth), Chalābhāsa (a reflection of movement, vibration) as also Vastwābhāsa (reflection of an entity), Vijñāna is Aja

(birthless), Achala (immovable), Avastu (non-entity), Shānta (quiescent), Advaya (non-dual)."

JĀTI ETC. ARE IMAGINED IN AJA-ADVAYA-ĀTMAN ALONE

(Question): With regard to which really real Entity (Paramārtha Vastu) are these Janma and such other Asadbuddhis (false concepts) engendered in Avivekins?

(Answer): We will mention; that Paramārtha (Absolute Reality), though It is devoid of Janma, appears as if having a birth. An imagination of the type - "Such and such a person is born" - is an example for this. Though the Ultimate Reality is not at all born, this Vikalpa (misconception) is caused. Similarly, although that Paramārtha Tattwa is verily Achala (non-moving), It appears as if It is moving. For that reason alone, people are misconceiving in the manner that - "Such and such a person is going." In the same way, although that Tattwa is not a Vastu endowed with any Dharmas (qualities, special attributes), people are misconceiving in the manner that - "It is endowed with such and such qualities, special features"; for the people to misconceive in the manner - "Devadatta is white-complexioned, is tall" - this alone is the reason.

Here because illustrations like Jātyābhāsa (misconceptions of birth), Chalābhāsa (misconceptions of movement) etc. have been mentioned, we should not think that the Kārikākāra had an opinion that a separate Padārtha (entity) - really having birth, movement, special attributes, being not quiescent and being dual - exists. Here from the Avidyākalpita (conjured up by ignorance) Vyavahāra Drishţi (empirical viewpoint) objects with Jātyādi attributes are accepted indeed; it is true that in the Śruti: "The Paramārtha Satya became both Satya and Asatya" - (Tai. 26) it has been stated like that also. But when observed from the Paramartha Drishti it has already been shown in the Vaitathya Prakarana that - "All Dvaita like Janma etc. is really false only"; that too is in accordance with Sruti teaching alone as evidently clear from the Sruti statement - "Vikāra (mutation) is Vāchārambhaṇa (mere an exercise in speech) and it is a mere name only" - (Chh. 6-1-4). Hence, although there does not at all exist any Vastu with the Svabhāva (essential nature) of having real birth, from the Vyavahāra Drishți

what are seen as if to exist like Jāti (birth) etc. are assumed to be *Upamāna* (illustrations) only; this fact we should discern.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF PARAMARTHA CHAITANYA

In any case, this is certain (determined) that - "Paramārtha Vijñāna (the Absolute, Transcendental Reality of Pure Consciousness) which is Aja, Achala, Nirdharmaka keeps on appearing just like objects having various attributes of Jāti (birth) etc. of the type - 'He is born, he goes about, he is tall, he is whitecomplexioned' etc." Here the 'Vijñana' does not mean the predicative form or nature of awareness or consciousness (i.e. at the empirical level). Especially the 'Alaya Vijñana' which the Buddhists propound is not at all relevant here. For, in the Kārikā: "Therefore, Chitta is not born at all" - (4-28) - itself that has already been refuted; 'एवं न जायते चित्तम्' - (4-46) - meaning - "Thus Chitta is not born" - in the next Kārikā also it is being refuted. Apart from this, because Alaya Vijnana is of the nature of 'Vijñānasantāna' (continuum of objective awareness) which is associated with Nitya Avachhinna (perpetually separated, distinct) Chalana (movement) - it is not fit to be transacted as 'चलामासम्' (as if moving). If it is questioned - "In that case, why is it here in this context Paramārtha Tattwa (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality of Pure Consciousness) is called by the word - 'Vijnana'?" the answer is: It is for the purpose of indicating the fact that - "As a result of the dispute between the two factions among Buddhists, viz. Vijnānavādins (Idealists) and Bāhyārthavādin (Realists) the Vijnanabrahman alone which is Aja and Advaya is established." For this conclusion the Śruti 'विज्ञानमानंदं ब्रह्म' - (Bri. 3-9-27) meaning - "Brahman is Vijnana, and Ananda" - which has called Brahman by the word - 'Vijñāna' - is itself the authoritative source. To the question - "What is the Swarūpa of this Paramārtha Vijñāna?" - the answer is: Since It is devoid of Prapañcha (world of duality) like Jāti (birth) etc. It is 'Shānta' (quiescent, Blissful); since It has never any opposing entity or object It is 'Advaya', Pure Consciousness, without anything second to It and non-divisible. For this conclusion - the Srutis like: 'विज्ञानघन एव' - (Bri. 2-4-12), meaning - "It is verily a mass,

lump of Consciousness"; 'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शांतम्' - (Shwetāshwahara 6-19), meaning- "It is devoid of parts, of action, It is peaceful"; 'ऐकमैवाद्वितीयम्' - (Chh. 6-2-1) - meaning - "One alone without anything second to It" - etc. are the authoritative sources.

ऐवं न जायते चित्तमेवं धर्मा अजाः स्मृताः । ऐवमेव विजानन्तो न पतन्ति विपर्यये ॥४६॥

Meaning: "Thus the Chitta is not born, thus the *Dharmas* (beings) are said to be *Aja* (unborn). Those people who have cognized (Intuited) thus only will not fall victims to *Viparītajñāna* (misconception, erroneous knowledge)."

CONCLUSION OF THE YUKTI THAT CHITTA AND CHITTADRISHYA ARE NOT BORN

Hitherto it was depicted that - "Therefore, Chitta is not born' - adopting the Vijñāvādins' Yukti, viz. Like the Chittadrishya Chitta also is never born at all, is it not so? By explaining this tenet with the help of various reasons and illustrations, it was established that Ajāti alone is *Paramārtha* (the final Absolute Truth). In order to conclude that very topic this verse is employed.

By means of these Yuktis what was previously stated viz. "Chitta is never born" - is proved to be correct. By means of these very Yuktis - the Brahmajñānis reckon that - "Dharmas, meaning Ātmans (beings), the Padārthas (objects) which are Chittadrishya are verily Ajaswarūpas (of the very essence of birthlessness); for, they are not separate, different from Ātma Tattwa which is Aja-Advaya." The Śrutis like - 'नेह नानास्ति किचन' - (Bṛi. 4-4-19), meaning - "Here there does not exist even the least bit of distinction" - etc. which are proclaiming this truth are the authoritative sources for this conclusion. Here the word - 'चर्माः' - the plural word 'Dharmas' is used because there are many Upādhis (adjuncts); even those Upādhis too are really, in the Absolute sense, Aja-Advaya-Ātman and hence we should discern that - "The fact that - 'Ātmans are also Aja' - becomes self-established."

THE BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE COGNITION OF AJĀTI

Those who cognize so as to culminate in their experience that this Ātmatattwa is in this manner devoid of Janma, of Chalana and of Dharmas but is verily of the essential nature of Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness) which is Shānta, Advaya - they become capable of having given up their Eshaṇātraya (the triad of attachments, desires) like Putraishaṇa (attachment to children, wife, kith and kin), Vittaishaṇa (attachment to one's assets) and Lōkaishaṇa (desire for name and fame or to attain higher regions of existence) and they will never fall once again in the ocean of Avidyā. The Śruti: 'किन को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः' - (Īśa 7), meaning - "One who has searched out (Intuited) Ekatwa (unity, non-dual Self) - there which attachment, which misery possibly can exist?" - is the authoritative source for this conclusion.

16. ILLUSTRATION FOR THE TEACHING THAT JATYADI (i.e. BIRTH etc.) ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY REAL

ऋजुवक्रादिकामासमलातस्यन्दितं यथा। ग्रहणग्राहकामासं विज्ञानस्यन्दितं तथा।।४७॥

Meaning: "Just as appearing as if to be straight, crooked etc. is (merely) the turning or movement of the firebrand (torch), in the same way appearing in the forms of cognizing, cognizer is verily the movement of Vijnāna."

ILLUSTRATION FOR THE TENET THAT VIJNĀNA (PURE CONSCIOUSNESS) REMAINING AS IT IS, STILL APPEARS IN VARIOUS FORMS

In order to clarify whatever has been taught so far about the Paramārtha Darshana (Spiritual teachings or philosophy of the Absolute Reality of Pure Being-Consciousness) an illustration is being given here. Just as a moving, swinging torch or firebrand, though it subsists as it is, it appears as if many forms like straight, crooked etc. exist in the light, in the same way what appears in the various forms of Vishaya (objects) and Vishayi (the subjective consciousness) is verily the movement of the

Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness) alone. This so-called, apparent movement of this Vijñāna is also verily Avidyākrita (a projection brought about by ignorance); really speaking, (from the Absolute viewpoint) Vijñāna is not at all moving. Vijñāna is 'born' as Chitta due to Māyā alone, is it not so? To an entity which is absolutely Achala (devoid of movement) how at all can there be movement? This truth has already been stated in the Kārikā - 'अजाचलम्' - (4-45), meaning - "It is birthless, motionless."

FOR VIJÑĀNA VIBRATION IS NOT THERE AS ABSOLUTELY REAL

But those who affirm that - 'Vijnana has really a vibration, motion which is its essential nature, as also for Paramatman, who is of the Vijñānaswarūpa, there invariably exists a particular power of vibration, motion' - are Bhrāntas (deluded people). For, if that Spandana (vibration, motion) is Nihsākshika (without a Witnessing Principle, Consciousness), then it amounts to saying that it has no Pramāņa (valid means of proof) whatsoever. But if it is said that it has a Sākshi (Witnessing Principle or Consciousness), then it will have to be perforce accepted that that Sākshi is always (eternally) devoid of any Spandana whatsoever. Even to imagine, conjecture that for the Vijñāna (Pure, Absolute Consciousness beyond time-space-causation categories and duality itself), which is Kūṭasthanitya (Absolute, eternal) and Sarvasākshi (Witnessing Principle of everything) there exists a phenomenon of vibration, it is not possible whatsoever, is it not so? Further, to assert in the manner that - "For that Atman, devoid of any parts, there exist two parts - one which is of the form of Kūtasthasākshi, and the other of the form of Its Sākshva (witnessed object) which is capable of motion - at one and the same moment of time" - is not tenable in logic. The Srutis like -"(That Atman) is Nishkala, Nishkriya and Shanta" -(Shwetāshwatara 6-10); "One who is birthless outside and inside" - (Mundaka 2-1-2); "That this Atman is Mahanta, Aja, Ajara, Amara, Amrita Brahman" - (Bri. 4-4-25) - etc. are repeatedly proclaiming this Absolute, Transcendental nature of Being of this Atman. Therefore, it is not proper to say that for Atman who is of Vijñānaswarūpa there exists an independent Spandanashakti (power of motion, vibration). In truth, Vijñāna does not at

all mean a predicative form of consciousness, awareness; only if it is so, we will have to imagine that to that too there exists a proclivity, innate nature of motion, is it not so? Further, it is not at all false to say that this Vijñāna is endowed with a potential power needed for the creation (birth), sustenance and dissolution of the world; Śrutis like - 'परस्य शक्तिविविधैव श्रूयते' - (Shweta. 6-2) - etc. meaning - "His Parāshakti is said to be varied indeed" - are authoritative sources for this statement. Therefore, for the Kārikā expression - 'विज्ञानस्पन्दितम्', meaning - "The motion of Pure Consciousness" - we have to interpret it to mean - "appears as if a motion due to Avidyā" - only.

अस्पन्दमानमलातमनाभासमजं यथा । अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानमनाभासमजं तथा ॥४८॥

Meaning: "Just as a motionless firebrand remains Aja, and without appearing in a different form of light. in the same way the Vijnāna devoid of motion remains Aja without the alien (apparent) forms of appearance."

ILLUSTRATION FOR THE TENET THAT WHEN AVIDYA IS REMOVED ADVAITA (NON-DUALITY) ALONE SUBSISTS

Although when the firebrand is moving it appears in various forms, when it is not being moved it does not appear in various forms and remains in its true form as it is, in the same way Vijñāna, in the absence of (disappearance of) Avidyā, does not appear in the forms of Janma etc. and remains Aja in Its non-dual form as It really is (in Its Absolute, Transcendental Being).

अलाते स्पन्दमाने वै नाऽभासा अन्यतो भुवः । न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दात्रालातं प्रविशन्ति ते ।।४९॥

न निर्गता अलातात्ते द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः।

विज्ञानेऽपि तथैव स्युरामासस्याविशेषतः ॥५०॥

Meaning: "When the firebrand is swung round the designs of light have not at all come from another source; when it is not swung round neither do they not leave it and go to another region or direction, nor do they enter at all into

the firebrand. They have not come out of the firebrand; for, they are not real objects. With regard to the Vijnāna also those appearances must be existing in a similar manner; for, their being an appearance is a common feature (between the two)."

विज्ञाने स्यन्दमाने वै नाऽऽभासा अन्यतोभुवः ।
न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्यन्दात्र विज्ञानं विश्वन्ति ते ।।५१।।
न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानाद् द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ।
कार्यकारणताभावाद् यतोऽचिन्त्याः सदैव ते ।।५२।।

Meaning: "When Vijñāna is shaking the appearances have not come from another thing; when it is not shaking they do not go to any other region or place away from Vijñāna; neither do they enter into Vijñāna too. They have not come out of Vijñāna; for, they have no Vastu Swabhāva (essential nature of being a substance) at all. Because there is no relationship of cause-effect they are always existing as Achintya (inconceivable) only."

ABHĀSAS (REFLECTIONS, APPEARANCES) ARE ALWAYS OF THE NATURE OF BEING INCONCEIVABLE

When the firebrand is being swung round many forms of light are seen in it, is it not so? No one believes that those forms have come from some other object and have entered into the firebrand. When the firebrand is not swung round, none of us ever thinks that those shapes or forms of light have left it and gone somewhere else, nor do we believe that they have entered into the firebrand itself. In the same way, when Chaitanyaswarūpa Atman is appearing in various forms of not-selves those appearances are not born; nor do they come from somewhere else and enter into Ātman; when we decide that Ātman is Advitiya alone by means of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) it is not possible also to reckon that they have actually entered into Atman Himself. Whether in the case of the illustration or whether it is in the case of the illustrated example of Atman, appearances are always mere appearances alone. They have neither any resultant effect, nor do they have any cause; therefore they are verily Achintya, meaning, they are mere appearances alone and it is never possible to

conceive or conjecture in the manner: "They came from such and such a cause; they gave such and such a fruit; they traversed to such and such a region." Just as in the illustration although there exists one firebrand alone, in it we, out of a deluded vision, imagine things (shapes) which do not exist at all, in the same way people themselves (in their deluded Avidyā state) misconceive the Dvaita that is appearing in Atman and are enestioning about it. This Dvaita is neither something different from Atman, nor is it in its apparent form Atman also. In the Bhāshyas of Shri Śankara these apparent false forms are described as: 'तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयम्', meaning - "An appearance which can neither be determined as that very particular thing nor something which can be determined to be other than that thing and defined." But the present-day Vyākhyāna Vedāntins are affirming that - "They are Anirvachaniya which are Sadasadvilakshana, meaning - they are Anirvachaniya Bhāvas (indefinable entities) which can neither be possibly defined, determined as Sat (real) or Asat (unreal)." In any case, it is quite certain that they - in the real, Absolute sense - do not exist at all.

HERE VIJÑĀNA MEANS ADVITĪYA CHAITANYA ALONE

The Buddhists too affirm that because the external objects are verily Vijnāna (intellectual awareness, consciousness) alone they do not possess Gati (going somewhere), Agamana (coming from somewhere). 'अन्यतो नापिचायातं न तिष्ठति न गच्छति । मायातः को विशेषोऽस्य यन्मृदैः सत्यतः कृतम् ॥' - (Bōdhi Charyāvatāra 9-143), meaning - "It has not come from somewhere else, does not exist (subsist), does not also go anywhere; what difference is there between Maya and this? Even so, the foolish people are saying that this is real!" - thus they are also saying. Even then, because it has been stridently, vociferously stated that - "In this manner Chitta too is not born" - (4-46) - thereby Vijñāna is not different from Ātman who is Aja, Achala and Vijnapti (the end product of Intuitive Knowledge) - that Vijñāna too like the various shapes of the firebrand is verily a false appearance - thus we should discern. Some people among the Vijñānavādins are saying: 'Vijñāna itself is born in the forms of Bāhyārtha and is having

Sanklesha (misery); when it gets transformed into Nirvāṇarūpa (liberated state), it attains Vyavadāna (disappearance)' - is it not so? By virtue of that part of the verse which says: "They have not come out of Ātman who is of the essential nature of Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness)" - these Buddhists' doctrine also stands refuted.

Now, those disputants (among the Buddhists) who are assuming that for all Dharmas (beings, entities) Shūnya (essencelessness) alone is the Tattwa (Ultimate Reality) and are asserting that - "Seen from whatever viewpoint or aspect, it has no Nirōdha (suppression), no Utpādana (production), no $\bar{A}gamana$ (coming), no Nirgamana (going)" - quite contrary to universal experience, are saying so on the basis of dry, vain logic that all those things do not exist; such people are, in fact, like (the idiots) who are trying to box the empty space and hence they have no access to an entry whatsoever into the purport of this Kārikā, so to speak. Therefore, we should never doubt that in this teaching of Vedanta the doctrinaire logical theory of these opponents - who are outside the purview of the Vedic teachings (Vedabāhya), which is devoid of Yukti and Nishprayojana (totally without any lasting benefit) - is mixed up or interpolated. On the contrary, Shri Gaudapādāchāya - in the true Vedāntic traditions - has taught: "The external objects are all Achintya (inconceivable); they are imagined (misconceived) in Atman who is Advaita-Vijñānaswarūpa; it is not possible to say whether they are Tattwa (Atman Himself who is the Absolute, Transcendental Reality) or Anyatwa (something other than Atman). Hence, if they are observed from the Paramartha Drishti, they do not have any relationship whatsoever of Janya (that which is produced) and Janaka (that agent which produces or causes the birth) between them; they are mere appearances of the various shapes of light of the rotating firebrand as if they are straight or crooked." Those who realize this truth attain the fruit of establishing themselves as Paramātmaswarūpa alone which is Nityashuddhabuddhamukta Vijñānātman.

> द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य हेतुः स्यादन्यदन्यस्य चैव हि। द्रव्यत्वमन्यभावो वा धर्माणां नोपपद्यते ॥५३॥

Meaning: "One substance may be the cause for another substance; one thing may be the cause for another. But to say that *Dharmas* (beings, souls) are either Dravya or different from another is not tenable."

THE CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP IN THE ABSOLUTE SENSE IS NOT TENABLE

Ātman is of the essential nature of mere Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness) which is Aja, Advaya and Kūṭastha. In Him Chitta, the Dharmas (objects, entities) of the forms like Jīva etc. are misconceived; they are merely Avidyāspandana (vibrations due to ignorance). Just as in a swinging firebrand the various shapes of light like straight, crooked etc. are seen, these Dharmas too seen in Ātman are verily false appearances. It is being established that there does not exist any Kārya-Kāraṇabhāva whatsoever between them. To say that there exists a cause-effect relationship between them is opposed to Yukti indeed - this fact is being proved now.

Those who assert that between Chitta and Dharmas there exists a Kārya-Kāranabhāva - according to their teaching also one Dravya (substance) may be the cause for another; for the word 'Dravya' here the meaning is: 'A really existing Vastu or entity.' In the previous verse, because the expression - 'द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः' (because Dravyatwa or substantiality is not tenable) - has been used, we have to perforce determine that for the word 'Dravya' this above meaning alone is apt. In any case, the Kāryakāraņavādins (disputants who champion the cause of cause-effect theory) also have accepted that - "Dravya alone - really that which is an existing entity (Vastu) - may possibly be a cause for another Dravya, but anything which is Adravya (non-substantial), Avastu (that which is not a Vastu), can never be a cause for something which is not a Vastu." It is true that from a really existing Vastu like a rope etc. an Avastu like a snake etc. is 'born'; but in that example, there is no real cause-effect relationship at all. Hence, it is seen in our workaday world that - "A real entity alone should necessarily be the cause for a real entity." In the same way, "The cause is separate. The effect has necessarily to be separate from it; a thing cannot itself be the cause for itself" - thus it is acknowledged by the Paramārtha-Kārya-Kāraṇa-vādins. For a cause like a seed there should be another thing like a sprout which is separate as a $K\bar{a}rya$ (effect) - thus it is seen in our empirical world of transactions; no one ever accepts that - "For a seed the seed alone is the cause; for a sprout the sprout alone is the cause" - is it not so?

But whether it is the Jivas or other *Dharmas* (objects) - to say that they are Dravyas is not tenable. For, they are - just like the various shapes of light seen when a firebrand is swung round - mere false appearances alone. Therefore, they are neither Dravyas nor are they anything separate from the Chitta. Even the Vijñānavādins do not accept that - "The imagined things like a snake, a streak of water etc. in a rope - just as the buffalo is different from a horse - are different from one another" - is it not so? In the same way, any Dharma which is the vibration or motion of Avidyā is not a Vastu; Dharmas - whatever they may be - among themselves are also not different from one another. They are also not different from Chitta. Therefore, the Kāryakāraṇabhāva (relationship of cause-effect) is not at all tenable.

(Objection): Are you saying that Vijnana is Shanta, Advaya, as also that alone is Atman? From that all else is caused, is it not so?

(Solution): True. But why we call that Vijñāna, known as Ātman - 'Dravya' - is for the purpose of indicating the truth that - 'Although it is not a Dravya, when compared to the Dharmas which the people have imagined (misconceived) to be Dravya, that alone is the real Vastu.' That is all and not that Ātman is really (i.e. in the Absolute sense) a Dravya at all. Let it be. Thus Ātman Himself who is said to be relatively a Dravya is verily everything; He is neither the cause for anything that is separate or different from Him nor an effect. For that reason alone the Śruti defines Ātmatattwa as 'अपूर्वमनपरम्' - meaning, "For Ātmatattwa there is neither a prior nor a posterior." Hence, because there is no cause-effect relationship whatsoever, Ābhāsas (reflections, appearances) are always Achintya (inconceivable) - (4-52) - thus what we had said is itself correct.

17. BY MEANS OF THE CONVICTION THAT THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP OF CAUSE-EFFECT DELIVERANCE FROM SAMSĀRA (TRANSMIGRATORY EXISTENCE) ACCRUES

ऐवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्चित्तं वापि न धर्मजम्। ऐवं हेतुफलाजाति प्रविशन्ति मनीषिणः ॥५४॥

Meaning: "Thus neither Dharmas are born from Chitta, nor the Chitta is born from Dharmas. In this manner those who are Vivekins will imbibe (cognize, realize) the teaching that Hetu-Phalas are never born at all."

HOW COME THE TEACHING THAT BETWEEN CHITTA AND DHARMA AND ADHARMA THERE IS NO CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP?

Thus because - (a) the birth etc. of $\bar{A}bh\bar{a}sas$ (reflections) are mere appearances, (b) Ātman is Sarvānanyaswarūpa (of the essential nature of everything); (c) apart from Him there is no Paramārthavastu (Absolute Entity or Reality) whatsoever - to say that He is the 'cause' is untenable. Therefore, it is not possible for the Chitta (mind) itself which the common run of people have assumed (misconceived) to be the adjunct of the Jiva (transmigratory soul) to be born; for, it is not separate from Atmachaitanya (Pure Consciousness of the Self) at all. Thus it is evolved. For that reason alone, from the Chitta - the Dharmas - meaning, the external phenomena, are not born at all; the Chitta too is not born from those external objects (reflections or appearances). In fact, all Dharmas (phenomena) are verily the mere $\bar{A}bh\bar{a}sa$ (appearances) of Atmavijñānaswarūpa (the essential nature of Pure Consciousness of the Self). No one believes or thinks that either the silver which is the mere appearance of sea-shell is born from the snake which is the mere appearance of a rope, or the ropesnake is born from the nacre-silver - is it not so?

In the past it was stated that - "Thus the Chitta is not born" (4-46) because the Chitta, which the Vijnānavādin has accepted, is not seen apart from Ātman. Whereas here, the special feature is: Even if we agree to the methodology of those who have assumed that - "The relationship between cause and effect cat-

egories is *Paramārtha* (absolutely real)" - we have demonstrated - on the strength of Yukti of the type - "Because Chitta etc. are Adravya and they are not different from one another - there is no cause-effect relationship among them" - the truth that - "Neither from the Chitta the external *Dharmas* (phenomena) are born, nor from the external *Dharmas* the Chitta is born."

THE BENEFIT THAT ACCRUES IF ONE DISCERNS THAT CHITTA ETC. ARE NOT BORN

Thus by virtue of discerning this truth that for Chitta etc. there is no cause-effect relationship, those who are Jñānis - for this reason only - enter into the Intuitive realization of this profound teaching that - "Neither from a Hetu (cause), which is of the form or nature of Dharma or Adharma, the body which is the Phala (resultant effect), nor from that body the Dharma or Adharma phenomena are born"; to wit, they cognize the truth that - "In Ātman these Hetu-Phala do not exist whatsoever."

यावद्धेतुफलावेशस्तावद्धेतुफलोद्भवः । क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे नास्ति हेतुफलोद्भवः ।।५५॥

Meaning: "As long as the influence of Hetu-Phala exists, these Hetu-Phalas are being born; if the influence of Hetu-Phala dies out, Hetu-Phalas are not born."

FOR THE BIRTH OF HETU-PHALA ABHINIVESHA (AFFINITY OR DETERMINATION) ALONE IS THE CAUSE

Here in this Kārikā answers to the following questions have been given: (a) Those, who without having this Jñāna (Self-Knowledge) are having Mithyābhimāna (false pride) of the type that - "Hetu-Phalas are really existing" - to such people what harm is caused? (b) But if that Mithyābhimāna is not there, then what benefit accrues? To entertain an Abhimāna (misconception of the type) - "I have Hetus (the causes) of the type of Dharma (merits) and Adharma (demerits). Performing these Dharmas and Adharmas, in due course of time I am born in a particular species of creatures and then I enjoy the fruits of those merits and demerits" - is itself called 'Hetuphalāvesha.' As long as a person misconceives this Hetuphalāvesha in Ātman and possesses

that kind of a mind, these Hetu-Phalas will be incessantly born in him - to wit, performing acts of merit or demerit and experiencing or enjoying their respective fruits - this attitude will continuously, without any break, proceed. But if this Abhinivesha is got rid of or given up - just like a person who is possessed by an evil star or force is relieved of that evil by the strength of Mantra (Vedic hymn) or herbal medicine - if this deep-seated misconception of the mind is exercised away by Tattwajñāna - then the birth or generation of Hetu-Phala will not occur anymore, as stated in the Śruti 'तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विष्य निरंजनः परमं साम्यमुपैति' - (Muṇḍaka 3-1-3), meaning - "Then to the Jñāni these Puṇya (merit) and Pāpa (demerit) do not taint or touch at all; there will occur Paramasāmya (supreme similarity, identification) between him and Paramātman indeed."

यावद्धेतुफलावेशः संसारस्तावदायतः। क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे संसारं न प्रपद्यते ॥५६॥

Meaning: "As long as Hetuphalāvesha exists, the transmigratory existence is spreading out. When the Hetuphalāvesha wears out, one does not acquire Saṃsāra. For, then Dharma-Adharmas which are the cause for Saṃsāra do not exist at all."

THE EXTINCTION OF ABHIMĀNA (VAIN PRIDE, FALSE IDENTIFICATION) OF THE FORM OF - 'I AM KARTŖU-BHŌK1ŖURŪPA' IS ITSELF MŌKSHA (LIBERATION, BEATITUDE)

As long as the Abhimāna (vain pride, misconception) of the type - "I am of the essential nature of experiencing the fruits of Dharma-Adharma after I perform them" - exists in one till such time the Samsāra has spread out its ramifications. The moment this Abhimāna gets extinct, or disappears, there is no acquisition whatsoever of Samsāra; only if there is the cause the effect exists, is it not so? Therefore, in order to get rid of this untenable (wrong) belief completely a person who is discriminative in his approach to life should necessarily acquire Aja-Advaya-Ātmavidyā.

18. JANMA-NĀSHA (BIRTH-DESTRUCTION) ARE VERILY ĀVIDYAKA (PRODUCTS OF IGNORANCE)

संवृत्या जायते सर्वं शाश्वतं नास्ति तेन वै । सद्भावेन ह्यजं सर्वमुच्छेदस्तेन नास्ति वै ।।५७।।

Meaning: "From the viewpoint of Saṃvṛiti (empirical transactions carried out due to Avidyā) everything is born; therefore, there is nothing like Shāshwata (eternal). From the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi (viewpoint of the Transcendental, Absolute Reality beyond time-space concepts) everything is Aja (birthless) alone; from It there is nothing like Uccheda (extirpation, destruction) at all."

JĀTI IS ĀVIDYAKA; AJĀTI IS PARAMĀRTHA

(Doubt): Even after stating that apart from Ātman, who is Aja there does not exist anything whatsoever, you are mentioning that both Hetu-Phalas and Samsāra have *Utpatti* (birth)! Is it not a contradiction of what you said first and later?

(Solution): There is no defect whatsoever in this. To wit: From the viewpoint of Saṃvṛiti - meaning from the stand point of empirical transactions which are Avidyākalpita - everything is being born; from this Avidyādṛishṭi, there is no entity whatsoever which is Shāshwata (eternal). Thus because from the Avidyāvyavahāra Dṛishṭi there is nothing like Shāshwata, we said that - "As long as this Hetu-Phalāvesha exists Samsāra has its ramifications." But when we observe from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi, this Vishwa itself is Aja (unborn); therefore, Jāti (being born) - is itself not there at all. Hence, observed from that Paramārtha Dṛishṭi, Hetu, Phala etc. - for none of them there is any destruction whatsoever. Therefore, our mentioning Utpattināsha for Samsāra is not opposed to Ajātivāda.

HOW COME THIS DIVISION (DISTINCTION) OF SAMVRITI AND PARAMARTHASATYA?

Here 'संवृति' means 'the empirical transaction with regard to 'Avidya', - 'संवियते समाच्छाद्यते परमार्थतत्त्वमनया', meaning - 'That thing

which has concealed, hidden the Paramārtha - that is Samvriti'. When we examine and observe from the Paramārtha Drishti - although everything is Brahman which is Aja, by virtue of, or due to, Samvriti - meaning - because from the viewpoint of Vyavahāra which is itself projected by Avidyā It appears as though It has split up into the forms of Pramātru (cognizer), Pramāṇa (means of cognition), Prameya (cognized object) etc. - it amounts to saying that there exists an apparent 'concealment' of Its essential nature. Further, because for such people having or entertaining this Drishti of Samvriti this Bāhya Drishti alone (i.e. extroverted viewpoint) exists, there is an apparent impediment of the forms of Ajñāna, Samshaya and Mithyājñāna with regard to Brahmajñāna which is one's inner Ātman; therefore, they do not get, attain Brahmajñāna.

Buddhists too have acknowledged 'Saṃvṛitisatya' and 'Paramārthasatya' - such two kinds of realities. 'द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्चित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना। लोकसंवृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः'- (Mādhyamika Kārikā 24-8, Vṛitti p. 180) - thus alone says Nāgārjuna Kārikā - meaning - "Relying on two kinds of Satyas (realities), Buddhists are preaching Dharma; they are - Lōkasaṃvṛitisatya, Paramārthasatya." But the reason that they have adduced for dividing Satya in this manner is quite a different one altogether. Chandrakīrti who has written a commentary on this, explains it thus:

(i) 'Saṃvṛiti' means - 'that which is hidden all around'; Ajñāna conceals the Tattwa (essential nature of Being) of all Padārthas (objects, entities); therefore, it is called 'Saṃvṛiti'. (ii) One thing being born from another thing, meaning, one thing depending on another is itself 'Saṃvṛiti' - thus also we may say; or, in the alternative - (iii) 'Saṃvṛiti' means, Samketaha (an indication, sign, allusion), the empirical transaction Vyavahāra of Abhidhāna (name) and Abhidheya (named object), Jñāna-Jñeya-Vyavahāra (transaction of knowledge and object of knowledge) - etc. such Lōkavyavahāra (workaday or empirical transactions) - we may also describe it like this' - (Mādh. Vṛi. p. 180). It is their doctrine that - "Without assuming Abhidhāna-Abhidheya-Vyavahāra as Paramārtha (absolutely real) it is not possible to teach Paramārtha (the Absolute Reality), as also if It is not taught

it is not possible for anyone to cognize, know It - keeping, assuming Lōkasamvriti as a device alone the Paramārtha is instructed." - (Mādh. Kā. 24-10, Vri. p. 181); it is called 'Samvriti', because it is 'Yuktibādhya' (that which is sublated by a device, or it is something which is sublated by means of Anubhava (Intuitive Experience) of Yogis. Here 'Yukti' means 'Pratitya Samutpāda' (dependent origination); that alone is the Pramāņa (valid proof) for Shūnyata (essencelessness). Further - how it is 'Anubhavabādhyatwa' ? To wit : 'तत्र प्राकृतको लोको योगिलोकेन बाध्यते । बाध्यन्ते धीविशेषेण योगिनोऽप्युत्तरोत्तरैः' - (Bōdhicharyāvatāra 9-4) - [This sentence is quoted by Prof. T.R.V. Murthy, in his "The Central Philosophy of Buddhism"] - meaning - "The belief of Prākritajanaha (materialistic, extroverted people) is sublated by the Yōgic Anubhava (experience of the Yogis); because the experiences of those Yogis too are of various grades, the higher-grade experiences sublate the lower-grade experiences." Thus if we accept the teaching (doctrine) that one's experience, then cancels or strikes down another's experience on the strength of which Anubhava can we possibly strike down and arrive at the decision as to who are the best among the Yogis with the highest Anubhava? How at all can we have a guarantee that that particular Anubhava is of the final order?

On the other hand, in our Vedānta Siddhānta how is this Samvriti Paramārtha Viveka? The answer is: From the waking viewpoint to imagine *Pramātrutwa* (cognizership, 'I' notion) in Ātman as also the Pramāṇa-Prameya etc. Vyavahāra which depends upon that Pramātrutwa is 'Samvriti.' This Samvriti is misconceived due to Avidyā. Avidyā means a misconceived (deep-seated) belief born out of mixing up Atman who is real and Anātman which is unreal. Shri Sankara has explained in detail in his Sūtra Bhāshya that - "All the Samvriti which is of the form or nature of Vyavahāra is verily Avidyākalpita." On the contrary, Paramarthasatya means - 'though the Avasthas like Jāgrat are leaving out one another, quite distinct from all of them that Reality which exists in one and the same essence of Pure Being and which is Sarvasākshi (the Witnessing Principle of everything) is Ātman alone. "The Vyavahāras (empirical transactions) of the type of Pramāṇa-Prameya-Vyavahāra etc. which

are Avidyākņita (projected by, conjured up by Avidyā or ignorance) are called 'Saṃvṛitisatya', because they are not sublated as long as this Paramārthasatya is cognized or Intuited, and not because they are sublated either by mere Yukti (reasoning) or by the Anubhava of Yōgis. Here the salient, special feature that is pointed out is: What the Buddhists call 'Saṃvṛiti' as that Yukti as well as Anubhava is verily that Saṃvṛiti which is included or comes within the purview of Vyavahāra - Āvidyaka (a product of Avidyā) alone."

WHAT EXACTLY IS IT REFUTED IN THIS VERSE?

Here we have to discern that : 'सदावेन द्वाजंसर्वम्' - (From the viewpoint of the Paramartha everything is Aja alone) - by this sentence, having indicated the truth that - "Everything is Nitya (eternal)" - merely Uccheda (destruction) alone is not sublated; on the other hand, it has been pointed out that when observed from the Paramartha Drishti both 'Shāshwatatwa' and 'Ucchedatwa' do not exist at all. For, in Atman who is of the essential nature of Prajñānaghana (a sheer mass of Pure Consciousness) there is no possibility or scope whatsoever for any kind of Vikalpas (extreme imaginations, misconceptions) like Nityatwa (eternality) etc. For that reason alone, in the epic 'Mahābhārata' it has been stated that 'उच्छेदनिष्ठा नेहास्ति भावनिष्ठा न विद्यतेः' - (Mōksha Dharma 219-6) - meaning - "Here it does not culminate either in eradication, extinction, or in existence." If it is asked: "In this Kārikā it appears as though 'Nityatwa' is accepted by the expression -'Everything is Aja alone' - is it not so ?" - the answer is : It is stated like that only to sublate Janma which is imagined, misconceived due to Samvriti, and not to indicate that in Atman there exists another *Dharma* (special attribute) called 'Ajatwa'. This fact will be clarified later on in the Kārikā - 'अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या' - (4-74). Therefore, nothing contrary to our Siddhanta has been stated here at all. Since it has been mentioned that - "Due to Samvriti everything is born" - it should not be misunderstood or misinterpreted that it has been accepted here that everything is really born indeed; on the other hand, it should be discerned that whatever objects or phenomena seem to be born - all those are

'born' due to Samvriti - thus first it should be assumed by way of superimposition - and then by way of rescission, it is taught that - "Nothing whatsoever is Shāshwata (eternal). Hence, the real purport behind this half verse is: "From the Paramārtha Drishţi, Ātmaikatwa (unity - non-duality - of Ātman) alone exists; It is devoid of Uccheda but It is 'Shāshwata'; but from the point of view of Samvriti Uccheda as well as Shāshwata - both exist."

धर्मा य इति जायन्ते जाायन्ते ते न तत्त्वतः । जन्म मायोपमं तेषां सा च माया न विद्यते ।।५८।।

Meaning: "Those Dharmas which thus are born, they are not born really. Their *Janma* is analogous to Māyā; that Māyā too does not exist."

$S\overline{A}MV$ RITIKAJANMA (EMPIRICAL BIRTH DUE TO AVIDYĀ) IS $M\overline{A}Y\overline{O}PAMA$ (SIMILAR TO ILLUSION)

Atmans (beings, Jivas), external Vastus - these Dharmas (phenomena, beings) are believed to be born by the ignorant people, is it not so? How are those Dharmas born? They are born due to Samvriti alone but not in reality at all. 'Those beings or objects are born due to Samvriti' - this statement also signifies that they are Mayopama, meaning - 'Just as Maya (illusion) is born'; 'just as objects or phenomena are born due to Māyā (illusion), in the same way these are born' - this is implied here. Because it is stated - "The birth of those Dharmas is - 'just like the birth due to Māyā' or 'just like Māyā itself is born' - brought about" - it should not be imagined, reckoned that 'Māyā' is a really existing entity; that phenomenon of 'Maya' also is something non-existent; 'Māyā' is a name given to something that does not exist at all. Therefore, Janma - just like Māyā (magical act, illusion) - meaning just as Māyā is not really existing - in the same way - the intended purport here is that - 'The Janma of Dharmas (beings) is really not existing' - alone and not that - 'Due to a particular cause called - Māyā - they are (really) born' - at all. This truth should be discerned here.

> यथामायामयाद् बीजाद् जायते तन्मयोऽङ्कुरः। नासौ नित्यो न चोच्छेदी तद्वद्धमेंषु योजना।।५९।।

Meaning: "Just as from a totally illusory (Māyāmaya) seed a totally illusory sprout is born, and just as that is not Nitya (eternal) as also not destructible, similarly we should make this illustration applicable to Dharmas and comprehend the intended purport."

MĀYĀJANMA REALLY MEANS AJANMA ALONE

If a question of the type - "In that case, how could it be said that the Janma of those Dharmas is Māyōpama (analogous to an illusion)?" - is raised, then the following answer is given: From a seed - which is Māyāmaya (completely illusory) and has as its very essence mere appearance alone - a sprout, which is also Māyāmaya, is born, is it not so? But the Janmādi (birth, growth etc.) of that sprout are not real entities at all. For that reason alone, that sprout is neither Nitya nor destructible also; for, it is an Avastu (non-entity), is it not so? That which is Avastu cannot possibly be said to be either eternal or destructible, is it not so? In the same way, we should understand the Janma and Nāsha of all Dharmas; the purport here is: It cannot be said justifiably that they too really have either Janma or Nāsha. For, everything is verily mere Māyā, conjured up by Avidyā, which is quite natural.

"एवं सित क उच्छेदः शाश्वतो वा कथं भवेत्। स्वभावाद् वर्तमानेषु सर्वभूतेषु हेतुतः।।" - (Mōksha Dharma 259-41) - meaning - "If all Dharmas are thus existing by virtue of that cause alone called 'Swabhāva' (essential nature), to say there is extinction for them too - which is that? Which is, then, the thing that is Shāshwata"? - this sentence of Mōksha Dharma text affirms this truth alone.

"Shāshwatavāda" means, the doctrine of the cause being eternal; "Ucchedavāda" means, the doctrine that the cause gets destroyed - refuting both these doctrines by means Yukti (reasoning) is the Buddhistic Siddhānta (philosophy of Buddhism). Because everything is verily Aja-Advaya-Ātman, to prove by means of Yukti as well as Anubhava that "In Ātman both these 'Shāshwata' and 'Uccheda' are mere conjectures, misconceptions" - is Vedānta Siddhānta. In order to signify this truth alone here the Buddhistic technical terms of 'Shāshwata', 'Uccheda' are themselves being used - thus we should discern.

19. WHEN OBSERVED FROM PARAMĀRTHA DŖISHŢI THE DVAITA PHENOMENON IS NOT PERCEPTIBLE TO $V\overline{A}K$ (SPEECH) AND MANAS (MIND)

नाजेषु सर्वधर्मेषु शाश्वताशाश्वताभिषा। यत्र वर्णा न वर्तन्ते विवेकस्तत्र नोच्यते।।६०।।

Meaning: "Whatever Dharmas there are, which are Aja - in them there are no 'Shāshwata' or 'Ashāshwata' concepts. Where there are no categories or concepts (words), there *Viveka* (discrimination) is not recommended."

DHARMAS ARE REALLY BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF SPEECH

If observed from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi in all *Dharmas* - which are eternal, of one and the same essence of Chaitanya or Pure Consciousness and Aja with regard to Ātmans and the external objects - it is not proper, reasonable to say that either they are Shāshwata or Ashāshwata. Where there are no words or concepts available whatsoever to name, there the distinctions like *Nitya* and *Anitya* cannot possibly be stated; for, in *Aja* Ātman there are no special features whatsoever. Previously in 4-58 it was stated that - 'Dharmas in their apparent forms, their birth is like a Māyā Janma; it is not possible to say whether they are Nitya or Anitya'; but in this Kārikā it is being stated that - "Because from the Tattwa Dṛishṭi - (a) they do not exist apart from Aja Ātman; (b) in the essential nature of Pure Being of Aja Ātman they do not possess any special features whatsoever" - they are not objects for Vāk (speech).

Here the expression - 'वर्ण न वर्तन्ते' (words are not capable of indicating them) - has been mentioned as a Upalakshaṇa (implication of something in addition, synecdoche) only; by this implication, we should include the mind also; for, the Śruti - "Without objectifying (signifying) Brahman the words as well as the mind return" (Taittiriya 2-9) - is stating thus.

यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया । तथा जाग्रद्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ।।६१।

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं चित्तं स्वप्ने न संशयः । अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रत्र संशयः ।।६२।।

Meaning: "Just as in the dream the Chitta is shaking (vibrating) as if it is dual due to $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$, in the same way in the waking too the Chitta is shaking as if it is dual due to $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$. There is no doubt with regard to the fact that in the dream the Chitta (itself) being Advaya alone appears as if it is dual; in the same way, in the waking too it being Advaya only (the Chitta) appears as if it is dual - there is no doubt."

DHARMAS BEING OBJECTS TO VĀK AND MANAS IS *MĀYIKA* (ILLUSORY)

(Objection): The statement that - 'The speech and the mind cannot possibly objectify Dharmas' - is opposed to *Pratyaksha* (perceptual knowledge, experience), is it not so? The fact that people are objectifying them by means of speech as well as the mind and expressing in the manner - "This is Satya; this is Anṛita"; "This is Shāshwata; this is Ashāshwata" - is perceptible, is it not so?

(Solution): We have stated that - "All these are - from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi - Aja-Advaya Ātman only; if this truth is remembered, then it will not be possible to indicate them after discrimination either by the speech (words) or the mind." Really speaking, although all of them are mere Advaya Vijnāna alone, it is seen in our empirical transactions that they are objectified, is it not so? - this is nothing but the objectification of their appearance; and they are thus appearing because the Chitta is vibrating due to Māyā. For this the illustration of the dream is adduced in the Kārikā.

Previously in 4-49 it was stated: "Both the seed and the sprout are $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}maya$ (totally illusory)" - that was said from the viewpoint that - "Those who are witnessing the Māyā are also knowing, cognizing them at the moment of their appearance only." In fact, that seed-sprout seen is neither Nitya nor does it get destroyed - thus it was mentioned. For those onlookers who are seeing the various phenomena like the seed-sprout etc. which the $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}vin$ (magician) is showing (projecting) merely as a pastime, pleasant recreation, there is no abiding interest in delib-

erating upon questions like - "Whether those seed-sprout etc. are Nitya or Anitya?" - is it not so? Thinking in the manner that - "All this is verily $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$; neither they are Nitya nor are they destructible" - alone, they (i.e. onlookers) are indifferent towards that question, is it not so? But, in the dream though the Chitta is invariably vibrating illusorily, the cognition of the truth that -"All this is verily Māyā" - does not occur to anyone whosoever during that period of the dream; the Dharmas that exist therein are verily objects for Shabdapratyaya (the concepts projected by the words) of the type - 'Shāshwata, Ashāshwata' - this is the special feature in this case. Just as in the case of Tattwa, which is verily Advaya, It is appearing as if It is Dvaya due to Māyā, and even so during that time those Dharmas therein are invariably objects for Vāk and Manas - in the same way it is so in the waking too; thus a similarity between the illustration of the dream and the illustrated example of the waking is pointed out. These very same verses are also mentioned in the Advaita Prakarana also; (Therein, instead of the word 'Chitta' the word 'Manaha' has been used, that is all). There, in that context, they were stated in order to establish by means of Yukti the teaching that - "For a Sadvastu there may be a Janma due to Māyā"; but here the special feature of these verses is to prove the fact that - "Even the objects which are created, projected by Māyā may become objects for the speech and the mind." This point is to be discerned.

20. ALL DUALITY IS NON-DIFFERENT FROM CHAITANYA

स्वप्नदृक् प्रचरन् स्वप्ने दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् । अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वाऽपि जीवान् पश्यति यान् सदा ॥६३॥

स्वप्नदृक्चित्तदृश्यास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् । तथा तहुश्यमेवेदं स्वप्नदृक्चित्तिमध्यते ॥६४॥

चरञ्जागरिते जाग्रदिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान्। अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वाऽपि जिवान् पश्यति यान्सदा ॥६५॥

जाग्रच्चित्तेक्षणीयास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् । तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं जाग्रतश्चित्तमिष्यते ।।६६।।

Meaning: "One who sees the dream wanders about in the dream and is seeing Andajas (creatures born out of eggs), Swedajas (born out of warm vapour or sweat, like insects) existing in all the ten directions and whatever creatures he is seeing always - all of them are objects for the dreamer's Chitta alone; they are not existing apart from it. In the same way, the Chitta also of this dreamer is seen by him only. One who is running about in the waking is seeing either creatures born out of eggs or insects born out of sweat in all the ten different directions as also whatever creatures he is seeing always - all of them are objects for the waking person's Chitta alone; they are not existing separate from it. Similarly, it has to be accepted that the Chitta of these waking persons is verily an object to the respective waking person alone."

THE DUALITY THAT IS AN OBJECT FOR VYAVAHĀRA IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM CHAITANYA (PURE CONSCIOUSNESS)

It has already been stated that - "The duality that is object for the transactions of speech and mind is not *Paramārtha* (Absolutely real); because it is *Chittaspandana* (vibration of the mind) it is verily Māyā." That Chitta too - because it is not existing in the Absolute sense, it amounts to saying that all duality is verily *Asat* (false, unreal). Thus it has been concluded here.

All the Jivas who are seen by one who is carrying out the transactions in the dream, are invariably perceived by his Chitta alone. Therefore, apart from that Chitta those creatures do not exist at all; the fact that - "The Chitta itself is imagined (misconceived) in the various forms of Jivas etc. seen in the dream" - is known to everyone. Apart from this, that Svapnachitta (mind of the dream) also does not at all exist by itself apart from the dreamer. In the same way, it is reasonable to accept the proposition that all the Jivas also seen in the waking do not exist apart from the waking person.

What was previously stated viz.: "Therefore, Chitta is not

born" - (4-28) - that teaching alone is strengthened by a proper cause. Because the Chitta of the waking person does not at all exist by itself apart from his Ātman, really it is not born at all; by means of the very Yukti, which the Buddhist has acknowledged to say: "Apart from Chitta the Chittadrishya does not exist" - it becomes established that - "Apart from Ātman who illumines the Chitta even that Chitta also does not exist"; thus this truth is clarified here. It has already been demonstrated in the Vaitathya Prakarana that - (a) "Waking, dream - the Ātman who illumines both these is one and the same" as also - (b) "There is no Vailakshanya (distinction) whatsoever between waking and dream"; adding those teachings also here, the seeker should discern the teaching that - "Ātman who illumines both these states of Consciousness is alone (unitarily, non-dually) Paramārtha (Absolutely real)."

उमे ह्यन्योन्यदृश्ये ते कि तदस्तीति नोच्यते । लक्षणाशून्यमुमयं तन्मतेनैव गृह्यते ।।६७।।

Meaning: "Both of them are objects for each other. We are not saying as to which is existing. Both are devoid of Lakshanas (hallmarks, signs); by that Buddhi (intellect) alone (this truth) is cognized."

THE EXISTENCE OF CHITTA (MIND) AND CHETYA (OBJECT CONCEIVED BY THE MIND) IS RELATIVE

(Objection): Why should we accept that the Chitta by itself is not separate from one who sees, perceives? That which cognizes the external *Dharmas* (beings, objects) is itself the Chitta - thus only it can be stated, is it not so?

(Solution): Our answer to this is: Apart from the seer or perceiver the Chitta by itself, independently cannot at all be established. For, its existence too - just like the external objects - is verily Sāpekshasatta (relative existence). To wit, both Chitta (mind) and Chetya (mental concept to) are to be invariably established being dependent upon (mutually related to) each other. That which cognizes the externally existing Dharmas like Jīva etc. is itself Chitta; and that which is object for the Chitta is itself the Dharma - thus mutually depending upon each other these two are being known and none of them is singly established

to exist independently. Therefore, it is never possible to say which of them really exists. In the dream neither the elephant nor the Chitta which perceives the elephant is really existing, is it not so? Even so, it is being seen. In the same way, in the present case or context too, the *Vivekins* (people who are capable of such Intuitive deliberation, discrimination) do not at all cognize that either Chitta or Chittadrishya is really existing. This alone is the implicit purport.

BETWEEN CHITTA AND CHETYA THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP OF *PRAMĀŅA* (VALID MEANS OF COGNITION) AND *PRAMEYA* (THE COGNIZED OBJECT)

How is it that both Chitta and Chetya do not exist? - The answer is: Both these are Lakshaṇāshūnya (devoid of signs of recognition); for both there is no Pramāṇa (valid means of cognition); for, by the Mati (belief) alone, that is, by the belief or concept of the type that - "This is Chitta; this is Chetya" - alone it is appearing and not that it is established on the basis of any Pramāṇa. Due to the awareness of the type - "This is a pot" - the pot is appearing; that Ghaṭabuddhi (awareness of pot) also is not established independently; it is, in fact, established because it is 'cognizing' the pot. It being so, it is not possible to affirm or ascertain as to which of them is established by which. This is the implicit meaning here.

यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च।।६८।।
यथा मायामय जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च।।६९।।
यथा निर्मितको जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च।
तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च।।७०।।

Meaning: "Just as the Jiva who is caused by the dream is born and dies, in the same way all these Jivas are caused and become extinct. Just as the Jiva who is Māyāmaya is born and dies, similarly all these Jivas are caused and become extinct. Just as an artificially produced Jiva is born and dies, in the same way all these Jivas are caused and become extinct."

THE JĪVAS WHO EXIST IN THE WAKING ARE ALSO NOT REALLY EXISTING

'Nirmitakajīva' means a Jīva produced by means of Mantra, herbs, roots etc. Although Svapnajīva (dream soul), Māyāmayajīva (an illusory soul), Nirmitakajīva (artificially produced soul by means of Mantra, herbs etc.) - these are not really existing, they appear as if they are born and are dying; in the same way, the Jīvas who appear in the waking are also not existing at all really. This is the total meaning of the three verses. In the same way, although the Chitta is not really existing it appears as if it is existing - thus also we should add to the meaning of the verses.

HERE THERE IS NO SCOPE FOR INTRODUCING THE EKAJĪVAVĀDA

Here, in this context, by the expression - "All these Jivas" - to interpret it to mean - 'except the waking Jiva all the other Jivas' - and then we should not conceive of any scope for 'Ekajivavāda' (the theory of one and one Jiva only). For, this Prakaraṇa is written with the intention of signifying, teaching that the commonality of Jivas is itself not existing really. In the next verse it is vociferously, stridently stated: 'न कश्चिज्जायते जीव:' - (4-71), meaning - "No Jiva whosoever is born." Therefore, both Chitta and Chetya are without any Pramāṇa; we should discern here the fact that - "The empirical dealing of 'Jivas' is due to Samvṛtiti alone" - is relevant here.

21. CONCLUSION OF AJĀTIVĀDA

न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः सम्भवोऽस्य न विद्यते । ऎतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किञ्चित्र जायते ।।७१।।

Meaning: "No Jiva whosoever is ever born; there is no cause for his birth also. That state wherein nothing even the least bit is born - that alone is the supreme state."

AJĀTI ITSELF IS THE ABSOLUTE REALITY

The preceptor is concluding that the teaching - "Ajāti Itself is Paramārtha" - becomes determined from the fact that - "It is not possible to decide that the apparent forms of Chitta and

Chetya are such and such." In fact, that no Jīva is born is itself the Absolute Truth (Paramārtha). The statement that - "Jīvas being born is like the birth of Svapna-Māyā-Nirmitaka Jīvas" - is meant for the purpose of indicating that $Vy\bar{a}vah\bar{a}rika$ Janma (empirical birth) is $M\bar{a}yika$ only and not with the intention to say that either Chitta or Chetya (the concepts of the mind) are really, absolutely existing. Chitta means verily mind. The statement that - "The mind is born from Paramātman" - in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad (2-1-3) - is to denote that all the $Vik\bar{a}ra$ (Kārya or resultant effects) or empirical mutations in general are verily or merely an exercise in words; really speaking, in Ātman there is no mind whatsoever existing indeed. For this the Śruti that - "(Paramātman is) Aprāna, Amanaska, Shubhra" - (Muṇḍaka 2-1-2) is the authoritative source.

It being so, in the Absolute sense no Jiva is ever born; for him to be born there does not exist any cause whatsoever. Whatever statements were made previously to refute the various Jātivādas were all Vyāvahārikasatya (empirical reality) alone; but Paramārthasatya (Absolute reality or truth) is: "Nothing whatsoever even an iota of it is really born."

This verse has already appeared (3-48) in the Advaita Prakarana also. There the purport of the verse was to signify the teaching that - "No devices (Upāya) whatsoever are real; the Aja-Advaya-Tattwa which is the *Upeya* (that Reality indicated by the devices) is the *Paramasatya* (the Ultimate Reality)." But here the purport for the verse is to conclude the demonstration of the truth - "By the disputes and differences among the various disputants *Aja-Advaya-Tattwa* (the birthless-non-dual-Transcendental Reality) alone gets evolved."

The teaching that - "No Jiva is ever born" - does not become relevant in the Buddhistic doctrine; for, all the different schools or factions of Buddhistic Philosophy are invariably Nairātmyavādas (doctrines of negation of Ātman's existence). But this teaching here is exclusively committed to Advaita Vedānta alone. In the 'Introduction' this fact has been clarified.

चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राह्मग्राहकवद्द्वयम् । चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥७२॥ Meaning: "This Dvaita (duality) of the form of Grāhya and Grāhaka is verily the vibration of the Chitta. Chitta is Nirvishaya (devoid of any object); by this, they say it is Asanga (non-attached) only."

CHITTA ALSO IS ADVAYATATTWA ALONE

It has already been stated previously that - 'अइयं च इयामासम्' (4-62), meaning - "All Dvaita of the form of Grāhya-Grāhaka is verily Māyika, a vibration only of the Chitta." "Because that Chitta, in the Absolute sense, is Ātman alone, it is verily Nirvishaya" - thus it becomes evolved. Thus because it is Nirvishaya, knowledgeable people say that Chitta also is always Asanga (non-attached). The Śruti: 'असंगो इययं पुरुष:' - (Bri. 4-3-15) - is an authoritative source for this conclusion. To wit: That which is Savishaya (having an object) - to that thing there is a Sanga (attachment, contact) with its object; but this Chitta in its intrinsic form being verily Ātman, devoid of the categories of Vishaya (object) and Vishayi (subject), it is Nirvishaya indeed. Hence it is Asanga.

HERE FOR THE WORD 'CHITTA' THE MEANING IS NOT 'VIJNĀNA' OF THE BUDDHISTS

Because it is taught here that - "This is verily the vibration of the Chitta"; "Because the Chitta is Nirvishaya, it is Asanga" - there is enough scope for the common uninitiated people to misconceive that it is verily Buddhists' 'Vijnana'. For, Vijnanavādins among Buddhists also say : 'चित्तमात्रमिदं सर्वं द्विषा चित्तं प्रवर्तते । ग्राह्मग्राहकभावेन आत्मात्मीयं न विद्यते' (Lankāvatāra 3-121), meaning - "All this is verily Chitta; Chitta alone exists in a dual form of Grāhya and Grāhaka; in this there is no division of 'I' and 'mine'." But if the true seekers discern the subtle teaching of Shri Gaudapāda here in this Kārikā to the effect that - "Chitta is always Nirvishaya anti hence it is Asanga" - then it becomes clear to them that this is not what the Buddhists refer to as Vijñana. For, Buddhists do not accept the teaching that - "Because Vijñāna is always Nirvishaya, it is Asanga." On the other hand, they affirm that -"Vijnana transforms itself by itself into the form or shape of Vishaya; if it gives up its impurity of Grāhya-Grāhaka, then it

attains Nirvāṇa (Beatitude)." Apart from this, because what was stated in the previous Advaita Prakarana as Aja-Advaya-Brahmavāda in the manner - "This is Advaitavāda which refutes the birth of Dvaita itself" - by saying - 'No Jīva whosoever is born' - that very Aja-Advaya-Brahmavāda alone has been recapitulated here too - Chitta alone subsists exclusively. Because this Prakaraṇa is emphasizing the truth that - "Chitta is merely Chittadṛik (mind as seer)" - also this teaching is contrary to Buddhists' Vijñānavāda. Hence, we should understand that this teaching - "Chitta, being Nirvishaya, is Nitya as also Asanga" - is not in the least convenient to the Buddhistic doctrine.

22. THE INSTRUCTION ABOUT AJĀTI ALSO IS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF SAMVRITI (EMPIRICAL TRANSACTIONS) ALONE

योऽस्ति कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नास्त्यसौ । परतन्त्राभिसंवृत्या स्यात्रास्ति परमार्थतः ।।७३।।

Meaning: "That thing which exists due to Kalpitasamvriti - that thing does not exist in the Absolute sense. It may exist by virtue of *Paratantrābhisamvriti* (dependent upon a progressive, serial causation); but, in the Absolute sense, it does not exist at all."

ŚĀSTRAS ETC. AS ALSO THE OBJECTS MENTIONED IN *PARASHĀSTRA* (TEXTS OF OTHER PHILOSOPHIES) ARE NOT PARAMĀRTHA (ABSOLUTELY-REAL)

(Doubt): If you agree that because it is Nirvishaya, Chitta is Asanga, then Asangatwa (non-attachment) itself does not get established, is it not so? You have invariably acknowledged the distinctions with regard to various objects (Vishaya Vibhāga) like Śāstra, Shishya, Shāstā (the preceptor who teaches the Śāstra or science) etc. is it not so? It is not possible to deny that those distinctions do not exist; for, if your Śāstra too is said not to exist, then what it teaches - viz. Aja-Ātmatattwa also - it amounts to saying - does not exist, is it not so? It is not a desirable conclusion for you indeed. Apart from this, in this Prakaraṇa, you have refuted the philosophical teachings of schools like Sānkhya,

Vaisheshika, Boudha etc., haven't you? Now you have to accept that they too invariably exist. For, if it amounts to saying that there is no object which is to be refuted - then it is tantamount to saying that this refutation also does not exist. That too will not be desirable to you; for, without refuting the rivals' Śāstras your own Siddhānta cannot possibly be sustained, is it not so?

(Solution): This defect especially does not at all exist in our philosophy. For - (i) first of all, what you insist in saying that Sastra, Shishya etc. should necessarily exist - we have accepted that by virtue of Kalpitasamvriti (deliberately conceived empirical transactions). Because they are imagined by way of an Upāya (device) for teaching the Paramārtha, all these 'exist' only from the Adhyārōpa Drishti (viewpoint of deliberate superimposition) but not from the Paramārtha Drishţi (viewpoint of the Absolute Reality). We have already stated in the Agama Prakarana that - "This tenet is taught only for the purpose of Upadesha (spiritual instruction), but if (the Paramartha) is cognized there does not exist this duality" - (Agama 1-18). Therefore, for that Vishaya that exists due to Samvriti alone - for the Chitta, which is Aja from the Pāramārthika viewpoint, there does not accrue whatsoever any Savishayatwa (being associated with an object or having objectivity).

(ii) Further, you had raised a doubt of the type - "Because you are refuting the objects which are established by the rivals' Sāstras, it amounts to your admitting that they exist; from this, you doubted that Chitta becomes susceptible to Savishayatwa, is it not so? For this, our solution is: In the opponents' Śāstras the objects or phenomena like Pradhāna, Paramāņu etc. which are acceptable to them exclusively are only existing due to Kalpitasamvriti - meaning, Avidyāvyavahāra Drishţi - alone and not absolutely existing. In the same manner, what they have acknowledged as Satkāryavāda, Asatkāryavāda etc. - all such dogmatic theories - if observed, analysed properly from the Pāramārthika viewpoint - do not exist at all, and hence from those objects, which are Avidyākalpita, for the Chitta no Savishayatwa whatsoever can attach itself. Because their doctrines are also being refuted adopting a methodology acceptable to those opponents (disputants) alone, that excercise of refutation also is Sāmvritika (i.e. due to Avidyākalpita

Vyavahāra) alone. By this no harm whatsoever is caused for the Paramārtha. For killing a snake in the dream by a stick of the dream no $P\bar{a}pa$ (sin or demerit) or Punya (merit) entails him in the waking, is it not so? Therefore, what we said, viz. "Chitta, meaning Ātmatattwa, is said to be always Asanga" - is quite reasonable indeed.

अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नाप्यजः । परतन्त्राभिनिष्यत्त्या संवृत्या जायते तु सः ॥७४॥

Meaning: "What is said to be Aja is also from Kalpitasamvriti alone; from the Paramārtha Drishti Aja also does not exist. By virtue of or due to *Paratantra Abhinishpatti* (manifestation of dependence on another thing) He is born from Samvriti alone."

EVEN THE CONCEPTION OF HIS BEING AJA IS ALSO FROM SAMVRITI ALONE

(Doubt): If Śāstra etc. are also Avidyāvyavahāra alone, then it evolves that the conception of His being 'Aja' also is Āvidyaka alone, is it not so? What solution is there for this (anomaly)?

(Solution): True; just like Śāstra etc., we say from Kalpitasamvriti alone that He is 'Aja'.

Here, we should discern the division of Samvriti in this manner: 'Samvriti' means Avidyāvyavahāra, Just as in that Vyavahāra also the division of 'Satya', 'Anrita' is familiar in our workaday transactions, in the same manner it has been accepted in our Śāstra. The Śruti - "(Paramārtha) Satya became both Satya and Anrita" - (Taittirīya 2-6) - is saying this. For that Śruti statement the implicit meaning is: Brahman alone which is Paramārthasatya assumed the two forms of the sea-shell which is Sāmvritikasatya and of the silver of the sea-shell which is Sāmvritikānrita. "That which gets established, determined by Pramāṇa (valid means of proof) - that thing is Samvritisatya; when a thing gets sublated, negated as we examine it by means of Pramāṇas that thing is Sāmvrityanrita" - thus we should discern. Although Kalpitasamvriti also is Āvidyakasamvriti alone, the preceptors have perforce to utilize this for the

purpose of teaching the Tattwa. But in this context what is a special feature is: 'Lōkasamvriti' is brought about (conjured up) by Avidyā; because in our empirical transactions we have (quite naturally) assumed those things which are Mithyārūpa (of the form of false appearance) to be Satya, for the common run of people the Samsāra Anartha (the calamity of transmigratory existence) is caused from it; on the other hand, in the case of Kalpitasamvriti because it is Vyavahāra alone imagined (deliberately, knowingly) for the purpose of teaching the Tattwa to others, from it no harm whatsoever is caused to anyone whosoever. If those knowledgeable people who have cognized the reality of $\bar{A}k\bar{a}sha$ (empty space), even though they transact in the manner that - "Ākāsha is blue" - in reality the empty space is not in the least blue, is it not so? Similarly, we say, from Kalpitasamvriti, that - "Ātman is Aja"; by this there is no harm, whatsoever caused at all to Atman.

ĀTMAN IS SAID TO BE AJA WITH A VIEW TO NEGATING BIRTH ITSELF

From the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi, Ātman is not Aja at all. We are saying that Ātman is Aja only for the purpose of refuting the assumption in others' Śāstra that - 'He is born', and not that it is our intended purport that in Ātman in reality (in the Absolute sense) there exists a Dharma (quality or attribute) of Ajatwa (birthlessness) at all. In the Kalpanābhedas (various imaginations) of the type - 'He is born', 'He is dead' etc. the Dharma of 'Ajatwa' of Ātman is not really involved. Therefore, even the concept of 'He is Aja' is assumed or suggested (superimposed) from Saṃvṛiti alone. If Jātatwa (being born) is Saṃvṛiti, for the purpose of negating that what is conceived (as a counter) as Ajatwa (birthlessness) also is from Saṃvṛiti only, is it not so? Because Pratiyōgi (the opposite concept) of Jātatwa is Sāṃvṛitika, relative to that the Kalpita Ajatwa also should necessarily be that much Āvidyaka alone. This is the intended purport here.

'KALPITA', 'PARATANTRA' ETC. ARE NOT BUDDHISTIC TECHNICAL TERMS

Here in this context some people are deluded to think that in Shri Gaudapādāchārya's commentary the Buddhistic doctrines have got mixed up. Their doubt is: The Buddhistic surmise is

that objects have three kinds of natures like Kalpita, Paratantra and Parinishpanna. "From whichever kind of Vikalpa (concept) whichever kind of object is Kalpita (imagined) it is called 'Parikalpita' - it is not something that is really existing; by means of Pratyaya (a distinct percept) what is caused is a 'Paratantra Swabhāva'; 'Parinishpanna Swabhāva', means 'what was stated before not existing now' (Trimshikā 20-21). Vasubandhu (a Buddhist scholar) has given the following examples for these terms: (1) On the strength of a Mantra (hymn) the form that is magically created - for example a Māyāhasti (magical elephant) - is Kalpitaswabhāva; there the elephant's form exists, but the elephant does not at all exist. That is called 'Parikalpita'; (2) its shape is 'Paratantra'; (3) there the elephant does not at all exist - this alone is 'Parinishpanna Swabhāva' (Trimshika Vivarana 27-28). Although Grāhya-Grāhakatwa does not exist people imagine (misconceive) it to be existing and hence it is called 'Parikalpita'; 'Paratantra' means 'Because it is born from Hetu-Pratyaya (a percept as cause) it is said to be 'Paratantra'; Paratantra is always non-existing and this alone is 'Parinishpanna' - this is the explanation they give. The Buddhists' doctrine is: 'Parinishpanna' is the real Swabhāva (essential nature) of a Vastu (entity); whereas Parikalpita, Paratantra - though both these are Asat alone, they do exist from the Vyāvahārika Drishți and hence they are called 'Swabhāva.'

It being so, in the Kārikā sentence: "That which is existing due to Kalpitasaṃvṛiti" - that does not really (absolutely) exist; "It may exist due to Paratantrābhisaṃvṛiti, but not Pāramārthically (i.e. in the Absolute sense)" - how the Sougata Buddhists' highly imaginary, misconceived ideas or theories of Parikalpita-Paratantra can possibly find a place or have any scope - we just cannot divine. Especially in the above Kārikā sentence the scope for, or relevance of, the three Swabhāvas propounded by the Buddhists, viz. 'Kalpita', 'Paratantra' and 'Parinishpanna', is not at all there; nor for them any illustrations have been given here by Shri Gauḍapāda. Apart from this, in this argument for the repeated usage of the expressions - "Kalpitasaṃvṛityā" (due to highly imagined Vyāvahārika transactions), "Paratantrābhisaṃvṛityā" (the empirical dealings superimposed due to a percept as cause) in which the word 'Saṃvṛiti' is being repeated - there does not

appear to be any tangible purpose being served; for, the Buddhists have accepted that whether it is 'Kalpita' or 'Paratantra', it is invariably Sāmvritika, meaning - Āvidyaka (projected by, conjured up by Avidyā, ignorance) alone, is it not so? On the other hand, according to the explanation given by Shri Śankara for this Kārikā, it is stated: "Śāstra, Shishya etc. exist due to 'Kalpitasamvriti' alone; for, on the basis of the Nyāya (maxim) of Adhyārōpa (Superimposition) and Apavāda (Rescission) for the purpose of spiritual instruction alone these concepts, categories of Śāstra, Shishya etc. are deliberately conceived, is it not so? In reality (considering from the Absolute viewpoint of the Ultimate, Transcendent Reality) even Śāstra etc. do not at all exist, and hence for the Chitta there is no object at all. This teaching gets evolved inviolably and irrefutably." In the same manner, alien concepts like 'Pradhāna' (of the Sānkhyans) and 'Paramānu' (of the Vaisheshikas) - which have been taken up for consideration only from the viewpoint of refutation - there is 'existence' from the 'Paratantrābhinishpatti' (advent or manifestation of dependence on another thing) only; they are accepted here from the viewpoint of Samvriti (empirical transactions conjured up by Avidyā) alone acceptable to the opponents' Śāstras. They have been refuted by means of Yuktis (logical devices) acceptable to the respective disputant (followers of various schools of philosophies or Darshanas which are predominantly logic-oriented and dogmatic or doctrinaire in approach) after confronting them with logical conclusions undesirable to their respective doctrines, but we have not at all accepted that they do really exist even while refuting them. In the same way, the commentary on the sentence - "अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या" - also should be discerned. The refutation of 'Janma' which the alien Darshanakāras have imagined (misconceived) is invariably from the standpoint of Adhyārōpita Vyavahāra (superimposed empirical dealings) exclusively for the purpose of Tattwopadesha (teaching of the Ultimate, Absolute Reality) alone, but we have never at all accepted that 'in the Absolute sense, Janma exists. In any case, thus only from Paratantrābhinishpatti - meaning, invariably assuming those doctrines which are established in the opponents' Sastras - it has been stated that - "He is Aja" - and hence it should be discerned that this teaching can

be suitably applied to the teaching that - "He (Ātman) is born due to Saṃvṛiti alone."

Thre is also another textual variation like - "परतन्त्रोऽभिनिष्परंपआ' - but that is not correct. Or, for that also somehow a meaning can be adduced. 'Paratantra' (dependent upon another), meaning, due to 'Abhinishpatti'. By virtue of Janma it is 'Paratantra', meaning, under the control of another; this is stated desiderating another; this is said by assuming the Padārtha (an object signified by a word) that is established in another's Śāstra. Therefore, it may also be explained in the manner - "It is born due to Saṃvṛiti". Here "Saṃvṛiti" means 'Āvidyakavyavahāra'; because this Saṃvṛiti conceals Paramārtha, it is given this name. In any case, thus everything becomes reconciled.

23. THE FRUIT OF PARAMĀRTHA JÑĀNA

अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते । द्वयाभावं स बुद्धैव निर्निमित्तो न जायते ।।७५।।

Meaning: "There exists Abhinivesha (staunch affinity to, identification with) in what is non-existent, but therein no Dvaita exists; only if it is cognized that there is no Dvaita, it evolves that it is not born because there is no cause."

BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF NON-EXISTENCE OF DUALITY THE PARAMAPURUSHĀRTHA (ULTIMATE, SUPREME GOAL OF HUMAN EXISTENCE) ACCRUES

Observed from the Absolute point of view, because Vishaya (an object) does not exist whatsoever there is 'Abhūtābhinivesha', meaning: Though there is no duality existing, there is a persistent identification or belief that it exists. In that Advaitātman duality, especially, does not exist whatsoever. Just as in phenomena like Svapna (dream), Māyā (magical show), Gandharvanagara (celestial city) etc. there exists mere appearance - and if properly observed, no substance really exists - in the same way, here also when we cognize Aja-Advaya-Tattwa the duality is sublated. Because thus for birth Mithyābhinivesha (vain, false identification or affinity) alone is the cause, merely by cognizing the truth that

the non-existence of duality does not exist one is not born at all. For this conclusion the Śruti: "Being Brahman in the beginning itself, he reaches (merges in) Brahman" - (Bṛi. 4-4-6) - is the authoritative source.

यदा न लभते हेतूनुत्तमाधममध्यमान्। तदा न जायते चित्तं हेत्वभावे फलं कुतः ॥७६॥

Meaning: "When the Hetus (causes) like Uttama (superior, best), Adhama (lowest, inferior), Madhyama (middle-grade) are not existing, then Chitta is not born; when there is no cause how at all can Phala (the effect) arise?"

IF THERE IS NO STAUNCH IDENTIFICATION, DHARMA AND ADHARMA DO NOT EXIST; JANMA ALSO DOES NOT EXIST

The Varna-Ashrama Karmas, if performed without any desires but along or associated with Upāsanas (meditations), are responsible for Devatwaprāpti (attainment of divinity) and hence those Karmas are cailed 'Uttamahetus' (superior causes); even if they are performed without Upāsanas, merely by means of Varņa-Āshrama Karmas fruits like Svargaprāpti (attainment of heaven) accrue; "After the enjoyment of the Phala (fruit)," - it is mentioned in the Smriti - "the practitioners acquire a Janma endowed with an excellent region or country, community or caste, race, religion, longevity, intelligence, behaviour, wealth, happiness, discriminative power." Those Karmas which help acquire the lives of mute creatures are 'Adhamahetus'. Dharmas (merits, righteous Karmas) mixed with Adharmas are 'Madhyamahetus' responsible for Manushyatwa (human birth). By virtue of the differences in Dharma and Adharma the various types of Janmas are obtained - this system is described in Manu Smriti and such other Smritis. All these three kinds of Hetus (causes) do not at all affect or arise in that person who has cognized Brahman who is beyond all Kalpanas and who is Akartru (non-doer, i.e. devoid of Kartrutwa, Bhöktrutwa projected by Avidyā); although for people who are devoid of discrimination it appears as though the sky or empty space is polluted by impurities, one who is a Vivekin that pollution is not visible at all, is it not so? We should discern it here in the same manner.

Thus when the Hetus are not born at all, then Chitta is not born at all; to wit, Ātman with the Chitta as an adjunct does not acquire the Janmas with the body, the senses etc. - this is the implied meaning here. For, there is no possibility of a Janma being acquired either by a mere Chitta or mere Ātman devoid of any adjunct whatsoever. We have already stated in the Advaita Prakaraṇa that - "By virtue of an association with a Kalpita (misconceived, superimposed), Upādhi (adjunct, attribute) alone Janma etc. are being caused."

The reason for our statement - "When there are no Hetus, one is not born" - is: Without there being any Hetu, the Phala cannot come into being in any manner; there is no scope whatsoever for the fruit called Janma to accrue. There is a Smriti also to this effect: 'बीजान्यग्न्युपदग्धानि न रोहन्ति यथा पुनः । ज्ञानदग्धैस्तथा क्लोशैर्नात्मा संपद्यते पुनः ।' - (Mōksha Dharma 211-17), meaning - "Just as the seeds burnt in a fire do not sprout out, in the same way the Kleshas (miseries) which are burnt by Jñāna do not once again taint or affect Ātman."

अनिमित्तस्य चित्तस्य याऽनुत्पत्तिः समाऽद्वया । अजातस्यैव सर्वस्य चित्तदृश्यं हि तद्यतः ॥७७॥

Meaning: "There is a teaching that - 'A Chitta which is Animitta (devoid of a cause) is not born' - is it not so? That is nothing but (the Anutpatti or non-birth) which is Sama (one and the same everywhere) and Advaya (non-dual) of a Chitta which, being Ajāta (birthless), has become everything. For, it is verily Chittadrishya (object for the mind)."

THE FRUIT OF JÑĀNA IS ALWAYS IN ONE AND THE SAME FORM

What kind of Anutpatti (non-birth) is it of the Chitta which we have described as - "When the causes like Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit) become extinct, the Chitta is not born" -? Is it that now the birth being real, after the Jñāna accrues it becomes extinct? It is not so. What we said previously that - "After one cognizes or Intuits the Paramārtha, any Nimitta whatsoever of the form of Dharma and Adharma becomes extinct and thereby there is no Utpatti (birth)" - that (Paramārtha) is not

a new one at all; on the contrary, the Paramartha, ever, in all states of existence, remains, subsists in one and the same state, meaning, Nirvishesha (devoid of any special features whatsoever) nature. For, a Tattwa which is ever Sama and Advaya there cannot possibly exist variations like being Mukta and not being Mukta, is it not so? The Anutpatti of the Advaya Chitta which has become everything, without being born, is verily its Swabhāva even before the cognition of the Tattwa indeed; for, both these phenomena - i.e. the Nimitta (Hetu) of the forms of Dharma and Adharma and the Janma which is the Phala - are verily Chittadrishya (objects of mind only). Hence even then it is Asat alone. We should here resort to that very Yukti which is mentioned in the Kārikās - "The Chittadrishya is not born" -(4-28); "Chittadrishya is Avastu (non-substantial)" - (4-33). Therefore, merely because of Abhinivesha (vain or false affinity or clinging on to a belief) due to which we have assumed a thing, which really does not exist, to exist - it is not at all possible to imagine either that - "Due to Dvaita which is the Nimitta, Paramārtha is Asarva (not everything)" - or that -"Paramāitha is of a Swabhāva (nature) of being born with a Janma which is a resultant effect."

If it is not so, it amounts to imagining that - "Jñāna removes something which exists, as also brings into being something that does not exist" - quite contrary to universal experience. Therefore, the correct understanding is: There is no Ajñāna that is not capable of being Nivritta (removed), there is no Jñāna which is not born."

बुद्ध्वाऽनिमित्ततां सत्यां हेतुं पृथगनाप्नुवन्। वीतशोकं तथाऽकाममभयं पदमश्नुते।।७८।।

Meaning: "If one cognizes the truth that being without any cause is itself the Reality, he attains a place, state which does not accept (desiderate) any cause which is extraneous, which is devoid of Shōka (misery, grief), desire and which is Abhaya (fearless)."

BY PARAMĀRTHA JÑĀNA HETU (DEALINGS OF DHARMA AND ADHARMA RESPONSIBLE FOR JANMA) BECOMES EXTINCT

Because the Dvaita which is the cause for wirth - which is

explained by means of a Yukti in the manner - "All this is verily Chittaspandita (vibrations of the mind); Chitta is verily Nirvishaya; it is verily Advaya" - does not exist at all, - if one cognizes the truth that - and does not see (entertain) the motive for Devādiprāpti (attainment of the position of a deity) which is of the form, nature of *Dharma* (merit) and *Adharma* (demerit) - then true seeker realizes that - "only if there is Dvaita the Abhimāna (pride, identification) of the type of believing in the existence of Hetu (cause) and Phala (effect), exists and for the attainment of the Phala one perforce accepts the Hetu? Because one has cognized, realized the Paramartha, Dvaita itself is not there and then how at all can there be any scope for accepting Hetu? Therefore, if one does not accept Hetu, meaning - if he gives up, renounces the three types of desires, aspirations like Putraishana (desire to have progeny), Vittaishana (desire to possess, amass wealth), Lōkaishaṇa (desire to attain supreme worlds of higher beings, fame, name in the world etc.) - he attains, reaches a state, position which is devoid of Shōka (grief), desire and fear meaning devoid of Avidyā - i.e. he will never be born again." This is the (order of reasoning) implied here.

For this conclusion the following Śruti sentences are the authoritative sources: 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः', meaning - "There what attachment (can there be)? What grief (can there be)?" यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य दुिहमानिमिति वीतशोकः', meaning - "When (he) sees the Isa (Lord) who is of queer nature, then he cognizes the truth that - 'All this is verily His greatness, excellence indeed' - and becomes rid of Shōka"; 'स कावःभिजीयते तत्र तत्र । पर्याप्तकामस्य कृतात्मनस्तु इहैव सर्वे प्रविलीयति कामाः' - (Mundaka 3-2-2), meaning - "He is being born here and there due to desires; but for one who has attained totally all the desires and has become Kritātma (one who has attained the Self), here itself all desires become extinct"; 'हि वे भवति य एवं वेद' (Bri. 4-4-25), - meaning - "One who cognizes in this manner, He verily becomes one with Abhaya (fearless) Brahman."

अभूताभिनिवेशाद् हि सदृशे तत्प्रवर्तते । वस्त्वभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निस्संङ्गं विनिवर्तते ।।७९।। Meaning: "Due to Abhinivesha for Abhūta (a non-existent thing) he engages himself is something which is equal to that. Once he realizes, cognizes that there is no real entity, he becomes Nissanga (detached) and recedes from it."

FOR ACCEPTING DHARMA ETC. AJÑĀNA ALONE IS THE ROOT CAUSE

How can it be said that - "Merely by cognizing affinity he will not (in this manner) accept the Hetus" - ? To this, our answer is: "For, since there exists invariably an Abhinivesha (innate to the belief) that - 'The non-existent thing is existing' - Chitta gets prompted to indulge in something which is analogous, similar to itself." The manner in which the Chitta engages itself in its transactions is: "This thing exists; by accepting this cause this thing should be acquired; by accepting this cause this thing should be got rid of" - is it not so? Therefore, merely by cognizing that there is no Vastu existing, that Chitta becomes Nissanga (detached) and recedes, and once again it does not accept any cause or motive.

REALLY SPEAKING, CHITTA'S PRAVRITTI AND NIVRITTI ETC. ARE ABHŪTA ABHINIVESHA ALONE

Here if we consider only the literal meaning of the verse, it means only this much: "Due to the Abhinivesha of the type - 'Though there is no Vastu, it is there' - the Chitta is prompted to act; merely on cognizing the truth that - 'The Vastu does not exist' - it recedes." We should determine, decide that - "Even so, "Though there does not exist any Vastu externally, there invariably occurs an Abhinivesha of the type - 'The Vastu is there' - alone; in the same way, 'This is good; this is bad; this is desirable, this is undesirable' - we have such a staunch belief ; then, feeling that 'I am having attachment or hatred towards it, and in order to obtain or get rid of it I have Sankalpa (wish, volition) and Pravritti - all these are verily Abhinivesha that we entertain. In the same way we should also determine that a belief like - "With a conviction that - 'The Vastu does not exist' - I should give up the Adhyasa (misconception) of the type -'This is good, this is bad' - and then recede from such a transaction" - also is verily Abhinivesha. If it is so, then only there will be agreement, reconciliation between the sentence -

"The Anutpatti of the Chitta is Sama, Advaya" - (4-77) and this present sentence. In the same way, among the verses prior to or posterior to this verse, in their respective contexts we should see that they are all reconciled and discern that everything is Abhinivesha alone. We should also understand that the statements like - "He attains to an Abhayapada (a position or state of fearlessness)" - (4-77); "Then a Nishchala (unshakeable) Sthiti (state) accrues" - (4-80) - are also made only from Kalpita-samyriti standpoint alone.

निवृत्तस्याप्रवृत्तस्य निश्चला हि तदा स्थितिः।

विषयः स हि बुद्धानां तत्साम्यमजमद्वयम् ।।८०।।

Meaning: "Then the condition or state of the Chitta which has receded but which does not proceed forward is verily Nishchala (motionless, still). This is an object for the Jñānis, it is Sāmya (of one and the same nature), Aja, Advaya."

WHEN THE CHITTA BECOMES NIHSANGA (DETACHED) IT IS VERILY SAMA, AJA, ADVAYA ĀTMAN

In any case, in this manner with the cognition that - 'There is no Vastu' - it recedes and without engaging itself in another object which is similar to it, it rests - for such a Chitta, its state then is Nishchala (still). Because it has become quite certain that at the time or moment of Jnana this Chitta remains or stays put perennially introverted (Uparata), it has attained a resolute, steadfast or distinct state, which is devoid of any kind of motion, vibration whatsoever and which is verily Brahman - that is of Nityāchalaswabhāva (eternally motionless essential nature). This Chittasthiti (state of mind), which is verily of Brahmaswarūpa, Advaya Chaitanyamātra (non-dual Pure or Absolute Consciousness), exists only in the Intuitive Experience of Paramārthadarshis (Self-realized souls, Jñānis); this cannot possibly be known by the Ajñas (ignorant people) who have Abhinivesha (a staunch clinging or affinity) for Mithyāvastu (unreal, false appearances of material objects); what is appearing to their Chitta is Sāmvritika, meaning - projected by $Avidy\bar{a}$; it is $Sadvit\bar{i}ya$ (associated with duality); when its parts or components become uneven or imbalanced it is born, moves and then gets destroyed. But this truth is known only to Jñānis; therefore, since by its very

essential nature it is Niravayava (partless) it is Sāmya (the same everywhere), the components do not get split up and are not born, it is Nirvishesha (devoid of any special attributes); it is also Advaya (non-dual). This alone was mentioned as - 'अजित समतां गतम्' - (3-38) in the previous Chapter. There it was stated that 'निष्पत्रं ब्रह्म तत्तदा' - (3-40), meaning - "Then it became Brahman" - is it not so? Because it was a fruit accruing from Manōnigraha, it was stated like that; but here the special feature is: That very same thing has been mentioned as a fruit of Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge of the Self) which is devoid of duality - that is all.

Here by the expression - 'विषयः स हि बुद्धानाम्' - (It is an object for the Buddhas or Jñānis) - it is neither indicated here about a particular Samādhi (trance) nor the meaning that - 'For those who are not Jñānis to attain that Samādhi it is very difficult'; on the contrary, it is affirmed that although this state which is Aja, Advaya is Nityasiddha (eternally established and available), it can be known (Intuited) by that Experience (Anubhava) alone which Jñānis have attained; for, Ajñāna (ignorance, lack of knowledge) alone is the hurdle or concealing cover (impediment) for it. That is all.

अजमनद्रमस्वप्नं प्रभातं भवति स्वयम् । सकृद्धिभातो ह्येवैष धर्मो धातुस्वभावतः ॥८१॥

Meaning: "It is devoid of birth, of sleep, of dream, self-illumning. This *Dharma* (Entity) is by its very essential nature shining (illumining) incessantly."

ĀTMAN WHO IS APPEARING TO JÑĀNIS' ANUBHAVA IS OF KŪṬASTHA (ABSOLUTELY IMMUTABLE), CHINMĀTRA (PURE CONSCIOUSNESS), PRAKĀSHASWARŪPA (ESSENTIAL NATURE OF BRILLIANCE)

The special attribute of 'अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नम्' has been used in the Agama Prakaraṇa (1-16) and in the Advaita Prakaraṇa (3-36). Because It is without Agrahaṇa (not having comprehension), Anyathāgrahaṇa (misconception) - it is that which is devoid of mutations like Janma etc. - this is the implied meaning here. Because It is verily a mass, lump of Pure Consciousness

"Swayamprabhāta." (By Itself It is shining, It is self-effulgent), It need not be illumined by another. This aspect itself has been described in the Advaita Prakarana as "ज्ञेयाभित्रम्" - (3-33). This Dharma (Entity, Reality) called Ātman is "Sakridvibhāta", meaning - an eternally illumining, shining entity - to wit, by virtue of Dhātuswabhāva (Its very core of Being) It is Chidaikaprakāsharūpa (of the very essence of non-dual Light of Pure Consciousness). By virtue of Dhātuswabhāva means - by virtue of Vastuswabhāva (essential nature of Being, the Ultimate Reality) alone. The Śruti states that : "न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चंद्रतारकं । नेमा विद्युतो मांति कुतोऽयमिनः । तमेव भांतमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्विमदं विभाति ।।" - (Mundaka 2-2-10), meaning - "There even the sun does not shine, the moon or the stars do not shine; these lightnings also cannot shine, then where is the question of this fire shining? When He is shining all these are following Him and are shining, indeed; by means of His Light alone all this is shining."

COMMENTARY ON A VARIANT TEXT

There is also a variant text like - 'धातु: स्वभावतः'. In that context too it means: The Swatantravastu (independent Entity) of the essential nature of Paramatman or Supreme Self by virtue of Its very core of Being is eternally shining and hence It is 'Swayamprabhāta'. That which was, due to Samvriti, not shining in the beginning, by virtue of Jñāna It is 'shining' - for this empirical transaction 'It' becomes an object; but observed from the Paramartha Drishți - since It is ever shining, It is by Itself shining - this truth is cognized by the Jñanis. This is the implied meaning here. In the Advaita Prakarana also it was mentioned: 'अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमनामकमरूपकम् । सकृद्विभातं सर्वज्ञम्' (3-36) - in order to signify the teaching that - "By means of $\bar{A}tmasaty\bar{a}nub\bar{o}dha$ (Spiritual instruction about the Self as the Absolute Reality) when one cognizes (the Atmaswarūpa), there does not remain anything else to be done with regard to that Brahman Knowledge" but here it is stated that - "After having cognized the Truth there does not exist anything second to It, that Chitta which has receded (i.e. has become introverted and quiescent) - its Brāhmisthiti (state of total merger, rather becoming one with the Ultimate non-dual

Reality of Brahman-Ātman) is Swayamprabhāta (self-effulgent); for Its illumining It does not desiderate anything else at all" - This much alone is the difference between these two variant texts.

Here in this context - a modern scholar, Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya has imagined that - "Although Shri Gaudapādāchārya has used here the term 'Dharmadhātu' which is in vogue in Buddhistic literature, because he was not familiar with the Buddhistic philosophy (doctrines) he has imagined two variant expressions like 'धर्मो घातुस्वभावतः' and 'धर्मो घातुः स्वभावतः'. But in none of the hand-written manuscripts this latter variant text (i.e. Dharmō Dhatuhu Swabhāvataha) is to be seen; in case even if we assume that in some hand-written manuscript it does exist - in that event also, we can conceive of a suitable interpretation in the manner - 'Because this Paramartharupa Dharmadhātu, meaning - the Vastu or Reality which is the substrate for everything, of the essential nature of Paramārtha (Ultimate, Absolute Reality) - by Its very core of Being is Nityaprakāsha (eternally self-effulgent), for It there is no need whatsoever of a Light which accrues from Chittasamādhāna (quiescence, equanimity of the mind) etc.; for, It is Advaya'."

The word 'Dhātu' being used in this sense or with this connotation is to be seen in the Sūtra Bhāshya also. For instance, look at this sentence : "एक एव परमेश्वरः कृटस्थनित्यो विज्ञानघातुरविद्यया मायया मायाविवत् अनेकथा विभाव्यते नान्यो विज्ञानधातुरस्ति" - (Sūtra Bh. 1-3-19), meaning - "One and the same Parameshwara alone who is Vijñānadhātu (the very core of Being of Pure Consciousness) and Kūṭasthanitya (eternally Absolutely immutable), due to Avidyā - just as by virtue of Māyā there exists the Māyāvi - appears to the common people in various forms; there is no other Vijnanadhatu." It has already been stated that - "Both Chitta and Chetya - because they are devoid of any special signs or symbols - do not exist whatsoever" - (4-67) - is it not so? Therefore, since this Dharmadhātu is Advaya as also by Its very essence of Being -Nityaprakāsha - It is Swayamprabhāta; that is all, but this 'Dharmadhātu' is never illumined by any other entity. This is the implied meaning.

Here in this context 'Dharma' means Paramātman alone. In the Śruti - 'अणुरेष धर्मः' (Kathopanishad 1-1-21) this word is seen being used in the sense of 'Paramatman'. The reason for giving Him this name of 'Dhātu' is: Being the substrate for all Vikalpas (of the mind) this Paramatmatattwa 'wears' (Dhāraṇāt) them. Just like the Mūlabhūtadhātuvastus (primordial elements as the basic entities), because It has assumed Its uncommon or unusual form also, It has been given this name. Here 'Dharmadhātu' can never even possibly be suspected to mean 'Shūnya' (essencelessness) which the Buddhists, who are outside the purview of the Vedas, have assumed. For, with that meaning the Kārikā's purport does not become suitable, agreeable at all. The Buddhists' doctrine is: "तथता भूतकोटिश्चानिमित्तः (परमार्थकः) । धर्मधातुश्च पर्यायाः शून्यतायाः समासतः ।। -(Madhyāntavibhāga Sūtra 1-15) ; "अनन्यथाऽविपर्यासस्तित्ररोधार्यगोचरैः । हेतुत्वाच्चार्यधर्माणां पर्यायार्थो यथा क्रमम् ॥" - (Ma. Vi. Sūtra 1-15, 16) -[Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhattāchārya has quoted these two verses culling them from "Madhyāntavibhāga Sūtra", of Maitreyanātha, in his book 'Agamashāstra'. In the first verse the synonyms of 'Shunyata' are found; in the second the meaning of introspection those words is to be found]. The implicit meaning of these verses (which is their opinion) is: Beginning with Samyagdrishti up to Samyagvimukti jñāna (the subtle knowledge of Liberation) whatever the Aryadharmas are there - for all of them since it is the cause, 'Shūnyata' alone is the 'Dharmadhātu' for them.

But neither the topic of those Dharmas nor their Hetu (cause) is to be found here. Especially the qualifying attribute of 'अजमानद्रमस्वानम्' can never be suitable for 'Shūnyatwa'. Because the common people, who are seeing a dream due to Anādimāyā, have an Abhinivesha towards Dharmas viz. 'Chittadrishya' due to Saṃvṛiti - they experience Nidrāsvapna like, 'Agrahaṇa', 'Anyathāgrahaṇa'; but when these (ignorant) common people acquire the 'waking' of the nature of Jñāna of the type - "We are really Aja-Advaya-Ātmans only" - then invariably the Intuitive Knowledge of the type - "That Paramātman who is Anidra, Asvapna, Sakridvibhāta is Himself our Ātman" - accrues; 'Paramātmarūpa will shine by Itself as their Ātman' - in this interpretation the qualifying attribute of 'Ajamanidramasvapnam'

is rendered quite suitable. Therefore, here there is no scope whatsoever for the Buddhistic doctrine to be introduced or interpolated. Our explanation alone is the one which is a suitable commentary for the topic under discussion and deliberation.

24. THE TATTWA WHICH IS AJA-ADVAYA IS CONCEALED BY *MITHYĀGRAHAŅA* (MISCONCEPTION)

सुखमावियते नित्यं दुःखं विवियते सदा । यस्य कस्य च धर्मस्य ग्रहेण भगवानसौ ॥८२॥

Meaning: "By assuming any particular *Dharma* (special attribute) this Bhagavanta gets always hidden very easily; and always He gets manifested with difficulty."

ALTHOUGH ĀTMAN IS NITYAPRAKĀSHARŪPA, HE IS ONE HAVING THE COVER OF MISCONCEPTION

Even after affirming in this manner, if the question is raised as to - 'How come this Paramartha Tattwa of Nityashuddhabuddhamuktaswabhāva is not known by the common run of people?" - the answer is: Because of comprehending, grasping - meaning, because of Abhimana (the pride or identification with) the belief that 'we are grasping'; to wit, because of Mithyā Abhinivesha (vain, false sense of affinity, clinging on to a preconceived notion). 'Mithyāgrahaṇa' means 'not really comprehending'; 'Mithyā Kōpa' - means 'enacted (false) anger or dramatic acting as if angry' alone, is it not so? In the same way, due to Mithyāgrahaņa - meaning, due to the false notion or misconception that we are comprehending, knowing something - alone this Bhagavanta, meaning the Divine Being who is Nityaswatantra (eternally independent) and Advaya, though He is Nityanirāvaraņa Jñānaswarūpa (eternally devoid of being concealed and of the very essence of Intuitive Knowledge), easily without any strain gets hidden. Just as the sun is 'covered up' by a cloud, He is 'concealed' by the cover of misconception. Seeing duality is the only cover for Atman who is Bhagavanta; no other real cover is needed; and He manifests Himself with Duhkha (grief or difficulty). Although He is verily of the essential nature of

eternal manifestation due to the Abhinivesha of the type of - "We are comprehending a Mithyāvastu" - there has been an apparent impediment for His brilliance, effulgence as Pure Consciousness. Just as for a person who has turned or directed his attention towards another direction or region, though a golden necklace worn around his neck is shining, it is not perceptible - in the same way, although the Tattwa is Swayamprakāshaswarūpa, for the extroverted (Bahırmukhachitta) people it is very difficult to cognize or Intuit and hence it is stated here - "Always with Duhkha It gets manifested". For this reason, although both the Upanishads and the $\overline{A}ch\overline{a}rya$ (preceptor) are teaching with the aid of various methodologies and pedagogic devices, for the Ajñas it is not possible to cognize Him. The Śruti states this : 'शृण्वन्तोऽपि बहवो यं न विद्युः । आश्चर्यो वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्धा' -(Kathopanishad 1-2-7), meaning - 'Although many people listen to this Atman's Swarupa, they are not able to cognize It; one who preaches is of a wonderful nature; one who obtains or secures Him is a wiseman."

HERE BHAGAVĀN MEANS ĀTMAN ALONE

"In this Prakarana the deliberation on 'Dharmadhatu' is taken up; Shūnyatā alone which is Dharmadhātu has been called 'Bhagavān' here" - thus some present-day research scholars have opined. It is their belief that previously from Verse 4-80 to 4-84 because there was discussion about the state of the Chitta alone, here there is no scope for Atmavichara at all. But the purport of the Prakarana is to refute the doctrine of the Vijnanavadin alone, in the manner - "Chitta is not born, nor is the Chittadrishya born." Apart from this, here in this context the teaching that - 'Both these are not born' - alone is not relevant; on the contrary, what is really, more importantly relevant is: 'Just as Chittadrishya is not separate from Chitta, in the same way apart from Ātman, who is Chidrūpa, Chitta does not exist.' Therefore, in the Prakarana wherein it is taught that - "Aja-Anidra-Asvapna Advaita Ātman alone is Paramārtha" - how at all can there be any scope for Shunya? - This question these research scholars alone have to answer. If one keeps in mind the fact that - "In order to demonstrate the truth that Atman alone is Aja - a proper Yukti has been utilized in this Ajāti Prakaraņa"

- then the truth Here in this context, there is no relevance of Shūnyavāda of Buddhism - will become very clear.

अस्ति नास्यस्तिनास्तीति नास्तिनास्तीति वा पुनः । चलस्थिरोभयाभावैरावृणोत्येव बालिशः ।।८३।।

Meaning: "He exists, does not exist, though existing does not exist - in this manner, never at all He exists; moving, steady, both and non-existent - by these one, who is childish, is incessantly covering Him up."

THE VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH THE EXAMINERS OR OBSERVERS MISCONCEIVE

Because they are endowed with subtle observations, even the 'knowledges' of those who are famous as scholars are rendered to be verily 'covers' for Bhagavanta; it being so, where is the question of mentioning about the knowledges of foolish people who are highly materialistic? - This topic has been proved here in this verse.

Some people have believed, with regard to Ātman, that He is Sattāyukta Asti (He exists), meaning - He is (associated with existence); He does not exist - thus the Kshaṇikavādins among the Buddhists, as also the Lōkāyatikas, meaning - Chārvākas (materialists) have believed; the Ardhavaināshika (half Nihilists) Digambaras (among the Jains) have believed that the Tattwa may be existing (Syādasti) or may not also be existing (Syānnāsti) in Sadasat form. The Buddhistic Shūnyavādins believes that the Tattwa does not at all exist; being devoid of both the opposite categories of Astitwa and Nāstitwa, It is Nihswabhāva (essenceless), Nirupākhya (indefinable).

Here Asti (exists) - this form is Chala; for, it belongs to Anityavastus (non-eternal objects) like an earthen pot etc. Nāsti (not existing) - this form is Sthira; for, it has never any special attribute or feature whatsoever. Asti Nāsti (though existing, non-existent) - this form is Chalasthirarūpa; Nāstināsti (never existing) - is especially Atyantābhāva. For, in it Astitwa etc. - no such categories whatsoever ever exist.

Because due to the Abhinivesha alone of the non-existing

concepts like Asti etc. of the forms of Chala etc. are appearing in the Bhagavatswarūpa, devoid of any special characteristics whatsoever, all these people like Sadvādi etc. are incessantly covering up Bhagavanta due to their Mithyāgrahaņa (misconceptions) - meaning, they staunchly believe that the Bhagavattattwa is concealed alone. This is the implied purport here. For, although the sun is Nityaprakāsha Swarūpa alone, the foolish ignorant people think that the clouds - which are being seen with the help of his rays alone - cover up the sun; in the same way, these disputants too are trying to cover up Bhagavanta with their own Mithyagrahana of the type of Asti, Nasti etc.; but this Bhagavanta - in the Absolute sense - is verily of Chaitanyasvabhāva which is eternally shining (manifested); by means of His brilliance (Pure Consciousness) He is illumining everything; all concepts too are being illumined and manifested by His Chaitanyaprakāsha alone. Even so, the nondiscriminating people are carrying on their disputes as if to conceal Him by means of their respective beliefs, concepts. Although these disputants have reckoned themselves to be *Panditas* (scholars) and though some of their followers too are believing so, because they have not cognized the Paramartha, they are just like children - ignorant of the Truth indeed.

THE ASTITWAVĀDA (THEORY OF EXISTENCE) THAT IS FOUND IN THE ŚRUTI IS KALPITASAMVŖITI

(Doubt): In the Śruti - 'अस्तीत्येवोपलब्यव्यः' - (One should reckon that He exists alone) - also, Astitwa (concept of existence) alone is taught, is it not so ? It being so, is it proper to have ridiculed the Astitwavādins calling them 'childish' ?

(Solution): This is not at all wrong. For, the Sruti has no prime purport in instructing Astitwa (empirical existence). For the purpose of cognizing the truth that - "The Tattwa is devoid of any special characteristics" - using as a device this Astitwa as an Adhyārōpa (superimposition) - this instruction is imparted. Because of the facts that: (a) all through the people's intellect (sense of awareness) is associated with the sense of the type - 'It exists' - with regard to the Kārya (effect, object) of the external world; (b) even if the Kārya of the world gets 'merged' (Laya), it culminates in the sense of - "It exists" - alone; (c)

even the Buddhi (intellect) which cognizes that the object does not 'exist' is itself invariably associated with the Pratyaya (concept of certainty) and gets merged - the Sruti in order to refute or negate the 'Asadvāda' (theory or concept of non-existence) instructs in the manner - "One should cognize, reckon (this Ātman) to exist alone." But here too it is not the ultimate intention of the Sruti to indicate that - "Astibhāva (concept of existence) itself is the Tattwa (Ultimate, Absolute Reality)" - at all. When the Sruti teaches the Tattwa devoid of any Upādhis (adjuncts) whatsoever, it instructs only by negating all special characteristics in the manner - 'Not this, not that'. Therefore, in the Sruti quoted by the opponent who has raised the doubt, it is also stated that: 'अस्तीत्येवोपलव्यस्य तत्त्वभावः प्रसीदति' - (After cognizing It to be existing, the Tattwabhāva or the object of the Ultimate Reality will become (Prasanna) revealed or manifest". Therefore, there is no contradiction whatsoever in the instruction of the Sruti.

Hence, what we stated that - 'Even those disputants who have become known to be erudite, great scholars are verily childish in this regard' - is correct indeed. Thus when it is said that even for examiners (or researchers) there is *Mithyādrishṭi* (false viewpoint), what is there to be gainsaid about extroverted people who are by their very nature foolish, puerile?

ONLY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF LŌKASAMVŖITI (UNIVERSAL EMPIRICAL DEALINGS DUE TO MISCONCEPTION) ASTITWA ETC. ARE ĀVARAŅA

Here there lurks a secret to be discerned: 'Saṃvṛiti' is of two kinds viz. Lōkasaṃvṛiti and Kalpitasaṃvṛiti. Between these two, because Lōkasaṃvṛiti is caused by misconception alone, wherever concepts like Astitwa, Nāstitwa etc. are believed to be real - in all such cases it amounts to our having invariably concealed the essential nature of Bhagavanta. On the contrary, in the case of Kalpitasaṃvṛiti, because the knowledgeable traditional preceptors have, for the purpose of teaching the Tattwa (Absolute Reality), following the Adhyārōpa-Apavāda-Nyāya (maxim of deliberate superimposition and rescission), assumed tentatively certain special attributes or features for Ātman - by this superimposition really no Āvarana whatsoever ensues. Even

when they assert that - "Atman exists" - in their mind, in the real sense, the misconception of the type - "In Him there exists a quality or special attribute of 'existence' or 'being' -" - is not engendered, and hence there is no defect tainting their Antahkarana (mind) at all. When observed from this viewpoint - even when the Sruti teaches in the manner - "One should cognize that Atman exists only" - it is an empirical transaction carried out due to 'Kalpitasamvriti' (deliberate superimposition) with the intention of turning, inducing the intellect (discriminative faculty) of the Jijñāsus towards the Tattwa alone; but not stated in order to establish the minds of Jijnasus in Astitwa (the empirical concepts of existence etc.). For, if it is assumed that - "The ultimate purport of the Sruti in indicating, instructing that Atman is really an object for an intellect entertaining the sense or awareness of 'existence' " - then what we stated in the beginning as a preamble with the aid of the Sruti in the manner - 'नैव वाचा न मनसा' - (Kathōpanishad 2-3-12), meaning - "Stating by speech (or words) or imagined by the mind, He cannot possibly be cognized" - will be rendered false. Apart from this, in Śrutis like: 'अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मात्' - (Katha 1-2-14), meaning - "It is different from Dharma, is different from Adharma"; 'अशब्दमस्पर्शम्' -(Katha 1-3-25), meaning - "It is devoid of sound, touch, form, taste, smell" - thus all aspects of \overline{A} varana have been very clearly sublated, negated. Therefore, the Sruti saying - "He exists" - is not at all defective. In the same way, even if it is stated - with the intention or perfect understanding that everything (nay, all duality) is Kalpita (superimposed upon) in Atman - that "Bhagavanta is 'Sarvarūpa' - " - there will not be any defect whatsoever tainting that teaching; for, even stating in that manner is verily from the viewpoint of Kalpitasamvriti. In the Vishnupurāna it is stated that - 'ज्योतींबि विष्णुर्पुवनानि विष्णुर्वनानि विष्णुर्गिरयो दिशश्च । नद्यः समुद्राश्च स एव सर्वं यदस्ति यत्रास्ति च विप्रवर्यः ॥' - (Vishnupurāṇa 2-12-38), meaning - "The brilliant bodies like stars etc. are verily Vishnu, big mansions are verily Vishnu, forests too are verily Vishnu, mountains, cardinal directions too are verily Himself; rivers, seas, all are Himself; whatever things exist, whatever things do not exist - all those

are verily Himself, oh dear, great among Brahmins)!" - even this statement should be understood in the same manner. Therefore, what was said by us - "In various forms like Asti, Nāsti etc. the Avivekin has concealed Ātman" - is correct indeed.

25. ĀTMAJÑĀNI IS OMNISCIENT, ONE WHO HAS FULFILLED THE PRIME PURPORT OF LIFE

कोट्यश्चतस्र एतास्तु ग्रहैर्यासां सदाऽऽवृतः । भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दृष्टः स सर्वदृक् ।।८४।।

Meaning: "That Bhagavanta who, because He is comprehending the four categories or corners (of empiricism), is always covered up - one who has seen (cognized) such a Bhagavanta who is devoid of any taint of these categories is verily a Sarvadarshi (omni-perceiver)."

PARAMĀTMAN IS DEVOID OF FOUR CATEGORIES OR CHATUSHKŌŢI (CORNERS) OF EMPIRICAL DEALINGS OF THE TYPE ASTI, NĀSTI ETC.

In that case, how is this Paramārthatattwa (existing)? Only if It is known, people are not called 'Avivekins' but are recognized as Jñānis, is it not so? - if this question is raised, the answer is:

Asti, Nāsti, Asti-nāsti, Nāsti-nāsti (He exists; He does not exist; though existing He does not exist; He never exists at all) - in this manner the various disputants have decided these four Kōṭis (categories) - is it not so? By the comprehension (awareness) of these categories alone that Bhagavanta is always covered up. It has amounted to their misconceptions having apparently covered up that Bhagavanta. This 'Āvaraṇa' is confined to the respective disputant alone and it is not applicable to everyone. Therefore, in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa it was stated that - "That entity which the preceptor propounds (shows) - that entity alone the disciple comprehends (sees)" (2-29). These, in fact, do not taint or touch the Ātmavastu at all; meaning, by means of the cognition of these categories of Asti, Nāsti etc. though Paramātman appears as if He is covered up by these empirical concepts, in reality they have not reached out to Him.

For this, the Śruti: 'स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा अगृद्धो न हि गृद्धते' - (Bṛi. 3-9-26), meaning - "That this alone is the Ātman taught as Neti, Neti (Not this, not this); He is Agrāhya (incomprehensible); for, He is not to be comprehended with any means whatsoever" - is the authoritative source.

HERE 'BHAGAVĀN' MEANS NIRVISHESHA ĀTMAN ALONE

(Objection): 'ज्ञानशक्तिवलैश्चर्यवीर्यतेजांस्यशेषतः । मगवच्छव्दवाच्यानि विना हेयेर्गुणदिषिः' - (Vishṇupurāna 3-5-79), meaning - "Barring those qualities which are to be discarded, the remaining qualities or excellences like Jñāna, Bala. Shakti, Aishwarya, Virya, Tejas etc. with all such Kalyāṇaguṇas (berngn, beneficent qualities) He is endowed that Paramātman alone is fit to be called 'Bhagavān'. Thus sages like Parāshara etc. are sayıng. It being so, how can the assertion of Shri Śaṅkara that - "Paramārtha Tattwa alone which is devoid of all the attributes, categories like Asti, Nāsti etc. is the meaning for that word 'Bhagavān'" - be proper, justifiable?

(Solution): There is no defect whatsoever in this. For, though Paramātman who is verily the $\bar{A}tman$ (i.e. the very substrate) for qualities like Jñāna, Bala etc. is not the object for any Shabda (word) or Pratyaya (concept), in comparison with Jivas who are endowed with Ajñāna (ignorance), Ashakti (powerlessness) etc. He is stated - in Gounavritti (a secondary sense) - to be endowed with benign and beneficent qualities like Jñāna, Bala, Shakti etc. Here even the difference of Guna (quality) and Guni (one endowed with that quality) does not really exist. In the same Vishnu Purāṇa it has been stated : 'अशब्दगोचरस्यापि तस्य वै ब्रह्मणो द्विज । पूजायां भगवच्छब्दः क्रियते ह्यूपचारतः' - (Vish. Pu. 6-5-71), meaning - "Though that Paramatman is not at all an object for words, for namesake He is called 'Bhagavanta' to signify reverence as a formality." Even in the Sruti which the doubting opponent had quoted the difference of Guna and Guni is refuted and it has been stated that Jñāna, Bala, Shakti etc. alone are Bhagavanta. For the expression - 'दिना हेथैर्गुणादिभिः' - the meaning is: Barring the Heyadharmas (qualities which are to be discarded) like Guṇa, Kriyā which are conjured up by Avidyā, the

benign hallmarks of Bhagavanta like Jñāna, Bala etc. are called by the word 'Bhagavanta'. Apart from this, this Bhagavanta called 'Brahman', being Nirvishesha (devoid of any special attributes), is Sarvātmaka (the very essence of everything); hence apart from Him the phenomenon called 'Saguṇabrahman' does not exist whatsoever. It has been stated by the knowledgeable sages, on the basis of (or from the view-point of) Kalpitasaṃvṛiti alone that - 'He alone who is Sarvaguṇātmaka merely by His will (volition) has assumed (worn) the bodies of everyone'. This very Nirvishesha Brahman Itself, endowed with the special attributes of names and forms projected by Avidyā, has been recommended in the Śāstra for the benefit of low-class and middle-class seekers for special Upāsanas (meditations).

Hence, the sage Parāshara has said : 'समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकोऽसौ स्वशक्तिलेशावृतभूतवर्गः । इच्छागृहीताभिमतोरुदेहः संसाधिताशेषजगद्धितो यः' - (Vishņu Purāṇa 6-6-84), meaning - "He is endowed with all benign and beneficent qualities; by virtue of one part of His power He has covered up the whole gamut of the empirical, physical objects; merely by His will, whatever serene, excellent bodies He likes He wears or assumes and whatever good has to accrue to the whole world that He provides." Therefore, here there is no defect whatsoever in our calling Nirvishesha Brahman 'Bhagavān'.

HOW COME A SEER OF NIRVISHESHĀTMAN IS OMNISCIENT?

That Muni (sage) who has cognized such a Bhagavanta is verily a Sarvadarshi; meaning - he alone is Sarvajña, a Paṇḍita (scholar) who has known the Paramārtha (the Absolute, Ultimate Reality). Aja-Advaya-Ātman alone is everything, is it not so? Therefore, one who has cognized that Ātman is said to be Sarvadarshi.

प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृत्स्नां त्राह्मण्यं पदमद्वयम् । अनापत्रादिमध्यान्तं किमतः परमीहते ॥८५॥

Meaning: "Because he has attained complete Omniscience (Pūrņasarvajñatā) as also Advaya-Brāhmaṇya (non-dual

Brahmanhood), devoid of categories like beginning, middle and end, herefore how can he perform any Karma at all?"

BRAHMAJÑĀNI IS KŖITAKŖITYA (ONE WHO HAS ACHIEVED WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED IN LIFE)

Because it is said - "One who has attained this Pūrnasarvajñatā" - it amounts to having signified that just like Darshanakāras like Kapila, Buddha etc. who have cognized only the Anatman akin to Apūrņa (incomplete) Sarvajnatwa (omniscience), this is not Akritsna (incomplete, immature). Just as it is stated in the Śruti: 'कस्मिन्न भगवो विज्ञाते सर्विमिदं विज्ञातं भवति' - (Mundaka 1-1-5) - "That Entity which if cognized it amounts to cognizing everything" - that person who has cognized that Brahman is called here 'Pūrņasarvajña'. That person who has Intuited that Brahman is verily Advaya Brāhmana. On the authority of the Śruti sentence: 'य एतदक्षरं विदित्वाऽस्माल्लोकात् प्रैति स ब्राह्मणः' - (Bri. 3-8-9), meaning - "Oh Gārgi, that person who cognizes this Akshara (Reality devoid of destruction or emaciation) and goes away from this Löka - he alone is Brāhmaṇa" - (the definition of the word 'Brāhmaņa' or what is called in our common parlance 'Brāhmin' is given here) - 'One who cognizes Brahmātman and transcends the Samsāralōka which is the object for Mithyāgrahaņa (also called Adhyāsa in Vedānta, i.e. 'I' notion) is himself called 'Brāhmaṇa'. Apart from this, just as the Śruti says: 'एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य', meaning - "For a Brahmin this alone is the Nitya (eternal) Mahima (greatness, excellence)" because one who has cognized Brahman which is described as "Neti, Neti" is himself one who has attained the Nitya Mahimā which is devoid of any increase or decrease, in the predominant sense, he is said to be 'Brāhmaṇa'. Because the person, who has attained this 'Brāhmanyapada' (state of Brahmanhood) which is beyond *Utpatti* (birth), *Sthiti* (sustenance), *Laya* (dissolution), has verily attained the $L\bar{a}bha$ (profit or precious benefit) of Atman who is Advitiya - herefore what can there remain for him to be done or achieved ? For this reason alone, in the Sruti : 'आत्मानं चेद् विजानीयात् अयमस्मीति पूरुषः । किमिच्चन् कस्य कामाय शरीरवनुसंज्जरेत् ॥' -(Bri. 4-4-12), meaning - "If a human being cognizes in the

manner - 'I am this Brahman' - desiring which object and for quenching, satiating which desire can he torture the body?" - thus it is stated. Even the Smritis too are saying: "Greater than Ātmalābha there is no other Lābha" - (Āpastamba Sūtra 1-8-22-1) etc. In the **Bhagavadgītā** also it is stated: "For him by doing anything there is no benefit whatsoever that has to accrue" - (Gītā 3-18).

विप्राणां विनयो ह्येष शमः प्राकृत उच्यते । दमः प्रकृतिदान्तत्वादेवं विद्वान् शमं व्रजेत् ।।८६।।

Meaning: "For the wise the dignity is this alone; this alone is said to be the natural Shama (control of the mind); because by its very nature it is $D\bar{a}nta$ (tamed, subdued) this alone is Dama (control over the senses), one who has known like this, attains Shama."

THERE IS NO NEED FOR A JÑĀNI TO MAKE ANY EFFORT TO ACQUIRE SHAMA, DAMA ETC.

(Question): Because there is a Śruti sentence like: "One who has cognized in this manner should become Shānta, Dānta, Uparata, Titikshu and endowed with Shraddha and recognize Ātman in himself alone" - (Bṛi. 4-2-28), even a Jñāni should be performing Sādhanas like Shama, Dama etc. prescribed by the Śāstra, is it not so? Since there is also a Gītā statement like - "This is verily called 'Jñāna', what is different from this is Ajñāna" - (Gītā 13-11) the seeker should be practising Sādhanas like Amānitwa etc., is it not so?

Answer: Not so. For, to be established in Ātmaswarūpa alone is the natural Vinaya (humility) for Brahmajñānis. For them this alone is said to be the natural Shama. Because by Its very nature Brahmātman is *Upashānta* (quiescent), this alone is their Dama. Just as the ignorant people's senses whisk away the mind due to its Rāga-Dwesha, they do not at all drag the mind of these Jñānis. It being so, where is the question of a *Vidhi* (scriptural injunction) stipulating that a Brahmajñāni should practise disciplines like Shama, Dama etc. ?

Therefore, since the person who has cognized such an Advayabrahman is established in Brahmaswarūpa alone, he is

always endowed with the essential nature of Shama-Dama etc. These Sādhanas in their entirety rest in him as though they are decorative ornaments. Like the *Mumukshus* (seekers desirous of Liberation in this very life-span), the Jñāni need not at all practise these.

26. THE QUINTESSENCE OF OUR OWN METHODOLOGY

सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते । अवस्तु सोपलम्भं च शुद्धं लौकिकमिष्यते ॥८७॥

अवस्त्वनुपलम्भं च लोकोत्तरिमिति स्मृतम् । ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च विज्ञेयं सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम् ॥८८॥

Meaning: "That duality which is associated with substance and awareness is called 'Loukika'. That which is devoid of substance but having Upalambha (recognition or comprehension otherwise than from memory, the same as Anubhava) is called 'Shuddhaloukika'. But that which is not having either substance or cognition, awareness is called 'Lōkōttara'; thus the knowledgeable people are always talking about Jñāna, Jñeya and Vijñeya."

RELATIONSHIP OF THE TEXT

Because in this manner the philosophies of the various disputants are mutually opposed to one another and are responsible for Rāga-Dwesha, the fact that all of them are *Mithyādarshanas* (false, pseudo-philosophies) has been proved by means of their own respective Yuktis alone, and thereby it has been demonstrated convincingly that the Aja-Advaita-Darshana (i.e. Advaita Vedānta) itself which is devoid of the four-cornered logic or dialectical categories (called 'Chatush Kōti') as also which does not give any room for Rāga and Dwesha etc., is a *Maṅgalakara* (auspicious and beneficent) and by its very nature a *Shānta* (blissful) philosophy (i.e. spiritual science), and hence it amounts to our having concluded the truth: first, as stated in 4-2, this Darshana is devoid of disputes or controversies and secondly, it

is not opposed to anything else. Now Shri Gaudapāda undertakes to expound, though briefly, this his own Vedantic Prakriya (methodology) alone. In fact, to observe the three states of Consciousness of waking, dream and deep sleep (and to cognize the Vedāntic truths) is itself the unique Vedānta Prakriyā. So far by means of Yukti the truth that Aja-Advaya-Ātmatattwa alone is the Paramārtha has been shown, is it not so? This alone is in consonance with Sārvatrika Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience); (a) Whereas the philosophies of the various disputants which are predominantly logic-oriented do not possess this capacity; (b) though keeping the Buddhists' Yuktis in the forefront in this Prakarana the teaching has been expounded, the objective of inculcating the fact that - 'Between the first Agama Prakarana, which has begun its teaching based predominantly on Sruti instructions, and this fourth Alātashānti Prakaraņa there is complete agreement' - is the important benefit that accrues from the detailed consideration of this genuine, unique Vedāntic methodology. By this it amounts to having concluded the entire gamut of the Śāstraic teachings.

IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE PARAMĀRTHA LOUKIKA, SHUDDHA LOUKIKA AND LŌKŌTTARA ARE A DEVICE

The state of Consciousness which is the support or substrate for the whole gamut of Avidyā Vyavahāra (empirical transactions conjured up by ignorance) of duality which comprises Samvriti Sadrūpa Vastu (a substance which is endowed with empirical reality) awareness - meaning the Sastra, the Shishya and the Shāsaka (preceptor) and which is the support for Dvaita of the type of Grāhya and Grāhaka - is 'Loukika', means Jāgarita Avasthā. In fact, in Vedānta this alone is accepted as the 'Jāgarita Avasthā' (i.e. this is the Śāstraic definition of waking in Vedānta) but our commonplace empirical waking is not at all accepted as really endowed with any substantiality. It has already been stated that - "That thing which exists due to (from the viewpoint of) Kalpitasamvriti does not at all exist (Absolutely) from the Paramārtha Drishţi" - (4-73), is it not so? Without the Samvritivastu, mere cognition or awareness existing is called 'Shuddha Loukika', meaning 'Svapna'. Here the subtle teaching of Vedanta that - "The waking state is gross and is common,

equal to everyone, while the dream state is different from the waking which is grosser than the dream, and it is visible, perceptible exclusively to the dreamer - is said from the waking Samvritidrishti (viewpoint of empirical reality) alone" - should not be forgetten. For, it has been taught here that the Avasthātraya which is established by virtue of Samvriti is itself the 'Upāya' (a subtle device) for the Paramārtha Darshana (the Intuitive Experience of the Ultimate, Absolute Reality of Vedāntic spiritual science, philosophy).

Further, the essential nature of deep sleep is being described in detail. That state of Consciousness in which there is neither Vastu (substance), and knowledge or cognition of it nor the dual aspects of Grāhya and Grāhaka is called 'Lōkōttara', meaning 'Sushupti or deep sleep'. The word 'Lōka' connotes 'being cognized and cognizing; devoid of both these, that state which is the seed or cause for all empirical procedures (Pravṛitti) is 'Lōkōttara', meaning deep sleep.

THE IMPLICIT MEANING OF WORDS LIKE 'LOUKIKA' ETC.

For the words like 'Loukika' etc. that are used here in this context we should not conceive that they mean merely the waking, the dream etc. On the contrary, we should reckon that they connote both meanings of Sthāna (place, region), Sthāni (the occupier of the region) or Avasthā (the state) and the Sākshi (Witnessing Principle) of the state viz. Atman. Just as we have to assume the implied meaning of the sentence - "We should not enter the town" - (Gautama Dharma Sūtra 1-4-32) so as to imply both the town and the residents of the town, in the same way here also we have to interpret it. In fact, in order to determine the Paramarthaswarupa of Atman who is Avasthavanta (associated with a state) alone these words like Loukika etc. are utilized. For that reason only we should discern that here for the expression - 'इतिस्रृतम्' - found in the second verse above the intended purport is that the Paramartha Tattwa associated with this device has been signified in this manner.

To wit: "Jñāna means that Intuitive Cognition (Knowledge) by means of which people cognize, without desiderating any instruments or senses or mind whatsoever, all the three states like Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lōkōttara - i.e. they cognize

by means of Jnana which is Nirvikalpaka (devoid of any concepts), Anubhavarūpa (of the very essence of Intuitive Experience)." 'Jñeya' means all the three states like Loukika etc. taken together. For, apart from these there is no other phenomenon whatsoever to be called Jñeya (object of knowledge). For this reason alone, it was stated in the Agama Prakarana that -"Including the \overline{A} dhidaivika (celestial plane, region) also the entire Prapañcha (world of duality) is implied in the Loukika (waking state)". The implied purport here is that - "Sānkhyans and the other disputants - all of them - whatever Tattwas (entities) they have imagined are all misconceived and included in these three states alone." Hence, if we cognize the Tattwa of all these three (i.e. the Absolute Reality which is the substrate, backdrop of the three states of awareness), it is tantamount to cognizing everything. Further, the word 'Vijneya' means: When we observe these three plenary experiences of Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lōkōttara, that Paramārtha Tattwa which becomes 'Sākshātkāra' (Intuited spontaneously and effusively), meaning - the 'Turyātma' Tattwa which is Aja (birthless), Advaya (non-dual). Thus, beginning with Loukika, what is 'existing' up to Vijneya is both the Upāya (device) and the Upeya (the object pointed out by the device) - thus the 'Buddhas' - i.e. Paramartha Darshis - affirm.

FOR THE WORDS LIKE LOUKIKA ETC. THERE IS NO PURPORT OF INDICATING THE 'JÑĀNAS' OF YŌGĀCHĀRA PHILOSOPHY

In the Buddhistic school of philosophy called 'Yōgāchāra' these three words of Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lōkōttara are used for three kinds of knowledge. But those meanings cannot possibly be adopted or assumed here. According to that Buddhistic philosophy, 'Loukika' means the commonplace Grāhya-Grāhaka Vishayajñāna (empirical subject-object knowledge) which is universal. 'Shuddha Loukika' means Paratantraswabhāva Jñāna (knowledge dependent upon an external agency). 'Lōkōttara' means the Nirvikalpa Jñāna (awareness devoid of any special attributes or features) that accrues or ensues in a state when there is neither the Grāhakachitta (comprehending mind) nor the Grāhyavastu (object which is comprehended); because it has transcended the Lōka (empirical world of duality) it is called 'Lōkōttara'. Then to the Yōgi, who has entered into the Vijñaptimātra (pure aware-

ness, consciousness), a resultant fruit accrues - thus the Yōgāchāras opine. [For this doctrine refer to Mādhyamika Vṛitti, page 185].

But here (in Shri Gaudapāda's Kārikā) for the purpose of cognizing the Vijñeya (object of Intuition) called 'Turiya' as a device the Avasthātraya of the type of Loukika etc. and its Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) is taught. Therefore, both these *Prasthānas* (approaches) are different, distinct from each other. Because special characteristics like - "Dvaya is called Loukika" etc. - which describe the Jñeyaswarūpa (the essential nature of the object to be known) are mentioned, thus it should be interpreted differently here. 'स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः' - (Māṇḍūkya Mantra 7) - thus the Turiyātman has been described in the Upanishad, is it not so? That very thing is expounded by using the word 'Vijneya'. Apart from this, the proponents or followers of Yogachara philosophy have not accepted at all the fact that - "Apart from the Chitta or mind which is the Grāhaka (comprehending principle) there exists a Vijñeya (an object of comprehension)." In their teaching - for the Chitta alone which is devoid of 'Samklesha' is called 'Alayavijñana'; they have accepted that such a Chitta becomes Anāsrava (independent), Dhruva (eternal, immortal) by virtue of Advayajñāna (non-dual knowledge) which is Nirvikalpa (devoid of special attributes).

OBJECTIONS AND SOLUTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE USAGE OF WORDS LIKE LOUKIKA ETC.

(Question): No one among the ancients has called all the three states like the waking etc. by names like Loukika etc., is it not so? These words are profusely used in Buddhistic texts only. It being so, in the sense that no one has previously used - why is it that these words are used to cause delusion among the Shrōtṛus?

(in keeping with the syllogistic meaning) they can be used by anyone - whosoever he may be - in the sense of - 'commonplace, known or familiar to everyone' etc. as they like. There are no conventions stipulating that these words should be interpreted in such and such a manner with a particular meaning only. It is true that Yōgāchāras use these with certain conventional meanings. But in these senses they are using them as Pāribhāshika (tech-

nical terminology) and hence they cannot compel everyone to use them with that technical meaning alone. This is not a chapter devoted to divide Jñāna; the author Shri Gauḍapādāchārya also in the past had not divided or separated Jñāna in this queer manner. It is self-evident from these verses that by means of the devices of Jñāna and Jñeya, he has taken up the subtle task of recognizing (Intuiting) the Vijñeya. It being so, it is incomprehensible or inscrutable to explain away as to how could this alien methodology of Yōgāchāra be suddenly (abruptly) brought forth here? When the opinion that - "In the first Āgama Prakaraṇa through the device of Avasthātraya (that is found in the Śāstra, Upanishad) the Turīya is propounded or taught and then that very Turīya is being concluded here" - is compatible, to interpolate an alien methodology not relevant to the context is not justifiable also.

Apart from this, the word 'Loka' being used significantly for Avasthas cannot possibly be said to be extremely unfamiliar to Vedic scholars. In the Śruti: 'स समानः सनुभौलोकावनुसंचरित' - (Bṛi. 4-3-7), meaning - "He being equal to the mind traverses incessantly both the Lōkas or worlds" - thus as an illustration for Avasthādvaya (two states of waking and dream) this word being used in the Sruti is seen. Further, the Sushupti (deep sleep state) being referred as 'Paramaloka' is found in the Śruti: 'एषोऽस्य परमो लोकः' - (Bri. 4-3-32), meaning - "This itself is the supreme world for Him." Besides, it is not possible to assert that there is no prompting, justifying reason at all for using the words like Loukika etc. to indicate the states like waking etc. In the waking there exists invariably 'Sarvalōka Sādhāraṇatwa' (commonality or universality acceptable to all the people). The facts that - in the dream the experience is confined to only the dreamer and in deep sleep all the Lōkavyavahāras (empirical transactions) are extinct, invisible - are in everyone's experience (Sārvatrika Anubhava). Instead of this, in the teachings of Yogacharas the doctrines that - Paratantra and Parinishpanna are objects for Shuddha Loukika Jñāna and Lōkōttara Jñāna, respectively - are to be known from Vyaktigatānubhava (individually-acquired experiences). But those words are not as suitable, compatible as they are in our Vedāntic Siddhānta - thus too it can be concluded. Therefore, the author

Shri Gaudapāda having utilized these words in this manner is not at all wrong; he has, in fact, used these special words purposefully and fully conscious of their import.

Further, 'सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम्' - thus the word 'Buddha' is used, is it not so? That word is used with the purport: "Those people who have cognized the Viveka (discriminative purport) of the words Jñāna, Jñeya and Vijñeya as we have now stated - they only are Paramārtha (Absolutely) 'Buddhas'; not those who by virtue of their Yoga practices etc. are honouring themselves, saying that they alone are Lōkōttaraprajña (knowers of the Absolute Reality)." For this the Moksha Dharma Smriti : 'एतदे जन्मसाफल्यं ब्राह्मणस्य विशेषतः । आत्मज्ञानं शमश्चैव पर्याप्तं तत्परायणम् । एतद् बुद्घ्वा । भवेद्वद्धः किमन्यद् बुद्धलक्षणम् ॥" - (Mō. Dh. 249 - 10, 11), meaning -"This alone is the fruition of human birth; especially for a Brāhmin's birth this alone is the fruition; meaning, Ātmajñāna, Shama - to remain engrossed in these with all dedication and devotion. One who has cognized this becomes a Buddha (a Jñāni) ; what other special attributes of a Buddha are there?" - is the authoritative source for the above conclusion.

27. SARVAJÑATWA (OMNISCIENCE) ACCRUING FROM AVASTHĀTRAYA VIJÑĀNA

ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ञेथे क्रमेण विदिते स्वयम्। सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधियः।।८९।।

Meaning: "If one cognizes Jñāna and three kinds of Jñeya in a systematic order, for such a great wise man everywhere Sarvajñatwa (omniscience) will accrue by Itself (spontaneously) here and now."

EXPLANATION OF THE THREE WORDS LIKE JÑĀNA ETC.

To the question: What is the benefit accruing from the cognition of Turya through the three devices like Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lōkōttara? - the answer is provided by this verse.

Some people have interpreted the 'Jñāna' used here to mean 'Manōvṛittivishesha' (a special mental concept); but that is not

correct. For, here the Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge - Experience) pertaining to the three states like Loukika etc. alone is relevant. First of all, Loukika is of the essential nature of the external Grāhya-Grāhaka phenomena; hence, its knowledge cannot possibly be of the form or nature of the Grāhaka Manovritti (the comprehending mental concept) - which is one part of that whole, plenary Consciousness. To wit: The external comprehension of the form of sensual perception is that which is of the nature of the external objects like sound, touch etc., while the Jñāna which objectifies the internal Sukha, Manorupa Duhkha etc. is of the nature of mental concepts or mentations. It being so, how at all can we accept that the $J\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ (Consciousness, plenary Awareness) which comprehends the Loukika of the form of Grāhya-Grāhaka both internally and externally in all its entirety is merely a Jñāna of the form of the mental concepts which are one part included within that plenary Consciousness? In fact, it is well-known to all of us that in order to cognize both the senses and the mind there invariably exists in all of us a separate 'Nirvikalpaka Jñāna' (Pure Consciousness devoid of any mental concepts) called in Vedāntic parlance 'Sākshādanubhava' which is quite apart from the two i.e. - the senses and the mind. In the same way, to comprehend cognize the Shuddha Loukika, Lököttara both these is verily this 'Sākshādanubhava Jñāna' (Direct, Intuitive Experience or Knowledge). Although this Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge and not intellectual concept) is not Savishesha (endowed or associated with special attributes) like the Manōvritti (mental concepts), due to the difference in the adjuncts It may become three types and hence in the expression - 'ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ञेये' - even if the special attributes of Trividha (three kinds) is used to be made applicable to Jñāna and Jñeya on the basis of a maxim called 'Madhyamani Nyāya' to be endowed with - it will not be wrong. In the statement - "If cognized systematically in a particular order" - it should be understood that the reference is to Manovrittirupa Jñana alone pertaining to the empirical categories like Jñāna - Jñeya; for, cognizing in an orderly manner is verily Vrittijñāna (mental concept).

THE ORDER IN THE PROCESS OF COGNITION

Now, here in this context the order in cognition is: First,

we should cognize the gross Loukika. To cognize that - 'The Vaishwānara (Cosmic Person), endowed with the total adjunct of that Loukika Avasthā, is itself the 'Jñāna' of Loukika. By sublating that - as stated in the Vaitathya Prakarana, cognizing that both these (i.e. waking and dream states) are Sarvasama (equal, identical in all respects) to sublate, falsify Loukika; then to determine that both these are *Vitatha* (verily false appearances) - to determine it to be Taijasa, endowed with an adjunct, is itself the Jñāna of Shuddha Loukika. Thereafter, if we sublate that Shuddha Loukika, the Lokouttara Jñana accrues. If it is recognized that Shuddha Loukika also is Mithyārūpa (of a false, unreal nature) alone, then we acquire the cognition that between Shuddha Loukika and Lokottara there is no difference whatsoever; for, then whether a second thing appears or not, we get a sense of conviction, certainty to the effect that - 'By this no special feature whatsoever is caused in Atman'; now only the mere name of an 'Avasthā' remains, subsists for Lokottara. Apart from Atman who is endowed with an adjunct that 'Avasthā' too gets completely extinct, as if to suggest that - 'It is an object to be grasped or derived by means of the proverbial sixth sense.' As regards the statement that - 'It is the seed for the worlds of Loukika and Shuddha Loukika' - what about it? We answer: It is a mere Kalpana (mental concept) conjured up due to Samvriti alone. Even if we had imagined that Loukika and Shuddha Loukika are totally different from each other and that between them there is a cause-effect relationship - because all such beliefs are the effects of Samvriti alone, if we go deep and analyse these states with the Intuitive awareness, in the Absolute sense there is no difference or distinction between these two; just as this truth is realized to be true with a stamp of certainty, similarly here the apparent distinction between Shuddha Loukika and Lōkōttara also should be discerned.

In any case, thus among these three Loukika etc. states to merge or sublate the previous one into the next is their true cognition. Now, the particular *Upāhitātman* (Ātman associated with the adjunct of a state) who is *Sthāni* (confined to that particular state) cannot possibly be imagined not to be existing in any state. Although these Loukika etc. are getting separated one from the other - rather each one of them is leaving out

the other - the Chinmātraswarūpa (the essential nature of Pure Consciousness) of Ātman does not change whatsoever anywhere. He does not also get extinct anywhere. Thus after determining that - 'For Ātman there is no taint or touch of any Avasthā,' the concept or belief that He is endowed with Avasthās also gets extinct.

Anyway, thus all the three states becoming extinct, if we cognize Paramātman, who is Paramārthasatyaswarūpa, Aja, Advaya, Abhaya, and devoid of the categories of cause-effect - in a manner described in the Āgama, Vaitathya and Advaita Prakaraṇas - He by Himself - meaning, Ātman's Paramārthaswarūpa alone - will subsist.

TO THAT PERSON WHO HAS COGNIZED LOUKIKA ETC. SARVAJÑATWA ACCRUES OF ITS OWN ACCORD

In order to eulogise this 'Turyātma Jñāna' it has been stated like this: To that person the Omniscience will accrue by Itself. Because He Himself is everything and is Sarvajñarūpa (of the very essence of Omniscience) Turyātman is called 'Sarvajña'. This omniscience which is, in truth, his very essence of Being - meaning, prior to his body (mortal coil) is given up or falls off, when he is still alive - accrues spontaneously of its accord to this great wise man of this Vedantic wisdom here and now itself. Because he has merged (sublated) Loukika etc. and is endowed with a Buddhi (intelligence, wisdom) which is Sarvalōkātishaya (exceeding and excelling all the worlds) and which has imbibed the knowledge pertaining to Atmavastu, he is called 'Mahādhiyaha' (one endowed with great and sublime knowledge, wisdom). Because it has been stated: "If one cognizes the Trividhajñeya in an orderly manner this Sarvajñatwa accrues" - one should not get deluded to think that this Jñāna is a particular kind of Paricchinna (distinctive) Jñāna which is attained afresh. In truth, It is always and everywhere existing. Once we cognize that Swarūpa, that Jñāna has become verily Atmaswarupa and hence the implicit meaning here is that It exists (beyond the time concept) without any change at anytime whatsoever. For such a Paramārthajñāni - unlike the other disputants who are endowed with Jñāna arising out of Yōga Siddhis etc. - his Jñāna does not have any birth and destruction

at all. As stated in the Kārikā - 'ब्रह्मज्ञेयमजं नित्यमजेनाजंविबुध्यते' (3-33), meaning - 'It is verily Brahman which is Jñeya. In truth, by the Aja Jñāna the Aja Tattwa is always being cognized.'

28. THE DEVICES FOR ATTAINMENT OF JÑĀNA ARE NOT PARAMĀRTHA SATYA

हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयान्यग्रयाणतः ।

तेषामन्यत्र विज्ञेयाद्युवलम्यस्त्रिषु स्मृतः ॥९०॥

Meaning: "The four phenomena of 'Heya', 'Jñeya', 'Āpya', 'Pākya' - should be fully, clearly cognized. Among them, barring Vijñeya, in the other three cognition exists - thus the wise people say."

JÑĀNĀNGA UPADESHA (INSTRUCTION SUBORDINATE TO INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE)

Because it has been stipulated: "When the three kinds of Jñeya are cognized in an orderly manner" - people may wrongly think, believe that those three are existing Absolutely really; so in order to prevent this misconception, here it is refuted. Heya means the three states of Loukika etc. If it is asked: How come these are to be 'Heya' - meaning, those which are to be given up, discarded? - then the explanation is: In Atman these Jagrat, Svapna and Sushupti (i.e. Loukika, Shuddha Loukika and Lokottara, respectively) are not existing whatsoever - thus, just as the apparent superimposed, misconceived appearances of snake etc. are merged in the rope - these three states are to be sublated or merged in Atman; thus it has to be cognized and hence, even when a particular state is existing because it is Chidbhāsya (a reflection of Pure Consciousness) as also Chidvyapta (being pervaded by Pure Consciousness), these three states do not exist whatsoever apart from Atman, who is Chidrupa (of the very essence of Pure Consciousness) - thus determining also, any particular state can possibly be sublated (discarded) and the Turiya Tattwa can be determined, hence they are 'Heya'. Thus when Vaishwanara, who is having the adjunct of the waking - by (means of Pravilaya complete merger of) the waking - is

determined to be Turiya (Ātman) alone, there is no scope for imagining any other Avasthā whatsoever and hence there is no need whatsoever for any further attempt to be made to determine that He (i.e. Vaishwānara) does not exist. Even so, in order that it may become easy to comprehend and follow for people who are endowed with low-grade and middle-grade intelligence (wisdom, discriminating faculty), adopting a systematic order alone which is familiar in our workaday world this *Pravilaya* of the three states is mentioned (explained) - thus we should discern it.

Further, in this verse the word 'Jñeya' means the Paramārtha Tattwa alone, i.e. Turiya alone devoid of the four-cornered categories. In the Sruti - "Always existing in Atmarupa is verily this Jñeya" - (Shwetāshwatara 1-12) - is the authoritative source for calling Atman alone 'Jñeya'. Apya means the three disciplines of 'Pānditya', 'Bālya' and 'Mouna' which a Yati (sage) who has given up the external three Eshenas (desires like Putreshana, Vitteshana, Lokeshana) has perforce to earn, acquire. In the Śruti: 'तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् । बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निविद्याथ मुनिः' - (Bri. 3-5-1) - meaning : "One who is a Brāhmaṇa, cognizing (discerning) Pānditya without any residues by means of Bālya, should aspire, endeavour to remain steady; then after having completely controlled, conquered Balya and Panditya, he should become a Muni" - thus it has been stated, is it not so? There in that context 'Pānditya' means to acquire Ātmavijñāna (the Intuitive Knowledge of the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) from the Āchārya and the Śāstra. 'Bālya' means to stay put in the 'strength of Jñāna' (i.e. to get established in the Intuitive Experience of Pure Consciousness) and like an innocent boy or child to remain without Dambha (deceit, fraud, trickery), Darpa (pride, arrogance) etc. 'Mouna' means fully dedicated, engrossed (Tātparya) in Ātmachintana alone. These three are called 'Āpya'; they are to be acquired. 'Pākya' - means, those defects like Rāga, Dwesha, Mōha etc. which have to be fully conquered by becoming ripe, mature by experience. The Smriti: 'कषाये कर्मीमः पक्के ततो ज्ञानं प्रवर्तते', meaning - "When by means of Karmas the Kashāya becomes ripe enough, then Jñāna accrues" - is the authoritative support for this.

All these four disciplines - meaning, as devices for Jñāna are to be discerned first of all.

THE JÑĀNŌPĀYAS (DEVICES FOR ATTAINING JÑĀNA) ARE INSTRUCTED FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF KALPITA SAMVRITI ALONE

Among these, barring the Paramārtha Tattwa which is Vijneya, the remaining Heya, Āpya, Pākya - in these three - Upalambha meaning, (cognition) - is Avidyā Kalpana alone - thus say the Jñānis. All these three are not Paramārthasatya. Whatever the Śruti has instructed as a device - all that it indicates finally as 'Neti, Neti' - thus, as previously stated in 3-26, here too it is from the standpoint of Kalpitasamvriti alone and hence these Heya etc. have to be reckoned from the Adhyārōpa Drishti. Once the fruit of Vijñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) accrues, they too are Asatya - thus it will be rescinded (Apavāda) - in this way we should understand.

Especially in the case of Turya who is Vijñeya, though first there exists Vijñeyatwa, after the Vijñāna (Intuitive Experience) accrues, a special feature happens to be - "The Sādhaka who is the Vijñātṛu (knower, cognizer) is himself the Turya" - such a conviction is born.

THE WORDS 'HEYA', 'JÑEYA' ETC. ARE NOT THE TECHNI-CAL TERMS USED BY MAHĀYĀNAS (BUDDHISTS)

Because the words - 'Heya', 'Jñeya' and 'Vāpya' are used, as also the usage of the word 'Agrāyaṇa', some modern scholars like Prof. Vidhushekhara Bhaṭṭāchārya (author of 'Āgama Śāstra') have imagined for these words the meanings of 'Parikalpita' and 'Paratantra' etc. which are very familiar in Mahāyāna Buddhism. This is verily a mere figment of imagination. For, this is not a Prakaraṇa which undertakes, or has the prime purport of, expounding doctrines of Parikalpita etc. at all. Nor is there any benefit accruing by using those alien terms. Merely because the words like Heya, Jñeya etc. are used, there is no cause whatsoever to stipulate and compel everyone that everywhere - i.e. wherever these words are used by anyone - they must be interpreted to mean the same as the Mahayāna Buddhists have assumed; for, even for common people to use these words in the manner - 'कापशी हैयः' (One should give up, discard a bad path);

'सुपथो ज्ञेयः अनुसर्तव्यश्च' (One should reckon as to which is a righteous path, and follow it" - there is no restriction or objection at all. If suppose a person uses these words like Heya etc. with a particular connotation, merely on that count there cannot be any restriction whatsoever that those words should not be used with any other meaning and purport, is it not so? Besides, in Adhyātma Granthas which undertake the task of demonstrating the *Muktimārga* (path of Liberation) these words of Heya etc. being used is also found. For instance, in the Samyagmati Prakaraṇa (17-82) of Upadeshasāhasri Shri Śaṅkara has written in the following manner:

बन्धं मोक्षं च सर्वं यत इदमुभयं हेयमेकं द्वयं च। ज्ञेयं ज्ञेयाभ्यतीतं परममधिगतं तत्त्वमेकं विशुद्धम्।। विज्ञायैतद् यथावच्छुतिमुनिगदितं शोकमोहावतीतः।

सर्वज्ञः सर्वकृत् स्याद्भवभयरिहतो ब्राह्मणोऽवाप्तकृत्यः ॥

Meaning: "Cognizing that - 'The thing from which both Bandha (bondage) and Mōksha (liberation) are caused' - is to be completely Heya (to be discarded, given up), if one discerns the Dvaita which is Jñeya and that one unitary (nondual) Entity which is called 'Paramatattwa' which is Jñeyātīta, Vishuddha in consonance with the teachings Śruti and Munis, the aspirant transcends Shōka-Mōha and becomes a Sarvajña, Sarvakarta, devoid of Samsāra Bhaya, Kṛita Kṛitya and Brāhmana." Here in this verse both the words of Heya and Jñeya are used in the sense of - 'Heya' is that which is the cause for Bandha and Mōksha, while the Tattwa (Absolute Reality) which is not Jñeya (known by the intellect) is Itself 'Jñeya'."

29. THE CONCLUSION OF SHĀSTRĀRTHA

प्रकृत्याऽऽकाशवङ्जेयाः सर्वे धर्मा अनादयः।

विद्यते न हि नानात्वं तेषां क्रचन किञ्चन ॥९१॥

Meaning: "All Dharmas (beings) by their very nature

are, like the empty space, beginningless - thus we must reckon; in them nowhere even the least bit of manifoldness exists."

THAT ĀTMANS ARE MANY IS SAID FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SAMVRITI ALONE

Thus it has been expounded - both by means of the Yuktis of the opposing disputants as also our own methodology - the truth that Paramātman, who is Aja, Advaya, is Himself Paramārtha. Now all the teachings of the Śāstra will be concluded. Here what was first accepted from the Adhyārōpa Dṛishṭi, viz. - "Because the states like Loukika, Shuddha Loukika etc. are distinct, separate - Ātmans are many"- is being refuted.

The seeker should not believe either that the states are different or Vishwa, Taijasa etc. who are the Avasthāvantas (Cosmic Beings endowed with the adjuncts of the respective states) are different. For, this 'Nānātwa' (manifoldness) is mentioned from the standpoint of Kalpitasamvriti (deliberate superimposition) but not that it is really (Absolutely) existing. From the Paramārtha Drishti if we observe, Dharmas, meaning - Ātmans (Jivas), in their very essential natures are - just like empty space - subtle, Niranjana (who are devoid of any taint or touch of special qualities), Sarvagatas (all-pervading); in the original text the metaphor of 'like the sky or empty space' is mentioned to signify that their Swarupa is extremely subtle etc. and not that they are 'equal to, similar to Akasha or empty space.' Because 'Dharmas' is used in the plural sense, one should not reckon that to emphasize this fact. Only Atmans are really, invariably many - but 'Everywhere' means 'at no time and in no state - whatsoever' - even the least bit of manifoldness exists - thus it is stated. The difference is appearing due to the Upādhis alone; since the adjuncts are Avidyā Kalpita alone, in the Absolute sense there does not exist any Dharma-Nānātwa whatsoever. This is the implied purport here.

HERE THE WORD 'DHARMA' MEANS 'ĀTMAN' ALONE IN THE PREDOMINANT SENSE

Although it is true that Shri Gaudapādāchārya uses the word 'Dharma' to indicate both $\bar{A}tmans$ (sentient beings) and $An\bar{a}tma$

Padārthas (insentient things), here the fact that he has used it invariably to indicate 'Atman' is evident from the purport of the Chapter. In the next verse since he has written that - "All are Adibuddhas (from the beginning conscious) - it can be discerned that here, in the main, the manifoldness of Jivas (selves, individual transmigratory souls) is negated, refuted. For, in order to help attain (teach) Aja-Advaya-Ātmajñāna here, in the main, negating or refuting Jivanānātwa itself is more essential. It has been taught in this chapter that - "No Jiva whosoever is born" - (4-71). Similarly, in the Advaita Prakarana also, it was begun by saying - "The Dharma (Jiva) who has taken refuge in Upāsana exists in Jātabrahman (the world of Brahman who is born, created)" - (3-1) and in the end it was concluded by teaching that - "No Jiva is born" - (3-48) and hence in order that there is agreement between that and the sentence found in this verse here to accept the meaning of 'Jivas' for the word 'Dharmas' is itself reasonable; because having stressed that - 'There is no Jiva-Nānātwa' - it amounts to refuting, negating the various conglomerations of body, senses, mind as adjuncts for Jivas (transmigratory souls), there is no defect whatsoever entailing us even if a 'Bāhyārtha' a (far-fetched or an extraneous meaning) for the word 'Dharma' is accepted. Even so, here in the main sense the fact that - we should reckon for the word 'Dharmas' the meaning of 'Jivas' - should not be forgotten.

In this verse 'Kwachana' (anywhere) means - whether it is in the Advaita Avasthā or whether it is in the Jīva Avasthā obtained due to Avidyā; 'Kinchana' (even the least bit) means - whether it is observed from the Paramātma Drishti or whether it is observed from the viewpoint of Jīvas being different from one another - i.e. whether separately or whether without any difference - in any manner, Nānātwa (manifoldness) does not exist. This alone is the implied meaning here. This same teaching was made in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa by the sentence: 'नात्मभावेन नानेदं न स्वेनापि कथंचन । न पृथङ् नाप्यकिचिदिति तत्त्विदो विदुः ॥' - (2-34), meaning - "This entity - whether in the form of Ātman or in the form it appears - in no manner it exists. Nothing whatsoever, either mutually different or without being different, ever exists - thus the people who know the Ultimate Reality have cognized."

आदिबुद्धाः प्रकृत्यैव सर्वे धर्माः सुनिश्चिताः । यस्यैवं भवति क्षान्तिः सोऽमृतत्वाय कल्पते ।।९२।।

Meaning: "All the Dharmas by their very essence of Being are determined to be $\bar{A}dibuddhas$ (of the nature of the effulgence of Pure Consciousness from the beginning). One who has such a $Ksh\bar{a}nti$ (patience, forbearance) becomes fit for Amritatwa (immortality)."

THAT ĀTMANS ARE JÑEYA IS SAID FROM SAMVRITI VIEWPOINT ONLY

Since it is stated: "Just like the empty space one should reckon" - in the above verse, any one may misconceive that the tenet that Dharmas are Jñeya (those who are to be cognized, known)' - is also Paramārtha (Absolutely real, true) and so, here in this verse it has been refuted. All Dharmas, by their very essence of Being, are invariably 'Adibuddhas' - meaning, from time immemorial 'Buddhas' or Chitprakāshaswarūpas (of the essential nature of the effulgence of Pure Consciousness). It means that just as the sun is Nityaprakāshaswarūpa (eternally of the essence of brilliance), in the same way these *Dharmas* (Jivas) too are Nityabodhaswarupas (eternally of the essence of Pure Consciousness). To these Ātmans never at all there exists any Ajñāna exists; only if it is so, in order to remove their Ajñāna, Jñāna will become necessary and thereby it will amount to their being Jñeyas, is it not so? Or, there is no room for doubting in the manner: 'Whether these Atmans are like this or like that ?" - they are not of that nature either. For, they are of Nityanishchita (of an essential nature which is ever or eternally established or determined) alone. In the case of these people who are of Jñānaswarūpa there is no scope whatsoever for Ajñāna, Samshaya or Mithyājnāna to exist.

ONLY IF ONE COGNIZES THAT - 'ĀTMAN IS OF AN ESSENTIAL NATURE OF CERTAINTY' - MUKTI ACCRUES

That Mumukshu (the seeker of Liberation) who has attained the profound patience, forbearance to realize, as stated above, that - "I am a Nityabuddha; because all these Ātmans are verily Nityabuddhaswarūpas, they are Sunishchitaswarūpas (of an essen-

tial nature of certainty)" - and who has cognized the truth that - "There is no need for them to cognize the Tattwa afresh or to communicate It to others - just as to see the ever-shining, resplendent sun there is no need of any help of any other light or of showing to others - in the same way, to these Ātmans also there is no need of Jñāna - and further who has reckoned that - "Our Ātman is neither Jñānāshraya (a substrate for knowledge) nor Jñānavishaya (an object for knowledge)" - he alone is the fully qualified person for Mōksha. This is the implied purport here.

आदिशान्ता ह्यनुत्पन्नाः प्रकृत्यैव सुनिर्वृताः । सर्वे धर्माः समाऽभिन्ना अजं साम्यं विशारदम् ॥९३॥

Meaning: "All the Dharmas are $\bar{A}dish\bar{a}ntas$ (of a quiescent nature from the beginning), devoid of birth or birthless, by virtue of their very essential nature they have completely receded (i.e. are liberated from duality). Being in one and the same nature, they are non-different. (They are all) Aja, Sāmya (one and the same) and Vishārada (who have mastered this Vidya, scholars)."

ĀTMANS ARE NITYASHĀNTA (ETERNALLY QUIESCENT)

Just as there is no need whatsoever to attain Intuitive Knowledge (Jñāna) afresh with regard to Ātman, in the same manner there is no need to acquire afresh Shānti (tranquillity, peace of mind). For, all these Atmans are Nityashāntas (eternally of the nature of peace, tranquillity); in fact, they are not born at all. By their very essence of Being they are Sunirvritas, meaning - of the essential nature of being liberated. If it is asked: "In that case, are they Shūnyaswarūpa (of the essential nature of essencelessness, nought)?" - the answer is: Not so; for, they are non-different from Aja-Advaya-Brahma. If it is asked: "In that case, is there no difference whatsoever among them?" the answer is: No; all these are, in the essential nature of Advaya, Sama, Abhinna; therefore, there is no need of quietening of any undesirable thing or attainment of desirable object. When they are all of one and the same essential nature of Being - by doing what, which excessive thing can possibly be

caused in them? If anything is done, then that desired object endowed with qualities like increase or decrease will necessarily have to be one among the following four: Utpādya (that which is produced), Āpya (that which can be procured), Vikārya (that which can be transformed), Samskārya (that in which a quality is brought about and a defect is removed). Ātmatattwa is not one of these four at all. The Śruti: 'न वर्षते कर्मणा नो कनीयान्' (Bṛi. 4-4-23), meaning - "This greatness (Mahima) does not get increased by Karma nor does it get decreased by it" - is the authoritative source for this conclusion. Therefore, Ātmatattwa is birthless, that which exists in one and the same state and blemishless.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF THESE THREE VERSES WHICH SHED LIGHT ON PARAMARTHA

The secret teaching that is to be discerned here in this context is: It was stated in 4-90 that - "Barring Vijñeya, in the remaining there is mere Awareness or Pure Consciousness" - and also that Heya etc. - these three phenomena are mere appearances but that they are not really existing entities - is it not so? How can it be said that Heya etc. do not exist? What exactly is that entity or substance which is Jñeya (object to be known)? - in answer to these questions these above three verses have been written.

- (1) The reason to infer that all the three like Heya etc. do not exist is to be discerned as: Dharmas (Ātmans) are all 'Ākāshakalpas' (misconceived objects in empty space). They are, in fact, endowed with essential nautres like Sarvagatatwa (all-pervasiveness), Nityatwa (eternality) etc.; for, they are verily Aja-Advaita-Paramātman. Therefore, they do not have states like Jāgarita etc. This is the implied meaning of the first verse.
- (2) Because it has been stated that 'Paramārtha is Anidra, Asvapna thus one should cognize' it may amount to saying that *Dharmas* (Ātmans) are *Jñeya* (things to be known) and *Anātmans* (not-selves). In order to dislodge this doubt it was taught that "That statement also was made from the standpoint of Kalpitasaṃvṛiti alone; if observed from the Pāramārthic standpoint Jñeyatwa also does not exist; for, all Dharmas are in their very essence of Being Ādibuddhas and Sunishchitaswarūpas; if the seeker cognizes in this manner then merely on that count

Amritatwaprāpti accrues." This is the implied meaning of the second verse.

(3) Because it has been stated that - "One who has cognized in this manner becomes the fit person for Amritatwa" - it may amount to saying that - "For the purpose of Shānti (quiescence) of Bandhaduhkha (the misery arising out of bondage) there is a Sādhana still remaining - that of Kashāyapāka (ripening, maturing of desires, proclivities lurking in the mind) etc., as also the attainment of Amritatwa afresh still remains." In order to signify that there are no such residual Sādhanas, it is taught that - "All Dharmas are by their very essence of Being 'Ādishānta, Sunirvṛitas'; therefore, when observed from the viewpoint of Paramārtha there is nothing whatsoever to be done or performed in order to attain or acquire Shānti etc." This is the implied meaning of the third verse.

Here the salient features of Shri Gaudapāda's teachings are: (i) Those who are Upāsanāvādins (proponents of Upāsana as the ultimate means for Beatitude) - and are arguing to uphold their doctrine that - 'Jiva by practising Upāsanas (meditations) alone attains Brahmātmatwa after the fall of the body' - these disputants have been refuted in the first verse. (ii) He has refuted the doctrines of 'Sākshātkāravādins' (proponents of the theory of materialization of Atmajñana) - who propound that - "Only after attaining Sākshātkāra by means of Brahmajñāna or Jñāna Abhyāsa (repeated practice of Jñāna or Brahman Knowledge) Avidyā can possibly be got rid of" - in the second verse. (iii) Further, he has refuted the doctrinaire theory of Videhamuktivādins (proponents of Beatitude only after death) in the third verse. These disputants opine that - "Only if the Jiva practises Sādhanas like Jñāna and Dhyāna etc., after the fall of the body the fruits of Duhkhashānti and Mōksha accrue to him."

It is true that in the Upanishads, Sādhanas like Upāsana etc. have been taught; it is also true that it has been instructed that by means of examining the three states of Consciousness one should acquire the Jñāna Ātman, who is devoid of the three states; it is true that it has also been taught that by Jñāna alone Kaivalyaprāpti (attainment of Beatitude) accrues; but all that is taught from the standpoint of Kalpitasaṃvṛiti to the respective qualified seeker according to his level of mental faculties and

purity, but merely on that count there is no liarm or danger whatsoever caused to the teaching of Paramārtha Satya as described in these three verses. In truth, *Nityasatya* (eternal Truth) which is *Paramārtha* (Absolute, Transcendental) is: "All Dharmas or beings are of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Ātman who is of Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swarūpa" - indeed.

Here in the second verse, the benefit of using the word - "Kshānti" is: In the Buddhistic philosophy the Siddhis (spiritual extra-sensory perceptions or powers) called 'Kshāntis' - which they have accepted - are described in texts like "Samādhirāja" etc., is it not so? In that text, it is begun teaching in the manner - "One who aspires for Samyaksambōdhi should cognize three Kshāntis" - (Sam. Rāja 7) - the various Kshāntis which the practitioners have necessarily to acquire and their special features are described. But here in these Kārikās, the word 'Kshānti' is used in order to indicate that the forbearance or patient self-control called 'Nityatṛupti' (eternal satiation, sense of fulfilment) - which is described as: "Dharmas in their very essence of Being are Ākāshakalpas, Nityabuddhas and Nityanishchitaswarūpas; they are also Nityashāntas and Sunirvṛitas" - should perforce be reckoned in this context.

वैशारद्यं तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा।

भेदनिम्नाः पृथग्वादास्तस्मात्ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ॥९४॥

Meaning: "To those who are always wandering about in *Bheda* (distinction) there is no *Vaishāradya* (scholarship, spiritual Knowledge). Those disputants who affirm about difference, distinction have leaned heavily on the side of difference; therefore, they are said to be *Kṛipaṇas* (low-level, indiscriminate, wretched persons)."

IGNORANT PEOPLE ARE IMPURE AND LOW-MINDED

Those who have cognized the Paramārtha Tattwa, which is devoid of the divisions, categories like Jñātṛu, Jñāna, Jñeya - which we have described - they only are Brāhmaṇas who are Akṛipaṇas (not low-minded); but the rest are verily Kṛipaṇas (low-minded, wretched people). Those who have cognized (believed innately) that objects are distinct, various - in other words,

who are Dvaitins - they have heavily leaned, tilted themselves towards difference alone; in other words, they follow and indulge in variety, diversity - meaning, they are suffering in Samsāra only. Those who are always wandering about in diversity, difference conjured up by Avidyā - i.e. in the path of duality, diversity - they do not possess Vaishāradya (spiritual wisdom, Knowledge); they do not have Vishuddhi (purity of heart and mind). Therefore, they are considered as Kṛipaṇas by Brahmajñānis.

अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद् भविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः । ते हि लोके महाज्ञानास्तच्च लोको न गाहते ॥९५॥

Meaning: "Whosoever are Sunishchita (convinced about, steadfast) with regard to Paramārtha Tattwa which is Aja and Sāmya - they alone are Mahājñānis (great Realized souls) in the world; this fact is not known by the common people of the world."

THOSE WHO HAVE COGNIZED AJĀTMAN ARE MAHĀJÑĀNIS

The fact that - "Those, who are not Mahatma (noble or holy), are not scholars and are totally outside the Vedanta spiritual science - such low-grade people with Alpaprajña (low intelligence, wisdom) cannot possibly comprehend this Paramartha Tattwa" - has been mentioned here. Whosoever they may be those who have got the conviction of the type - "This is proper, correct in this way alone" - with regard to Paramartha which is Aja and Sāmya - they only are recognized in this world to be the Mahāprajñas (great erudite scholars), who are supposed to have cognized the Tattwa which is supremely great (Niratishaya) and Aparicchinna (indivisible, impartible). The Sruti is saying: 'तदिदमप्येतिंहं य ऎवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति' (Bri. 1-4-10), meaning - "Even now he who cognizes in the manner - 'This Brahman alone I am' - he alone will become all this." The common run of people who are having their mind steeped in desires and proclivities of duality cannot possibly cognize, comprehend this path of the Jñānis. This is just like - the person who is dreaming cannot comprehend the state of a wakeful person. For this conclusion Smritis like 'सर्व भूतात्म भूतस्य सर्वभूतिहतस्य च । देवाऽपि मार्गे मुह्मन्त्यपदस्य पदैषिणः ॥' (Mōksha Dharma 293-23), meaning - "In the path of

one, who is the Ātman of all creatures, beings, who provides what is beneficial to all beings - even the deities lose their way, for, they are searching for the footprints in a region where there are no footsteps". 'शकुनीनामिवाऽऽकाशे गतिनैवोपलध्यते' (?), 'या निशा सर्वभूतानं तस्यां जागति संयमी' (Gitā 2-69) - meaning - "Just as in the sky (the footprints of) the birds (are not visible, in the same way the Jñānis' Swarūpa) is incomprehensible; "That which is night for all creatures, in that one who is engrossed in, identified with Paramātma Tattwa - he is really awake" - are authoritative sources.

अजेष्वजमसङ्क्रान्तं धर्मेषु ज्ञानिमध्यते । यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥ ९६॥

Meaning: "It is said that among the Dharmas who are birthless, this Ajajñāna (Intuitive Knowledge which is birthless) exists without getting Saṃkrānta (transferred). Jñāna does not go anywhere else, is it not so? Due to this, it is said to be Asaṅga (detached).

THE JÑĀNA OF AJĀTMAN IS ĀTMĀBHINNA (NON-DIFFERENT FROM ONE'S SELF)

(Question): How can it be said that they are Mahājñānis? Why is it that this is not known to the rest? "That which is Aja is Jñeya; that Sādhana (instrument, means) which enables us to cognize It is Jñāna; one who has verily attained the Ajātmajñāna is Jñātru" - in this manner their Jñāna also exists divided in categories like Jñātru, Jñāna, Jñeya, is it not? It being so, their Jñāna too is Parichhinna (divisible) Jñāna alone, is it not so?

(Answer): Because it is not different, apart from Advayātman, from the standpoint of the Jñātruswarūpa of Ātmans who are the Aja, that is, never born, Dharmas (Jīvas, beings) - Jñāna (Intuitive Knowledge, Pure Consciousness) is Aja (birthless) alone, without being different or separate from Jñātrus - just as the heat and light that exists in the sun is not different, separate from him - in the same way, It is apart without joining or combining with another entity or object. In fact, Dharmas who are different from 'Jñātru' do not exist at all. Therefore, thus

Jñāna existing in the Ātmans who are Aja - just as the Jñāna or knowledge of the ignorant people mixes or associates itself with the Jñeya (object to be known) which is different from them - does not blend with them, and hence that Jñāna is called 'Asaṅga' (unattached, detached).

Previously what was stated as - "Jñāna which is like Ākāsha or empty space" - was for this reason alone. Because everything is the effect (product) of Ākāsha, it is not possible to say that Ākāsha is conjoined with another object; similarly, because there is nothing whatsoever which exists apart from Ajātmaswarūpa and since everything is verily the Swarūpa of Jñātru - those who have cognized It have cognized Akhaṇḍa Chinmātra Tattwa (the Absolute Reality which is immutable, whole Pure Consciousness) which is non-different from Ajātmaswarūpa by means of Jñāna - meaning, they have cognized by means of Pure, Absolute Intuitive Experience alone - their Jñāna is said to be Asaṅga (unattached). Therefore, that statement that they are Mahājñānis is correct indeed.

अणुमात्रेऽपि वैधर्म्य जायमानेऽविपश्चितः । असङ्गता सदा नास्ति किमुताऽऽवरणच्युतिः ॥९७॥

Meaning: "To one who has not cognized (It) even though a little of Vaidharmya (dissimilarity) occurs, Asangatwa (non-attachment) never exists; then where is the question of saying that he has no $\bar{A}varanachyuti$ (removal of covering)?"

FOR DVAITINS THERE IS NO ASANGATWA; THEY ARE ALWAYS AJÑAS (IGNORANT) ALONE

For the rest of the people who have not cognized Ajādvaya Brahmātman, although a little bit of Jñāna of dissimilarity with regard the Tattwa accrues, in such a cognition of the nature of Ajñāna some other extraneous thing always gets conjoined and hence there can never possibly be any Asangatwa; it being so, how at all can the removal or destruction of Ajñānāvaraṇa (covering of ignorance) occur? The Śruti states: - 'यदा हैवैष ऐतस्मिनुदरमंतरं कुरुते। अथ तस्य पर्य पवित' (Tai. 2-7) - meaning, "When this person thinks of even the least bit of difference, then he begets fear".

Therefore, one should not imagine even the least bit of difference.

अलब्यावरणाः सर्वे घर्माः प्रकृतिनिर्मलाः । आदौ बुद्धास्तथा मुक्ता बुध्यन्ति इति नायकाः ॥९८॥

Meaning: "All Dharmas are verily devoid of Āvaraṇa (cover); by nature itself they are *Nirmala* (pure). From the beginning they are *Buddha* (knowers), *Muktas* (liberated). Because they are capable, they are cognizers."

AJÑĀNĀVARAŅA ALSO IS NOT PĀRAMĀRTHIKA (ABSOLUTELY REAL)

(Question): Because it is said: "Dvaitins have no escape from \bar{A} varaṇa", it amounts to saying that in your philosophy \bar{A} varaṇa' (cover) is accepted by you. Is it true?

(Answer): No. To no Dharma (Ātman, being) there is any Āvaraṇa (covering of Avidya) whatsoever. We are not saying that Ātmans have a Bandha (bondage) of the type of covering of Avidyā etc. and that by an effort they should get rid of it; in fact, all Ātmans (Jīvas) in their very essence of Being are Nirmala (pure); there is no need whatsoever of their getting purified by any Saṃskāra (refinement). They are verily from the beginning Jñānis (Realized souls); there is no need whatsoever of destroying Ajñāna (or Avidyā) and then attaining afresh Jñāna (Self-Knowledge). All of them from the beginning (eternally) are Vimuktas (liberated ones); there is no need whatsoever of their attaining afresh a state called 'Mukti'. Thus all of them are verily of Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swabhāva.

Despite it being so, on the basis of (adopting the viewpoint of) Kalpitasaṃvṛiti we have said that - "By means of Jñāna - Ajñāna is removed, destroyed and after the Āvaraṇa gets removed (Chyuti) Mōksha is attained." That is all. Therefore, here there is no contradiction whatsoever.

HOW IS IT PROPER TO SAY - "JÑĀNIS COGNIZE" ?

If a question of the type: "They are Mahājñānis; what they have known, the common people cannot cognize" - (4-95) it was stated previously by you. How is it? Those who are in the beginning *Aprabuddha* (devoid of awareness of Reality, i.e.

who are ignorant) later on attain the discriminative knowledge or cognition, is it not so ?" - is raised, to that our answer is : They (i.e. Mahājñānis) are having the capability of cognizing (the Ultimate Reality); in fact, their very essence of Being is endowed with the power or capability of Awareness, Consciousness. Therefore, we have said : "They cognize". Don't we say : "Being eternally of the essential nature of light, the sun 'is shining'? Similarly, if we say that - 'Those Mahājñānis, who are verily Jñānaswarūpas, cognize' - what is wrong? Sometimes we say that the mountains, which never move about, are 'standing' - is it not so? In the same way, we should discern here that those who are of the very essence of Jñānashakti (the power of being aware or conscious eternally) are said to be - "They cognize" - in a manner of speaking.

क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः । सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद्बद्धेन भाषितम् ॥९९॥

Meaning: "The Jñāna (Pure Consciousness) of Buddha (the Mahājñāni, Realized soul) who is the all-pervading principle (cause of all creation) does not move out and reach the Dharmas. All Dharmas and Jñāna also are like this alone. This truth the Buddha (the founder of the sect of Buddhism) has not taught."

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF JÑĀNA IS ADVITĪYA (NON-DUAL)

(Question): "Why cannot it be said that for the expression - "They cognize" - the meaning is: "They are having the action of cognizing?" In the Gounaprayōga (usage in a secondary sense) of the type - "The mountains are standing" - because in the expressions used in a predominant sense of the type - "The horses are standing" - etc. the quality connoting a state of the 'action of going' - exists in the mountains too, it may be there by namesake. But - "Ātmans are, in the predominant sense alone, cognizing" - thus why can't we imagine?

(Answer): The word 'Tāyin' means 'one who is pervading everywhere like the Ākāsha or empty space'. Thus for Jñāna - which is Sarvavyāpi (all-pervading), Paramārtha (Absolutely, i.e. beyond the concepts of categories of time-space-causation, nay

beyond all duality, relativity), of the very essence of Aja-Advaya-Tattwa (birthless, non-dual Reality) - there is no need whatsoever of conjoining another object or entity and then cognizing It. For, It is Aja and Achala (immovable). Or, 'Tāyin' may be interpreted to mean 'Pūjya' (venerable) or 'Prajnāvanta' (having the Intuitive Knowledge of the Reality). The etymological derivation of this word coming from the root - viz. 'तनु श्रद्धो प्रकरणयोः' - can thus be interpreted. In any case, since the Jnāna of a Jnāni (Realized soul) is verily Advitīyātmaswarūpa, there is no need whatsoever for It to get in contact, touch with an object and then to signify or help get its cognition.

In the same way, because all the Atmans (beings) are Pāramārthically $\bar{A}k\bar{a}shakalpas$ (misconceptions in empty space), they do not touch or contact another object; at the beginning of this chapter it was stated: "ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान् यो गगनोपमान् । ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन संबद्धः' - (4-1), the purport of which is - "Jnatru-Jneya-Jnana - all these are all-pervading" - is it not so? What was stated in the Upakrama (beginning) is being concluded in the Upasamhāra (concluding verse). This entity called 'Brahmātma Tattwa' is - like the Akāsha or empty space - Achala, Avikriya, Niravayava, Nitya, Advitiya, Asanga, Adrishya, Agrāhya, that which is devoid of hunger, thirst and such other defects - of the essential nature of Jñāna, is it not so? Therefore, the illustration, analogy of the empty space thus being given is quite reasonable indeed. This teaching is implicit in the Sruti statement : "न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेविपरिलोपो विद्यते अविनाशित्वात् न तु द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्येद्विभक्तं यत् पश्येत्" - (Bri. 4-3-23), meaning - "For the sight of the seer there is no lapse or extinction whatsoever; for, It is Avināshi (indestructible). There is nothing second to It which is apart from It and which is different from It; only if such a second thing exists, one can possibly see, is it not so?"

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ADVAITAJÑĀNAVĀDA AND THE BUDDHISTS' JÑĀNAVĀDA

This Advayajñāna has not been taught by Buddha, i.e. Gautama Buddha (the founder of Buddhism). It is true that what he had preached - to wit, he had refuted the external objects and had imagined that Vijñāna (intellectual awareness) alone exists -

is very close to Advaitavastu (non-dual Absolute Reality). How is that which he had taught was close to Advayavastu (of Vedanta) ? - The answer is: For, in his doctrine Vijnana alone is suitable to carry on the transactions of Jñana-Jñeya without any dependence on the $B\bar{a}hy\bar{a}rtha$ (external objects); this reason is quite close to, as also partly acceptable to, Vedānta when it is compared with the opinion of the Bāhyārthavādins (Realists). But because by this very Yukti - without any dependence whatsoever on Kshanikavijnāna - by virtue of Avidyā alone it can be established that all Pramāna-Prameya-Vyavahāra is carried on it is determined that Advaita which is Prapañchōpashama (in which the world of duality is extinct), Shiva (auspicious) exists ; for this reason alone, we are saying that their Vijñānavāda is close to Advayavastu. That is all; but here Shri Gaudapāda has not at all opined that either the Buddhistic philosophy or Kshanika Vijnānavāda is close to Advaita Vedānta. The Buddhistic doctrine is negating the Vyāvahārika Anubhava (empirical experiences of everyone) and thereby assuming and teaching that the external objects do not exist, is it not so? That doctrine is not accepted at all here - thus we have to understand.

As regards the doctrine of Sarvashūnyavādins (Nihilists - another sect among the Buddhists who propound that everything is Absolutely essenceless) it undertakes to show, prove merely on the basis of Yukti (logical arguments) that - "All substances are Nihswabhāva (essenceless)." But mere Yukti has nowhere finality and hence they have no scope - even the least bit - of advocating the Advayajñānavāda (the theory of non-dual Intuitive Knowledge); for that reason we have not considered it here in detail at all. In fact, the teaching that - "Advaitajñāna which is Paramārtha is expounded exclusively in the Upanishads" - is very close to, dear to the heart of Shri Gauḍapāda.

30. COMPLETE HARMONY IN THE TEACHINGS OF THE FOUR PRAKARANAS

ALL THE PRAKARAŅAS EXPOUND AJĀDVAYA TATTWA ALONE

Here what the true seeker has to carefully, cautiously discriminate (ratiocinate) and ascertain is: In the Agama Prakarana

on the basis of examining the three states of Consciousness the three metres (letters) of Omkara were analysed and the Advayatattwa - which is extremely different from Abhidhāna (name) and Abhidheya (named object), which is not accessible to speech and mind, which is devoid of any mental concepts like Antahprajñatwa (internal awareness), and Bahiprajñatwa (external awareness) etc., which is Ajānidrāsvapa (devoid of birth, sleep and dream) - was determined following the instructions of the Upanishads alone. In the Vaitathya Prakarana that very same Nirvikalpātma Tattwa was demonstrated by means of Upapatti (logical devices) and it was taught that that very Atma Tattwa, which is Prapañchōpashama, Shiva and Advaya should be cognized by the true seeker to be his very essence of Pure Being and that he should get himself established in It. In the Advaita Prakarana also it was expounded that Advaita alone is Satyu (Real) and then for the benefit of the Madhyamādhikāris (middle-grade qualifiers) - as a subtle device adopted to get oneself established in the Brahmaswarūpa - the Manonigraha (complete cessation of the mind and its merger in Atman) was taught and it was concluded that Ajādvayātma Tattwa alone is the Supreme Truth. In this fourth Alātashānti Prakaraņa, especially, by virtue of the differences of opinion among various disputants it was shown as to how the truth that - 'Ajādvayātma Tattwa alone is Paramārtha" - gets evolved and at the end of the Chapter once again utilizing his own methodology of the form of Avasthatraya it was proved that - "Ajādvaya Brahma Siddhānta is, in all respects and always, inviolable, irrefutable." Therefore, between the Upakrama and Upasmahāra there is complete harmony - this fact gets evolved and established.

'IN THIS VERSE THERE IS ADOPTION OF BUDDHISTIC DOC-TRINE' - IS AN IRRELEVANT STATEMENT

In this manner when the Shāstrārtha (the Ultimate Truth propounded by the scriptural texts) is being established from the teachings of all the four Chapters, some people with a pride that they are research scholars, unable to detect the difference between Boudhaprasthāna Siddhānta (the spiritual teaching based on Buddhistic methodology) and Vedāntaprasthāna Siddhānta, as also some others, who profess to be Vedāntins who are having a

staunch affinity in proving the greatness of their respective school of philosophy, are affirming that:

(1) In the Gauḍapāda Kārikās at various places the Yuktis which are found in Buddhistic texts are seen to be copied. (2) Between the Pada (words), Vākya (sentences) found in various Buddhistic texts and some Padavākyas found in this text there is a pronounced literal similarity to be seen. Therefore, there is scope for inferring that - "Shri Gauḍapādāchārya also was either a Buddhistic preceptor or a 'Pracchannabouddha' (pseudo-Buddhist) who had a reverential attitude towards Buddhistic teachings and was going about as a Vedāntāchārya." Not being satisfied with this much of derogatory comment, some research scholars, who have undertaken an academic analysis of the teachings as propounded in certain ancient texts, have even ventured to show that it is not possible at all to ascertain whether an independent author by name 'Gauḍapādāchārya' existed or not!

In order to silence all these critics this one penultimate verse of the Alātashānti Prakaraṇa is sufficient. For, 'नेतद्वरेन पाषितम्', meaning - 'This is not a topic which Buddha taught" - this sentence emphatically proclaims that - "Vijñāna (Intuitive Knowledge) which is devoid of divisions like Jñātṛu-Jñeya-Jñāna and which is of the essential nature of Kūṭastha Chaitanya (Immutable Absolute, Pure Consciousness) has been taught only (exclusively) in Vedānta" - both in the Upakrama (preamble) and the Upansamhāra (conclusion). It being so, who at all can possibly say that Vedānta Siddhānta is similar to the Siddhānta of Buddhists who are Kshaṇika Vijñānavādins?

For this sentence some present-day scholars like Prof. Vidhushekhar Bhattāchārya etc. have written a commentary and that is: Because Sarvadharmas (all religious, righteous qualities) and Jñāna is known to all the people, these have not been taught by Buddha; these are phenomena which exist from time immemorial. What is to be understood, discerned by each one by himself is not taught; it is not possible also to do so; whether Tathāgatas (enlightened beings) are born or not, the Dharmatā (righteousness) of Dharmas (beings) does not get evolved. It exists invariably at all times and hence this is not what Buddha has taught afresh.

It is not possible for this commentary to be suitable or correct. For, the question - 'Whether this has been taught by Buddha or not?' - is not at all relevant here in this context. Whether Buddha has taught it or not - irrespective of that - those who are Vaidikas (people having implicit faith in the teachings of the Vedas which are said or believed to be given unto the world by the Lord Himself) cannot possibly believe that his teachings are Paramārtha. Hence, if we say that Shri Gaudapādāchārya has written that - "This (truth) has not been taught by Buddha" - then the wise people may think (interpret) that - "Because he has stated some peculiar, irrelevant thing, we need not take that into our reckoning." Therefore, instead of discarding what has been actually stated thus by the author and imagining needlessly what has not been stated, if we comment in the manner - "A Jñāni's Jñāna does not go out and associate Itself with anybody's religious teachings; in the same way, because all Atmans are Ananya (non-different, identical with) the all-pervasive Jñāna, they cannot possibly associate themselves with anything else" - then not only there will be full agreement or concord between Upakrama and Upasamhāra but also it becomes fully reconciled with the Sruti statement - "Where there exists Advaita with what, what else can He possibly see? ... " - (Bri. 2-4-14). Apart from this, by this statement it amounts to depicting (confirming) that - "This Jnan is not that which been taught by Buddha" - i.e. the extreme difference that exists between the Buddhistic philosophy and this ancient Vedānta philosophy. Therefore, the true seekers should conclude and get convinced that here in this context there is no scope for any fake, irrelevant commentary.

HERE THE EXTREME DIFFERENCE THAT EXISTS BETWEEN BUDDHISTIC DOCTRINES AND VEDĀNTIC TEACHINGS HAS BEEN FULLY CLARIFIED

In addition to this, in this Alātashānti Prakaraṇa after solving (i.e. refuting) the doctrines of the Realists that - "The external objects exist" - by means of the Vijnānavādin's Yuktis and then the latter's doctrines are also refuted by using his (i.e. the Vijnānavādin's) own Yuktis alone by reiterating the statement - 'तस्मान्न जायते चित्तम्' - (4-28), meaning - "Therefore, Chitta also is

not born" - to drive home the tenet that the Vijnana (awareness) also, which has a different name of 'Chitta' is Aja, Asanga, Advayātman. Because all Ātmans are verily of the essential nature of Aja-Advaya-Ātman, by their very nature they are of Nitya-shuddha-buddha-mukta-swarūpa - this truth has been clarified. At various places repeatedly the defects that are to be found in the Asatkāryavāda, which is acceptable to the Buddhists, are revealed. As against this, the geniune spiritual teachings of our own Vedantic philosophy - which states that: "The Tattwa which is Sat is born due to Māyā" - is affirmed. This teaching which is in consonance with the Śruti: 'अजायमानो बहुषा विजायते' -(Though not born, in manifold ways He keeps on being born) how at all and in what manner is it possible to assert that such a philosophy is equal to, or similar to, either Kshanika Vijñānavāda of Nairātmyavādins (disputants who reject the existence of Atman or the Self as Pure Being-Consciousness) or the doctrinaire theory of those (Nihilists or Shūnyavādins) who revere Pratityasamutpāda (dependent origination) and assert that everything is verily Shūnya (essenceless)? This question should be deliberated upon Intuitively by the research scholars (who wish to cognize the Tattwa).

IN THIS PRAKARAŅA WHAT IS THE REASON FOR FOLLOWING THE SHABDAS (WORDS) AND YUKTIS (LOGICAL DEVICES) FOUND IN BUDDHISTIC TEXTS

In this Chapter in order to depict the fact that there exists an extreme difference between the methodology of Buddhism and the methodology of Vedānta in a clear-cut manner so as to loom large before everyone, Shri Gauḍapāda has used those respective individual statements of the Buddhists with a totally different meaning altogether. Shri Bādarāyaṇāchārya, the author of 'Shārīraka Mīmamsā Sūtras', has used in that highly logic-oriented text Pāribhāshika Shabdas (technical terms) like 'Pratyaksha' (perceptual knowledge), 'Anumāna' (inferential knowledge), 'Pradhāna' (primordial or primeval matter before creation) etc. in order to signify the Śruti (Upanishads), Smṛiti (works of individual sages), Brahman (the Absolute, Transcendental Reality beyond all empirical transactions or duality), respectively; in the same way, here also we should discern (the

fact that Shri Gauḍapāda has used these apparantly Buddhistic terms to wean away those misguided people towards the true Vedāntic Knowledge). The real purport behind his usage of some queer Yuktis which the Buddhists have presented as also some of their illustrations being quoted here is to show (drive home) clearly that their Yuktis are opposed to their own Yuktis and teachings. All these aspects were discussed and depicted in the introductory Chapter itself and hence on this count too here the true seeker should discern that there is no scope whatsoever even to doubt that there is similarity between the Buddhistic doctrines and the Vedāntic teachings (much less, to surmise that Shri Gauḍapāda has borrowed or copied the Buddhistic methodology; for, the two methodologies are poles apart).

INVOCATION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATISE

दुर्दर्शमितगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् । बुद्घ्वा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुमों यथाबलम् ।।१००।।

Meaning: "That Pada (blissful state) - which, being very difficult to attain, highly profound (serene), Aja, Sāmya, Vishārada, is devoid of Nānātwa (manifoldness) - cognizing such a Pada we salute It to the best of our might or strength."

SALUTATION THROUGH EULOGIZATION OF THE PARATATEWA (ABSOLUTE, TRANSCENDENTAL REALITY)

At the beginning of this Prakaraṇa Grantha (an individual's treatise), studying the Upanishad alone the $\overline{A}gama$ Prakaraṇa has been started. Because for the Upanishad at the beginning there was \overline{O} ṃkāra alone, by its very study and remembrance alone it was tantamount to the author having invoked (the Paratattwa) at the beginning of the treatise. Now, because the Tattwa which is Nityanirastadvaita (eternally non-extinct, non-dual) has been decided, determined by means of $\overline{A}gama$ (traditional methodology of teaching the Ultimate Reality) and Upapatti (reasoning in consonance with universal experience), Shri Gauḍapāda is observing, performing the traditional Mangala (auspicious conclusion) through eulogy:

Durdharsha, means - 'Because all the four-cornered logical paradigm of the type of 'Asti, Nāsti (exists, does not exist) etc. which were previously mentioned are non-existing, those people who are following their own respective doctrines and are arguing out - though they are scholars - they are not able to cognize this Tattwa; and hence it is too difficult to reckon. Thus it has been stated in the Śruti: 'तं दुर्दश गृढमनुप्रविष्टम्' - (He is too difficult to be cognized; He' is one who has entered into an impervious place which is secret, highly obstruse, estoric). 'Atigambhira' means: For those who have not acquired the necessary Intuitive Knowledge - to such people, It is fathomless, deep like an ocean, extremely difficult to enter into. In the Śruti: 'यमंतः समुद्रे कवयो वयंति' (Taittiriya Nārāyaṇapanna) - it is stated that : "Just like the deep ocean is difficult to enter deep into, this Tattwa, which is still interior even to Avyākrita (i.e. the unmanifested seed form of the manifested world of duality), only Rishis (sages) who are Jñānis can possibly cognize."

What is the reason for this Tattwa to be Durdharsha and Atigambhīra? The answer is: This is Aja, Sāmya and Vishārada. 'Aja' means - devoid of Janma and such other changes, mutations; 'Sāmya' means - because It is Nirvayava (without parts, components) It is that Reality devoid of such incongruities, disparities of having parts, components; 'Vishārada' means - because It is Asanga, It is Pure without having any contact with anything else. Apart from this, being Anānātwa, meaning - devoid of the differences of Jñātru, Jñāna, Jñeya, It is Akhanda (a massive continuum) Chaitanya (Pure, Absolute Consciousness).

How at all a Tattwa of such an essence of Pure Being be perceptible to people steeped in the viewpoint of duality who are always seeing distinctively this duality which is variedly divided? Despite it being so, because It is the $\bar{A}tman$ (very Self, core of Being) for everyone, is of the essence of $Nityab\bar{o}dha$ (eternally aware), It is always Self-effulgent alone. To those who are engrossed in perceiving the external objects and dealing with them this Tattwa appears to be Durdharsha and Atigambhīra. But to those who have earned, acquired the benign grace of the preceptor, the Śāstra and Paramātman there does not exist anything else whatsoever which is more Sudarsha (clearly perceptible

or Intuited) and Supravesha (easy to enter into or fathom). As stated in the Vedic sentence : 'तिद्वाणोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यंति सूरयः' (Tai. Nārāyanapanna 1-3-6) - meaning, - 'Those who are knowledgeable It is always visible."

Cognizing such a Tattwa and attaining Its very Swarūpa, we are saluting that 'Pada' (sutble or serene state). How at all can anybody salute this Tattwa which the Sruti describes as - 'अदृष्ट, अव्यवहार्य, अग्राह्म, अलक्षण, अचिन्त्य, अव्यपदेश' - (Māṇdūkya 7) ? The answer is: Though in Its very essence of Being It is Avyavahārya (not available for any empirical transactions, beyond all empirical dealings) alone, we are making it perceptible to our empirical dealings and that form alone we salute. Although It is non-dual without anything else as second to It, when seen from the Vyavahāra Drishți alone It appears to all Pratyayas (mental concepts); in fact, whatever is perceptible to all the senses always is verily that very Pada - thus following the Śāstra Drishti, being engrossed in Its Being, seeing (Intuiting) that Tattwa alone we salute that Pada - in order to signify this fact, the qualifying statement that - "to the best of our capacity, ability (we salute)" - is mentioned.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF THE MANGALASHLŌKAS MEN-TIONED BY THE BHĀSHYAKĀRA (I.E. SHRI ŚANKARA)

अजमिप जिनयोगं प्रापदैश्वर्ययोगादगित च गितमत्तां प्राप्देकं ह्यनेकम्। विविधविषयधर्मग्राहि मुग्धेक्षणानां प्रणतभयविहन्तु ब्रह्म यत्तत्रतोऽस्मि।।१।।

SALUTATION TO PARABRAHMAN

The purport of this invocation is: (a) Although Brahman which is familiar in Vedāntic literature is Itself Aja alone, by dint of Its Aishwarya Yōga, meaning, by a relationship with Its Māyāshakti which is in Its full control - It has assumed a relationship with birth; to wit, It appears in both the forms as Sthāvara Jangama (stationary and moving) creatures and Chetanāchetana (sentient and insentient) beings. Just as deities, sages etc. by virtue of their magical powers, without desiderating the help of any other accessory, merely by meditation or contemplation acquire whatever forms they like, in the same way this Brahman, for the sake of showering its benign grace on the

spiritual practitioners, merely by Its wish, volition assumes various forms and thereby has acquired Māyājanmas. (b) Though It is Agati as also Kūṭastha and Achala, without there being any cause-effect categories It is Gatimanta (endowed with the capacity of going anywhere) - to wit, Gantṛu (one who goes), Gantavya (the act of going and reaching a region), Gati (going) - this division i.e. the Gatitrayavibhāga (three divisions of transmigration or going) like Devayāna, Pitṛuyāna, Kshudrajanma - this Tattwa has assumed. In the same way, (c) though It is Eka (one, non-dual) without anything second to It, It is having Anekatwa (manifoldness) - meaning, Jīvas, Jagat, Īśwara - such forms It has assumed.

These Janma, Gati - mentioned above - are not states when observed from the Paramārtha Dṛishṭi; from the ignorant, deluded viewpoint of people who are perceiving the various objects in their external viewpoint due to Samvriti alone this is apparently like that. Such a Māyājanma (illusory birth) etc. is being referred to by the Śruti also. Although It is appearing in all such ways to people with a deluded viewpoint, It is capable of destroying the fear of those who surrender unto It and salute It to wit, It destroys their Avidyā which is the root cause for all kinds of duality, diversity. In fact, by Its benign grace alone they attain the Intuitive Experience of the type - "I am myself that Brahman alone which is Aja, Ajara, Amara, Amṛita." 'Such a Brahman I salute' - is the purport of the verse.

प्रज्ञा वैशाखवेधधुभितजलनिधेर्वेदनाम्नोऽन्तरस्थं

भूतान्यालोक्य मग्नान्यविरतजननग्राहघोरे समुद्रेः

कारुण्यादुद्द्धारामृतिमदममरैर्दुर्लभं भूतहेतोर्यस्तं पूज्याभिपूज्यं परमगुरुममुं पादपातैर्नतोऽस्मि ।।२।।

SALUTATION TO THE GRAND-PRECEPTOR

The purport of this verse is: Aviratajananagrāhaghoare, meaning, that which is dreadful since it is full of cruel crocodiles of the type of continuously (without interruption) obtaining various bodies - in such an ocean of Saṃsāra, seeing the creatures who are getting drowned in it, by means of his *Prajñā* (Intuitive

Knowledge) as the churning rod or pole - in the ancient times by churning the ocean of milk called 'Veda', from it by the grace of Shriman Nārāyaṇa what was earned by hard work - this Amṛita called 'Brahmajñāna' - which was not got even by the deities who had acquired the *Amṛita* (ambrosia) from the Amṛitamathana - that preceptor who took it out and gave it to the Jīvas who were immersed in Samsāra out of compassion - to that revered preceptor by name, Shri Gauḍapādāchārya, and grand preceptor who has been also revered by all - I pour my salutations at His feet.

यत्प्रज्ञालोकभासा प्रतिहतिमगमत् स्वान्तमोहान्यकारो मज्जोन्मज्जच्च घोरे ह्यसकृदुपजनोदन्वति त्रासने मे ।।

यत्पादावाश्रितानां श्रुतिशमविनयप्राप्तिग्राया ह्यमोघा तत्पादौ पावनीयौ भवभयविनुदौ सर्वभावैर्नमस्ये ॥३॥

SALUTATIONS TO THE PRECEPTOR

The purport implicit in this verse is: In the dreadful ocean of the type of repeated births to me who was getting drowned and floating - thus I was suffering; the darkness of my heart was removed completely by the brilliance of the light of whose feet, to those who have taken refuge at whose feet Tattwashravaṇa (listening to discourses on the Absolute Reality), which is of greater value than everything else, Shānti (peace), Vinaya (humility) accrued - to the feet of such a preceptor, Shri Gōvindapādāchārya who drives away the fear of Samsāra - with all my devotion I salute.

OM TAT SAT

ERRATA

Page	Line from above	Printed as	To be read as			
PUBLISHERS' NOTE						
	5	seakers	seekers			
	10	interpoalated	interpolated			
	10	titerature	literature			
	18	elaborates	elaborate			
	24	gemine	genuine			
FOREWORD						
j	27	Anutshava	Anubhava			
**	33	illu sive	illusive			
ii	1	establi shed	established			
**	8	intellecutal	intellectual			
iv	1	constituing	constituting			
••	6	thoughot	thought			
PREFACE						
1	13	predecesso	predecessor			
••	15	Advita	Advaita			
••	16	a line illustrious	a line of illustrious			
••	18	time-honowed	time-honoured			
2	12	these	this			
**	16	work.	work confirm his identity.			
**	24	audaciously	audaciously			
		too gone	too, gone			
**	34	repeated	refuted			
3	1	here is this	here in this			
4	21	Gaudapada. Prof	Gaudapada. (iv) Prof.			
	Below Essential Gaudapada					
1			INTRODUCTION			
2	19	Shri Gowda	Shri Gauda			
"	9	unantriguous	unambiguous			
••	24	giving into	giving in to			
**	28	(Anavayakrama)	(Anvaya Krama)			
4	13	unquivocally	unequaivocally			
••	31	device has	device (Upāya) has			
5	27	Take details	(Delete the line)			
6	35	which it is	which is			
9	1	Ātman) in a	Ātman) is depicted in a			

			
10	3+4	(Taken from)	(Delete these lines)
••	16	ānandagiri	Anandagiri
11	8	discription	description
12	22	to amount	to ancient
••	27	Because (a) general	Because (a) the general
••	27	tenet	tenets
••	36	Ānandajñām a	Ānandajñāna
13	27	i mpicit	implicit
••	33	false decision)	false concept)
14	8	(mind) are	(mind) have
••	11	and the repute	and then refute
••	16	importible	impartible
••	24	refused	refuted
••	30	as also shown	as also has shown
15	13	knowledge	knowledges
••	13	each from	each apart from
••	16	consiousness	consciousness
••	25	Shri Śaṅkara	he himself
••	37	folloging	following
16	3	aim dialectic	dialectic
••	4	qrangling	wrangling
••	6	Bālyāstitva vādins or realists	Bāhyāstitvavādins or Realists
••	11	Prakarana or chapter	Prakaraņas or chapters
••	12	exaimning	examining
••	14	his Ajātivāda	of Ajātivāda
**	18	Vidhushikhāra	Vidhushekhara
**	20	predominently	predominantly
"	21	excesively	excessively
**	25	calcutta	Calcutta
**	32	'Brahnātmavāda'	'Brahmātmavāda'
**	33	Bhattāchāyas	Bhattāchārya's
••	35	date	Late
••	36	the another	the author
••	••	'The central	'The Central
••	37	Buddism,	Buddhism'
17	1	indulitable	indubitable
**	5	in there	in them there
••	,,	anything in the best	anything in the least
••	8	chapter); that	chapter) to show that the
••	14	owerred	averred
**	16	adopted used	adopted or used
	• •		adopted of dood

••	18	of truth. Because	of truth. But because
••	23	Avasthātraya is exists	Avasthātraya exists
••	26	distinction	distinctions
••	"	(empirical,	(empirical
••	27	sphered)	dealings)
••	28	Vivartavāda prior	Vivartavāda exist prior
17	31	Siddānta	Siddhānta
"	32		
••	33	OVER Propoporto different	aver Propoporto to different
••	33 34	Proponents different view to establish	Proponents to different
**			view to establishing
10	35 •	practise	pristine
18	1	asumption	assumption Lagrange de
**	8	upanidhads	Upanishads
••	9	or alone	or alien
**	10	pure being	Pure Being
,,	10	Anum	Anaņu
**	11	etc. The Tattwa	etc." - the Tattwa
••	12	ultimate reality	Ultimate Reality
••	17	by adopting	having adopted
"	19	himself is the	himself to the
••	24	symptions	symptoms
••	27 	cause effect	cause-effect
••		(Nimittanainithika	(Nimittanaimittika
••	29	scholars like	to scholars like
••	30	spiritl	spiritual
••	31	Siddanta	Siddhānta
	38	theory of the world	theory of the not-self of the
••	20		world
	39	Reality	duality
19	5	Prog.	Prof.
••	12	reason slone	reason alone
••	14	Nāgārjunas	Nāgārjuna's
	30	conversent	conversant
19	33	avered	averred
20	2	There is room	There is no room
	8	peurile	puerile
••	11	"The essential	"The Essential
,,	14	predominently	predominantly
••		on dialections	on dialectics
••	16	(a school of Buddism only)	(a school of Idealism of
••	22	Dialogation	Buddhism only)
••	22	Dialection	dialectics

,,	27	Nihilism - are	Nihilism. They are
••	28	preserting	preserving
,,	30	on viewpoint	viewpoints
,,	31	obivious	oblivious
,,	34	initialy from	initially. From
21	3	ensconced by in	ensconced in
**	9	posed by these	posed by this
,,	16	(absolute Reality of self	(Absolute Reality of Self
**	24	Vijñānavāda (Idealism)	Vijñānavādins (Idealists)
,,	25	Shūnyavāda (Nihilism)	Shūnyavādins (Nihilists)
,,	31	Buddhits	Buddhists'
"	35	varies in	various places in
"	38	ing or	ings or
22	14	'Āgama' his	'Āgama' or his
**	,,	text	texts
,,	26	Whereas for	For
**	28	Nāgārjunas	Nāgārjuna's
**	30	Naishiswābhāvya	Naihswābhāvya
22	34	which is of dependent	which is not of dependent
23	4	Absolute self	Absolute Self
**	8	unborn self,	unborn Self,
**	17	essenceless	essencelessness
**	18	non-dual self	non-dual Self
"	24	: Tathāgatabhūtakŏi'	'Tathāgatabhūtakōti'
,,	36	Vaddami "	Vadāmi "
**	39 (last)	a pindārtha	Apindārtha
24	7	Paramārtha is not	Paramārtha it is not
"	11	the purpost	the purport
**	17	- "(Mashyamika	in" Mādhyamika
**	,,	Kārikā vrithi	Kārikā Vritti
••	22	Brahma	Brahman
••	23	(ultimate reality)"	(Ultimate Reality)"
,,	30	ultimate reality"	Ultimate Reality"
**	37	a kind in Reality	a kind of Reality
25	13	Vijñānavādis	Vijñānavāda

ADVAITA PRAKARAŅA

After the page 357 through inadvertence page 359 followed by page 358 and page 390 have been printed. So while reading after the matter on page 357 continue with page 358, 359 and 390. The error is deeply regretted.

About The Author

His Holiness Paramahamsa Sri Sri Satchidānandendra Saraswati Swāmīji, the founder of Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya and author of over 200 reputed works on Advaita in Kannada, Sanskrit and English, blessed the earth with his presence for 96 useful and rich years (1880-1975).

His works are characterised by vast and deep scholarship, clear and precise perception and an attractive and lively style. His authentic interpretation of Śańkara has been greatly recognized by both the East and the West. He was not just a rare and accomplished individual but a mighty and magnificent institution.

About This Book

Shri Gaudapāda has established by taking as his central authoritative source the Māndūkya Upanishad, which though smallest in size (only 12 Mantras or verses) among all the Upanishads yet the most famous one, the following profound Siddhanta by means of logic fully in consonance with Anubhava (universal Intuitive Experience): "On the support of Anubhava of Avasthātraya or three states of consciousness, Atman of all of us is verily Ajadvaya Brahman alone which is Nityaniravastha or eternally devoid of any state; That alone is the Paramartha satya". Further, he has not only clarified as to what exactly is the wide difference between the predominantly perverted logic orinted Vijnānavādis and Shūnyavāda, on the one hand, and Vedanta on the other, but also has convinced all true seekers about the facts that: (a) Vain logic can never stand its ground all through; (b) all the devices adopted by the logically-oriented Darshanas or schools of philosophy are all meant for the worship (Ārādhana) of Paramātman.