


SALIENT FEATURES  
OF  
ŚĀṆKARA'S VEDĀNTA



BY  
SWAMI SATCHIDANANDENDRA SARASWATI

**SALIENT FEATURES  
OF  
ŚANKARA'S VEDANTA**

*BY*  
**SWAMI SATCHIDANANDENDRA SARASWATI**

*INTRODUCTION BY*  
**PROF. S.K. RAMACHANDRA RAO**

**ADHYATMA PRAKASHA KARYALAYA  
THYAGARAJANAGAR, BANGALORE 560 028**

**“SALIENT FEATURES OF ŚAṆKARA’S VEDĀNTA”**

by Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati

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## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

First Edition

This is a free rendering of Sri Swamiji's '*Śāṅkara Vedānta Prakriye*' (Kannada) which was first written during his *Cāturmāsya Samkalpa* at Davangere in the year *Manmatha*. The Second Edition was published by us in 1959. It has been translated into Telugu and Tamil since, but English-knowing readers who could not understand any of the three Dravidian Languages have continued to press for an English rendering of this popular book. His Holiness has himself undertaken the task at our request.

We hope that the valuable contents of this production will now appeal to a wider circle of readers.

Holenarasipur  
22-1-1967

Y. Narasappa  
Chairman of the Executive Committee

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## PREFACE

First Edition

There have been a number of books on Śaṅkara Vedānta produced and published in this country and elsewhere. While they are very popular probably because their authorship has been ascribed to the great Śaṅkara, they contain tenets in conflict with one another. Relying upon these as well as the systems contained in the subcommentaries on Śaṅkara's classical works, even learned men professing to follow Śaṅkara have been broadcasting ideas opposed to one another in the name of that great thinker. And adverse critics belonging to other schools of Vedānta have been mis-representing Śaṅkara's system are greatly puzzled and perplexed as to what exactly is the matter or method adopted in the school belonging to his tradition.

It is not easy for beginners to consolidate and discriminate for themselves the various doctrines contained in the three groups of works collectively called the *Prasthāna Trayī* indisputably ascribed to Śaṅkara. I have therefore tried to do this to the best of my ability.

Two Appendices—one containing the cardinal Tenets of Śaṅkara's Vedānta, and the second a list of the Sanskrit quotations adduced in the body of the work—have been given at the end of the work. The first is a free rendering and adaptation of an article by my student, Pandit H.S. Lakshminarasimha Murthy. I hope that these will be helpful to beginners to remember the principal points of the system. I have every hope that one who has mastered the leading ideas of Śaṅkara's

Vedanta contained in this little book, may very well take to the study of more advanced books such as my '*How to Recognize the Method of Vedanta*', with assurance.

I have — as usual — made over the copyright of this book to the Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya. May Bhagavan Narayana shower His blessings on their laudable enterprise.

Holenarásipur  
22-1-1967

Satchidanandendra Saraswati

# **ADHYATMA PRAKASHA KARYALAYA**

**(PRIVATE TRUST)**

**An Institution to help the interpretation of Indian Culture by  
stimulating the study and practice of the Adhyatma Vidya  
in its universal aspect.**

**HOLENARSIPUR – 573 211; Hassan Dist.**

**Date 1-7-1990**

**To**

**The Secretary  
Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya  
Bangalore Branch  
No 68, 2nd Block  
Thyagarajanagar  
Bangalore - 560028**

## **Subject : PERMISSION LETTER**

**Permission is hereby granted to Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Bangalore branch to reprint and publish all English and Sanskrit works of Parama Pujya Sri Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswathi Swamiji, published earlier by Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, (H. O.), Holenarsipur, unconditionally.**

**We pray that God bestow His choicest blessings on the branch Karyalaya and give them enough strength to print and publish all the works of Sri Sri Swamiji.**

**We heartily wish success in their project.**

**Holenarsipur  
1-7-1990**

**H.S. Lakshminarasimha Murthy  
Secretary  
Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya**



## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

Second Edition

His Holiness Sri Sri Satchidānandendra Saraswathi Swamiji (1880–1975) has written a number of books on Vedānta in Kannada, Sanskrit and English. While the books in Sanskrit are useful primarily for pundits all over the country, the Swamiji was hopeful that books in English would prove useful to a large number of persons not only in this country but all over the world, who are interested in the study of Vedānta in general and Śāṅkara Siddhānta in particular.

Pujya Swamiji established a branch of the Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya at Bangalore mainly because, this being an international city would serve as a centre for spreading Śāṅkara Siddhānta all over the world.

As most of these books in Sanskrit and English are now out of print and the demand for such books remained unfulfilled, it was felt that a reprint of these books would fill in the breach in this respect.

Therefore a reprint project of Pujya Swamiji's English and Sanskrit works has been launched by Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Bangalore Branch. This project is now inaugurated by the publication of this reprint of the English book — "Salient Features of Śāṅkara's Vedānta".

We are thankful to Smt. and Sri C.S. Seetharama Rao, Tax-consultant, Jayanagar, Bangalore, who have made it possible for us to reprint and publish this

valuable work of Parama Pujya Swamiji, by their generous financial assistance. This donation has been made in the sweet memory of Late C.V. Suryanarayana Rao and Narasamma, the revered parents of Sri C. S. Seetharama Rao.

We profusely thank Prof. S.K. Ramachandra Rao who has on our request kindly written the scholarly introduction. It has enriched the value of this book. It not only throws light upon the contents of the book, but also gives an idea about Pujya Swamiji's life and mission.

We are grateful to the authorities of the Adhyātma Prakāsha Kāryālaya, Holenarsipur for having permitted us to reprint and publish this book.

Our heartfelt thanks are also due to all those who have carefully read through the proofs and to many others, but for whose efforts this work could not have seen the light of day.

We are also highly thankful to Sri Nithyananda Printers, for their elegant execution of the printing and binding work.

We pray that the revered Swamiji bless us with the required strength in executing this project of reprinting all his English and Sanskrit works.

Our pranams at the holy lotus feet of Swamiji.

Bangalore  
20-7-90

K.G. Subraya Sharma  
Secretary  
Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya  
Bangalore 560 028

## ABBREVIATIONS

ABh. SBh.	Adhyāsa Bhāṣhya of Sūtra Bhāṣhya
Ai.	Aitareya Upanishad
Br.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad
Br. Bh.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣhya
Br. Mā.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Mādhyandina Recension
Ch.	Chāndōgya Upanishad
G.	Bhagavadgītā
GBh.	Bhagavadgītā Bhāṣhya
GK.	Gauḍapāda's Kārikās
GK. Bh.	Gauḍapāda Kārikā Bhāṣhya
Jai. S.	Jaimini's Sūtras on Dharma
Kā.	Kāthaka Upanishad
Mā., Mān.	Māṇḍūkya Upanishad
Mā. Bh.	Māṇḍūkya Bhāṣhya
Mu., Mun.	Muṇḍaka Upanishad
Pr. Bh.	Praśna Bhāṣhya
Ś. Bh.	Śabaraswamin's Bhāṣhya on Jaimini's Sūtras
SBh.	Sūtra Bhāṣhya
Sve.	Śvetāśwatara Upanishad
Tai.	Taittirīya upanishad
Tai. Bh.	Taittirīya Bhāṣhya
Tai. Br.	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Tai. N.	Taittirīya Nārāyaṇapanna
V. S.	Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa

## INTRODUCTION

The author of this work, the revered Svāmi, Śrī Sacchidānandendra Sarasvatī (1880-1975), is justly acclaimed to be the second appearance of the great Śaṅkara. The task before Śaṅkara when he appeared a thousand and odd years ago was to recover the true Vedāntic tradition from among the mass of wrong interpretations of the Upanishadic texts. When the author of this work appeared over a hundred years ago, the mission before him was to recover the true techniques of Śaṅkara from among the maze of perverted viewpoints of the various sub-commentaries.

The task to which the revered Svāmi addressed his entire life, dedicating every waking moment to it, was to set the house of Śaṅkara in order. He realized quite early in his life that the views of the great master were being unfortunately and grossly misrepresented by his followers as well as opponents, that considerable pernicious accretions had occurred in the general standpoint of Advaita, thanks to the later sub-commentators, and that the philosophy now claimed widely to be Śaṅkara's is not really his. The Svāmi undertook to vindicate the traditional method and matter as envisaged by Śaṅkara not only by translating the original and genuine works of Śaṅkara in Kannaḍa, but by writing independent works in English, Kannaḍa and Sanskrit on the subject. His literary output was truly phenomenal, and his writings, prolific as they are, are characterized by precision, lucidity and erudition. But it was not before years of scrupulous and intensive study not only of the works of Śaṅkara, but of all the

sub-commentaries and glosses available, and also of the definitive texts belonging to the schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva, that he applied himself to the publication of his discovery that Śaṅkara has been misrepresented.

He was branded as a rebel by the conventionalists because he dared to question the prevailing approach to Śaṅkara, which is moulded principally by the sub-commentaries (Bhāmatī and Pañchapādikā). But the Svāmi has convincingly demonstrated, by elaborate and painstaking scrutiny, that the sub-commentaries have subscribed to, and introduced, many a concept that is altogether alien to Śaṅkara's commentarial corpus, and that not infrequently these concepts militate against the tradition that Śaṅkara attempts to uphold.

This has been the achievement of the Svāmi's long life and single-minded devotion. And reasons are not far to seek why this discovery of the unadulterated philosophical position of Śaṅkara (Śuddha-Śaṅkara-Prakriyā) has not received the recognition, celebrity and acceptance that it merits; the strength of convention has set up strong barriers in the minds of people, and there is resistance both unconscious and deliberate, to welcome any attacks on the conventional views, however well-founded and cogently presented.

It is a curious irony of our religious attitudes that the dogmatists are prepared to sacrifice Śaṅkara's commentaries for the sake of the sub-commentaries on them, namely, Bhāmatī and Pañchapādikā. It appears all too important for the dogmatist to defend Vāchaspati-miśra and Padmapāda even when they misrepresent Śaṅkara. It, therefore, required of the Svāmi, courage of conviction and steadfast determination to speak the truth at all costs. Instances are numerous as to how attempts were made to discredit

the Svāmi and prevent his viewpoints from being recognized. Undaunted, however, the Svāmi persevered and went on publishing his books in Kannada for popular edification in Karnāṭaka, in Sanskrit for carrying conviction to the conventional scholars, everywhere in India, and in English for the enlightenment of the interested students and scholars of modern persuasion all over the country and abroad. He also moved about from place to place, giving lectures and discourses on the same theme.

A simple, and unostentatious man with a retiring disposition and an ascetic temperament, he was also extraordinarily peaceable and quiet. He did not appear either in his talk or in his approach in the least like a rebel. He altogether avoided heat in his arguments, and did not delight in debates or controversies. He was entirely academic and intellectually honest in his attempt to eradicate the misconceptions concerning Śaṅkara. While his devotion to Śaṅkara was unflinching and complete, he boldly debunked the myths and legends which the conventional Śaṅkara-vijayās are replete with. His approach to the problem of Śaṅkara and his accomplishments was historical and rational.

He therefore rejected most, if not all, of the stotras and prakaraṇas, popularly ascribed to Śaṅkara, as spurious, and placed his entire reliance on the commentaries on the three prasthānas (Upanishads, Gītā and Vedānta-Sūtra) and a few other works like Upadeśa-sāhasri and Aparōkshānubhūti. Among these commentaries (Bhāṣhyās) he regarded the one on Vedānta-Sūtra as the most authentic and comprehensive statement of Śaṅkara's own ideas. He accepted Sureśvara as faithful to Śaṅkara, and attached great

importance to his **Naishkarmya-Siddhi** and **Vārtikās**.

The need to discover the real Śaṅkara was felt by him when he was only thirty-five (in the year 1915). He had already studied the basic works of Śaṅkara under the guidance of K.A. Krishnaswamy Iyer (the author of *Vedānta or the Science of Reality*), and had undergone the traditional discipline of Vedānta learning under the renowned scholar Mahāmahōpādhyāya, Vidyānidhi Hānagal Virūpāksha Śāstri. He had also by then got initiated by the then pontiff of Śrīgeri, Śrī Śivābhinava-Nṛsimha-Bhāratī Svāmi, at Kālaḍi (1910), and he had come under the influence of saintly scholars like Brahma-chaitanya Mahārāj of Gōndāvali and Kurtukōṭi Mahābhāgavata. With this rich philosophical and spiritual background, the desire that he felt to discover the real Śaṅkara for himself expressed itself in the monograph, *Mūlāvidyā-nirāsa* in Sanskrit, in 1929, also called *Śrī-Śaṅkara-hṛdayam*. He applied himself diligently to repeated study of Śaṅkara's works (Bhāshyās on the three Prasthānās) for several years to convince himself that the sub-commentaries (of Vāchaspati miśra and Padmapāda) had not done justice to the great master.

It was in the year 1920, a year after his wife passed away, that he felt called upon to take this as a mission in his life. He resolved to dedicate the rest of his life to correct the popular but fallacious understanding of Śaṅkara's philosophy, and to present Śaṅkara to the interested folk, altogether independent of the sub-commentaries.

He was working as a school-master at that time in Bangalore, and he established a centre for the study of Śaṅkara's original works, and also for the publications

he would periodically bring out to present Śaṅkara's thought in its pure form. This centre was called **Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya**. This centre was shifted to Hoḷenarasīpur in the year 1938, two years after he retired from Government service as a school-master in Bangalore.

He continued his study and he went on publishing books and monographs, all purporting to present Śaṅkara's philosophy unadulterated by the sub-commentaries, through the Kāryālaya at Hoḷenarasīpur. Ten years later, he felt the urge to renounce his worldly life and enter the monastic order. He was 68 years of age in 1947 when he became a sanyāsin under the monastic name of **Śrī Sacchidānandendra Sarasvatī** (his previous name being Yellāmbāḷase Subbarāya). He lived for twenty-seven years after taking Sanyāsa, continuing the work he had been doing for the past twenty seven years. He brought out two books in Sanskrit calling upon the conventional scholars to reconsider and recognize the differences between Śaṅkara's commentaries (**Bhāshyās**) and sub-commentaries (**Vyākhyānas**). The **Vijñapti** (1961) and **Vidvadgoshtī** (1962) are polemical in character and list the inconsistencies and textual problems. He prepared guides in Sanskrit for understanding aright the **Sūtra-bhāshya** of Śaṅkara (**Sugamā**, 1955 and **Sūtra-bhāshyārtha-tattva-vivechanī**, 1964) and a series of seven handbooks in Sanskrit to crystallize genuine viewpoints of Śaṅkara (**Śuddha-Śaṅkara-Prakriyā- Bhāskara**, 1964).

During the latter years of his monastic life, he was prevailed upon to establish a branch of Adhyātma



Prakāśa Kāryālaya in Bangalore in the year 1970. In Bangalore it was that the institution first took its birth about fifty years earlier and had continued here till it was shifted to Hoḷenarasīpur eighteen years later. His health had now begun to fail, mainly because of extreme old age, but he continued with will and zeal to write books and address interested folk almost till he attained Mahā-Samādhi on August 5, 1975 when he was 96. His long and dedicated life was an excellent translation into action of the ageold counsel that one must spend all one's time till sleep overtakes waking hours and death overtakes life, in quiet contemplation of the Upanishadic truth:

आ सुप्तेरा मृतेः कालं नयेद्वेदान्तचिन्तया

An early influence in his life was his association with another saintly soul, Hosakere Chidam̐ba-rayya, who was a fellow-teacher in the schools where he worked, and who was like himself devoted to a deep study of Vedānta, not as an intellectual exercise but with an eye for practical application. Both of them had set their eyes on the monastic order quite early in their lives, especially after their wives died young. Chidam̐barayya wrote some works in Kannaḍa, but did little more; he was given to a contemplative mode of life.

Another early influence on the Svāmi was Subrahmaṇya Iyer, who was his teacher in the High School at Hāssan, and who also taught him the first lessons in Vedānta, besides providing free lodge and boarding to him (the poor boy that he was) at his own home. If the Svāmi developed an excellent command over the English language although he never entered the portals of a college, it was because of this teacher who taught him English in the school and at home.

It was this teacher again who introduced him to K.A. Kṛṣṇaswāmi Iyer in Bangalore, who was not only an erudite scholar in Vedānta but an author of philosophical works of considerable renown. Dr. S. Rādhākṛṣṇan was an admirer of this Iyer, and had profited by talking, with him on Vedāntic issues. He wrote a foreword to Iyer's **Vedānta or the Science of Reality**. Continued and intimate association with Kṛṣṇaswāmi Iyer provided the future Svāmi with valuable insight into the method of Vedānta, especially the one dealing with the three states of being: wakefulness, dream and deep sleep. Iyer was also known for his independent thinking, his sole reliance on the three commentaries of Śaṅkara (the Prasthāna-traya-Bhāṣyas) and his disregard for the sub-commentaries. The Svāmi derived great moral support from Iyer for his own urge to discover the real Śaṅkara.

After the death of Kṛṣṇaswāmi Iyer, the future Svāmi had to plough a lonely furrow. He had no one to sympathize with his search for the real Śaṅkara, or to support him in this cause. His adversaries were naturally numerous, for he threw stones at the shibboleth of convention. The hold of the conventional punḍits on the masses was so strong that very few patrons came forward to help his Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya grow. Even his own erstwhile teacher, Hānagal Virūpāksha-Śāstri, who had taught him **Sūtra-Bhāṣya**, had now turned against him, and treated him like a heretic and outcast. He prevented the then Mahārāja of Mysore from helping the cause of Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya.

But the future Svāmi was made of sterner stuff, and

he faced the challenges all alone and unyielding. He continued his search for the real Śaṅkara as if in a fury, in the teeth of severe opposition, and published book after book defending his call to ignore the sub-commentaries and go back to Śaṅkara. At last he found an ally in Viṭṭhala-Śāstri, who was a great vedāntin and scholar attached to the court of the Mahārāja of Mysore. Viṭṭhala-Śāstri was so convinced that he not only supported the position of the future Svāmi against all adversaries, but claimed him as his own guru. Indeed, in later years he received initiation into monastic order under the name of **Svāmi Jñānānandendra-Sarasvatī**, and continued the work of his teacher. Another scholar who supported the call for going back to Śaṅkara was Parakkaje Subrahmaṇya Bhaṭṭa.

With the exception of these two scholars, there was hardly any positive help that was forthcoming to the cause of Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya, which was established solely for popularizing the genuine and original teachings of Śaṅkara. The Svāmi has brought out from his own pen more than two hundred books from the Kāryālaya, all of them purporting to explain the tradition of Vedānta as recognized by Śaṅkara.

While most of the books written by him are in Kannada, some are in Sanskrit, and some in English. And while most of the books are either translations or explanations of Śaṅkara's own original commentarial works, there are also translations of other works like **Pañchapādikā** (an incomplete sub-commentary on Śaṅkara's **Sūtra-Bhāṣya**, (1966), not however faithful to Śaṅkara), and Rāmānuja's commentaries on **Brahma-Sūtra** (which are severely critical of Śaṅkara's

views). The most significant contribution made by the Svāmi to philosophical literature in Kannaḍa is the translation into easy and readable Kannaḍa for the first time all the commentaries of Śaṅkara (on **Vedānta-Sūtra**, on the **ten Upanishads** and on **Bhagavad-Gītā**), with ample annotations and critical introductions.

His early work in Kannaḍa tracing the history of Vedāntic ideas before and after Śaṅkara, (**Vedānta-Vichārada Itihāsa**) is a monumental work, although only the first part of it was brought out. Dealing with the same theme but in a more elaborate and well-documented manner is his work in Sanskrit, **Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabhijñā** (1964), which can be said without exaggeration to be the most important contribution ever made by any one to the Vedāntic literature in the country. It is easily his **magnum opus**. It contains an elaborate introduction in English dealing with how to recognize the Vedāntic method. It is an analytical and comparative study of all the Vedāntic thinkers and authors who lived prior to the days of Śaṅkara, and those who lived after Śaṅkara's days; it is an honest and dispassionate appraisal of Śaṅkara's Vedānta as a tradition, and is encyclopaedic in its scope in this particular field.

His writings in Kannaḍa and Sanskrit on Gaudapāda's **Māndūkya-Kārikā** (**Māṇḍūkya Rahasya-vivṛti**, 1958), and Śaṅkara's commentary on it provide remarkable insight into the discussion of the three states of Being (avasthātraya, the three avasthas); he establishes with elaborate arguments that Gaudapāda was a Vedāntin and not a Buddhist. While I have my own reservations on this issue, his arguments

are undoubtedly serious and worthy of attention by all Indologists interested in this area. Likewise, his works on Sureśvara's **Naishkarmya-Siddhi** in Kannāḍa and Sanskrit (**Kleśāpahārini**), are profound and deal extensively with an important subject in Vedānta, the role of wisdom (jñāna) apropos ritualistic action (karma).

He merits the gratitude of scholars in Vedānta for having brought into focus the original essay of Śaṅkara, **Adhyāsa-Bhāshya**, which is designed to be prefatory in character to his commentary on Vedānta-sūtras. He has written on this, essays in Sanskrit, Kannāḍa and English, and has suggested that 'adhyāsa' is the corner-stone of the philosophical position of Śaṅkara, and that it is all too important in the conceptual framework of Advaita Vedānta. The Svāmi's perceptions are indeed correct, for **Adhyāsa-Bhāshya** is without doubt the most original and definitive of Śaṅkara's writings; it seeks to reconcile the lay and universal conviction of mundane existence (lōka-dṛṣṭi) with the enlightened view of reality as expounded in tradition (Śāstra-dṛṣṭi). The import of this prefatory essay is far-reaching; and it is a master-piece of early Sanskrit prose writing.

It was usual for his books in English to be only translations or adaptations from lectures delivered originally in Kannāḍa for several days in various places on occasions like Chāturmāsya or Śaṅkara-saptāha. The book-form which these talks assume involves rearrangement of topics, enlargement of scope and revision of the matter, so that each book will be self-complete and meaningful.

Among the English works written by him, the **Intuition of Reality** answers very convincingly the usual

charge against Advaita-Vedānta that it is merely academic and intellectual, and that it has no use for a personal god. **How to Recognize the Method of Vedānta** illustrates the value of the concept of “adhyāropa” (superimposition) and “apavāda” (removal of this superimposition after ascertaining the nature of the object on which the superimposition had been made), and **The Vision of Atman** explains the importance of śravaṇa (study of scriptures), manana (intense cogitation over what has been received from the study) and nididhyāsana (total absorption in the object of pursuit) in realizing the Vedāntic reality. **Śaṅkara’s Clarification of Certain Vedāntic Concepts** is a valuable work inasmuch as it clears many a cobweb that has grown in course of time around the most seminal concepts like the Ātman, Vidyā and Avidyā, Īśvara, Māyā, Sanyāsa and Yoga in the field of Advaita Vedānta. **The Upanishadic Approach to Reality** establishes that the various Upanishads uniformly adopt a single method of approach leading to the ultimate intuition of Reality.

It is rather remarkable that although he has written a large number of works, he does not repeat himself. Each of his books presents a specific argument or aspect of Vedānta, not covered by any of his other books. And it is usual for him to cite chapter and verse for every statement that he makes, and his books are thus a veritable mine of relevant and significant quotations from the original works of Śaṅkara. His intellectual honesty and sincerity of purpose are apparent in every one of his books.

It is heartening to note that the Bangalore branch of the Adhyātma Prakāśa Kāryālaya has undertaken to

reprint all his English books for the edification of the English-knowing folk all over the country and abroad. Some of his major books in Kannada are being brought out in new editions by the main office of the Kāryālaya at Hoḷenarasīpur; and this has gone a long way in catering to the needs of the seekers of Vedāntic wisdom in Karnāṭaka. There is now an enlarged circle of those who are hungry for authoritative works on Vedānta, not only in Karnāṭaka but outside also, who would prefer books in English for various reasons.

There is real dearth of small, readable but accurate and dependable books in English on the subject of Vedānta in general and Śaṅkara in particular. Most of the books on Advaita Vedānta that are now available follow closely the sub-commentaries (**Pañchapādikā** and **Bhāmatī**) or later works, dependent upon these sub-commentaries (like **Vivaraṇa Kalpataru**, **Pañchadaśī**, and **Samkshēpa-Śārīraka**), and therefore present only a distorted picture of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Vedāntic tradition.

The need for making the English works of the Svāmi available to the people is, therefore, great and urgent. They will help to correct the wrong impressions that are now widely held, and clarify issues on which sufficient light has not till now been shed. And they will serve as authoritative handbooks for understanding the true spirit of Vedānta and for organizing one's life in accordance with the tenets of the Vedāntic tradition.

The book that the Bangalore branch of the Kāryālaya has selected to inaugurate this reprint-series is **Salient Features of Śaṅkara's Vedānta**. This book was first published in 1967 from Hoḷenarasīpur as a free rendering in English of a Kannada work (entitled

**Śāṅkara-Vedānta-Prakriye**) which had been written by the Svāmi during his Chāturmāsya residence in Dāvaṇagere during the Hindu Year Manmatha (corresponding to 1956) and published in 1959 (second edition). This Kannaḍa work was so well received by the seekers of Vedāntic wisdom that it was published subsequently in its Telugu and Tamiḷ versions. The English translation was done by the Svāmi himself, and this version too became popular.

This book takes into account the baffling perplexity which the students of Śāṅkara's Vedānta would normally experience when they hear or read irreconcilably conflicting views ascribed to the same Śāṅkara, and adverse criticisms voiced by the opponents against all these views. That the ideas ascribed to Śāṅkara differ among themselves is to be expected and would be warranted if all the various works that at present go by his name are really his. Evaluation and understanding of Śāṅkara's viewpoint would be impossible unless we rely only on the works that are genuinely his. The Svāmi rightly relies on the three groups of works of Śāṅkara which are collectively known as **Prasthānatraya-Bhāṣya**, and on nothing else. And among these (the commentaries on the Upanishads, on the Gītā and on the Vedānta-sūtras), the magnum opus and most indubitably authentic is the commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras. Śāṅkara's views as expressed here can safely be regarded as truly his own. Whatever view runs against the views expressed in this work cannot reasonably be Śāṅkara's, and can be dismissed as outside the framework of tradition.

This book presents Śāṅkara's views in a brief but lucid manner. All the doctrinal issues that are germane to the traditional viewpoint (theory and practice) of Vedānta are dealt with here: the pure or



“Witness”-nature (**Sākshi**) of Brahman, the scope and validity of scripture (**Śāstra**) which is the only means of our knowing this nature, the relative importance of reason and intuition, the states of consciousness apropos the real Self (**Ātman**) and the practical involvements in Self-realization.

The chapter on “Spiritual concentration” (Ch.5) is particularly interesting, for it discusses the role of upāsanā, Yoga and nididhyāsana in Vedāntic discipline as no one has done earlier. It clarifies the aspect of Sādhana apropos the liberating wisdom (jñāna), which alone is held in Vedānta as the immediate, necessary and sufficient precondition for liberation, moksha. The author shows how the “yōga” of Vedānta is distinct from the “yōga” of Patañjali, and argues that “nididhyāsana” according to Śaṅkara is a direct means to the intuitive vision of the Self (or self-realization). For greater elucidation of this issue, the reader is referred to the Svāmi’s Sanskrit work **Gītā-Śāstrārtha-Viveka** (1965), where Śaṅkara’s position alongside the Sāṅkhya and Yoga ideologies is discussed.

In the brief compass of this book, the author has packed extremely valuable information for those who are given to intellectual inquiry as well as for those who are spiritual seekers. The author has also provided at the end a comprehensive list of Sanskrit quotations from the source-texts (particularly from Śaṅkara’s **Sūtra-Bhashya**), which have been used while preparing this book. The relevant original passages in Sanskrit have been reproduced in full, and this adds value to the book. The discerning reader who is also acquainted with Sanskrit may at once check if the translations of the passages are correct and the ideas as explained here are faithful to the original texts. This

method of providing complete relevant material in its original form whenever a point is made speaks volumes for the author's honesty and integrity, and for the authenticity of the book.

It is to be hoped that the Bangalore branch of the Kāryālaya will persevere in this laudable venture, and bring out all the English works of the revered Svāmi in reprint-editions. It will facilitate proper appreciation of the rich contribution made by Śrī Śaṅkara to the cause of spiritual and intellectual renaissance in the country more than a thousand years ago. It will also help the cause of the mission to fulfil which Śrī Sacchidānandendra-Sarasvatī Svāmi took his birth over a hundred years ago.

I congratulate the earnest, energetic and enterprising Secretary of the Bangalore branch of the Kāryālaya, Puṇḍit Śrī K.G. Subrāya Śarmā, who is devoted to the task of keeping alive the sacred memory of the revered Svāmi, and has resolved to launch this reprint-project as another venture in that direction.

Date: 28.4.1990;

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## CHAPTER ONE

### BRAHMAN AS THE UNIVERSAL WITNESSING SELF

1. If one were asked to state in a single proposition the metaphysical Reality taught in all the Upanishads, or Vedantas as they are known to Śaṅkara, the following text from the Chāṇḍōgya might be appropriately quoted: "Now this subtle principle, all this phenomenal universe has that for its essence; that is the only Reality, that is the only Self. That thou art, O Śvetaketu!" (Ch. 6-8-7). This Upanishadic doctrine summed up in these three words 'That thou art', can be realized here and now by any one who has duly qualified himself to enter on the course of Vedantic study.

2. This ultimate Reality can neither be expressed by any word nor grasped by any concept. "From it all words fall back failing to reach it, along with the intellect" (Tai. 2-9), for it possesses none of the distinctive features such as genus, substance, quality, action or relation, and these are the only conditions affording scope for words. Nor is It a knowable - that is to say, something objectifiable - by concepts. So say the Śrūtis and the Smṛtis alike: "This is inapprehensible and eternal" (Br.4-4-20); "He is indestructible and incomprehensible" (G. 2-18). It is the very self of even speech and mind, for it is this which reveals them as such. "It is the mind of mind, speech of speech" (Ke. 1-2); "That which is not utterable by speech, but by which speech itself is uttered" (Ke.1-5); "That which one is unable to conceive by mind, but by which mind

itself is said to be conceived" (Ke. 1-6) - Śrutis such as these say so. That is why Śrutis try to describe It by denying all possible properties of knowable objects. "Now the teaching 'Not such, not such', for there is none beyond this 'not such' " (Br. 2-3-6). This Śruti expressly says that there is no other possible way of presenting the nature of transcendental reality except in the negative form '*neti neti*'.

3. Even while ultimate Reality is thus unobjectifiable by words or concepts, the Śruti tries to indicate its real nature by employing certain epithets such as '*Brahman*' (the Absolute), '*Bhooma*' (Plenitude), '*Sat*' (Pure Being). Students of Vedānta should remember that reality is not the express meaning of such terms. "It is only by means of name, form and action super-imposed on it that Brahman is positively described in Śrutis by expressions like 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Br. 3-9-8); 'Solid consciousness only' (Br. 2-4-2); Brahman', and 'Ātman' (Br. Bh. 2-3-6).

4. The existence of Brahman does not allow of any doubt, for Brahman is our very Self. "Brahman must be taken to exist inasmuch as it is the self of everyone" (SBh1-1-1). "One would himself become non-existent, if one were to think of Brahman as non-existent; if, on the other hand, one were to take Brahman as existent, then he is himself regarded as existent" (Tai. 2-6). That is why the Śruti says "This is Ātman (the Self) described as 'not such, not such'" (Br. 3-9-26). That is why "The word 'Ātman' is used in all Śrutis with reference to Brahman" (Br. Bh. 2-1-20).

5. Although Brahman is our very Self, there is conflict of opinions among philosophers regarding its specific nature. The mere body, the senses, the mind,

the momentary stream of consciousness, the indeterminate *Śūnya* - all these have been severally held to be the Self. Some maintain that there is, distinct from all these, a doer and enjoyer of the fruits of action, while yet others hold that he is only the enjoyer but not the doer. Others believe in the existence of a Ruler other than the individual soul, an omniscient and omnipotent Being. The Vedantins are of the opinion that this Ruler is in truth the Self of the enjoyer, and that this is the Brahman of the Upanishads. Sri Śaṅkarāchārya teaches that the Highest Goal of human life is reached by the realization of this Brahman.

6. The *Mīmāṃsakās* aver that the individual self (*Jīvātman*) as distinguished from the body and the senses, is both the locus and object of the ego-(the 'me'-) notion. Such too is the popular idea of all that believe in the existence of an individual soul. But as a matter of fact the only real Self is the Witness (*sākshi*) who is the seer of even that *Jīvātman*, the object of the 'me' notion. This Witnessing *Ātman* is not many, not one for each body. He is the Self common to all beings. He is to be known only through the teaching of the Upanishads. That is why in the Śruti 'I ask thee about the *Purusha* of the Upanishads' (Br. 3-9-26), the significant epithet '*Aupanishada Purusha*' has been used. So says the great Śaṅkarāchārya (SBh.1-1- 4).

7. No one can deny the existence of this Self of the nature of the witness, for 'He is the Self of even the person that denies it' (SBh. 1-1-4). The venerable Śaṅkara brings home to everyone the existence of this *Ātman* basing his observation on a fact of universal intuition. He remarks 'Whoever it be that denies this Self, It is even his own inalienable essence' (SBh. 1-1-4; 2-3-7).

8. That this Witnessing Principle is of the nature of consciousness and the Universal Self of all beings, is a unique teaching of Vedānta. The following Śruti declares this in the most unmistakable terms: "One and the same Shining One (*Deva*), is hid in all beings, the omnipresent, the inmost Self of all beings, the Overlord of all acts, presiding over all beings, the Witnessing Consciousness, One, and without attributes" (Śve. 6- 11). Anyone who can take his stand in this Witness can be convinced of the appropriateness of the various characteristic epithets used in this Vedic text.

9. It is impossible that there should be two selves for one and the same body (SBh. 1-2-20), for 'Ātman' means one's own nature' (SBh. 1-1-6). While the term 'Ātman' is well-known to denote one's own self, there are some who hold that there is a Supreme Self (*Paramātmā*) distinct from our individual self, and that we are each distinct from that Supreme Self. Evidently they are doing violence to the common signification of the term 'Ātman' and foisting an unusual meaning on it. They are also thereby treating the Supreme Self as the non-self and an object, thus imputing to that Self the characteristics of external objects and rendering it an impermanent thing. It is not possible even to conceive of anything other than our individual self as our own self. Śruti says "He is the un-seen seer, un-heard hearer, un-thought thinker, un-understood understander. There is no seer other than he, there is no hearer other than he, there is no thinker other than he, there is no understander other than he. This is your Self, the Inner Controller (*Antaryāmin*), the Immortal One. Anything other than this is ephemeral" (Br. 3-7-23). Those that torture this Vedic text whose meaning is quite in consonance with universal intuition by giving it

any other interpretation, would be courting an obstacle to their own spiritual progress.

10. It is inconceivable that there can be more than one Witnessing Ātman. We all know that ether (*Ākāśa*) is all-pervading. Anything conceived to exist must be in ethereal space. Now even the mind which cognizes all this space as its object is itself an object of the Witnessing Consciousness. Can we now say that this all-pervading Witnessing Ātman is limited by space and divided into many? The Upanishads speak of Ātman as an all-pervading principle: "As extensive is this physical space, so extensive is this Ākāśa (*Ātman*) within the heart" (Ch. 8-1-3); "By whom is pervaded the ether, the heaven and the earth." (Tai. Nā. 1)

11. The Witnessing Principle is other than the self cognized by the notion of the ego, that is to say, it is of the nature of changeless Consciousness. So it is neither the agent nor the object of any act. "Neither something to be acquired, nor to be rejected, for the very reason that It is our own Self" (SBh. 1-1- 4); "All perishable effects can perish only upto and exclusive of the *Purusha* (the Witness). But the *Purusha* is imperishable, for there is nothing else extraneous to Him to cause His destruction. There being nothing else to affect Him, He is unchangeably eternal, and hence of a nature eternally pure, conscious and free" (SBh. 1-1-4).

12. This is the sum and substance of the truth taught by Vedanta: "This Atman is indeed the great, unborn, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless Brahman. It is well-known that Brahman is fearless. Whoever realizes it thus becomes indeed the fearless Brahman itself" (Br. 4-4-25).

## CHAPTER TWO

### NO REAL DISTINCTION OF THE KNOWER, MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE AND OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE IN BRAHMAN

13. The all-witnessing Brahman being inapprehensible, cannot be known through any means of knowledge. Only an apprehensible object can be seen through the senses. A sensible object has one or more of the characteristic properties of sound, touch, colour or form, taste and smell. But Brahman is devoid of all these properties. "Soundless, touchless, formless, undecaying and tasteless; likewise, eternally odourless, beginningless, and endless, beyond the *Mahat* (universal principle of consciousness) and constant, realizing that, one is freed from the jaws of death (that is, ignorance, desire and action)" (Kā.1-3-15)-so says a Śruti text. It is here stated that this Ātman is beginningless and endless, that is to say, being the witness of both time and space as well as objective things, He does not begin or end in time, and that He is changelessly eternal and beyond all intellect.

14. This principle called Ātman is no object either of sensuous perception or inference and other valid means of knowledge. "Now this principle is obviously not an object of perception since it is devoid of form and other sensible qualities; nor is it an object of inference and other means since it is free from any inferential sign or other perceptible aids of knowledge" (SBh.2- 1-6). Therefore, observes Śaṅkara, this has to be known only by the help of *Āgama* (revelation) just as the supersen-



suous *Dharma* (religious duty and merit) (SBh.2-1-6).

15. The application of the means of knowledge (*Pramāṇāni*) necessarily implies the triple distinction of the knower (*Pramātr*), the senses and other means (*Pramāṇa*) and the object of knowledge (*Prameya*). But the Śruti says, "This inapprehensible constant principle is to be realized as a uniform entity" (Br. 4-4-20), 'as a solid mass of consciousness, homogeneous, continuous without any break whatsoever like the all-pervading ether' as Ācārya Śaṅkara explains it (Br.Bh. 4-4-20).

16. Well, it may be asked, even if the external senses will not do, would not at least the intellect be necessary to know it? How else could we know it if not through the mind? Quite true. "Through the mind alone, one has to see it" says the Śruti, "There is no diversity whatsoever in it. Whosoever sees as though there were any diversity in it goes from death to death" (Br. 4-4-19). Ordinarily the mind habitually sees only diversity; but in the opinion of Śaṅkara, (GBh. 2-21) it becomes a competent means of seeing the Ātman free from all distinctions when it is purified by means of initiation from revelation and teacher (*Śāstra* and *Ācārya*), as well as by disciplinary aids like the control of the mind and the senses (*Śama* and *dama*).<sup>1</sup>

17. It might be doubted whether the mind can ever transcend its nature of perceiving duality, whatever be the degree of purification it might undergo. Is it ever possible for one to know the Self without being aware at the same time of the distinctions inextricably involved in the process of knowing? He must necessarily be conscious of being the knower, of the mind as the

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1. Even then it cannot objectify Ātman. It can know Him only by intuition, when it is merged in Him. See the next para.

means of knowledge and of the Self as the object of knowledge. The distinctions will be there at least, even if he be not aware of them at the time. Of course, this objection is quite valid from the empirical stand-point. But when we have actually realized the possibility of knowing the non-dual Self, there can be no reasonable ground for any such doubt. Then we shall have been convinced of the sole reality of the Self as well as of the misconception on which the distinction of the knower and the known rests. This fact has been thus disclosed by Gaudapādācārya, the grand-preceptor (*Parama-guru*) of Śaṅkarācārya. "When the mind becomes aware of the sole reality of Ātman, then it reaches the state of no-mind, for it cannot grasp anything when there is nothing to grasp for it" (GK. 3-32). Ācārya Śaṅkara observes, that just as fire ceases to burn when there is no fuel to burn, so also when following up the teaching of the Śāstra and Ācārya, the truth dawns that Ātman is the only Reality and everything else is only a false appearance conveyed through mere words. Then the mind ceases to conceive there being nothing to conceive, and thus becomes no mind. So realization of the unreality of the distinction of knowledge and its object notwithstanding its appearance, is what is really meant by transcending all distinctions.

18. 'Is it right to regard the distinction of the knower, the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge as unreal, while it is a fact of universal experience?' it may be asked. But an appearance within the experience of all need not be necessarily real. It is natural for all men, sometimes to mistake the mother of pearl for silver, or for those suffering from cataract or some other kindred clouded eye-sight to see two moons where there is only one. But nobody would insist on that

account that there is actual silver or the additional moon in these instances. So while it is true that the distinction of the means and object of knowledge is a fact of experience common to all, it is only a case of natural super-imposition (*adhyāsa*), a misconception of something for another like the perception of apparent silver in the mother of pearl or of the second moon, in the instances cited above. The mutual super-imposition of the self and the not-Self on each other, is called *Avidyā*. "Basing themselves on the presupposition of this mutual super-imposition of the Self and the not-Self, named *Avidyā* " says Śaṅkara "proceed all activities of ordinary life as well as those prescribed by the Vedas" (ABh. SBh.).

19. The illusion of silver in the mother of pearl, or of the second moon, is not universal, whereas the distinction of knowledge and its object is a fact of universal experience. Would it not be a total abolishment of human life and activity altogether if we should dismiss as unreal distinctions universally recognized as real in common life? This misgiving need not deter us from knowing the truth. For if the idea of the distinction of knowledge and its object is really unfounded, its rejection cannot be regarded as a bold venture. That the distinction appears to be real to all cannot make it necessarily real as a matter of fact. There are many universal illusions and hallucinations such as the sun's apparent movement, the blueness of the sky and so on. Nor need we fear that all human transactions would come to an end if philosophers should decide, on a careful analysis, that the distinction is unreal. "All ideas and activities can continue to be regarded as valid and real until one realizes one's identity with Brahman, just as the ideas and activities of a dream are regarded valid

and real before waking. (To explain):- As long as the knowledge of the unity of the One Real Ātman has not dawned, it never strikes anyone that the effects of the nature of means of knowledge, object of knowledge as well as the resultant knowledge, are all unreal. Far rather, every individual regards only effects (such as one's body, children & c.) in the relation of me and mine through ignorance totally oblivious of his inherent identity with Brahman. Therefore all proceedings whether of ordinary life or based on scripture, can very well go on undisturbed so long as one does not wake to one's identity with Brahman. The case is quite analogous to that of a common man dreaming, while seeing a variety of things, feels up to the time of waking, quite certain that he actually perceives those things never suspecting for the moment that it is only an illusory perception" (SBh. 2-1-14).

20. An objection may naturally arise here. Even though perception and other means of knowledge do appear really to function in the dream state, they are all falsified as soon as we awake. Can we conclude, on such a self-betraying evidence, that the never-sublated waking perception and other means of knowledge within the experience of all, are the result of a misconceived phantasy? And, after all, what is gained by such a bold-faced dismissal of all the means of knowledge? The reply is that while a dream is falsified only in the waking state, we need not wait for any other succeeding state, to realize that the idea of the means of knowledge etc. is indeed real only for the ignorant. An analysis of the functioning of perception and other *pramāṇas* will quite do to bring it home to us. Ācārya Śaṅkara has concisely expressed all that is involved in the process in a single sentence: "No one can possibly be a knower

unless he entertains the notion that the body, the senses and so on, are either identical with or belong to him, and the means of knowledge can never function without a knower" ( ABh. SBh.). It follows that perception and other means are valid only for the ignorant.

The body is an object of the Witnessing Consciousness. Evidently one cannot be identical with the body, the object of his own consciousness, nor can the senses ever dependent on the body be regarded as belonging to one-self. In other words, unless one wrongly takes the body to be one's self and the senses as one's own, one cannot regard oneself as the knower, the employer of the means of knowledge, who desires to know an object. Now the intuition of this fact entitles us to conclude that all distinction of knowledge and its object is only a false appearance proceeding from ignorance. And when this realization is reached, the knowledge of the sole reality of the all-witnessing Ātman immediately emerges. "Thus this innate superimposition of the nature of misconception is beginningless and endless and primarily responsible for the notion of agent and enjoyer as is well-known to all people. All Vedantas have been revealed in order to destroy this cause of all evil by the attainment of the knowledge of the sole reality of Ātman" (ABh. SBh.). By means of the knowledge attained through this teaching, this evil effect of ignorance is absolutely removed and we take our stand in our real Ātman, which is the highest goal of human life.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### ŚĀSTRA THE ONE MEANS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

21. It might be objected that if all distinction of means of knowledge and its object be unreal, we shall have no means by which to know the Self, and since the existence of a thing has to be ascertained by some means of knowledge, it follows that we cannot be assured even of the existence of our own self. Nihilism would thus be triumphant without any opposition. This objection is not valid because the Veda is the exclusive means of knowing the Ātman. As the Brāhmaṇa passage declares “No one who has not understood the Veda can know that Great One” (Tai. Brā. 3-12-2-7). And we have already adduced the text “It is about that Purusha of the Upanishads, that I ask thee” (Br. 3-9-26) to show that Ātman is revealed in the Upanishads alone.

22. The Vedas are also known as the ‘Śāstras’. How are we to take the Śāstra to be a right means of knowledge? This question has been variously answered. Some are of the opinion that the Śāstra has to be believed to be an authority, just as we put faith in the testimony of experts (*āptavākya*). That would imply the dependence of the Śāstra on some other source of right knowledge for its veracity. If some one were to assure us that there are five fruits on the other bank of a river, the truth of that statement would have to be verified by actual perception or some other means of right knowledge. Similarly if we followed this school of thought, Vedic statements would require ratification by

some other accepted means of right knowledge. Others declare that the Vedas must be taken to be reliable inasmuch as they are a message from the omniscient God. In that case the Vedas cannot be taken to be the word of God before the existence of God is itself established. If it is insisted that God is to be known only by the Vedas, that would be arguing in a vicious circle, God being the guaranty for the authority of the Vedas while the Vedas in their turn are our testimony for the existence of God. The Mīmāṃsakās aver that the Vedas are a means of right knowledge since they are not of human origin. Their idea is that while a statement carries its own validity, it is possible that it is tainted by the faults of the person who makes that statement. In the case of the Vedas, however, nobody knows their author. Śrūtis and Smṛtis declare that the Vedas are beginningless and endless. So the Mīmāṃsakās conclude that the Vedas not being of human origin are a valid means of knowledge. While the orthodox section of our countrymen admit this, the Buddhists and the Jains do not. The followers of the Vedas do admit that these revelations have come to us through certain Ṛshis, notwithstanding the fact that their authorship is not ascertained. If followers of any other faith should happen to claim likewise that their accepted revelation is not of human origin either, then, in case of a conflict of statements, disagreement may naturally arise as to which of the two revealed texts is the one indisputably valid. Even if others may not claim super-human origin to the revelation of their own faith, questions may arise as to whether or not a statement must be accepted as valid simply because it is not of human origin; whether it is binding on us to believe in the existence of a text not human in origin, or whether, being but a statement

just like any other, it should not be inferred to be of human authorship likewise. There is room for many such differences of opinion on such points, if we are asked to accept the position of this school.

Now in regard to this matter, Śaṅkara is found to accept the individual view-point of the school with whom he happens to discuss for the time being, and generally speaking, he is seen to adopt the view of the Mīmāṃsakās in particular when he has to deal with Vedic teaching from the empirical standpoint. But in considering the validity of the Vedas with regard to Ātman, he has put forward a unique principle of interpretation which deserves to be specially kept in view. "Express statement and other textual aids (such as indicative expression, syntactical relation and so on) are not the only means of valid knowledge in the case of the enquiry into the nature of Brahman (*Brahma-jijñāsā*) as they indeed are in the case of the enquiry into religious duty (*Dharma-jijñāsā*). But intuition (*anubhava*)<sup>1</sup> and such others (as reasoning) should also, where possible, be taken to be the means in this case. For the knowledge of Brahman is to culminate in a final intuition and relates to an already existing entity" (SBh. 1-1-2). Again "In the case of religious duty, direct statement by the text and the like would be the only means of knowledge, because no experience is needed in support and because a duty to be accomplished depends entirely on the will of the person doing it" (SBh. 1-1-2). The Self, however, is something already existent and not

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1. The original Sanskrit term (*anubhava*) covers the whole range of sensuous experience, psychic experience as well as supra-mental intuition by means of which we directly intuit the three states of waking, dream and sound sleep.



something to be accomplished. Hence the knowledge of the Self has to culminate in experience. Although the Vedas declare that heaven &c. are attained through the performance of certain religious works, these resultants, heaven &c. are not within the range of experience. A doubt may possibly be entertained regarding the fruit of a religious rite as to whether or not it would accrue, since the result is not expected to be within the doer's direct experience. But the fruit of knowledge of Ātman is quite within one's immediate intuition, inasmuch as the Śruti says "Brahman is that which is immediate and not indirect" (Br.3-3-32). Hence Śaṅkara's dictum that "the Veda is absolutely valid with regard to its subject-matter just as the sun is the one direct means of throwing light on the form of an object, whereas human statements are in need of another means of corroboration and are also intercepted by the memory of the person making the particular statement and hence they are further removed from what they express" (SBh. 2-1-1). Obviously this applies with greater force to the question of knowledge of the Self than that of religious duty.

23. Perception and other means of knowledge are self-valid. No one would think of proving the validity of perception by a course of reasoning. Perception and other *pramāṇas* are deemed valid for the very reason that they yield us certain and unfalsified knowledge in their respective spheres. Similarly the Vedāntic text supplies us with perfectly certain knowledge of Ātman never to be sublated subsequently. Hence the Śāstra is to be considered a valid means of knowledge just because it is efficient to give us the realization of Ātman. Its validity requires no support from reason. "Since the knowledge of Ātman produces its own fruit instantaneously, its validity can never be impugned; nor is the

validity of the Śāstra dependent upon inference” (SBh.1-1-4).

24. Is it not self-contradictory to assert that Ātman is no object of any means of knowledge and to claim at the same time that the Śāstra is the one means of knowing Ātman ? No, because the Śāstra reveals Ātman as self-effulgent and hence not an object of any knowledge. It does not claim that it is the only means of objectifying Ātman. “It is well known that Ātman is no adventitious thing for any one of us, for He is Self-evident: One’s own self is not to be ascertained for one-self by some means of knowledge, for it is for *his* ascertainment of unknown external objects that means of knowledge are to be employed ” (SBh. 2-3-7). External objects can never be known except through instruments of knowledge, but Ātman is a self-established entity prior to the very idea of objects and means of knowing them.

25. If the Śāstra does not specifically reveal Ātman as its object, how can we regard it as a valid means of knowledge concerning Ātman? This objection is not well-founded, for “The Śāstra aims at the removal of distinctions conceived by ignorance. (To explain:) The Śāstra does not attempt to define Brahman as such and such an object. Aiming as it does to reveal Brahman as never objectifiable because of its being the inmost subjective Self, the Śāstra only removes all the idea of distinctions conceived by ignorance, such distinctions for instance, as of the knowable, knower and knowledge. The Śāstra is to be considered a valid means of knowledge only in so far as it does this”. (SBh. 1-1-4)

26. Since the Śāstra is itself of the nature of speech, how can it be affirmed that Ātman is beyond all speech? It is evident that this objection cannot rear its

head after what has already been said above, for the Śāstra does not function as a form of descriptive speech with regard to Ātman. "Even revelation makes Ātman known to us only by negating the function of a knower or of any means of knowledge in his case. 'Seen by whom, and by what means? Know whom and by what means?' it asks, 'Where everything is Ātman alone?' It does not assume the usual descriptive function of speech which rests on the presumption of the relation of words and things denoted by them" (Br.Bh.4-4-20).

27. Diving deeper into the matter, we find that each and every means of right knowledge can only end by removing the ignorance of its particular object, for it can never directly shed light on anything by objectifying it. "Those, however, who think that the means of knowledge operates on a jar by producing a resultant knowledge besides removing ignorance concerning it, are really claiming that an act of cutting a log of wood into pieces, operates upon either piece besides undoing the cohesiveness of the parts of the log to be cut" (Ma. Bh.7). Therefore every means of knowledge has the only function of removing the mis-conception about its object. The Śāstra too can very well be a *pramāṇa* in this legitimate sense.

28. One outstanding difference between the Śāstra and the other means of knowledge, is that while the latter dispel the ignorance enveloping their respective objects in particular, they never assure the knower of the destruction of all ignorance for good; whereas the Śāstra pulls up all ignorance by the roots, "The ultimate means of knowledge (to wit, the Śāstra) removes the knowing nature itself super-imposed on Ātman, and simultaneously with that removal, it ceases to be a

means of knowing just as the means of dream-knowledge ceases to be such on waking" (GBh.2-69).

From the standpoint of common sense, "The Self as knower is necessarily taken for granted before seeking for the means of knowledge. Nobody indeed ever thinks of proving himself to be such and such before proceeding to determine the nature of an object" (GBh. 2-18). Similarly *Pramāṇās* are necessarily presumed to be really means of right knowledge by every investigator who seeks for them to determine the nature of objects. Hence the concept of one's being the knower lies at the root of all human conduct based on primeval ignorance. But the *Śāstra* reveals that the very fact of Ātman being a knower rests on *Avidyā*. So, when the self is no longer a knower, the *Pramāṇās* are no *Pramāṇās* and without *Pramāṇās* there can be no object to be determined. Hence when the *Śāstra* enlightens us on the non-dual nature of Ātman "all has been reduced to the one Self who is to see, what object and by what means? Who is to know what and by what means?" (Br.4-5-15). The very notion of these discrete elements of knowledge is effaced at the dawn of this unifying knowledge of Ātman just as our dream-notion of the distinction of the knower, the knowable and knowledge is sublated as soon as we awake. Inasmuch as the *Śāstra* thus abolishes the very nature of all means of knowledge as such, it has been called '*antya-pramāṇa*', the final means of knowledge. And the *Śāstra* being itself a means of knowledge just like any other *Pramāṇa* ceases to be such as soon as the knowledge of the One Ātman makes its appearance, in the same way as dream-means of knowledge fade away on waking. Hence the *Śruti* says 'The Vedās become no Vedās' (Br.4-3-22) when one takes one's stand in Ātman.

29. Perception and other sources of knowledge do throw light on their respective objects and continue to be valid so long as our notion of perceptive and discursive knowledge obtains. The Śruti likewise reveals the true nature of Ātman, as that is its legitimate sphere of functioning. Only in this case, all notion of recognizing things by particular means is altogether abolished. It is clear that there is really no conflict between the *Śāstra* and the other means of knowledge such as perception, for as Ācārya Śaṅkara says "The several means hold sway only in their respective spheres" (Br. Bh. 2-1-20).

30. It might be objected that since the Upanishadic teaching implies at least the unavoidable distinction of the teaching, the teacher and the taught, the non-dual Absolute transcending all distinctions can never possibly be established. But this objection does not hold water. For as *Gaudapāda* remarks "This distinction is only admitted as a device at the first step for the convenience of instruction. When the truth is known, however, it will be found that no distinction of the kind is real as such" (GK. 1-18). The validity of the *Śāstra* as a means of the knowledge of non-duality thus remains quite intact.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### REASON SUBSERVIENT TO SELF-REALIZATION

31. It is stated in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad that Yājñavalkya instructed his wife Maitreyī in the knowledge of Ātman in these words “Ātman, verily, my dear, is to be seen by listening to teaching about Him, by thinking over His nature and by contemplation” (Br. 2-4-5). And in the Chāṇḍōgya, it is taught that just as the intelligent reflective man in the story reached his country Gandhāra after enquiries made on the strength of the instruction received from a wayfarer, so also, one who has had due instruction from a teacher can realize Ātman (Ch. 6-14-2). It follows from this that an aspirant should make use of reasoning as well as revelation from the Śruti for the purpose of realization.

32. Those who are able to arrive at the truth by the teaching of the Śruti alone, do not of course stand in need of any reasoning, since they have reached the goal. For such as have fully grasped the meaning of the two words ‘That’ and ‘thou’ used in the sentence “That thou art”-require nothing more to understand what the sentence means. “But in the case of those who are hindered by ignorance, doubt or misconception from having a correct appraisal of the signification of these words, the sentence ‘That thou art’ cannot possibly convey its true import. For understanding the meaning of a proposition pre-supposes the understanding of the meaning of the terms involved in it. Such aspirants, therefore, would require repeated study of the Śāstra as well as application of reasoning ancillary to it” (SBh. 4-1-2). Accord-

ingly the Śruti says "This Ātman is not accessible to many even for hearing about, and many there be who know Him not, even after a study of the *Śāstra*" (Kā. 1-2-7).

33. "It is beyond speculation, for it is subtler than the subtlest" (Kā. 1-2-8). "This knowledge is not to be had through speculation" (Kā. 1-2-9) nor can it be refuted by speculation. So says the Śruti. At first sight, it would appear from this pronouncement, that knowledge of Ātman has nothing to do with reason. But the Śruti only means that Ātman is not within the reach of dry reasoning which is not based upon the instruction of a teacher initiated in the traditional method of imparting the knowledge. Accordingly it has been declared "There cannot be any failure to understand it, when it is communicated by one who has become identical with Ātman" (Kā. 1-2-8). Again "It can be well understood when taught only by an Ācārya other than the ordinary ratiocinist" (Kā. 1-2-9). Āgama is the peculiar traditional method of efficacious teaching by virtue of which the aspirant is enabled to see his identity with Ātman. The Śruti (Ch. 6-14-2) relating to the intelligent and reflective man of Gandhāra (referred to in para 31) demands the aid of reasoning ancillary to such teaching. Hence that text is not in conflict with the one which rules out speculation unsupported by this means of right knowledge.

34. The Sanskrit term '*tarka*' has been used in different senses by different schools of thought. Some give that appellation to syllogistic inference. There ought to be fire on the yonder hill, for we see smoke there. Since we actually guess the existence of fire in this inference, the name '*tarka*' may well be applied to it. An

additional reasoning may also be advanced in support of this inference. 'No smoke would be visible if there were no fire there.' This reasoning substantiating the original inference has been also termed '*Tarka*' by the *Naiyāyikas*. But neither of these two kinds of reasoning is meant in the text 'It is to be thought over and contemplated' (Br. 2-4-5). "For the truth relating to this Reality which is conducive to final release is too deep even for a conjecture without revelation" (SBh. 2-1-11). Enquiry into Brahman demands primarily the consideration of Vedantic text and, as subservient to it, reasoning not in discord with it.

35. The difference between the reasoning proposed by the Śruti and mere speculation is this: The reasoning recommended by the Śruti being meant to be conducive to intuitive experience is never in conflict with experience. Independent reasoning, however, is merely the outcome of the conjecture of one's own mind. "Speculation is unbridled.... It is impossible to expect finality from speculations, for men's minds are diversely inclined" (SBh. 2-1-11).

36. Is it not itself a reason to argue that no reasoning is final since certain speculations have not arrived at finality? And reason approved by Śruti is in any case reason to be sure. For otherwise the injunction 'It must be reflected upon' (Br. 2-4-5), would be meaningless. Such being the case, what is there anything peculiar to it which makes it superior to other reasonings? Logicians too base their reasoning on something found true to experience 'From the known to the unknown' — is that not a principle to be acquiesced in by all?

Our reply to all this is as follows : Non-Vedic reasoning proceeds on some basic principle assumed in each individual case. But all do not subscribe to the



basic assumption of a particular school. Even in cases where the fundamentals may appear unassailable for the present, there is no guarantee that they will continue to be so for all future. For instance, the doctrine of the *pradhāna* (primordial matter) of the *Sāṅkhyas*, and the doctrine of the *paramāṇus* (atoms) of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, have been assumptions based upon mere speculation. These fundamental postulates not being universally accepted, conclusions drawn from arguments based upon them have likewise failed to command universal acceptance. Similarly the fundamentals postulated by the *Buddhists*, the *Jains* and the various schools of Western thought, have all been questioned. Śāstraic reasoning on the other hand, is based on universal intuition which can never be challenged. For instance, the teaching that the inmost Witnessing Principle in us is our own Self can never be gainsaid by anyone, for It is the Self of even the would-be denier. "Besides, Ātman cannot possibly be denied, for the simple reason that It is one's own Self" (SBh. 2-3-7). That is why the reason proposed by the Śruti, claims superiority over any other ordinary speculative reason. It is based upon universal experience while the other speculations are barren since they have no such support. Therefore no dry reasoning can be admitted here under the pretext that there is a text recommending reason" (SBh. 2-1-6).

37. It is true that other schools of thought likewise claim to base their arguments on experience; but that so-called experience does not cover the whole ground of life. Reason based upon that partial experience cannot stand the onslaught of a higher reasoning based upon a wider experience. "For we see that there is conflict of opinion among system-founders of even recognized fame for mental eminence like *Kapila* and *Kaṇāda*" (SBh. 2-1-11). So we cannot take that all of

them have given us correct ideas of truth and reality, for such mutually contradictory doctrines cannot all be absolute truth. "Right knowledge ought to be uniform throughout, since it must conform to an existent fact. That is to be considered real which consistently maintains its self-identity, and knowledge of that reality, is commonly called right knowledge, as for instance, the knowledge that fire is hot" (SBh. 2-1-11).

There have been a number of schools of speculative thought, both in our own country and in the west, which have each built different systems of their own, and there is scope for many more such schools to appear in the future. "But it would not be possible to assemble all the speculators of the past, present and future times at one place or time so that we might decide by their consensus of opinion that a particular conclusion is the ultimate truth in respect of any one fact to be regarded as real" (SBh. 2-1-11), whence it follows that no speculative thinker can be taken to have said the last word on the matter. "The Veda, on the other hand, being eternal and always capable of yielding the same knowledge, may be justly relied upon to let us know Reality as it is, and that universal knowledge which arises from it cannot be assailed by any of the speculators of the past, present or future" (SBh. 2-1-11). This is because the Vedic reasoning takes into account the entire range of the knowable and examines all the three states of experience, to wit, waking, dream and deep sleep. "These three states have been called 'the knowable', because there cannot be any thing knowable which falls outside the three, since the postulates of the advocates of any other school must necessarily be included in one or the other of these states" (GK. Bh. 4-88). Hence the Vedic dialectic which arrives at the

final conclusion after an examination of all the three states is based upon the most comprehensive experience. This experience being in entire harmony with that of persons of all places and times, Vedic reasoning based upon it is the only one that can be accepted as infallible.

38. Even the Vedic reasoning employed to ascertain the nature of Ātman does involve duality of course. This is so because "Even the unreal forms of Ātman due to *upādhis* (concomitant conditions) are provisionally assumed as though they were a property of Ātman to be known ; this, however, is only a device just to make us aware of the existence of Ātman" (GBh. 13-13). This dual characteristic is, however, invariably shown subsequently not to belong to Ātman as a matter of fact. Ācārya Śaṅkara quotes in this context the maxim of the experts in the traditional method of right teaching. "That which is really devoid of all plurality has to be explained by the method of superimposition and subsequent rescission" (GBh. 13-13). It is this method of provisional attribution and subsequent abrogation that is followed by the Śruti while it approves reasoning referring to the triad of states, causality and the like. This makes it clear how the employment of logic involving duality, does not adversely affect Advaita.

39. Two examples have been cited in the Sūtra-Bhāṣya to illustrate the kind of Vedantic reasoning based on universal intuition.(1)"Since waking and dream exclude each other, the Self is unaccompanied by them, and since in the state of deep sleep He leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with Pure Being, He is really of the nature of Pure Being altogether free from the world of plurality. (2)As the world comes forth from Brahman it cannot be different from Brahman in accordance with the principle of the

effect being not different from the cause” (SBh. 2-1-6). Śaṅkara's reference to 'reasoning of this type' in this connection may be taken to cover the method of the *sāmānya-viśeṣha* (the universal and the particular) as well as the reasoning based on the *pañca-kōśhas* (the five sheaths). As one example of the former may be cited the argument that “as everything is unfailingly accompanied by Pure Consciousness it must essentially be Pure Consciousness itself. By the perception of sound in general produced by the beating of the drum, the particular notes coming under the class are also perceived, for as particulars they have no independent existence of their own. So also no particular thing either in waking or dream can be perceived as distinct from Consciousness” (Br.Bh. 2-4-7). As for 'the five sheaths' made up of food, vital air, mind, intellect and blissful feeling, since they are each penetrated by the succeeding inner sheath, and Ātman is the most all-pervading innermost principle, none of the sheaths has any being of its own apart from Him. Here in the first of the four examples mentioned above, the three states are provisionally assumed to belong to the Self. In the second, Brahman is taken to be the cause of the world, and in the third, it is regarded as a genus, while in the fourth pervasiveness and the nature of being the inmost of all are temporarily ascribed to the Self for the sake of facilitating instruction. Of course, all these attributions are subsequently rescinded when Pure Reality comes to be pointed out.<sup>1</sup>

40. It is sometimes argued that acceptance of

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1. In the English Introduction to the Sanskrit work '*Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabijñā*' it has been explained at great length how this method, called the *Adhyārōpa-Apavāda Nyāya*, illustrates the central theme of the Upanishads and convincingly reconciles all apparently conflicting doctrines in these Sacred Books.

Advaita as the ultimate reality would run counter to perception, inference, and the portion of the Vedas enjoining rituals. Moreover, there would be no teacher of Advaita; neither the teaching nor anyone to be taught according to the system which assumes Absolute Non-dualism. If all this be allowed, would not the Advaitic Śruti prove suicidal to its own validity besides abolishing the universally accepted canons of evidence?

Now all this is only bad logic. For we have already shown that Ātman is no object of perception or inference. True, the *Karma-kāṇḍa* (Portion of the Veda prescribing religious works) pre-supposes the distinction of action, its means and results. But “a man naturally takes for granted the distinction of action, its means and results projected by *avidyā*, just as it obtains in ordinary life. Taking his stand on that distinction, he is engaged in adopting whatever is, in general, the means to accomplish something good and to avoid anything which is bad. But he has no idea of what particular means tend to what particular ends, desirable or undesirable. The Śruti only informs him of that means. But it says nothing about either the reality or unreality of the distinction of actions, means and results well-known in common life, nor does it try to prevent him from proceeding in that line” (Br. Bh. 2-1-20). So no means of knowledge is invalidated if Advaita is taken to be the ultimate Reality. For as already remarked (in para 29), “The means of right knowledge are dominant in their respective individual spheres (and not elsewhere)” (Br. Bh. 2-1-20). “When unconditioned Brahman is taken to be the sole reality, there is certainly no teaching, no teacher, and no end to be achieved by understanding the teaching” (Br. Bh. 2-1-20). And hence no charge of contradiction can be laid at the door of

Advaita. Nor can it be objected that the teaching of the Śāstra would be fruitless in the case of one who has realized Advaita, for one who has known the truth, has nothing else to know. "Even in ordinary life, no means of proof is seen to urge one to seek knowledge again about anything when once it has been known" (GBh. 2-69).

41. Even the mutual opposition and attempted refutation of the speculative systems, indirectly prove the truth of Advaita. For the schools presume duality to be real and put forward the claims of their respective theories and try to confute those of the other schools. Not one of them has been so far able to defend itself against all attacks and to convince all others of the truths of its own position. It follows that duality as such is the one fertile source of all conflict, and fallacies are inevitable if it is taken to be real. On the other hand, there is none to dispute the reality of the Ātman of Advaita, for He is the very Self of every one as Intuitive Consciousness. It is from this view-point that Śaṅkara quotes a traditional *ślōka* which purports to say that "The knower of Vedic teaching, leaves the cause of disagreement exclusively to the disputants themselves, and rests in perfect peace, because of the consciousness of reality safe-guarded by them all" (Pra. Bh. 6-3).

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### SPIRITUAL CONCENTRATION

43. “Ātman verily, my dear Maitreyī, is to be seen by listening to teaching about Him, by thinking over and by contemplation. By seeing Ātman verily, through listening, thinking over and assimilation, my dear, all this becomes known” (Br. 2-4-5). So has Yājñavalkya enumerated the means of self-realization to his wife Maitreyī. Ācārya Śaṅkara explains this passage as follows: “First one has to listen to teaching about Him by the teacher as well as the *Śāstra*. Then one has to think over the teaching by reasoning. Then one has to contemplate upon the Reality. For thus it is that He is seen when these disciplines of listening, reasoning and contemplation are all accomplished. When these are all harmonized, then and then only, the true vision of the One Brahman is achieved and not otherwise, by mere listening” (Br. Bh. 2-4-5).

By ‘mere listening’ in the above Bhāṣya, is meant listening which is not in harmony with thinking and contemplation. Any and every kind of interpretation does not constitute real listening. One must listen to the instruction of a teacher familiar with *Āgama* (the traditional method of efficacious teaching). And then one must reflect upon what has been listened to, and harmonize the teaching with reasoning, so as to clear all doubts and difficulties about it. Much more valuable than either of these is *nididhyāsana* (contemplation), for it is the final means of corroborating the teaching by one’s own experience. It is also known as *vijñāna* (special knowledge, assimilation). It is note-worthy that in

the above quotation, *vijñāna* is given as a synonym for *nididhyāsana*. And in the Chāṇḍōgya, it has been taught "He is to be sought out, He is to be known". 'Seeking' there is but listening and thinking over here referred to; for there can be no other way of actually seeking out one's own self. And " '*vijijñāsitavyah*' there means that one should know Ātman in a special way, that is to know Him through one's own intuition" (Ch.Bh.8-7-1).

44. Listening, thinking over and contemplation, all the three are the means to attain immediate knowledge of Ātman; when we talk of *Brahmajñāna* or *Ātmajñāna*, the word *jñāna*, does not signify either the act or the means of knowing. Knowledge involved in the word *jijñāsā* (wish to know or enquiry) is the resultant knowledge or final intuition, *Jñapti*. "The object of desire denoted by the desiderative suffix (the ending in the word *jijñāsā*) is the knowledge resulting in *avagati* (final intuitive consciousness), for desire aims at a result. It is Brahman that is desired to be intuited by *jñāna* the means of final knowledge. And it is the intuitive knowledge of Brahman which is the highest goal of man, because it destroys, once for all, *Avidyā* and other evils which are the seed of *saṁsāra*" (SBh. 1-1-1). "Reflection and contemplation are both meant for the intuitive knowledge" (SBh. 1-1-4). Now this intuitive knowledge is exactly what is meant by seeing Ātman. And so there remains nothing to be done after seeing Ātman. Everything becomes known when the Ātman is thus seen, for there is nothing else independent of Ātman. All action, means of action, and ends are due to *Avidyā* (misconception), just as the snake in the rope is the result of a misconception of the rope. Hence the Śruti says "Everything becomes known (when Ātman is seen)" (Br. Bh.2-4-5).



45. Listening (study of the teaching), thinking over and contemplation are the means for the intuitive vision of Ātman. "Since listening and the other means are to culminate in the vision, they must bear fruit in this very life in the same way as enjoined acts such as pounding paddy are to end in the appearance of rice-grains" (SBh. 4-1-1). Hence it follows that listening and other courses of discipline are to be pursued till the vision of Ātman ensues. "But in the case of those who are endowed with an adroit mind unhindered by ignorance, doubt, or misconception, the futility of repetition of these disciplines must certainly be admitted, since they would be able to intuit the meaning of the text 'That thou art' even when it is taught to them but once" (SBh. 4-1-2). Such aspirants are qualified in the highest sense for the teaching of Vedānta.

46. *Upāsanā* (meditation) and *Nididhyāsana* (contemplation) are both terms denoting preparatory species of discipline. "*Upāsanā* and *nididhyāsana* are means of mental acts involving a repeated process" (SBh. 4-1-1). Only, *nididhyāsana* is a particular species of *upāsanā* having a result to be experienced in this very life. "As for the *upāsanās* which are meant for perfect knowledge, the limit of their application is of course quite determined since they are to end in a visible effect just as acts like pounding of the paddy. For it cannot be insisted that some additional effort is necessary even after the effect, to wit, right vision of Ātman, is achieved" (SBh. 4-1-12); not so in the case of the other *upāsanās*, for their practice has to be continued for life, since the effect is to be experienced only after departure from the body, and depends on the last thought at the moment of dying.

47. The terms *upāsana* and *Vedana*, may mean either meditation or knowledge according to context. For instance in the passage "He who devotes himself (*upāste*) individually to them he does not know (*veda*); for (the Self) will be incomplete when taken singly out of the whole. Therefore one should take to it (*upāsita*) as Ātman, for all these become one here" (Br. 1-4-7). In this text both the terms *upāsana* and *vedana* are knowledge of Ātman, whereas the self-same words are used in the sense of meditation (*upāsana*) in this Śruti : "One should meditate (*upāsita*) upon mind as Brahman, whoever knows (*veda*) it thus he shines and warms up with name and fame, and spiritual splendour" (Ch. 3-18-1, 3). Now meditation is an act, while knowledge is not that. "An action is that which is enjoined without any regard to the nature of an existent thing, and which depends upon the exercise of a person's will....Although meditation or flow of thought is a modification of the mind, yet it is possible for a person either to do or not to do, or even to do it in a wrong way, since it quite depends on the will of the person meditating. Knowledge, on the other hand, is to be effected by some *pramāṇa*, and a *pramāṇa* has to conform to the nature of its object as it is. Knowledge therefore is not something which can be done, left undone or done in the wrong way at will, for it exclusively depends on an existent thing and not any Vedic injunction nor on a person's will" (SBh. 1-1-4). The knowledge of Brahman as one's own Self, is in fact that consciousness (*jñapti*) which has been already referred to (in para 44) as '*avagati*' (intuition). "Consciousness (*jñapti*) is identical with Ātman and not some thing different therefrom. Hence it is eternal. The modifications of the mind as an *Upādhi*, which passing through the organs of hearing,

sight &c. assume the forms of objects like sound, arise at their very inception only as objects of and pervaded by the consciousness which is Ātman. It is for this reason that they are semblances of Ātman- Consciousness commonly called by the name of knowledge, are imagined by people lacking in discrimination to be properties modifying Ātman Himself" (Tai. Bh. 2-1). It is from this common-sense viewpoint that we can talk of knowledge as 'arising' in conformity with the nature of its object. The knowledge of Brahman arising from Vedānta teaching means necessarily a mental modification and as such it cannot objectify Ātman. Yet it is called *Ātma-jñāna* because it reflects the Ātman, who is of the nature of consciousness and it is also in this sense that it is contrasted with meditation as dependent on its object and not on any injunction or a person's will.

*Nididhyāsana* no doubt is mental too, and it is also a kind of steady flow of thought enjoined by the Śruti just as any other *upāsana* is. But the former is a mental process of focussing one's closest attention in order to realize the nature of its object. "Come, sit down, I shall explain it to you. You had better try to assimilate it by close attention (*nididhyāśasva*)" (Br. 2-4-4). In this passage Yājñavalkya in using the word *nididhyāśasva* evidently exhorts Maitreyī to concentrate her mind upon what he says so that she might understand the thing without any doubt or difficulty.

48. In the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya the term 'Yōga' is sometimes seen to be used as a variant for both *upāsana* and *nididhyāsana*. "The white (*śukla*) and other paths to liberation which the Yōgins (devotees) speak of, are not paths to real freedom, for they relate to worldly life only. They merely lead to the worlds of

Brahma and other gods, since reference is made in that context to departing through particular parts of the body in such terms as 'The Ātman departs either through the eye or through the head, or through any other opening in the body' (Br. 4-4- 2)" (Br. Bh. 4-4-9). In this context, evidently, the yōgins referred to are upāsakās. "Now will be taught the resultant fruit of yōga, the realization of the identity of one's Self with Brahman, leading to the complete cessation of all mundane suffering" (GBh. 6-29). The yōga mentioned here is *nididhyāsana* or concentrated contemplation. In his commentary on a particular verse in the Gītā, Śaṅkara remarks that '*dhyāna* is thinking on the nature of the Self and yōga is exclusive concentration on the Self' (GBh. 18- 52). There also the yōga referred to is '*nidi dhyāsana*'. And in the Sūtra-Bhāṣya, "Now, as for this *samādhi* which is taught in the Vedantas, which aims at the realization of the Ātman of the Upanishads..." (SBh. 2-3-39), the *samādhi* to which reference is made is *nididhyāsana* likewise. *Samādhi* literally means concentration upon the Self. "Moreover, yōgins visualize this Ātman, the unmanifest, devoid of all plurality, during the time of *Samrādhana*, and *Samrādhana* means the practice of devotion, flow of thought and focussed attention" (SBh. 3-2-24). In this passage too, taken from the Sūtra-Bhāṣya, by yōgins are meant those who conduct *nididhyāsana*; and *samrādhana* is the process of practising this kind of contemplation. Again in the Śruti "The wise one having realized this Deva (Ātman) through the *Adhyātma-yōga* overcomes both elation and grief" (Kā. 1-2-12). Śaṅkara explains '*Adhyātma-yōga*' to be "the concentration of the mind which has been withdrawn from the sense-objects" referring again to this *nididhyāsana*. And the *mano-nigraha* (control of the

mind) which Gaudapāda refers to (GK. 3-40) as resulting in fearlessness and realization of Ātman, is nothing but *nididhyāsana*. If we take note of the fact that in all such cases *nididhyāsana* is invariably taken to be the means of realization of Ātman, it will be evident that it is not the 'yōga' practice as taught by *Patañjali* that is meant. This should be sufficient to dispel the false notion that *nididhyāsana* should result in 'Nirvikalpa Samādhi' (trance bereft of all thought constructions) before knowledge of Ātman dawns. When the realization of Ātman is achieved through *nididhyāsana* the mind is transformed into no-mind (*amanibhāva*) or Ātman" (GK. 3-31, 32). It does not result in mere 'suppression of the modifications of the mind (*cittavṛttinirōdha*)' as taught by *Patañjali*.

49. The word 'samādhi' has been variously interpreted by Śaṅkara to suit the particular contexts in which it occurs. "To those who are attached to enjoyment and power, and whose mind is enticed by the flower of speech relating to particular rites, the thought of resolve is never formed in their samādhi" (G. 2-44). Here the Ācārya explains *samādhi* as the mind in which everything is deposited for the enjoyment of the person concerned. In the verse (G.2-53) 'When thy mind now perplexed by various Śrutis stays steadily on the *samādhi*, then wilt thou attain yōga', he takes *samādhi* to mean the Ātman, since the mind becomes stable when staying on the 'Ātman'. And in the śloka "What is the description, O Keśava, of the steady-minded one who has taken his stand in *samādhi*?" (G.2-54), the Ācārya interprets '*samādhisthasya*' as of one who has got discrimination acquired through a balanced mind, or in other words, of one who has realized Ātman as distinguished from all not-self. Again in commenting on the sentence "Now

listen to wisdom concerning the *yōga*” (G. 2-39), the Ācārya says “wisdom regarding the Karma-yōga or performance of works, and in the yōga of *samādhi*” meaning *nididhyāsana* otherwise called *Dhyāna-yōga* by the term *samādhi*. He has nowhere stated that *samādhi*, *Savikalpa* or *Nirvikalpa*, (trance with or without thought-constructions), is the result of *nididhyāsana*. As for the Śruti, it expressly declares that *nididhyāsana* is a direct means to intuitive vision of Ātman.

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## CHAPTER SIX

### THE PURPORT OF THE VEDANTIC TEXTS IS TO TEACH THE NATURE OF ĀTMAN

50. Do the Vedanta texts aim at teaching the nature of the Self as identical with Brahman or do they aim at enjoining some action? It is essential for the orthodox students of Vedanta to find out an answer to this important question. For the purposes of this chapter, we shall suppose that the orthodox are those who believe that the knowledge arising out of the Vedantic teaching is the only means to final liberation. By '*Vedantas*' we mean the well known Upanishads. Inasmuch as they are also part and parcel of the Veda, they may be expected to aim at enjoining something. "Nowhere do we find, nor is it reasonable to hold, that the Vedic texts serve any purpose unless they have something to do with an injunction" (SBh. 1-1-4). Such is the *prima facie* view. "This innate super-imposition of the nature of wrong notion, beginningless and endless as being the occasion for living beings to conceive themselves as agents and experiencers of the fruits of their actions, is a matter of common experience. With a view to the destruction of this cause of all evils, all the *Vedantas* are begun, in order to enable one to attain the knowledge of the unity of Ātman" (ABh.SB.). This is Ācārya Śaṅkara's position.

51. Brahman is known only through the Vedanta Śāstra, and the Śāstra has the single aim of teaching Brahman. For "Statements in all *Vedantas* are uniformly found purporting to teach this" (SBh. 1-1-4). This uniform aim is visible in a three-fold context. The first

indication of the purport is that all the *Vedāntas* whether belonging to *Ṛk*, *Yajus*, *Sāma* and *Atharva Veda*, uniformly teach Brahman. The second indication is that statements in any particular Upanishad all teach Brahman in a sustained way. And the third one is that the words in the principal statements have a syntactical connection only as referring to Brahman. The Sanskrit word *samanvaya* literally means, going in perfect harmony with something, agreement. The aforesaid harmonious agreement of the various *Vedāntas*, the agreement of the sentences in each individual Upanishad and the syntactical agreement of the words in the principal propositions— this threefold agreement endorses the view that the Vedānta-Śāstra purports to teach Brahman only. This has been conclusively shown in the commentary on the aphorism '*Tat tu samanvayāt*' (That is because of the agreement). (V.S. 1-1-4)

52. Since action is the purport of the Veda ('whatever texts do not relate to it serve no purpose') (Jai. S. 1-2-1). 'It is well known that it aims at teaching rituals' (Śā. Bh. 1-2-1)- these statements of Jaimini and Śabaraswami relate to the enquiry into Karma (religious work) and justify the validity of the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda. But in such texts as "This Ātman is Brahman, the experiencer of everything" (Br. 2-5-19), teach Brahman alone. "And it is not proper to interpret this as teaching something else, while the syntactic agreement of the words is seen unfailingly to point to the nature of Brahman" (SBh. 1-1-4).

53. Although such words as *satya* (reality) that constitute texts like "Brahman is Reality, Consciousness and the Infinite..." (Tai. 2-1) syntactically refer to



Brahman, it is not directly signified by those words. "Nor is Brahman denoted by the word consciousness. Nevertheless, it is indicated by the word consciousness which is really the name of its semblance, a property of the mind. So with regard to the term 'Reality'. Since Brahman is altogether devoid of specific characteristics such as genus, substance etc., It is merely indicated by the word 'Reality' which ordinarily denotes the objective genus reality, while it is not directly expressed by that word. Thus 'Reality' and the other words mutually restrict one another on account of their concatenation, distinguish Brahman from the objects directly signified by them, and at the same time serve to point to Brahman by indirect indication. Thus it is established that Brahman is neither denoted by any word nor directly taught by means of an ordinary sentence of the form, for instance, of 'The lotus is a blue, large, sweet-smelling flower'. This is in accordance with the Śrutis 'From which all words return along with the mind having failed to reach It' (Tai. 2-9), 'Undefined and having no other basis' (Tai. 2-7)" (Tai. Bh. 2-1).

54. It cannot be maintained that Vedantic texts teach Ātman as an agent of action. "For the Śruti 'There, whom could one see and with what instrument?' (Br. 4-4-15) totally rejects all action, instrument of action as well as the result of action in the case of Ātman" (SBh. 1-1-4).

55. It is not right to think that since Brahman is an already-existing entity and not an action to be accomplished, it ought to be accessible to some means of knowledge other than Śruti. "Though Brahman is an existing entity, it cannot be the object of perception or other means of knowledge; for the identity of Brahman

and the Self, cannot be ascertained through any means other than the Śāstra" (SBh. 1-1-4).

56. It is wrong to maintain that the *Vedāntas* ought not to be regarded as teaching an existent entity, simply because the texts of the *Karma-kāṇḍa* do not teach things not connected with any injunction. "Although Vedic texts have not been elsewhere seen to have validity without any connection with an injunction, yet it is not possible to deny the validity of the Śāstra teaching Ātman, for the knowledge arising out of that teaching culminates in an actual result experienced here. Nor is the validity of the Śāstra in need of any proof by inference, in which case only we should have to seek for an example in support of the inference" (SBh. 1-1-4). Hence the analogy of the *Karma-kāṇḍa* texts serves no useful purpose here. "The fact that a particular text teaches a thing or an action is no criterion for its validity or invalidity, the only criterion being whether or not it gives rise to knowledge having a sure effect. Whichever text satisfies that condition, is valid and whichever does not, is invalid (Br. Bh. 1-4-7).

57. Some schools, while admitting that the Śāstra is the one source of the knowledge of Brahman, maintain that it teaches Brahman only as an accessory to the injunction of some meditation. In the same way as the *Yūpa* (sacrificial post), the *Āhavanīya* (a sacrificial fire) and other existent things unknown to common life, are taught as accessory to religious works, Brahman though an existent entity may well be taught, in their opinion, as an accessory to *upāsana* enjoined in the Śāstra without anything derogatory to the latter's validity. Their position is that the Śāstra can serve some purpose only in so far as it is either incentive or dissuasive. Such

injunctions as 'Ātman verily, my dear, is to be seen' (Br.2-4-5), 'He is to be sought out, He is to be known' (Ch. 8-7-1), are to be found in the context of Ātmajñāna also. These teachers believe that Ātman is presented there as an object of meditation enjoined there. " 'Not such, not such' (Br.2-3-6), 'Not gross....' (Br.3-8-8), 'One alone without a second' (Ch.6-2-1), 'Transcending hunger and other defilements' (Br.3-5-1)-these and other statements serve the purpose of presenting the particular form of the Brahman to be meditated upon. And the fruit of the meditation is either liberation or cessation of *Avidyā*." (Br. Bh.1-4-7)

Now this view that Brahman is only an accessory to meditation ordained by the Śruti, is not correct. For in the first place, if liberation be deemed to be the effect of meditation, it "would then have to be regarded as only a species of the effects of *Karma*, one of the various grades already described. But liberation is universally acknowledged to be eternal by all those who recognize it. Hence it is improper to think that Brahman is taught as an accessory to something to be done" (SBh. 1-1-4). Secondly, there cannot possibly be any scope for meditation after the enlightenment of the sole reality of Ātman has appeared. "For the idea of duality which has been effaced by the realization of the unity of Ātman, cannot rear its head any more" (SBh.1-1-4) and therefore Brahman as that non-dual Ātman cannot be made subservient to any meditation. And thirdly, it is not justifiable to hold that statements describing Ātman are only meant to present the nature of the object of meditation desiderated by the injunction "Ātman verily is to be seen". "For statements presenting the nature of Ātman such as 'That thou art' themselves lead directly to the realization of Ātman at the very moment one

understands their meaning by listening to them and there remains nothing else to be done in deference to the injunction about seeing Ātman" (Br.Bh. 1- 4-7).

58. Some think that the continuous remembrance of the knowledge of Ātman arising out of the Vedantic teaching, has to be carried on to attain liberation, and that has got to be enjoined by the Śruti. That is not admissible either. For when the idea of the not-self has been rejected as false, its impressions cannot rise up again and hence "the impressions due to the knowledge of the unity of Ātman continue as a matter of course, and hence there is no need for the Śruti to enjoin them" (Br.Bh. 1- 4-7).

59. "Brahman is seen to be taught by the Upanishads in two different aspects, one as qualified by different Upādhis or limiting factors which are the different modifications of name and form, and the other as the opposite of this, that is, as altogether free from all limiting conditions. Now it is only in the state of ignorance, that we talk of the distinctions of Brahman as the object of meditation, the meditator, and the like" (SBh. 1-1-12). It is to Brahman as the object of meditation-and not to Brahman to be realized-that forms, attributes and the like are ascribed. Of the two sets of texts, such Śrutis as the following lay stress on the Self as Brahman free from all distinctions 'Not gross, not subtle, neither short nor long'(Br. 3-8-8), 'Soundless, contactless, formless, undecaying'(Kā. 1-3-15), 'Ākāśa, indeed, is that which differentiates (the undifferentiated) into names and forms, and that is Brahman which is beyond them'(Ch. 8-14-1), 'Effulgent, formless is the Purusha, changeless both within and without' (Mu.2-1-2), Now this is Brahman having neither an antecedent

nor a consequent, neither within nor without, this self is Brahman, the all- experiencer'(Br.2-5-19). That texts like these do not lay emphasis on any thing else has been conclusively shown in the commentary on the Sūtra 'But that is because of the concord' (SBh. 1-1-4). But the texts which teach Brahman with form are not mainly concerned with the nature of Brahman, for they are primarily meant to enjoin the meditation of Brahman' (SBh.3-2-14). Hence it is not right to say that Brahman free from all distinctions or thought-constructions which Śrutis directly aim at presenting is to be treated as subservient to any injunction of meditation (*upāsana*).

60. Nor would it be right to consider that the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and the Self is in itself a kind of Upāsana. For in that case, such an injunction would have to be conceived as (1) either an injunction of meditation of some ascribed attribute, as for instance in the meditation of the mind as the *Viśvedeva gods* on the score of its possessing innumerable modifications(Br.3-1-9), or as (2) an injunction of a mental super-imposition, such as that of meditating the mind as Brahman or again as (3) an injunction of a specific activity, as in the meditation of *Vāyu* (the cosmic Life-principle) as the final merger(Ch. 4-3-1), or finally as (4) the injunction of a meditation for a ceremonial purification of Ātman, as for instance in the case of ghee to be purified by a look on the part of the sacrificer's wife. "If the unity of Brahman and the self be taken as falling under any one of the above-mentioned forms of meditation, the syntactical agreement of the words tending to make the texts, like 'That thou art', 'I am Brahman', and 'This Self is Brahman'—statements of the unity of Brahman and the Self, would be

disturbed" (SBh.1-1-4) and texts like "The knots of the heart are cut asunder, and all doubts are resolved" teaching the cessation of *Avidyā*, as the result of this knowledge would also be disregarded. And in none of the aforesaid conceptions of meditation could we be able to construe faithfully texts which teach the self as attaining the very nature of Brahman, such texts for instance as 'the knower of Brahman verily becomes Brahman itself' (SBh. 1-1-4).

61. "Nor can it be held that the knowledge of the Self as Brahman is itself enjoined. For the knowledge of the Self as Brahman relates to an existent fact, and as such it is not dependent on any injunction. Hence there being neither a person to be urged nor an action to be done, the imperative ending (*lin*) and other suffixes denoting an injunction when applied to it become altogether ineffective very much like the sharp edge of a razor or other instrument which becomes blunt when applied to a stone or any other hard thing, for they are then dealing with something which can be neither acquired nor avoided" (SBh. 1-1-4). "It is well-known that an injunction can function only with regard to things that can be acquired or shunned." (SBh. 1-1-4)

62. Of what use then are the texts which look like injunctions at any rate? Why do these make their appearance in the context of Self-knowledge if the latter cannot be enjoined at all? Such texts, for instance as 'Ātman indeed, is to be seen; He is to be heard about....' (Br. 2-4-5). Our reply to this query is as follows: "When an extrovert person endeavours to acquire what is pleasant or to avoid what is unpleasant to him, but finds therein no hope of attaining the highest goal of human life while he is actually anxious to reach such a

goal, such texts as the one cited above make him set his face against the natural activity of the aggregate of the body and the senses, and continually direct the stream of his thought towards his inner Self. And when he has thus set himself to seeking Ātman, the real nature of the Self which is neither to be acquired nor to be avoided is taught by Śrutis like 'All this is verily this Ātman' (Br. 2-4-6)...." (SBh. 1-1-4). And he becomes free by virtue of that knowledge. "Even in ordinary life, when we say 'Look at this!' or 'Listen to this!' or make other similar statements, we only mean to direct one to concentrate one's attention on the fact, but do not ask him actually to set about knowing it. For even when one has turned his attention towards the thing to be known; actual knowledge may or may not ensue according to circumstances. Therefore one who wishes to teach something existent, has only to point out the object to be known and knowledge will arise just in accordance with the nature of the object and means of knowledge" (SBh. 3-2-21).

63. There were some ancient Vedantins who thought that Śrutis urge the seeker to endeavour to dissolve the world of duality. But Śaṅkara says, "since the world is the product of *Avidyā* or super-imposition "Only Brahman has to be pointed out after negating the world of duality super-imposed by *Avidyā*" (SBh. 3-2-21) and by no other means can we hope to dissolve the world. Hence it is futile to command one to do that.

64. There are some who believe in the need for an injunction on the ground that a mere statement about Ātman could be of no avail. But "We do find that even a mere statement is effective, as for instance, a statement like 'This is only a rope, not a snake'" (SBh. 1-1-4).

An objection is sometimes started that unlike the rope-statement a mere statement about Brahman as the Self is not found to result in the realization of the identity, for we know that actually in too many cases the suffering soul continues to be such even after listening to Śāstraic teaching. But this objection has been already answered (in para 32). In the text 'That thou art', the word 'That' is intended to convey the Reality free from birth and other modifications, free from all the attributes of a substance, the Reality of the nature of Pure Consciousness knowable through immediate intuition. And the word 'thou' in the statement, is intended to indicate the consciousness other than the body, vital principle, mentation, intellect and the ego, all of which are likely to be imagined to be denoted by the term. "Now in the case of those for whom these significations of the two terms are intercepted by ignorance, doubt or misconception, the statement 'That thou art' cannot possibly give rise to the understanding of what it teaches" (SBh. 4-1-2). But the understanding does arise in the case of one who has grasped the meaning of those terms. "It is impossible to show that one who has realized his identity with Brahman remains a suffering soul just as before. For that suffering is incompatible with the knowledge of one's identity with Brahman, which is the outcome of Vedic teaching" (SBh. 1-1-4).

65. One more objection can be started against the view that Vedantic teaching can give rise to real knowledge of Brahman. The starting postulate was that 'Brahman is our very Self and hence it is no object of concept or speech. No means of knowledge can possibly point it out since it is not a knowable entity, and no words can describe it as it has no specific attributes'. It is now being claimed that a Vedantic passage purports



to teach Brahman, that the words in the Vedantic sentence can have syntactical agreement which tends to point out Brahman, and that the knowledge arising out of Vedantic teaching can do away with *saṁsāra*. How are we to reconcile these two mutually opposed views?

This objection has been virtually disposed of already. From the stand-point of *Avidyā* or the mutual super-imposition of the Self and the not-Self, we are all enquirers living the mundane life and in search of true knowledge, and at this stage the *Śāstra* is the means for us to the attainment of the knowledge of the Real. The *Śāstra* teaches us that our Self is Brahman itself free from all duality, by abolishing the very distinction of knowledge and its object, before we realize our identity with Brahman. And from that *paramārtha* (metaphysical) point of view, where the unity of *Ātman* is realized, there is no distinction whatsoever of knower and knowable. Nor is *Ātman* then the object of any knowledge. "Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge remain as such only up to the moment of their culmination in the transcendental awareness of the form of 'I am Brahman'. For when the non-dual *Ātman* has been realized, the *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge cannot continue to function as such, since they are deprived of both the knower and the objects of knowledge" (SBh. 1-1-4).

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

### ĀTMAN AS ABOVE ALL STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

66. The empirical view that one is a knower is the view of ignorance, *Avidyā*. It is from this point of view that all secular and Vedic activities proceed. For the idea that one is a knower, is the result of a mental superimposition of the real Witnessing inner Ātman and the unreal object witnessed, to wit, the body, the senses and the mind. "This secular and Vedic activity being the effect of *Avidyā*, ceases on the cessation of *Avidyā* in the case of one who is possessed of the steady knowledge due to the dawn of the discrimination of the Self; and *Avidyā* ceases because it is opposed to *Vidyā* (enlightenment) just as darkness is dispersed as soon as the sun rises" (GBh. 2-69). This point may be made still more convincing on an examination of the three states of consciousness. (*Avasthātraya Parīkshā*).

67. The three states i.e. waking, dream and deep sleep are to be subjected to an orderly scrutiny. "That by which 'the worldly (waking), the pure worldly (dream) and the ultra-worldly (sound sleep)' states become known is 'the knowledge'; these very states are 'the knowable' inasmuch as there is nothing to be known beyond them and all the basic principles postulated by the different schools of philosophy are included within their limits. And the *Vijñeya*, the specially knowable, is the highest reality known as the Fourth (*Tūrīya*), the essential nature of the non- dual, unborn Ātman (GK. Bh. 4-88). When the knowledge of the worldly (waking)

and other states is attained and when the threefold knowable is realized by a gradual process, that is to say, the process which consists in understanding the worldly (waking) first of all, then realizing the pure-worldly (dream) by noticing the disappearance of the waking in it, then being aware of the ultra-worldly (sound sleep) by noticing the disappearance of the previous dream-state in it—and when by such a process noticing the disappearance of all the three states in it, the really real, the *Turiya* (the Fourth), the non-dual, unborn, fearless (entity) is intuited, the aspirant has taken his stand in his own Self, his true nature” (GK. Bh.4-89). Here knowing the waking and the other states, means nothing else than to intuit the Reality underlying them all and thus to reduce them into that Reality which is known as ‘the Fourth’.

68. *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa*, *Prājña* and the *Turiya* have been called the *pādās* (literally feet), aspects of Ātman. Ātman conditioned by the waking state is ‘*Vaiśvānara*’. The entire waking world divided into the *Ādhyātmika* (internal), *Ādhibhautika* (external) and the *Ādhidaivika* (of the presiding deities) -forms the conditioning factor for Ātman here. This is the first of the four aspects of the real Ātman. Similarly *Taijasa* conditioned by dream is the second and *Prājña* conditioned by sleep is the third aspect. “The knowledge of the fourth is attained by merging each of the preceeding, the *Viśva* and the other aspects in the succeeding one. So the word *pāda* applied to them is to be understood in the sense of the instrumental case” as that by means of which *Turiya* is attained (*padyate anena iti*). But in the case of *Turiya*, it is to be understood in the sense of the objective, that is, as that which is attained (*padyatē iti*)”. So says Śaṅkara (Mān.Bh. 2).

Such being the case, the text 'Now this Ātman is four-footed' should not be understood as teaching actually four feet to Ātman additively. What is really meant here is that one and the same Ātman can be seen in four different ways, only the fourth being the reality about Him.

69. '*Viśva*', '*Virāt-puruṣa*' and '*Vaiśvānara*' — all these three are names of the witnessing Ātman conditioned by the waking state. '*Taijasa*' and '*Hiraṇyagarbha*' are both the names of the Ātman conditioned by the dream state. '*Prājña*', '*Avyākṛita*' and '*Prāṇa*' — these three are the names of the Ātman conditioned by deep sleep. "All the world inclusive of the region of the gods together with this Self, is proposed to be presented as forming the four several aspects of Ātman. Only thus is Advaita established after the abolition of all duality, and only thus is the one Ātman visioned in all beings as also all beings in that Ātman.... . Otherwise only the inner-self delimited by one's own body would have to be taken to be the Ātman, as for instance it is taken by the *Sāṃkhyas* and others. And if it be so taken, Advaita, the unique teaching of the Śrutis, would be missed" (Mān. Bh.3).

70. People commonly believe that the waking state represents the real while the dream state represents the unreal. But this opinion is not grounded in fact. "The wise consider both the states waking and dreaming as of the same value, for the well-known reason that the different phenomena in each are of the same nature presented as they are in the relation of perceiver and perceived" (GK.Bh.2-5). The things in each state equally possess causal efficiency in their respective sphere. For instance fire burns, food satisfies hunger, and so on. That the efficiency of things felt in one state is stultified

in the other, applies to both. External things perceived are considered real, and mere imaginary ideas in the mind are thought to be unreal in both the states. Again, in both the states, ideas in the mind last for a time living a lonely life, while each of the external phenomena enjoys a life coeval with another. That mental impressions are unmanifest while external things are manifest, is equally true in the two states. All these are common characteristics of both the states. Time, space and causality peculiar to the particular state, are experienced in both. Hence these two states are quite independent, and equally unreal, since each is totally abolished while the other state lasts. This has been explained at length in the Bhāshya on the second chapter of Gauḍapāda's work (GK.Bh.2 – 6 to 15).

71. Chitta (the mind) manifests itself in the form of duality as much in the waking state as in dream. We see many souls in the waking state just as in dream. The phenomena noticed in dream are not independent of the mind there; nor is that mind independent of the dream- observer. The same is true of the waking state. The phenomena there do not enjoy an existence of their own apart from the mind noticing them; nor has the mind any existence of its own independent of the waking observer. Apart from the Witnessing Self neither the mind nor the phenomena enjoy any absolute existence, for they are relative to each other. The souls which one comes in contact with during one's waking, are all imaginary, just like dream- souls, souls created by magic or souls conjured up by virtue of spells, yogic power and the like. Every thing there is really the mind, and the mind really Ātman. This is set forth at length in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa* (GK. Bh. 4-61 to 72).

72. Both in dream and waking is to be found time in its dual aspect, subjective and objective. In both are experienced time, space and causality appropriate to each. Hence it follows that these two states are not related to each other in point of any particular time, space and causal relation common to both. One might take illusory appearances for reality in a dream just as much as he does in the waking state. So we conclude that one confronts phenomena in dreams "then and there and not those arising out of waking experience" (GK.Bh. 4-41). It is quite wrong to suppose that there is a real cause-and-effect relation between the two states.

73. We thus arrive at the conclusion that waking and dream do each present a world peculiar to each, "Knowing that the infinite and all-pervading Ātman by means of whose light one is enabled to see both the dream-state and the waking state, the wise one grieves no more" (Kā. 2-1-4).

74. Waking and dream are each the result of mind-vibration peculiar to the respective states. "The waking consciousness, provided as it is with various gate-ways of knowledge, appears as though it had external things for its objects. But being really no more than mind-vibration it deposits corresponding impressions in the mind. And the mind thus impressed, behaves like a canvas on which a picture has been printed. Urged by ignorance, feelings and the effects of previous actions it presents itself as a replica of waking in spite of the fact that it is not equipped with external aids" (Mā.Bh. 4). This description of waking is from the empirical standpoint. But really speaking, there is no relation whatsoever between the two states. It is generally believed that waking is a public experience common to all, whereas dream is an experience private to each in-

dividual. The truth, however, is this: "Just as a dream appears to be an experience common to all, though in fact it is an individual experience of the dreamer, so also waking which we suppose to be its cause, ought to be only apparently common to all and not really a state of public experience, any more than a dream" (GK.Bh. 4-37). We have already seen that both waking and dream are unreal and there is nothing exclusively distinctive about either state. Nor is it right to imagine a causal relation between the two since they have neither temporal nor special connection. The misconception of taking the non-dual Ātman for a knowing Self related to means and objects of knowledge is a feature common to both the states.

75. This conclusion that either of the states waking or dream is no more than a dream, a misconception of reality, has the sanction of the Śruti also. Here is a statement in support of this view: "Now this same Ātman enjoys himself and roams about in the waking state *merely seeing good and evil (deeds)*, and again comes back in the inverse order to his former condition to the dream state direct" (Br. 4-3-17). If the Śruti did not consider waking also to be a dream, it would have said 'does good and evil deeds' in contrast to merely 'seeing' them in a dream. Similarly while defining sound sleep, the Śruti designates it as "that state wherein one never desires any pleasures, *and sees no dream whatever*" (Br. 4-3-19). Ācārya Śaṅkara remarks in this connection "The Śruti considers even the experience of waking a dream, and hence it says 'where one sees no dream whatever' " (Br.Bh. 4-3-19).

76. In sound sleep we do not see things distinct from one another as in waking or dream state; nor are

the ideas of things or the pleasures and pains derived from them distinctly experienced as in the two other states. "Prājña whose limiting condition is sound sleep, who is unified, one mass of homogeneous consciousness, full of bliss and enjoying bliss only and the door to distinct awareness, is the third pāda" (Mān.5). "The Ātman here is called '*Prājña*' because Pure Consciousness (*prājña*) is his special feature since the Ātman in the other two states have individualized consciousness also" (Mān. Bh. 5). It should be noted that the Ātman in sleep is not only Pure Consciousness, but also Pure Being and Pure Bliss likewise.

77. In sound sleep the soul (*jīva*) the knower divests himself of the nature of a knowing self. "When that mind suffused by which and stationed in which the soul is capable of thinking, seeing, hearing and performing other similar functions, when that is dissolved, the soul assumes its own divine nature" (Ch. Bh. 6-8- 1). The Śruti says "When a man is spoken of as sleeping (*svapīti*), then, my dear boy, he is in union with Pure Being, he is dissolved (*apītō bhavati*) into his own (*svam*) nature" (Ch. 6-8-1). Śaṅkara remarks that Uddālaka proposes to show his son, his own divine nature, divested of his soul-nature, in sleep alone.

78. The Śruti describes in a variety of ways the Self in sound sleep in order to bring its divine nature home to the listener. "Pure like clear water, One, the Seer without a second. This is the Brahma-world, O Supreme Ruler" - so said Yājñavalkya. "This is its supreme good, this is its highest attainment, this is its highest heaven, and this is its supreme bliss. Other beings live on a particle of this self-same Bliss" (Br. 4-3-32). "Here a father becomes no father, a mother no mother, the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas.



Here a thief becomes no thief, the killer of an embryo no such killer, a cāṇḍāla no-cāṇḍāla, a paulkasa no-paulkasa, a monk no-monk, a hermit no-hermit. This nature is untainted by good, untainted by bad; for he is then verily beyond all woes of the heart” (Br. 4-3-22). The experience of sound sleep is quite in consonance with this teaching. For there is universal experience supporting the view that Ātman is of the nature of supreme bliss, above all distinctions of the knower and the known; and of doer, deed and means and results of deeds.

79. Distinction of names and forms experienced in waking or dream, is entirely absent in deep sleep. No time, space or causality is experienced there. Hence the Ātman in deep sleep has been characterized in the Śrutis as the undifferentiated Self. “He is the Lord of all, He the All-knowing one; He is the Inner-Controller, He is the Source of all, the Generator and Dissolver of beings” (Mān. 6). This description quite fits in with the experience of the Self in sound sleep. Another Upanishadic text tells us how all this world comes out of the Ātman in sleep: “As a spider stretches itself out in the form of a thread, and as from a fire dart out tiny sparks, so also from this Ātman come out all organs(of sense and activity), all the worlds, all the gods and all creatures” (Br. 2-1-20). In deep sleep we do not find the world distinguished by deeds, instruments of action and results thereof. The witnessing Self there continues to show itself in both waking and dream. But a special feature of these latter states is that there are a number of distinct souls and details of deeds, instruments and results. When we ponder over these two facts we have no grounds to suppose that there is either any material or efficient cause for this world except Ātman. We have therefore to admit that the witnessing Ātman is Himself

the origin as well as the resort of the dissolution for this world, that the world is held up by Ātman, and shines in the light of His consciousness, and that Ātman alone is the Self of all beings. Here again we have the support of universal experience for the statement made by the Śruti that the Self in sleep is really the omniscient Lord of all and the Inner-Controller.

80. Looked at from this stand-point, Ātman would appear to present himself in two different forms, one with and the other exempt from multiplicity. But inasmuch as the multiformity is experienced only in waking and dreaming, and as that is only a false appearance as we have seen before, we have to conclude that the manifold aspect is only the figment of ignorance. Compared to Ātman, all phenomena are unreal and have only Ātman for their essence. All selves to be distinguished as *Viśva*, *Taijasa* or *Prājña* actually exist as identical with the causal Ātman before they make their appearance in their illusory forms of names and forms shaped by ignorance. Just as the snake is existent as the rope before its appearance so also all beings do exist as identical with the causal Ātman as their seed, prior to their creation" (GK. Bh.1-6).

81. It is stated in the Śrutis that Brahman first wished to become many and be born as the many, and then manifested Itself as the world. This becoming many is nothing but the differentiation of the ignorance-fabricated names and forms which were one with Ātman before their appearance. "When the unmanifested names and forms previously existent in and as Ātman are differentiated, then those names and forms are differentiated in all circumstances without renouncing their nature as Ātman, never distinct in time, space from Brahman. This differentiation of names and forms is the 'becoming many' spoken of here, for there can be no

other possible way of becoming many for Brahman which has no parts" (Tai. Bh. 2-6). Since Brahman is without parts, It cannot actually assume the form of the manifold like a seed which breaks up into parts and exhausts itself in a tree branching off in many forms; nor can it shrink itself in size, rolling up its multiple forms into one. An illusory snake never abandons its nature of being a rope even while it appears to be a snake. Similarly the world of innumerable beings and things will not have shaken off its real nature as the witnessing Ātman non-different from the non-dual Brahman, even while manifesting itself in its manifold form during waking or dream.

82. On this view, it is clear that Ātman remains the same for ever. "The evolution of sound sleep, dream and waking, is like a rope thrown up by a magician. *Prājña*, *Taijasa* and *Viśva* are like the illusory magicians created by him for climbing up the rope, and the reality called the Fourth is like the self-same real magician altogether distinct and different from both the created rope and the illusory juggler who, all the while remained standing on the ground though screened by magic from the sight of the on-lookers" (GK. 1-7). Neither the three states nor the Ātmans in those states have any existence apart from the real Ātman.

83. And why does Ātman create the world of names and forms, while remaining intact? This is not a legitimate question, for metaphysically speaking, Ātman has never transformed Himself into the world. "No reason can be assigned for substances like the rope illusorily appearing like a snake and so on; one can only say that it is their nature to appear so through the perceiver's ignorance" (GK. Bh. 1-9). Similarly Ātman naturally appears to have assumed the form of the manifold from the stand-point of ignorance. We cannot

attribute this appearance to anything else but natural ignorance.

84. What is the upshot of the examination of the three states? "Manifestations like inward consciousness or outward consciousness are unreal because they annul one another just like the snake, a streak of water or any other fancy construction on a rope. And the nature of Consciousness itself is real because it is never annulled in any state" (Mān.Bh. 7). Outward consciousness appears only in waking and inward consciousness appears only in dreams, while unconsciousness characterizes sleep only. Hence none of these phases which manifest themselves in the states peculiar to them, can be regarded as pertaining to the essential nature of Ātman. Waking, dream and sound sleep do not for a like reason really belong to the essence of Ātman. So we arrive at the conclusion that neither the manifold world nor its absence enters into the nature of Ātman. Pure Consciousness alone is his real nature.

85. But, it will be objected, even consciousness forsakes Ātman during deep sleep. For do we not remember on waking that we knew nothing during our sleep? "No, consciousness does not desert him in sleep, for one is conscious of sleep" (Mān. Bh.7). That consciousness which intuits sleep, is the consciousness of Ātman.

86. It is reasonable to ask why we are unconscious of everything, if, as it is alleged, consciousness persists even then. The reply is this : That is because everything becomes one with *Prājña* in that state. "This *purusha* firmly embraced as he is by *Prājña* is quite unaware of anything either external or internal" (Br. Bh. 4-3-21). So "Oneness is the cause of unconsciousness" (Br. Bh. 4-3-21). The Śruti says "True, he does not know anything there, but it is only while being a knower that he knows

not; for the knowing power of the knower never disappears, only there is nothing second to and distinct from Him there, which he could possibly know" (Br. 4-3-30).

87. Ātman is Pure Consciousness in waking and dream states too, just as much as He is such in deep sleep. Only there is, in these two states, the appearance of a world which looks as though it were a second to Him. "Dream is to him who sees the truth otherwise, and sleep to him who does not know it; when the misconception about these two ceases, one has attained the state of the Fourth" (GK. Bh. 1-15). Since dream is seeing truth otherwise, both waking and dream may be metaphysically considered to be dreams. Unconsciousness of the truth is deep sleep; so sleep or ignorance of the true nature of Ātman may be said to continue in all the three states. Of these three, deep sleep is characterized by ignorance alone, whereas misconception preponderates in waking and dream. But on closer scrutiny along the lines we have indicated so far, no ignorance whatever is seen to be actually lurking in deep sleep, for Ātman of the nature of Pure Consciousness alone remains there, while people mistake and look upon him as enveloped in ignorance from the waking point of view. And as there can be no misconception without ignorance underlying it, the same Ātman should be considered to maintain Himself free from dream or waking. We are thus justified in concluding that the notion of the existence of the three states is itself a grand misconception. Accordingly the Śruti proclaims "These three are his dreams" (Ai. 1-12). The final conclusion, then, is that Ātman is eternally free from all the three states.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### ĀTMAN AS UNBORN AND NON-DUAL

88. Gaudapāda has thus revealed the real nature of Ātman in one of his verses: "When the Jīva awakes from his beginningless illusory dream, then he realizes the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-dual (Ātman)" (GK. 1-16). That the Ātman is beyond sleep and dream, that he is free from the so-called three states of consciousness, we have already seen after an examination of the states. It follows from this, of course, that Ātman is free from birth and other modifications and that He is non-dual also. For there being no time, space, or causality apart from Ātman who is in Himself without parts and without qualities, He must be above all change such as birth. For the same reason the conclusion forces itself upon us that He is One without a second, that is, that His nature precludes the existence of selves and things other than Himself, and also that He is devoid of distinctions within His own nature. The present chapter is begun only to make His birthless and secondless nature still more clear.

89. The general belief of the common run of Vedantins is as follows: 'I am one among the innumerable souls inhabiting this world. I have to attain, through practice of devotion, union with the Supreme Self after shuffling off this mortal coil. In the Śrutis also it is stated that this world is born of God and that individual souls also emanate from Him. For instance, look at these texts: "He wished 'May I become many, may I be born'. He brooded over it and after He had

brooded over, He created all this, whatever we find here" (Tai. 2-6), "Just as tiny sparks dart forth from a fire, so also from this Self emanate all the organs ..... all these souls" (Br. Mān. 2-1- 23), "So, my dear boy, all these different beings are born of that Imperishable One, and are dissolved there too" (Mu. 2-1-1).

Now this belief of devotees is not founded on fact. For in the first place, it is impossible to conceive the Self as an effect. "Ātman is no effect for the very reason that he is of a nature whose existence cannot be thought away" (SBh. 2-3-7). To say that the Self is born is to concede that he can cease to exist, but the latter fact is quite inconceivable. A conceiver is required to conceive the non-existence of Ātman and if there is one, he would himself be that Ātman. "All perishable effects can perish only up to and exclusive of the Purusha (the Witness) but the Purusha is imperishable for there will be nothing else to cause His destruction. He is unchangeably eternal and hence of a nature eternally pure, conscious, free" (SBh. 1-1-4). Śrutis also declare that Ātman is beyond birth and allied modifications: This Śruti for instance "Now this Ātman is great, unborn, free from old age and birth; He is immortal, fearless, Brahman itself" (Br. 4-4-25). It is not quite correct therefore to say that the individual soul is born or that it has to attain liberation by means of devotion. Śrutis like the following aver that the Ātman is "Completely free from the manifold phenomenal world, perfectly unperturbed, the highest good, one without a second" (Mān. 7). And this has been conclusively shown to be true by an examination of the three states. So it is not right to hold that this world consisting of animate and inanimate entities is come from the Supreme Self.

90. The following considerations may perhaps deter some people from accepting the truth of the above statement. The existence of the world is vouched for by perception and other evidences. It is common knowledge that there are in it several individual souls engaged in activities and reaping fruits thereof. And many Śrutis say that all the multiplex world consisting of ether and other phenomena has arisen from the Supreme Ātman, and will go back into Him in the end. Would it be right to disregard all these sources of knowledge?

But perception and other means of knowledge transcended as they are by the highest intuitional knowledge and opposed to the teaching of Śruti texts declaring that Ātman is unborn and secondless, as well as to those like 'That thou art', teaching the identity of the soul with Brahman, cannot be of any account with regard to the Highest Reality, though there is nothing wrong in utilizing these evidences for purposes of practical life. Besides, it has been demonstrated that all idea of distinction of knowledge and its object, is based upon *avidyā*. Hence we have to understand that texts teaching the creation of the world or of individual souls do not seriously insist upon actual creation.

91. But, it will be asked, why do Śruti texts describe the creation of the souls as well as of other objects at such length and with such a wealth of illustrations, if as it is urged, there be no intention of emphasizing actual origination? We reply: "True, creation has been described in several ways and has been elaborated and richly illustrated by examples like that of clay, iron and sparks. All that description is only a means to prepare the mind for understanding the unity of the



individual and the Supreme Self”(GK. Bh. 3-15). Just as all that is made of clay is known through the knowledge of clay, all the world becomes known through the knowledge of Ātman. For the effect does not exist independently of the material cause. “The effect is only a matter of words, a mere name; that which is called the clay is the only reality” (Ch. 6-1-4). Like unto the vessels great and small made of clay, the world being an effect, cannot be independent of its cause, Ātman. Thus the Śruti only teaches the unreality of the world. “But the Śruti says that souls emanate from Ātman like sparks, and the Smṛti also teaches ‘My own part is the individual soul’ (G. 15-7). No, for that is only meant to confirm and strengthen the idea of the unity of the soul and Ātman. It is well-known that a spark darting forth from a fire is but fire and so in common life we treat it as one with fire. Similarly the soul which is a part of Ātman should also be considered to be one with the whole, the Supreme Self” (Br.Bh. 2-1-20). That is what is intended by the Śrutis and Smṛtis cited by the objector; they do not teach actual creation of souls.

92. But what about the seeming plurality of souls in actual life? “That distinction is only apparent owing to different associating conditions (*upadhis*) such as the mind, just as in the case of one undivided ether which appears to be cut up into several distinct portions owing to a jar and other conditions” (SBh. 2-3-17). “Ātman is born as so many *jīvas* in the same way as ether is seen to be born in the shape of several jar-spaces; and he is born as so many aggregates of bodies and senses in the same way as ether is born as jars and the like. Such is the illustration for origination” (GK. 3-3). The Śruti teaches creation merely to explain that the souls and the aggregates are not other than Ātman in consonance with

the principle of non-difference of the effect from the cause. That a seeming birth or a seeming plurality does not necessarily point to real birth or plurality, may be verified by a reference to dream-experiences. "Just as a dream soul is born and dies, so all these souls come into being, so do they disappear" (GK. 4- 68). "All the aggregates of bodies and senses are thrown out by the *Māyā* of Ātman, like those of dreams" (GK. 3-10). We have convincingly shown the metaphysical identity of both waking and dream in the previous chapter.

93. The Śruti says that Ātman in dreamless sleep is the cause of both the origin and dissolution of the world. Herein lies a principle that deserves to be borne in mind. Since we have already shown that both waking and dream are equally unreal, the world manifesting itself there stands in no need of a cause either for its origin or dissolution. For those that are convinced of this truth, Ātman is ever free from the world. "If the world really existed we could talk of its dissolution, no doubt. All this duality is but an illusion, Non-duality alone is real" (GK. 1-17). The statement in the Śruti therefore that the world is born of Prājña is only to remind us that Ātman is the one substrate for all the unreal manifestations just as the rope is the substrate for the illusory snake and other appearances that might be imagined there.

94. While the Unborn, Secondless Principle is the sole Reality, the creation of the world and the souls is taught in the Śrutis for seekers who belong to the average class. "For those who affirm that things do exist, because they are experienced and produce practical results, the wise ones have taught the origination of the world, for these people are afraid of the truth of non-

birth" (GK.4-42). "Let them take it as a tentative teaching, for as they advance in the study of the *Vedāntas*, they will of course rise to the realisation of Ātman unborn and secondless, such is the view of the wise, for they are never serious about the reality of origination" (GK.Bh. 4-42); "Even meditation is out of a lenient consideration for seekers of a middling capacity" (GK. 3-16). The distinction of the devotee and object of devotion as well as the path of light (*arcirādi mārga*) &c. taught for devotees who have realized the truth through meditation, is all from the stand- point of *avidyā*. "The soul in its several states is not dissimilar to the jar-space of the analogy, when it seemingly dies or is born, when it goes to the other world or comes back from there, or even while it exists in all the various bodies" (GK. 3-9).

95. Ātman is changeless and the world has no existence. Hence the highest truth is that nothing is really born. But yet "that which exists can be born illusorily though not in fact" (GK. 3-27), "From an existent entity as the cause, the world may very well be born like effects such as an elephant conjured up by magic, but not from a non-existent cause. Or again an existent entity like a rope, may be very well born illusorily as a snake &c. though not in fact. So also the unborn Ātman, even though unperceivable, may be illusorily born as the world"(GK.Bh. 3- 27). This is the *sat-kārya-vāda*, the doctrine of the effect already existent in the cause, which is taught in Vedānta.

96. 'There is no diversity whatever here' (Kā.2-1-11), 'Indra, the Supreme Lord, appears as many through the *māyās*'(Br. 2-5-19), 'Unborn, He is born in many forms' (Tai.Ā.3-13), 'Brahman, though changeless becomes the object of all conception and language

involving transformation and the like in its aspect of name and form, differentiated and undifferentiated, called into being by ignorance, and undefinable either as identical with or distinct from it' (SBh. 2-1-27). 'Name and form constructed by ignorance as though identical with the Omniscient Lord, undefinable either as identical with or as distinct from Him, are the seed of phenomena of mundane existence, called by Śruti and Smṛti variously as *māyā*(illusion), *śakti*(potentiality), *prakṛti* (primordial material cause)' (SBh. 2-1-14). When we speak of the world as having come from Brahman, we are speaking at the level of this *māyā*. This is a conception too, from the stand-point of *avidyā*. "But when from the stand-point of the Highest Reality these names and forms are further scrutinized in the light of the Śruti, they are found to have really no independent being of their own apart from Reality just as foam is not independent of water or as a jar is not independent of clay, or as any other effect has no independent being of its own apart from its cause. It is from that view-point, at the level of the highest vision, that Brahman becomes the object of conceptions such as 'One without a second', 'There is no diversity whatever here' etc." (Br.Bh.3-5-1).

97. The final conclusion is this: "No individual soul is born, there is no cause which can give rise to it. This is the highest truth and reality, wherein nothing is born, never a whit"(GK. 3-48).

## CHAPTER NINE

### PRACTICE AND FINAL GOAL

98. While Ātman is actually One without a second, a two-fold distinction is foisted upon Him by *avidyā*, to wit, that of being the *pramāṭr* or the seeker of Reality on the one hand, and that of *Paramātmān*, the Supreme Self free from all *saṁsāric* defilements, to be sought out by that aspirant on the other. There is a traditional saying to this effect: "Before the realization of Ātman to be sought out, Ātman is a *pramāṭr*. When He is sought out, the *pramāṭr* himself would become the One Supreme Self free from all evils of good and bad and the like" (quoted by Śaṅkara at the end of SBh. 1-1-4).<sup>1</sup> It is from the stand-point of *Pramāṭr* that spiritual discipline is enjoined in the Śrutis and Smṛtis for the attainment of *jñāna*, the knowledge of Ātman.

Religious works, devotional meditation, listening to the Śrutis &c.- all of these are means to knowledge. "*Agnihōtra* or any other obligatory ritual whether with or without the aid of *Upāsana* performed in this or in a previous birth with a view to obtaining freedom, becomes in proportion to its intensity, a means to the knowledge of Brahman through the destruction of accumulated sins that form a hindrance to the realisation of Brahman. Through the proximate means such as listening to Śrutis, reflection, faith and perseverance, it

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1. This and the other two ślōkas quoted along with it are usually attributed to Ācārya *Sundara Pāndya* on the strength of a statement by the commentator on *Sūtasamhitā*, but this ascription is open to question.

ultimately achieves along with *Brahma-Vidyā* (knowledge of Brahman) the same result that is aimed at by the latter" (SBh. 4- 1-18).

99. In the Śruti 'It is this Ātman whom *Brāhmaṇas* seek to know through daily recitation of the Vedas, sacrifice, charity and asceticism of moderation in food' (Br. 4-4-22), it is evident that these sacrifices and other practices are a means to the birth of knowledge, since the wording is 'seek to know' (SBh. 3-4-26). The Gita also says "Man attains perfection through worshipping Him by means of duty proper to him" (Ġ. 18-46). *Karma-yōga* therefore "which consists in the worship of *Īśwara* through performing duties without attachment after doing away with the pairs of opposites" (GBh. 2-39), is also a good discipline.

100. *Karma-yōga* removes desires and other defilements of the mind. "Yogins do their duty, abandoning all attachment, for self-purification" (G.5-11). But this *Karma* need not be necessarily an obligatory ritual like the *Agnihōtra* enjoined by the Veda; for even those that were not qualified for performing the *āśrama* rites, have been known to be enlightened souls. "*Raikva*, *Vāchaknavi* and others, who belonged to no *āśrama* are found to have been recognized by the Śruti as knowers of Brahman" (SBh. 3-4-36). "And in the *Itihāsa* or *Mahābhārata*, *Samvarta* and others are reported to have been great yogins although they had nothing to do with rituals prescribed for the several *āśramas*, as is evident from the fact that they went naked and conducted themselves in other ways (not allowed for those who accept one of the prescribed stations of life)" (SBh.3-4-37). It is quite possible that disciplinary spiritual acts like *japa* (repetition of mantras), *upavāsa* (holy fasts), and *devatārādhana* (worship of the gods) enjoined on all

human beings, are conducive to knowledge of Reality” (SBh. 3-4-38). It may even be that religious works performed in a former existence, give rise to knowledge in the present life. “So says the Smṛti, ‘Perfected in the course of many births, he then reaches the Supreme goal’ (G.6-45) thus showing that particular mental impressions accumulated in other existences also may lead to knowledge” (SBh. 3-4-38). “In the case of *Vidura*, *Dharma-vyādha* and others who reached illumination on account of effects produced by past deeds, no one can deny their attainment of the goal on the score that they were ineligible to perform Vedic rites, since knowledge of Ātman must invariably yield its fruit” (SBh. 1-3-38). “And all the four castes are entitled according to the Smṛtis to know the truth through the *Ithihāsas* and *Purāṇas* as the *Mahābhārata* specifically enjoins that it should be explained to all the four castes” (SBh. 1-3-38).

101. Disciplinary acts conducive to knowledge are of various kinds. “By the term ‘*karma*’, we should understand not merely rituals like the *Agnihōtra*. *Brahmacharya* (religious celibacy), *tapas* (asceticism), *Satyavadana* (truthfulness), *śama* (self-control), *dama* (control of the senses), *ahimsā* (harmlessness) and others of the kind are also *karmas* well-known among the followers of the stages of life other than that of a house-holder, to be of greater efficacy in contributing to enlightenment and unmixed with defilements, and there are also *karmas* of the nature of meditation and concentration” (Tai. Bh. 1-11). And there is the express injunction of *śama* and other practices as leading to knowledge. “Therefore one who knows thus, shall become self-controlled, self-subdued, quietistic, patient and concentrative and thereby see the Ātman in himself” (Br. 4-4-23).

102. It is declared in Śrutis like the following : that freedom ensues so soon as knowledge dawns. "Only thus much, my dear, is the means to immortality" (Br. 4-5-15). Hence "Kindling the sacrificial fire or other *āśrama-Karmas* are not desiderated by knowledge to yield its effect" (SBh. 3-4-25).

103. It is wrong to maintain that knowledge is only subsidiary to religious works. If it were so, it would mean that knowledge is for house-holders only, and that religious celibates, hermits and *sannyāsins* (those that have renounced all karma), are not eligible for knowledge. "But knowledge is declared in the Śruti to accrue to followers of the other stages of life wherein aspirants remain absolutely chaste. And knowledge cannot possibly be conceived to be ancillary to karma there, since they have no karma to perform" (SBh. 3-4-17). And renunciation of all karma is expressly enjoined as a means to reach Ātman. Witness the Śruti "It is this world of Ātman, wishing to reach which, the monks go away from their homes" (Br. 4-4-22). Hence it is clear that knowledge can give freedom independently of all karma.

104. In the Chāndōgya, a text says "One who has taken his firm stand in Brahman attains immortality" (Ch. 2-23-1). That Śruti has declared in so many words that the followers of the other three *āśramas* go to the worlds of the virtuous (to enjoy the fruits of their good deeds), but only the *sannyāsin* who has taken his firm stand in Brahman attains immortality. "The word *Brahma-saṁstha* (one who has taken his firm stand in Brahman) denotes steadfast devotion to Brahman and implies whole-hearted staying of the mind on Brahman to the exclusion of every other activity. And this can never relate to the other three stages of life, for the Śruti threatens them with sin if they should cease to do the



duties enjoined upon them as members of their respective *āśramas*. To the *Parivrājaka* (mendicant), however, no sin would accrue in default of performance of such works, inasmuch as he has renounced all karmas. *Śama*, *dama*, and similar internal acts of discipline constitute his duty which strengthens his establishment in Brahman but is never antagonistic to it. Devotion to Brahman supported by self-control, self-subduedness and the like, is verily the duty proper to his *āśrama*, just as sacrifice and other practices are proper to the other stages and only when he transgresses that, would sin accrue to him" (SBh3-4-20). "Hence no one can impute futility to the knowledge of Brahman alleging that we claim immortality to whomever that happens merely to occupy the fourth *āśrama*" (SBh. 3-4-20) for a real *parivrājaka* according to us, is one who is established in Brahman, and by dint of it has the natural endowments of self-control and other kindred virtues. It follows therefore that knowledge of Brahman is quite independent of karma, since *Brahma-nishthattva* (devotion to Brahman only) is possible only to one who has renounced all duties pertaining to the other three stages of life.

105. *Paramahansa-pārvirājya* (the highest order of religious mendicancy), becomes a necessity for those who want to devote themselves exclusively to *śravaṇa* (listening to scriptures) and the like, since that order of life 'conduces to the ripening of knowledge' (SBh. 3-4-20). Renunciation of all karma is seen to be recommended in the *Gītā* (G. 6-3) under the name of '*śama*', as a means to *Dhyāna Yōga* (the yōga of contemplation), the immediate means to knowledge of Brahman. "In the case of one who has acquired the knowledge of Brahman, this *Pārvirājya* (absolute renunciation) comes as a matter of course even without any sanctioning text as an

inevitable result of his unshakable conviction alone that he is one with Brahman devoid of all factors of karma such as the deity in view and qualificatory attributes such as a particular caste" (Br.Bh. 4-5-15). It is possible that a knower of Brahman stays away in the householder's station of life. "If for any reason, he is not in a position to renounce all religious works, he may continue to perform karmas, just to set an example to the world, though not being attached to the action or its result, he has no ends to serve thereby for himself. Such a person does not really perform any work at all; his action having been burnt up by the fire of knowledge, his action becomes no action" (GBh. 4-20). Even from this view-point, it is clear that knowledge stands in no need of the co-operation of karma in order to produce Mōksha (liberation) its immediate result.

106. One who has renounced all works has to attain firm stand in knowledge (*jñāna-nishthā*) exclusively through the practice of the means prescribed. So says the Śruti "Therefore a Brāhmaṇa should stand upon the strength of knowledge (or according to another interpretation should attain the humility of a child) after exhausting all knowledge; having exhausted strength and knowledge, he becomes contemplative; and having exhausted both contemplation and non-contemplation, he becomes a real Brāhmaṇa" (Br. 3-5-1). The meaning of the Śruti is this: First one should know all that is worth knowing about Ātman and by virtue of that knowledge overcome the consciousness of the reality of sensory objects and learn to behave in all humility just like a child, without making a display of his knowledge, scholarship, moral excellence and the like attainments. And over-passing even that stage, he should devote himself to the contemplation of the real nature of

Ātman. When he has succeeded in all these three stages of practice, he becomes a Brāhmaṇa, or knower of Brahman in the real sense of the word. So barring the practice of such *nivṛtti dharma* (renunciatory acts of discipline) a *paramahansa* has no other prescribed duties whatever to perform.

107. Spiritual discipline has fructified when it is found to culminate in knowledge of Brahman, and knowledge has fructified when absolute freedom is realized. "Since the fruit of knowledge is an immediate spiritual experience here and now, every one desirous of knowledge may be deemed to be qualified for it, unless there is any express prohibitive text. Hence even widowers and others who belong to no specific stage of life, may be held to be entitled, without fear of contradiction to *śravaṇa* and other means of knowledge and thereby to knowledge itself." (SBh.3-4-38).

108. It cannot be insisted that *śravaṇa* and other practices should necessarily lead to knowledge in this very life. "If the discipline undergone is not hindered by any obstacle resulting from any past deed fructifying at present, knowledge is born here only; but in case of such an obstacle hindering it, one may have to wait till a future birth for its dawning" (SBh. 3-4-51). Hence it is that the Śruti says "*Vāmadeva* proclaimed its spiritual truth even while in the womb of his mother" (Ai.2-5) implying thereby that knowledge may have to be attained in a birth subsequent to the one in which the means are practised. If those who reach *Brahmalōka* by virtue of *Upāsanā* (constant staying one's mind on *Saguṇa Brahman*), do get knowledge in that region, they become immediately free as is evidenced by Śrutis like "And he does not return" (Ch. 8-15- 1). But we gather

that it is quite possible that even in such highly evolved worlds, knowledge may not be accessible as a rule, from texts like the following: "They do not return to *this* human world" (Ch. 4-15-5). "For them there is no return hitherward" (Br.Mā.6-1-18). "Therefore in order to justify qualifications like 'this' and 'here', we have to conclude that they will return in another *kalpa* (cosmic period)" (Ch.Bh. 5-10-2).

109. In the case of *mukti* (spiritual freedom) which is the fruit of knowledge, however, it is not open to us to set any time-limit and say it shall be attained in this life or another. "Means of knowledge may possibly effect different degrees of perfection in its own result, viz. knowledge, but never in freedom which is the result of knowledge. We have repeatedly urged that freedom is nothing to be newly acquired, but, being an ever-attained essential nature of the self, is only realized by knowledge. Nor is there any possibility of degrees, higher and lower, even in that knowledge, for lower knowledge is no knowledge, the highest alone being entitled to be called such. Therefore gradation in knowledge is possible, if at all, only in its appearing earlier or later. But there can be no gradations whatever in freedom" (SBh. 3-4-52). For in fact freedom is no other than Brahman itself (SBh.3-4-52) and not something to be attained through some means. Freedom therefore has only to be realized through knowledge. Rightly viewed, even knowledge does not admit of any degrees or grades, for the highest knowledge which is incapable of being stultified is the only true knowledge in the strict sense of the term. Knowledge may arise earlier or later according to the difference in degree of the intensity of the effort employed to achieve it. So freedom is bound to accrue simultaneously with

knowledge. "The sentence 'That thou art' can by no means be made to mean 'Thou wilt become That after death'. '*Rshi Vāmadeva*, while seeing this, realized 'I have been *Manu*, and *Sūrya* also' (Br. 1-4-10). This text tells us that becoming all this, or realizing one's identity with everything, is the simultaneous result of true knowledge. Hence the immediate attainment of freedom has no exception in the case of one who has got knowledge" (SBh.3-3-32).

110. We have adduced the identity of freedom with the nature of ever-existing Brahman, as the reason why the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman cannot be conceived to be something to be reaped at a distant future. But some imagine that there might be a special freedom of disembodiedness besides the Brahman-hood immediately from right knowledge. They rest their belief on the Śruti 'Being Brahman itself, he becomes merged in Brahman' (Br. 4-4-6). But the Śruti is quite innocent of this interpretation. "It only means this: There being no desires to serve as limiting conditions to make him non-Brahman, he is verily Brahman here only and becomes merged in Brahman, not after he has shuffled off his mortal coil. A wise man cannot be conceived to be of one nature while alive and of quite another after death. It is only because he no more assumes another body that he is said to be finally merged in Brahman" (Br.Bh. 4-4-6).

111. It is wrong to think that a knower of Brahman has a body while alive and enters into freedom of disembodiedness only after death. The Śruti says "Just as the slough of a snake worn out and cast off, lies in an anthill, so does this body lie here, and as for himself, he is verily bodiless, immortal, Life, Brahman indeed,

Light itself" (Br.4-4-7). That is to say, "Now this other, the knowing one who is compared in the Śruti to the snake, has become free, identical with all. Like the snake in the illustration, he is verily bodiless. Although he continues to be there, he is no more an embodied being as before..... he was embodied and mortal before this because of his pre-conceived identity with the body owing to desire and action. Now that he is free from either, he is bodiless, and hence immortal" (Br.Bh.4-4-7).

\* \* \*

## CHAPTER TEN

### REVIEW OF OTHER SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

112. Vedanta is not particular in criticizing other systems of thought. "This system primarily aims at determining the purport of the *Vedantas* or Upanishadic texts and unlike other rational systems, not meant for establishing or refuting any particular system by means of pure ratiocination" (SBh.2-2-1).

113. Vedantins do not deny *in toto* all intrinsic value to systems like the *Sāṃkhya*. They only confute certain views in them which are opposed to reason and experience. They argue on the principle "What is not expressly condemned, may be assumed as approved" (SBh. 2-4-12), and have absorbed whatever is commendable in the teaching of the *Sāṃkhya*, *Yōga* and other systems.

114. In the Vedanta system of Bādarāyaṇa, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yōga* come in for criticism in greater detail than other systems. "This is because the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yōga* are popularly supposed to supply means to the Highest *Beatitude*. They have been accepted by authoritative Vaidikas and are seemingly supported by certain Śruti texts by implication. In particular there is this Śruti which says "Knowing that Cause, the Lord reached through *Sāṃkhya* and *Yōga*, one is liberated from all the snares of life" (Sve. 6-13). "The point of refutation is that the Highest Goal is never reached either by the way of the *Sāṃkhya* or that of the *Yōga* independent of the Vedic teaching.... As for the text quoted with reference to the cause reached through

*Sāṃkhya* and *Yōga*, it is only the knowledge and contemplation taught in the Vedas which are respectively to be understood by the terms '*Sāṃkhya*' and '*Yōga*', for the text in question is in the context of Vedic teaching. But in so far as these systems, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yōga*, are not in conflict with the Vedic teaching, they certainly have their place even in the Vedantic system" (SBh. 2-1-3).

115. The self-same principle holds good in the case of the logical systems also. "If they are of any help here through contributing their speculation and reasoning, by all means have them. As for the knowledge of truth, however, that must come from the Vedantic texts alone" (SBh.2-1-3).

116. Similar is the treatment to be accorded to Buddhistic and other non-Vedic systems of thought. The policy of Vedānta is to accept every reasoning unopposed to the Vedas. For instance, "The non-dual Reality devoid of the distinctions of knowledge, knowable and the knower has not been referred to by the Buddha. Nevertheless, the repudiation of external objects and the postulate of consciousness as the sole reality taught by him are doctrines very proximate to the doctrine of the non-dual entity. Highest Reality, however, has to be ascertained from the Vedantic texts only" (GK.Bh.4-99).

117. Sri Gaudapāda pays his homage to non-dual Reality and closes his treatise with a benedictory verse: "Difficult of comprehension and immensely deep, unborn, even throughout, and pure; realizing this state of non-distinctions, we bow to it in the measure of our ability." (GK.Bh. 4-100).



## APPENDIX

### CARDINAL TENETS OF ŚAṆKARA'S VEDANTA

Here is a brief summary of the salient features of Śaṅkara's Vedanta as described in the previous pages of this booklet. Failure to appreciate the cardinal principles of this system has resulted in many glaring misconceptions, some of which are noted below. Those that seek to know more about this subject, should apply themselves to a serious study of Śaṅkara's Bhāṣyas on the three branches of study, *Prasthānas* as they are collectively called - the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita and the Brahma-Sūtras with the aid of a competent teacher.

1. **Brahman** is the reality of the universe, which can be known only through the Upanishads. It is the Self-luminous **Witness** (*sākshin*), the very Self of us all. There is no *pramāṇa* or means of right knowledge, which can reveal it; nor is any *pramāṇa* needed to prove its existence either.

Persons unable to understand this truth have conceived the theory of *Ātma-Sākshātkāra* (Self-realization) for which they imagine that practices like the repetition of the *Mahāvākyas* (texts like '*Tat-tvam-asi*' - That thou art), *laya-chintana* (merging the objective world in Brahman by means of meditation) or the practice of *Pātāñjala yōga*, are necessary.

2. **The Vedanta-Śāstra** is not a *pramāṇa* directly revealing the nature of Brahman. It is called '*Pramāṇa*' simply because it dispels avidyā (ignorance) of Brahman. It is called the '**FINAL MEANS**' (*antya pramāṇa*) because it shows how the distinction of *pramāṇa* and

*prameya* (means and object of knowledge) accepted in common parlance, is really due to *avidyā*. That is to say, there cannot be any trace of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* after the knowledge of Vedānta has dawned.

Some who have not understood this principle believe that the Non-duality taught in the Vedānta texts is a matter of faith, others resort to the strange course of interpreting Vedāntic texts according to their own preconceived theory and asserting that their theory is correct because it is based upon those texts. A few more teach that there are both positive and negative texts revealing the nature of *Ātman*, while there are others who hold that the positive (affirmative) texts are more authoritative than the negative ones.

**3. *Avidyā*** is an innate, beginningless misconception due to a mental superimposition of the real and the un-real, the Self and the non-self as well as their properties on each other. This *avidyā* is known through intuition. This superimposition is the *primus* of all notions of the distinctions of *pramātr*, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (knower, means of knowledge and the object of knowledge). *Vidyā* or true knowledge consists in discriminating and determining the true nature of the self and the not-self with the aid of the Śāstra.

It is evident that those who proceed to prove *avidyā* by means of reason or *pramāṇas* (valid sources of knowledge) or the authority of the Śāstra are resorting to an obviously erroneous procedure, since the very notion of 'knower' is due to *avidyā*. *Avidyā* common life ignorance, doubt or misconception of objects and *vidyā* (true knowledge) that dispels it, are both in the sphere of *avidyā* par excellence. Strictly speaking, even the distinction of *avidyā* and *vidyā* relative to *Ātman* is a hypothetical notion allowed by Vedāntins as a concession to the popular mind, just as a device for explaining the highest truth. The final position is that the Reality or *Ātman* transcends both *vidyā* and *avidyā*.

Failure to realize this truth, has given rise to the imper-

missible demand for the cause of *avidyā*. The topsyturvy process of offering perception, inference, presumption or the *Śruti* as *pramāṇas* in evidence of *avidyā*, has been in vogue just because of this failure. Curious problems have cropped up regarding the locus of *avidyā* as well as the number of *avidyās*. 'Does it reside in the individual soul or Brahman? Is there a single *avidyā* or are there as many *avidyās* as there are individual souls? Would universal liberation ensue when the *avidyā* of a single *jīva* is destroyed? ' And so on!

For a detailed discussion of this subject, readers are referred to my '*Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabhijñā*' 'a Sanskrit work, where the only comprehensive method of Vedānta has been explained at length. The English Introduction to this book has been separately published by the Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya under the title '*How to Recognize the Method of Vedānta*'.

**4. Vedantic texts purport to teach Atman alone as an entity;** that is to say, they negate what are not really His properties, and culminate in revealing the self-established Ātman. There would remain nothing more to be done after realizing the import of the texts.

Various strange beliefs prevail among those that are not aware of this open secret. Some imagine that the Vedantic text only yields an indirect knowledge of Ātman, and that hence the repeated practice of the knowledge of the *Mahāvākya*, or the merging of the world of multiplicity in Ātman by means of meditation or the meditation on the qualityless Brahman or the practice of *Pātañjala Yōga*, or else continued mental repetition of *Pranava* (the syllable Aum) etc. is required.

**5. Atman is an ineffable entity.** He cannot be expressed by words or sentences; for no genus, quality, action or any other specific feature pertains to Him. He is devoid of all distinctions and can never be objectified.

Some who cannot understand this, think that negative propositions are incapable of giving rise to the knowledge of the form 'I am Brahman' just because they end in merely negating the superimposed attributes. One cannot completely get rid of the ignorance of the rope merely by the knowledge that it is not a snake. Hence, they argue, negative texts can never remove *avidyā* without a residuum. Some are even of the opinion that negative texts can only repeat what positive texts directly disclose and are hence no *pramāṇas* at all!

**6. Śravaṇa** (study of sacred revelation), **Manana** (reflective thinking) and **Nididhyāsana** (concentrated contemplation), are all means for realizing Ātman. Highly developed souls, however, who can immediately grasp the true meaning of the Vedic teaching, do not stand in need of any additional effort.

Not taking this principle into account is responsible for the divergence of opinion among commentators of Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya about the relation of *Śravaṇa* and *Nididhyāsana*. Of these, some aver that *Śravaṇa* is the principal means and the other two are only ancillary to it; while others insist that *nididhyāsana* is the one means to direct realization and without it mere *Śravaṇa* would be of no avail.

**7. Śravaṇa and the other means** are enjoined only in so far as they turn the seeker inwards and direct him to stay his mind on Ātman, but the resultant knowledge is no object of any injunction.

Those who cannot distinguish between the effort required for *Śravaṇa* &c. and the resultant knowledge in each case, have made it a matter for controversy whether or not '*śrōtavyah*' and similar texts constitute true injunctions. Some of them maintain that these are all injunctions while others insist that they are seemingly injunctions in form but are really statements of fact. Some even think that they are merely eulogistic statements.

**8. Manana** refers to the type of reasoning suggested

by the Śruti itself conducive to experience. Hence the term 'experience' here should be understood to mean the supersensuous intuition which results from our enquiry which takes in one sweep the whole field possible of whatever is knowable.

From this the reader has to understand that use might be made of **ordinary reasoning** also in so far as it is conformable to the reasoning suggested by the Śruti. Advaitins do try to disclose the hollowness of other systems according to the course of reasoning accepted by themselves. But *Advaita* itself cannot be established by means of pure logical ratiocination. People who are not aware of this fact, often try to apply speculation or inferences based upon partial experiences to Vedānta also. Others condemn all reasoning and affirm that reasoning is of no use in matters taught by the Śruti. So they interpret Śruti according to their own predilection and place their own convictions before seekers as the final Vedantic truth.

**9. Nididhyāsana** is that kind of spiritual discipline by means of which one concentrates one's mind on the subtle principle, Ātman. At the end of this discipline, one becomes conscious of the fact that the mind itself is a superimposition on Ātman. Then the mind becomes no mind, that is to say, it is realized essentially as Ātman himself.

Many confound *Nididhyāsana* with '*Upāsana*' and believe it to be a sort of spiritual imagination. It is this confusion that prompts some to believe that *Nididhyāsana* must end in 'trances', *Savikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa* (with and without consciousness of distinctions).

**10. Examination of the three avasthas**, is a special kind of reasoning suggested in the Śruti itself. It is the nature of Ātman only that has to be taken into account in this method. The whole of the world has to be regarded as the conditioning associate (*upādhi*) of

Ātman. Each state is to be evaluated from its own standpoint. This mode of reasoning comprehends the whole of human experience, inasmuch as there is no knowable not included in the three states.

People who cannot rise to this way of thinking, mistakenly suppose that the method of states (*avasthās*) is an examination of the states rather than that of Ātman to whom the states attach themselves. They argue that there is a **fourth state** called the *Turiya* which is often identified with the trance of *Nirvikalpa Samādhi*. They largely use the memory of dream and sound sleep for determining the nature of these two states.

**11. Each of the three states** is a full manifestation of Reality. Those who are capable of conceiving this fact, can attain the knowledge of Ātman even through the determination of the true nature of the Self in any one individual state.

Sensuous perception, mental awareness and receding to the undifferentiated nature of the Self erasing any of these modes of consciousness, may respectively be equated to the three modes conditioning *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. This method has been pointed out in the first chapter of *Gauḍapāda's Kārikās*. Thus looked at, the Witnessing Principle itself becomes the *Turiya* Self. Aspirants after truth sufficiently developed in reflection, can convince themselves that all objective not-self is really a super-imposition on the Witness of the waking state. The entire objective not-Self in the state is pervaded by the Witnessing Consciousness and is ultimately identical with it. Similarly with the two other states.

**12. Following in the wake of the method of *avasthās***, it is quite possible to look upon each of the five sheaths (the *Panca-kōśas* of the *Taittiriya*) as comprehending the entire objective not-Self and merge the *kōśas* successively each in the next interior pervading sheath until at last we come to the conclusion that all else is superimposed on the Witnessing Principle which

is called *Ānanda* (infinite bliss), the real ground of all the phenomenal world.

Failure to understand that the *avasthās* are independent expressions of the same Reality, has led some thinkers to imagine that there is a residue of positive ignorance in sleep, which serves as the seed of the waking world. Ignorance of this fact, has also induced some to assume that the *Ānandamaya kośa*, the principle of enjoyment of fruits of actions which really can exist in waking only, continues to persist potentially in sleep.

**13. Atman is eternally unborn and without a second.** Śrutis teach that the world has proceeded from Ātman. It is only as a device for gradually leading seekers of intermediate and lowest grades of intellect to the realisation of this truth. The statement that the world is born of Ātman simply means that it is a superimposition on Atman.

Those that cannot get mental hold of this secret, variously posit that Ātman and positive *avidyā* (or *māyā*) are both the cause of the world or that Ātman is the efficient cause while *avidyā* (or *māyā*) is the material cause of it.

**14. While the duties devolving upon Varnas and Āshramas (castes and stations of life) do lead to knowledge, they are not universally indispensable.** *Śama, dama* (Self-control and control of senses) and the like, however, are absolutely necessary as being intimate disciplinary acts enabling one to become introvert. Since knowledge has to end in a result to be experienced here and now, all those who are not expressly prohibited in the Śrutis, may be assumed to be entitled to a study of the Vedantas. *Śūdras* and others may enter upon the study of Vedanta through the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇas*.

Some ignorant people insist that women and *Śūdras* are strictly outside the pale of Vedantic knowledge; and there are some

who hold that knowledge is impossible for any one in this age of *kali* since all *karmas* enjoined in the *Śāstras* have slackened off in practice!

**15. Karmas performed in a previous birth may also serve as means to knowledge in the present life.** The only duty for Sannyāsins is unremitting devotion to knowledge. *Paramahansa Sannyāsa* only means the renouncing of *eshaṇātraya* (the three kinds of desires pertaining to the three worlds).

Those who are not in touch with this truth, argue that householders can never hope to get knowledge of Ātman, since they are not entitled to *Śravaṇa*. Others again insist that even *paramahansas* have duties incumbent on their stage of life, over and above *Śravaṇa* and the like *sādhana*s obligatory for them.

**16. Śravaṇa and other means may not give true knowledge invariably in this life.** Knowledge may come in a subsequent life, if there be any obstacle for its immediate birth. Spiritual freedom, however, is the immediate consequence of the knowledge of Ātman.

The mistaken notion that all who have studied Vedānta are *Ātma-Jñānins* and the self-stultifying postulate of *residual avidyā even in a Jñānin*, are both due to imperfect understanding of the above-mentioned doctrines. Whether one has or has not attained spiritual enlightenment, is a matter of personal intuition and not a subject to be settled by disputation.

**17. The enlightened man becomes free simultaneously with his enlightenment.** There is no further state called *Videha- mukti* (disembodied freedom). An enlightened man has been ever free, eternally bodiless, from his own metaphysical standpoint.

Some who cannot rise to this level of thought consider that *Jivanmukti* (liberation while alive) is only figurative or secondary while liberation after death, is the only liberation properly so called. Others believe that as soon as ignorance (*avidyā*) is



destroyed without any residue, the body of the enlightened one must drop down dead! Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya, has declared in unmistakable terms that when the Śruti says that a Jñānin is merged in Brahman (*Brahmāpyeti*), it is only to intimate that he no more takes up a new body like the common run of mankind.

**18. A Jñānin has completely broken the shackles of karma.** That he is reaping the result of fructifying karma (*prārabdha karma*) is only a statement from the empirical standpoint.

Knowledge of Ātman is the knowledge that one has ever been the Supreme Self devoid of body and action. That an enlightened person is spoken of as experiencing the effects of fructifying karma, is based on the apparent continuance of the semblance of the (*bādhitānuvṛtti* body) even after it has been sublated by knowledge of the truth, and it is only an accommodation to the empirical view. This may be compared to the expression 'The sky is blue' used even by persons who know that the sky has actually no colour whatever. An enlightened man would never look upon the possession of a body as a real fact. Some who are not aware of the meaning of what they are speaking, seriously insist that the fructifying karmas of an enlightened soul are of three kinds— voluntary, accidental, and due to the others' wish— all of which have got to be exhausted by enjoyment before final liberation is reached!

**19. There are no gradations in Self-knowledge.** He who has realized that he is the secondless Brahman beyond all action, means of action and results thereof, is the only real Jñānin. Such an enlightened one has nothing more to accomplish.

Conceptions of gradations among Jñānins labelling them as *Brahmavids*, *Brahmavidvaras* and *Brahmavidvaristhas* (as having reached the high, higher and the highest stages of knowledge) and also of imagining certain disciplining acts as incumbent on the Jñānin for the so-called direct realization are due to lack of grasping the truth enunciated above.

There is one thing which is most important to

remember for the students of Śaṅkara Vedānta, and that has been the basis on which all that has been presented in this booklet has been erected. It is common to all schools of philosophy other than that of Śaṅkara to give prominence to sensuous perception or mental cognition in their schemes of thought. Hence it is that most of these thinkers take Ātman to be the object as well as the subject of the notion of 'I'. Śaṅkara has repeatedly urged that the final aim of Vedānta is to point out that all talk of Jīva as the ego endowed with a body in which the senses and the mind inhere, presupposes a primary ignorance (*avidyā*), and to draw our attention to the Witnessing Consciousness which is the real Self of us all. **That, over and above the sensuous perception and mental activity, there is a source of universal experience to be recognized as the innermost intuition, is a fact which it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind before one can ever hope to resolve the knots of Śaṅkara's dialectics.** It is our hearty prayer to Sṛīman Nārāyaṇa that by His grace the attention of all our readers who are real seekers of spiritual freedom, may be drawn to this central fact of the system.

**Om Tat Sat**

## APPENDIX-II

### LIST OF QUOTATIONS ADDUCED IN THIS BOOK

N.B.: Upanishad and Gita quotations are in Roman Type, while Bhashya quotations are set in Antique.

**Page 1-1** 'स य एषोऽणिमैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो'  
(छां. ६-८-७, ६-९-४, ६-१०-३, ६-१४-३)

2 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह' (तै. २-९)

3 'एतदप्रमयं ध्रुवम्' (बृ. ४-४-२०)

4 'अनाशिनोऽप्रमेयस्य' (गी. २-१८)

5 'मनसो मनो यद्वाचो ह वाचम्' (के. १-२)

6 'यद्वाचाऽनभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते' (के. १-५)

**Page 2-1** 'यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतम्' (के. १-६)

2 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्ति'  
(बृ. २-३-६)

3 "अध्यारोपितनामरूपकर्मद्वारेण ब्रह्म निर्दिश्यते 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म'  
(बृ. ३-९-२८-७) , 'विज्ञानघन एव' (बृ. २-४-१२) , 'ब्रह्म',  
'आत्मा' -इत्येवमादिशब्दैः " (बृ. भा. २-३-६)

4 'सर्वस्याऽऽत्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः' (सू. भा. १-१-१)

5 'असन्नेव स भवति । असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् । अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद ।  
सन्तमेनं ततो विदुः ॥' (तै. २-६)

6 'स एष नेतिनेत्यात्मा' (बृ. ३-९-२६)

7 'सर्वश्रुतिषु च ब्रह्मण्यात्मशब्दप्रयोगात्' (बृ. भा. २-१-२०)

**Page 3-1** 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (बृ. ३-९-२६)

2 'य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवाऽऽत्मत्वात्' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

3 'य एव हि निराकर्ता तदेव तस्य स्वरूपम्' (सू. भा. २-३-७)

**Page 4-1** 'एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।

कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥'

(श्वे. ६-११)

**Page 4-2** 'एको हि प्रत्यगात्मा भवति, न द्वौ प्रत्यगात्मानौ सम्भवतः'

(सू. भा. १-२-२०)

3 'आत्मा हि नाम स्वरूपम्'

(सू. भा. १-१-६)

4 'अदृष्टो द्रष्टाऽश्रुतः श्रोताऽमृतो मन्ताऽविज्ञातो विज्ञाता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति मन्ता नान्योतोऽस्ति विज्ञातैष त आत्माऽन्तर्याम्यमृतोऽतोऽन्यदार्तम् ॥'

(बृ. ३-७-२३)

**Page 5-1** 'यावान्वा अयमाकाशस्तावानेषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशः' (छां. ८-१-३)

2 'येनाऽऽवृतं खं च दिवं महीं च'

(तै. ना. १)

3 'आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषां न हेयो नाऽप्युपादेयः'

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

4 'सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति । पुरुषो विनाश-हेत्वभावादविनाशी । विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः । अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः ॥'

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

5 'स वा एष महानजः आत्माऽजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्माऽभयं वै ब्रह्माऽभयं हि वै ब्रह्म भवति य एवं वेद ॥'

(बृ. ४-४-२५)

**Page 6-1** 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।

अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तं मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते ॥'

(का. १-३-१५)

2. 'रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः । लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम् ॥'

(सू. भा. २-१-६)

3 'आगममात्रसमाधिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थो धर्मवत्'

(सू. भा. २-१-६)

**Page 7-1** 'एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यमेतदप्रमयं ध्रुवम् ॥'

(बृ. ४-४-२०)

2 'विज्ञानघनैकरसप्रकारेण आकाशवन्निरन्तरेण'

(बृ. भा. ४-४-२०)

3 'मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यं नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन ।

मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥'

(बृ. ४-४-१९)

4 'शास्त्राचार्योपदेशशमदमादिसंस्कृतं मनः आत्मदर्शने करणम्'

(गी. भा. २-२१)

Page 8-1 'आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न संकल्पयते यदा ।

अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहम् ॥' (गौ. का. ३-३२)

Page 9-1 'तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाण-  
प्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकश्च प्रवृत्ताः ॥'

(सू. भा. अव. १-१-१)

Page 10-1 "सर्वव्यवहारानामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः ।  
स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक् प्रबोधात् । यावद्धि न सत्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिप-  
त्तिस्तावद् प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु विकारेष्वनृतत्वबुद्धिर्न कस्य-  
चिदुत्पद्यते । विकारानेव तु 'अहम्', 'मम' - इत्यविद्याया  
आत्मात्मीयेन भावेन सर्वो जन्तुः प्रतिपद्यते स्वाभाविकीं ब्रह्मात्मतां  
हित्वा । तस्मात् प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताप्रतिबोधादुपपन्नः सर्वो लौकिको वैदि-  
कश्च व्यवहारः । यथा सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य जनस्य स्वप्ने उच्चावचान्  
भावान् पश्यतो निश्चितमेव प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं विज्ञानं भवति प्राक्प्रति-  
बोधात् न च प्रत्यक्षाभासाभिप्रायस्तत्काले भवति, तद्वत् ॥"

(सू. भा. २-१-१४)

Page 11-1 'देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानरहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृ-  
त्त्यनुपपत्तेः'

(सू. भा. अव. १-१-१)

2 'एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृ-  
त्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । अस्याऽनर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायाऽऽत्मैकत्ववि-  
द्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते ॥' (सू. भा. अव. १-१-१)

Page 12-1 'नाऽवेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्' (तै. ब्रा. ३-१२-२-७)

2 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (बृ. ३-९-२६)

Page 14-1 'न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् । किं  
तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम् । अनुभवावसा-  
नत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-२)

Page 15-1 'कर्तव्ये हि विषये नाऽनुभवापेक्षाऽस्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रमाण्यं  
स्यात् । पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-२)

2 "कर्मफले हि स्वर्गादावनुभवानारूढे स्यादाशङ्का भवेद्वा न वा इति ।  
अनुभवारूढं तु ज्ञानफलम् 'यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद् ब्रह्म' (बृ. ३-४-१)  
इति श्रुतेः, 'तत्त्वमसि' (छां. ६-८-७) इति च सिद्धवदुपदेशात् ॥"

(सू. भा. ३-३-३२)

**Page 15-3** 'वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यं रवेरिव रूपविषये । पुरुषवचसां तु मानान्तरापेक्षं षक्तस्मृतिव्यवहितं चेति विप्रकर्षः'

(सू. भा. २-१-१)

**Page 16-1** 'आत्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वात् तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम् । न चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम् ॥'

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 16-2** 'न ह्यात्माऽऽगन्तुकः कस्यचित् । स्वयंसिद्धत्वात् ॥'

(सू. भा. २-३-७)

3. 'न ह्यात्माऽऽत्मनः प्रमाणमपेक्ष्य सिध्यति । तस्य हि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणान्यप्रसिद्धप्रमेयसिद्धये उपादीयन्ते ॥' (सू. भा. २-३-७)

4 'अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् । न । अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । न हि शास्त्रमिदन्तया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति । किं तर्हि प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाऽऽविषयतया प्रतिपादयत् अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति ॥'

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 17-1** 'सर्वस्याऽऽत्मत्वे केन कं पश्येद्विजानीयादिति प्रमातृप्रमाणादिव्यापारप्रतिषेधेनैवाऽऽगमोऽपि विज्ञापयति । न त्वभिधानाभिधेयलक्षणवाक्यधर्माङ्गीकरणेन ॥'

(बृ. भा. ४-४-२०)

2 'येषां पुनस्तमोऽपनयव्यतिरेकेण घटाधिगमे प्रमाणं व्याप्त्रियते तेषां छेद्यावयवसंबन्धवियोगव्यतिरेकेणाऽन्यतरावयवेऽपि छिदिव्याप्त्रियत इत्युक्तं स्यात् ।'

(मां. भा. मं. ७)

**Page 18-1** 'प्रमातृत्वं ह्यात्मनो निवर्तयत्यन्त्यं प्रमाणम् । निवर्तयदेव चाप्रमाणीभवति स्वप्नकालप्रमाणमिव प्रबोधे'

(गी. भा. २-६९)

2 'सिद्धे ह्यात्मनि प्रमातरि प्रमित्सोः प्रमाणान्वेषणा भवति । न हि पूर्वमित्यमहम् इत्यात्मानं प्रमाय पश्चात् प्रमेयपरिच्छेदाय प्रवर्तते'

(गी. भा. २-१८)

3 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाऽभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् ..... तत्केन कं विजानीयात्'

(बृ. ४-५-१५)

**Page 19-1** 'अत्र वेदा अवेदाः'

(बृ. ४-३-२२)

2 'स्वविषयशूराणि हि प्रमाणानि'

(बृ. भा. २-१-२०)

3 'उपदेशादयं वादः'

(गौ. का. १-१८)

**Page 19-4** 'ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते'

(गौ. का. १-१८)

**Page 20-1** 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' (बृ. २-४-५)

2 'पण्डितो मेधावी'

(छां. ६-१४-२)

3 'येषामेतौ पदार्थौ अज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययप्रतिबद्धौ तेषां तत्त्वमसीत्येतद् वाक्यं स्वार्थे प्रमां नोत्पादयितुं शक्नोति । पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकत्वाद् वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्येत्यतः, तान्प्रत्येष्टव्यः पदार्थविवेकप्रयोजनः शास्त्रयुक्त्यभ्यासः'

(सू. भा. ४-१-२)

**Page 21-1** 'श्रवणायाऽपि बहुभिर्यो न लभ्यः श्रृण्वन्तोऽपि बहवो यं न विद्युः'

(का. १-२-७)

2 'अतर्क्यमणुप्रमाणात्'

(का. १-२-८)

3 'नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया'

(का. १-२-९)

4 'अनन्यप्रोक्तेऽगतिरत्र नास्ति'

(का. १-२-८)

5 'प्रोक्ताऽन्येनैव सुज्ञानाय'

(का. १-२-९)

6 'पण्डितो मेधावी गन्धारानेवोपसंपद्येतैवमेवेहाऽऽचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद'

(छां. ६-१४-२)

**Page 22-1** 'मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः'

(बृ. २-४-५)

2 'न हीदमतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनमागममन्तरेणोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम्'

(सू. भा. २-१-११)

3 'तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन चेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते ।'

(सू. भा. १-१-१)

4 'श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाऽऽश्रीयते'

(सू. भा. २-१-६)

5 'उत्प्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात् ..... । न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुम् । पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात्'

(सू. भा. २-१-११)

6 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।'

(बृ. २-४-५)

**Page 23-1** 'आत्मत्वाच्चाऽऽत्मनो निराकरणशङ्काऽनुपपत्तिः'

(सू. भा. २-३-७)

2 'नानेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्यात्राऽऽत्मलाभः संभवति ।'

(सू. भा. २-१-६)

**Page 23-3** 'प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्याभिमतानामपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभुक्प्रभृतीनां पर-  
स्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्' (सू. भा. २-१-११)

**Page 24-1** 'सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपम् । वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् । एकरूपेण ह्यवस्थितो  
योऽर्थः स परमार्थः । लोके तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानमित्युच्यते  
यथाऽग्निरुष्ण इति ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-११)

2 'न च शक्यन्तेऽतीतानागतवर्तमानास्तार्किका एकस्मिन् देशे काले  
समाहर्तुम् येन तन्मतिरेकरूपैकार्थविषया सम्यग्मतिरिति स्यात् ।'  
(सू. भा. २-१-११)

3 'वेदस्य तु नित्यत्वे विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे च सति व्यवस्थितार्थविषय-  
त्वोपपत्तेः तज्जनितस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यक्त्वमतीतानागतवर्तमानैः सर्वै-  
रपि तार्किकैरपह्नोतुमशक्यम् ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-११)

4 'ज्ञेयम् एतान्येव त्रीणि । एतद्व्यतिरेकेण ज्ञेयानुपपत्तेः । सर्वप्रावा-  
दुककल्पितवस्तुनोऽत्रैवान्तर्भावात्' (गौ. का. भा. ४-८८)

**Page 25-1** 'उपाधिकृतं मिथ्यारूपमप्यस्तित्वादिगमाय ज्ञेयधर्मवत् परि-  
कल्प्योच्यते' (गी. भा. १३-१३)

2 'अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते' (गी. भा. १३-१३)

**Page 26-1** 'स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोरुभयोरितरेतरव्यभिचारादात्मनोऽनन्वागत  
त्वम् । संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना संपत्तेर्निष्प्रपञ्चसदात्म-  
त्वम् । प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यत्वन्यायेन  
ब्रह्माव्यतिरेकः इत्येवञ्जातीयकः ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-६)

2 'दुन्दुभ्याघातविशिष्टस्य शब्दसामान्यस्य ग्रहणेन तद्गता विशेषा गृही-  
ता भवन्ति । न तु त एव निर्भिद्य ग्रहीतुं शक्यन्ते, विशेषरूपेणाऽभा-  
वात् तेषाम् । तथा प्रज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण स्वप्नजागरितयोरं कश्चित्  
वस्तुविशेषो गृह्यते ॥' (बृ. भा. २-४-७)

3 'चिन्मात्राऽनुगमात् सर्वत्र चित्स्वरूपतैवेति गम्यते'

(बृ. भा. २-४-७)

**Page 27-1** 'यथाप्राप्तस्यैव अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितस्य क्रियाकारकफ-  
लस्याऽऽश्रयणेन इष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारोपायसामान्ये प्रवृत्तस्य तद्वि-  
शेषमजानतः तदाचक्षाणा श्रुतिः क्रियाकारकफलभेदस्य  
लोकप्रसिद्धस्य सत्यताम् असत्यतां वा नाचष्टे न च वारयति ॥'

(बृ. भा. २-१-२०)



Page 27-2 'स्वविषयशूराणि हि प्रमाणानि' (बृ. भा. २-१-२०)

- 3 'एकस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि निरुपाधिके नोपदेशः, नोपदेशः, न च उपदेशग्रहणफलम्' (बृ. भा. २-१-२०)

Page 28-1 'लोके च वस्त्वधिगमे प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वादर्शनात् प्रमाणस्य' (गी. भा. २-६९)

- 2 'विवदत्स्वेव निक्षिप्य विरोधोद्धवकारणम् ।  
तैः संरक्षितसद्बुद्धिः सुखं निर्वाति वेदवित् ॥' (प्र. भा. ६-३)

Page 29-1 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यो मैत्रेय्यात्मनो वा अरे दर्शनेन श्रवणेन मत्या विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वं विदितम्'

(बृ. २-४-५)

- 2 'श्रोतव्यः पूर्वमाचार्यत आगतश्च । पश्चान्मन्तव्यस्तर्कतः । ततो निदिध्यासितव्यो निश्चयेन ध्यातव्यः । एवं ह्यसौ दृष्टो भवति श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनसाधनैर्निर्वर्तितैः । यदा एकत्वमेतान्युपगतानि तदा सम्यग्दर्शनं ब्रह्मैकत्वविषयं प्रसीदति, नान्यथा श्रवणमात्रेण ॥' (बृ. भा. २-४-५)

Page 30-1 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' (छां. ८-७-१)

- 2 'विशेषेण ज्ञातुमेष्टव्यः, विजिज्ञासितव्यः स्वसंवेद्यतामापादयितव्यः' (छां. भा. ८-७-१)

3. 'अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म' फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः । ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म । ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः । निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात् ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-१)

- 4 'अवगत्यर्थत्वात्मनननिदिध्यासनयोः' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

- 5 'क्रियाकारकफलात्मकम् अविद्याप्रत्ययविषयं रज्ज्वाविव सर्प-प्रत्ययविषयः । तदुपमर्दनार्थमाह ।' (बृ. २-४-५)

- 6 'सर्वमिदं विदितम्' (बृ. भा. २-४-५)

Page 31-1 'दर्शनपर्यवसानानि हि श्रवणादीन्यावर्त्यमानानि दृष्टार्थानि भवन्ति । यथावधातादीनि तण्डुलादिनिष्पत्तिपर्यवसानानि तद्वत् ॥'

(सू. भा. ४-१-१)

- 2 'येषां पुनर्निपुणमतीनां नाज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययलक्षणः पदार्थविषयः प्रतिबन्धोऽस्ति, ते शक्नुवन्ति सकृदुक्तमेव तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थमनुभवितुमिति तान् प्रत्यावृत्त्यानर्थक्यमिष्टमेव ॥' (सू. भा. ४-१-२)

**Page 31-3** 'उपासनं निदिध्यासनं चेत्यन्तर्णीतावृत्तिगुणैव क्रियाऽभिधीयते'

(सू. भा. ४-१-१)

4 'यानि तावत् सम्यग्दर्शनार्थान्युपासनानि तान्यवधातादिवत् कार्यपर्यवसानानीति ज्ञातमेवैषामावृत्तिपरिमाणम् । न हि सम्यग्दर्शनं कार्ये निष्पन्ने यत्नान्तरं किञ्चिच्छासितुं शक्यम् ॥'

(सू. भा. ४-१-१२)

5 'आप्रायणादेव आवर्तयेत् प्रत्ययम् । अन्त्यप्रत्ययवशात् अदृष्टफलप्राप्तेः'

(सू. भा. ४-१-१२)

**Page 32-1** 'स योऽत एकैकमुपास्ते न स वेदाकल्पो ह्येषोऽत एकैकेन भवत्यात्मेत्येवोपासीताऽत्र ह्येते सर्व एकं भवन्ति ॥'

(बृ. १-४-७)

2 'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत — भाति च तपति च कीर्त्या यशसा ब्रह्मवर्चसेन य एवं वेद ॥'

(छा. ३-१८-१, ३)

3 'क्रिया हि नाम सा यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते पुरुषचित्तव्यापाराधीना च ॥'

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

4 'ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसं तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम् । पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात् । ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम् । अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम् । केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् । न चोदनातन्त्रं नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् ॥'

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 33-1** 'आत्मनः स्वरूपं ज्ञप्तिर्न ततो व्यतिरिच्यते अतो नित्यैव । तथापि बुद्धेरुपाधिलक्षणायाश्चक्षुरादिद्वारैर्विषयाकारेण परिणामिन्या ये शब्दाद्याकारावभासाः, ते आत्मविज्ञानस्य विषयभूता उत्पद्यमाना एव आत्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता उत्पद्यन्ते । तस्मादात्मविज्ञानावभास्यश्च ते विज्ञानशब्दवाच्यश्चाऽऽत्मन एव धर्मा विक्रियरूपा इत्यविवेकिभिः परिकल्प्यन्ते ॥'

(तै. भा. २-१)

2 'एह्यास्व व्याख्यास्यामि ते व्याचक्षाणस्य तु मे निदिध्यासस्वेति'

(बृ. २-४-४)

**Page 34-1** 'एष आत्मा निष्कामति चक्षुष्टो वा मूर्ध्नो वाऽन्येभ्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यः ॥'

(बृ. ४-४-२)

**Page 35-2** 'यान् शुक्लादीन् येगिनो मोक्षपथानाहुर्न ते मोक्षमार्गाः । संसार-  
विषया एव हि ते । चक्षुष्टो वा मूर्ध्नो वाऽन्येभ्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यः  
-इति शरीरदेशात्रिस्सरणसंबन्धाद् ब्रह्मादिलोकप्रापका हि ते ॥'

(बृ. भा. ४-४-९)

3 'इदानीं योगस्य यत्फलं ब्रह्मैकत्वदर्शनं सर्वसंसारोच्छेदकारणं तत्  
प्रदर्श्यते'

(गी. भा. ६-२९)

4 'ध्यानयोगपरो नित्यम्'

(गी. १८-५२)

5 'ध्यानमात्मस्वरूपचिन्तनं योग आत्मविषय एवैकाग्रीकरणम्'

(गी. भा. १८-५२)

6 'योऽयमौपनिषदात्मप्रतिपत्तिप्रयोजनः समाधिरुपदिष्टो वेदान्तेषु'

(सू. भा. २-३-३९)

7. 'अपि चैनमात्मानं निरस्तसमस्तप्रपञ्चमव्यक्तं संराधनकाले पश्यन्ति  
योगिनः । संराधनं च भक्तिध्यानप्रणिधानाद्यनुष्ठानम् ॥'

(सू. भा. ३-२-२४)

8 'अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति'

(का. १-२-१२)

9 'विषयेभ्यः प्रतिसंहृत्य चेतसः आत्मनि समाधानमध्यात्मयोगः'

(का. भा. १-२-१२)

10 'मनसो निग्रहायत्तम्'

(गौ. का. ३-४०)

**Page 35-1** 'अमनस्तां तदा याति'

(गौ. का. ३-३२)

2 'व्यवसायात्मिका बुद्धिः समाधौ न विधीयते'

(गी. २-४४)

3 'समाधीयतेऽस्मिन् पुरुषोपभोगाय सर्वमिति समाधिरन्तःकरणम्'

(गी. भा. २-४४)

4 'समाधावचला बुद्धिः'

(गी. २-५३)

5 'समाधीयते चित्तमस्मिन्निति समाधिरात्मा'

(गी. भा. २-५३)

6 'लब्धसमाधिप्रज्ञस्य'

(गी. भा. २-५४)

**Page 36-1** 'येगे त्विमां शृणु'

(गी. २-३९)

2 'कर्मयोगे कर्मानुष्ठाने समाधियोगे च'

(गी. भा. २-३९)

**Page 37-1** 'न क्वचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेणार्थवत्ता दृष्टा,  
उपपन्ना वा'

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 37-2** अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायाऽऽत्वैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते' (सू. भा. अध्यासभाष्य)

3 'सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येणैतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि ।' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 38-1** 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब. सू. १-१-४)

2 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्' (जै. सू. १-२-१)

3 'दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्' (शा. भा. १-१-१)

4 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः' (बृ. २-५-१९)

5 'न च तद्गतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमानेऽर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता ।' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

6 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २-१)

**Page 39-1** "न ज्ञानशब्दवाच्यमपि ब्रह्म । तथापि तदाभासवाचकेन बुद्धिधर्मविषयेण ज्ञानशब्देन तल्लक्ष्यते, न तूच्यते । शब्दप्रवृत्तिभूतजात्यादिधर्मरहितत्वात् । तथा सत्यशब्देनापि । सर्वविशेषप्रत्यस्तमितस्वरूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मणो बाह्यसत्तासामान्यविषयेण सत्यशब्देन लक्ष्यते सत्यं ब्रह्मेति । न तु सत्यशब्दवाच्यमेव ब्रह्म । एवं सत्यादिशब्दा इतरेतरसन्निधानात् अन्योन्यनियम्यनियामकाः सन्तः सत्यादिशब्दवाच्यात् तन्निवर्तका ब्रह्मणो लक्षणार्थाश्च भवन्तीत्यतः सिद्धं 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते, अप्राप्य मनसा सह', (तै. २-१) , 'अनिरुक्तेऽनिलयने' (तै. २-७) , इति चावाच्यत्वं नीलोत्पलवदवाक्यार्थत्वं च ब्रह्मणः"

(तै. भा. २-१)

2 " 'तत्केन कं पश्येत्' (बृ. ४-४-१५) इतिक्रियाकारकफलनिरासश्रुतेः" (सू. भा. १-१-४)

3 'न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः । तत्त्वमसि (छां. ६-८-७) इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेणाऽनवगम्यमानत्वात् ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 40-1** 'यद्यप्यन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टं, तथापि आत्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वात् तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं, प्रत्याख्यातुम् । न चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यं, येनान्यत्र दृष्टं निदर्शनमपेक्षेत ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 40-2** 'न वाक्यस्य वस्त्वन्वाख्यानं क्रियान्वाख्यानं वा प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य-  
कारणम् किं तर्हि निश्चितफलवद्विज्ञानोत्पादकत्वम् । तद्यत्रास्ति  
तत्प्रमाणं वाक्यम् यत्र नास्ति तदप्रमाणम् ॥' (बृ. भा. १-४-७)

3 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ. २-४-५)

4 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' (छां. ८-७-१)

**Page 41-1** " 'नेति नेति', 'अस्थूलम्', 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्', 'अशनायाद्यतीतः'  
-इत्येवमादिवाक्यानाम् उपास्यात्मस्वरूपविशेषसमर्पणेनोपयोगः ।  
फलं च मोक्षः, अविद्यानिवृत्तिर्वा ॥" (बृ. भा. १-४-७)

2 'तत्रैवं सति यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेष्वनित्येषु कश्चि-  
दतिशयो मोक्ष इति प्रसज्येत ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

3 'नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैर्मोक्षवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते । अतो न कर्तव्यशेष-  
त्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

4 'न ह्येकत्वविज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति'  
(सू. भा. १-१-४)

5 'आत्मवस्तुस्वरूपसमर्पकैरेव वाक्यैस्तत्त्वमसीत्यादिभिः श्रवण-  
काल एव तद्दर्शनस्य कृतत्वाद् द्रष्टव्यविधेर्नानुष्ठानान्तरं कर्तव्यम्'  
(बृ. भा. १-४-७)

**Page 42-1** 'आत्मैकत्वविज्ञानस्मृतिसन्तरेरर्थत एव भावात् न विधेयत्वम् ॥'  
(बृ. भा. १-४-७)

2 'द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते । नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्टं तद्विप-  
रीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम् ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-१२)

3 'तत्राविद्यावस्थायां ब्रह्मण उपास्योपासकादिलक्षणः सर्वो व्यवहारः'  
(सू. भा. १-१-१२)

4 'अस्थूलमनण्वहस्वमदीर्घम्' (बृ. ३-८-८)

5 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्' (का. १-३-१५)

6 'आकाशौ वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म'  
(छां. ८-१४-१)

7 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः' (मुं. २-१-२)

8 'तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमन्तरमबाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः'  
(बृ. २-५-१९)

**Page 43-1** “संपदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने ‘तत्त्वमसि’ ‘अहं ब्रह्मास्मि’ ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म’ इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत ।’

(सू. भा. १-१-४)

2 ‘इतराणि त्वाकारवद्ब्रह्मविषयाणि वाक्यनि न तत्प्रधानानि । उपासनाविधिप्रधानानि हि तानि’ (सू. भा. ३-२-१४)

3 ‘अनन्तं वै मनः अनन्ता विश्वेदेवाः’ (बृ. ३-१-९)

4 ‘वायुर्वाव संवर्गः’ (छां. ४-३-१)

5 ‘ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्मैव भवति इति चैवमादीनि तद्भावापत्तिवचनानि संपदादिपक्षे न सामञ्जस्येनोपपद्येरन् ॥’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 44-1** “‘भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः’ इति चैवमादीन्यविद्यानिवृत्तिफलश्रवणान्युपरुध्येरन् ॥’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

2 ‘यथाभूतब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम् । तद्विषये लिङादयः श्रूयमाणा अप्यनियोज्यविषयत्वात् कुण्ठीभवन्त्युपलादिषु प्रयुक्तक्षुरतैक्षण्यादिवत् ॥’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

3 ‘अहेयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् ।’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

4 ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः’ (बृ. २-४-५)

**Page 45-1** ‘यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः इष्टं मे भूयात् अनिष्टं मा भूदिति न च तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तमात्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थवाञ्छिनं स्वाभाविककार्यकरणसंघातप्रयुक्तिगोचरात् विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः इत्यादीनि ।’ तस्यात्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्याहेयमनुपादेयं चात्मतत्त्वमुपदिश्यते ॥ ‘इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (बृ. २-४-६) इत्यादिभिः ॥’ (सू. भा. १-१-४)

2 ‘लोकेऽपीदं पश्य, इदमाकर्णय इति चैवजातीयकेषु निर्देशेषु प्रणिधानमात्रं कुरु इत्युच्यते, न साक्षाज्ज्ञानमेव कुर्विति । ज्ञेयाभिमुखस्यापि ज्ञानं कदाचित् जायते कदाचित् न जायते । तस्मात् तं प्रति ज्ञानविषय एव दर्शयितव्यो ज्ञापयितुकामेन । तस्मिन् दर्शिते स्वयमेव यथाविषयं यथाप्रमाणं च ज्ञानम् उत्पद्यते ।’

(सू. भा. ३-२-२१)

3 ‘ब्रह्मैवाविद्याध्यस्तप्रपञ्चप्रत्याख्यानेनावेदयितव्यम्’

(सू. भा. ३-२-२१)

**Page 45-4** 'रज्जुरियं नायं सर्पः इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात्'  
(सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 46-1** 'तत्र येषामेतौ पदार्थावज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययप्रतिबद्धौ तेषां तत्त्वमसी-  
त्येतद् वाक्यं स्वार्थे प्रमां नोत्पादयितुं शक्नोति ।'  
(सू. भा. ४-१-२)

2 'नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम् । वेद-  
प्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मभावविरोधात् ॥'  
(सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 47-1** 'तस्मात् अहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि  
चेतराणि प्रमाणानि । न ह्येयानुपादेयाद्वैतात्मावगतौ निर्विषयाण्य-  
प्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्तीति ।'  
(सू. भा. १-१-४)

**Page 48-1** 'योऽयं लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः, स उत्पन्नविवेकज्ञानस्य  
स्थितप्रज्ञस्य अविद्याकार्यत्वादविद्यानिवृत्तौ निवर्तते । अविद्यायाश्च  
विद्याविरोधात्रिवृत्तिः'  
(गी. भा. २-६९)

2 'लौकिकं शुद्धलौकिकं लोकोत्तरं च क्रमेण येन ज्ञानेन ज्ञायते  
तज्ज्ञानम् । ज्ञेयम् एतन्न्येव त्रीणि । एतद्व्यतिरेकेण ज्ञेयानुपपत्तेः ।  
सर्वप्रावादुक्तकल्पितवस्तुनोऽत्रैवान्तर्भावात् । विज्ञेयं परमार्थसत्यं  
तुर्याख्यमद्वयमात्मतत्त्वम् ॥'

(गौ. का. भा. ४-८८)

**Page 49-1** 'ज्ञाने च लौकिकादिविषये, ज्ञेये च लौकिकादित्रिविधे-पूर्वं  
लौकिकं स्थूलम्, तदभावेन पञ्चाच्छुद्धं लौकिकम्, तदभावेन  
लोकोत्तरम् इत्येवंक्रमेण स्थानत्रयाभावेन परमार्थसत्ये  
तुर्येऽद्वयेऽजेऽभये विदिते स्वयमेवाऽऽत्मस्वरूपमेव ॥'

(गौ. का. भा. ४-८९)

2 'त्रयाणां विश्वादीनां पूर्वप्रविलापनेन तुरीयस्य प्रतिपत्तिरिति करण-  
साधनः पादशब्दः'  
(मां. भा. मं. २)

3 'तुरीयस्य तु पद्यत इति कर्मसाधनः पादशब्दः'

(मां. भा. मं. २)

4 'सोऽयमात्मा चतुष्पात्'

(मां. २)

**Page 50-1** 'सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य साधिदैविकस्यानेनात्मना चतुष्पात्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । एवं च सति सर्वप्रपञ्चोपशमेऽद्वैतसिद्धिः । सर्वभूतस्थ-  
श्चात्मा एको दृष्टः स्यात्, सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि । . . . . अन्यथा हि  
स्वदेहपरिच्छिन्न एव प्रत्यगात्मा साङ्ख्यादिभिरिव दृष्टः स्यात् । तथा  
च सति अद्वैतमिति श्रुतिकृतो विशेषो न स्यात् ॥'

(मां. भा. मं. ३)

2 'प्रसिद्धेनैव भेदानां ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वेन हेतुना समत्वेन स्वप्नजागरित-  
स्थानयोरेकत्वमाहुर्विवेकिनः'

(गौ. का. भा. २-५)

**Page 52-1** 'तत्रैव पश्यति न तु जागरितादुत्पद्यमानान्'

(गौ. का. भा. ४-४१)

2 'स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति ।'

'महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥' (का. २-१-४)

3 'जाग्रद्वज्रा अनेकसाधना बहिर्विषयेवावभासमाना मनःस्पन्दनमात्रा  
सती तथाभूतं संस्कारं मनस्याधत्ते । तन्मनस्तथा संस्कृतं चित्रित इव  
पटो बाह्यसाधनानपेक्षमविद्याकामकर्मभिः प्रेर्यमाणं जाग्रदव-  
भासते'

(मां. भा. मं. ४)

**Page 53-1** 'यथा स्वप्नः स्वप्नदृश एव सन् साधारणविद्यमानवस्तुवदवभासते,  
तथा तत्कारणत्वात् साधारणविद्यमानवस्तुवदवभासमानम् न तु  
साधारणं विद्यमानवस्तु । स्वप्नवदेव ॥' (गौ. का. ४-३७)

2 'स वा एष एतस्मिन् बुद्धान्ते रत्वा चरित्वा दृष्ट्वैव पुण्यं च पापं च पुनः  
प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नान्तायैव ।' (बृ. ४-३-१७)

3 'यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति'

(बृ. ४-३-१९)

4 'जागरितेऽपि यद्दर्शनं तदपि स्वप्नं श्रुतिः । अत आह 'न कञ्चन स्वप्नं  
पश्यति' इति ॥'

(बृ. भा. ४-३-१९)

**Page 54-1** 'सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानधन एवानन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः  
प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पादः ॥'

(मां. ५)

2 'प्रज्ञप्तिमात्रमस्यैवासाधारणं रूपम् इति प्राज्ञः । इतरयोर्विशिष्टमपि  
विज्ञानमस्ति ॥'

(मां. भा. मं. ५)

3 'यन्मयो यत्स्थश्च जीवो मननदर्शनश्रवणादिव्यवहाराय कल्पते, तदु-  
परमे च स्वं देवतारूपमेव प्रतिपद्यते ॥' (छां. भा. ६-८-१)



**Page 54-4** 'यत्रैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति, तस्मादेनं स्वपितीत्याचक्षते ।' (छां. ६-८-१)

5 'सुषुप्त एव स्वं देवतारूपं जीवत्वविनिर्मुक्तं दर्शयिष्यामीत्याह ।' (छां. भा. ६-८-१)

6 'सलिल एको द्रष्टाऽद्वैतो भवत्येष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राडिति हैमनुशशास याज्ञवल्क्यः । एषास्य परमा गतिरेषास्य परमा संपदेषोऽस्य परमो लोक एषोऽस्य परम आनन्द एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति ॥' (बृ. ४-३-३२)

**Page 55-1** 'अत्र पिताऽपिता भवति माताऽमाता लोका अलोका देवा अदेवा वेदा अवेदाः । अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति भूणहाऽभूणहा चाण्डालोऽचाण्डालः पौलकसोऽपौलकसः श्रमणोऽश्रमणस्तापसोऽतापसोऽनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन । तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान् हृदयस्य भवति ॥' (बृ. ४-३-२२)

2 'एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् ।'..... (मां. ६)

3 'स यथोर्णनाभिस्तन्तुनोच्चरेद्यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्त्येव मेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति ।' (बृ. २-१-२०)

**Page 56-1** 'सतां विद्यमानानां स्वेनाविद्याकृतनामरूपमायास्वरूपेण सर्वभावानां विश्वतैजसप्राज्ञभेदानां प्रभव उत्पत्तिः ।' (गौ. का. भा. १-६)

2 'यथा रज्ज्वां प्राक्सर्पोत्पत्तेः रज्ज्वात्मना सर्पः सन्नेवाऽऽसीत् एवं सर्वभावानामुत्पत्तेः प्राक् प्राणबीजात्मनैव सत्त्वम् ।' (गौ. का. भा. १-६)

**Page 57-1** 'यदा आत्मस्थेऽनभिव्यक्ते नामरूपे व्याक्रियेते तदा नामरूपे आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव ब्रह्मणाऽप्रविभक्तदेशकाले सर्वावस्थानु व्याक्रियेते । तदेतन्नामरूपव्याकरणं ब्रह्मणो बहुभवनम् । नान्यथा निरवयवस्य ब्रह्मणो बहुत्वापत्तिरुपपद्यते ।' (तै. भा. २-६)

2 'मायाविनः सूत्रप्रसारणसमः सुषुप्तस्वप्नादिविकासः । तदारूढमायाविसमश्च तत्स्थः प्राज्ञतैजसादिः । सूत्रतदारूढाभ्यामन्यः परमार्थमायावी स एव भूमिष्ठो मायाच्छत्रोऽदृश्यमान एव स्थितो यथा तथा तुरीयाख्यं परमार्थतत्त्वम् ॥' (गौ. का. भा. १-७)

Page 61-3 'न हि रज्ज्वादीनामविद्यास्वभावव्यतिरेकेण सर्पाद्याभासत्वे कारणं शक्यं वक्तुम् ।' (गौ. का. भा. १-९)

Page 58-1 'ज्ञस्वरूपविशेषेऽपि इतरेतरव्यभिचारादसत्यत्वं रज्ज्वादाविष्य सर्पधारादिविकल्पितभेदवत् । सर्वत्राव्यभिचाराज्ञस्वरूपस्य सत्यत्वम् ।' (मां. भा. मं ७)

2 'सुषुप्ते व्यभिचरतीति चेन्न, सुषुप्तस्यानुभूयमानत्वात् ।' (मां. भा. मं. ७)

3 'अयं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम् ।' (बृ. ४-३-२१)

Page 59-1 'एकत्वमेवाज्ञानहेतुः ।' (बृ. भा. ४-३-२१)

2 'यद्वै तत्र विजानाति, विजानन् वै तत्र विजानाति, न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् तद्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्विजानीयात् ॥' (बृ. ४-३-३०)

3 'अन्यथा गृहणतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः । विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्रुते ॥' (गौ. का. १-१५)

4 'त्रयः स्वप्नाः' (ऐ. १-१२)

Page 60-1 'अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते । अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥' (गौ. का. १-१६)

Page 61-1 'सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा । इदं सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किं च ।' (तै. २-६)

2 'यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः .... सर्व एत आत्मानो व्युच्चरन्ति ॥' (बृ. मां. २-१-२३)

3 'तथाक्षराद्विघाः सोम्य भावाः प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापि यन्ति ।' (मुं. २-१-१)

4 'अप्रत्याख्येयस्वभावत्वादेवाकार्यत्वमात्मनः ।' (सू. भा. २-३-७)

5 'सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति । पुरुषो विनाशहेत्वभावादविनाशी, विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः, अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-४)

6 'स वा एष महानज आत्माऽजरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म ।' (बृ. ४-४-२५)

7 'प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतम् ।' (मां. मं. ७)

Page 62-1 'मूलोहविस्फुलिङ्गादिदृष्टान्तोपन्यासैः सृष्टिर्या चोदिता प्रकाशिता कल्पिताऽन्यथाऽन्यथा, स सर्वः सृष्टिप्रकारो जीवपरमात्मैकत्वबुद्ध्यवताराय उपायः ॥' (गौ. का. भा. ३-१५)

Page 63-1 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' (छां. ६-१-४)

2 " 'क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गाः (बृ. २-१-२०) , ममैवांशः (गी. १४-७) — इति च श्रूयते स्मर्यते चेत् । न । एकत्वप्रत्ययदाढ्यार्थत्वात् । अनेर्हि विस्फुलिङ्गोऽग्निरेव इत्येकत्वप्रत्ययाहो दृष्टो लोके । तथा चांशोऽंशिना एकत्वप्रत्ययार्हः ॥" (बृ. भा. २-१-२०)

3 'बुद्ध्यष्टुपाधिनिमित्तं त्वस्य प्रविभागप्रतिभानम् आकाशस्येव घटादिसंबन्धनिमित्तम् ।' (सू. भा. २-३-१७)

4 'आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः ।  
घटादिवच्च संघातैर्जातावेतन्निदर्शनम् ॥' (गौ. का. ३-३)

Page 64-1 'यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।

तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥' (गौ. का. ४-६८)

2 'संघाताः स्वप्नवत्सर्वे आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः' (गौ. का. ३-१०)

3 'प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तते न संशयः ।  
मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥' (गौ. का. १-१७)

4 'उपलम्भात् समाचारादस्तिवस्तुत्ववादिनाम् ।  
जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैरजातेस्त्रसतां सदा ॥' (गौ. का. ४-४२)

Page 65-1 'तां गृहणन्तु तावत् । वेदान्ताध्यासिनां तु स्वयमेव अजाद्वयात्म-  
विषयो विवेको भविष्यतीति । न तु परमार्थबुद्ध्या ॥'

(गौ. का. भा. ४-४२)

2 'उपासनोपदिष्टेयं तदर्थमनुकम्पया' (गौ. का. ३-१६)

3 'मरणे संभवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरपि ।  
स्थितौ सर्वशरीरेषु चाकाशेनाविलक्षणः ॥' (गौ. का. ३-९)

4 'सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः' (गौ. का. ३-२७)

5 'सतो हि विद्यमानात् कारणान्मायानिर्मितस्य हस्त्यादिकार्यस्येव जगज्जन्म युज्यते । नासतः कारणात् । . . . . अथवा सतो विद्यमानस्य वस्तुनो रज्ज्वादेः सर्पादिबन्मायया जन्म युज्यते । न तु तत्त्वतो यथा तथा अग्राह्यस्यापि सत एवाजस्याऽऽत्मनो जन्म ॥'

(गौ. का. भा. ३-२७)

- Page 65-6** 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ।' (क. २-१-११)
- 7 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते ।' (बृ. २-५-१९)
- 8 'अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते ।' (तै. आ. ३-१३)
- 9 'अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृता-  
त्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादि सर्वव्यवहा-  
रास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।' (सू. भा. २-१-२७)
- Page 66-1** 'सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वा-  
भ्यामनिर्वचनीये संसारप्रपञ्चबीजभूते सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य माया,  
शक्तिः, प्रकृतिः — इति च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलष्येते ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-१४)
- 2 'यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्या परमात्मत्वात् श्रुत्यनुसारिभिरन्यत्वेन निरू-  
प्यमाणे नामरूपे मृदादिविकारवद् वस्त्वन्तरे तत्त्वतो न स्तः सलि-  
लफेनघटादिविकारवदेव, तदा तदपेक्ष्य 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' 'नेह  
नानास्ति किञ्चन' इत्यादिपरमार्थदर्शनगोचरत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।' (बृ. भा. ३-५-१)
- 3 'न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।  
एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किञ्चिन्न जायते ॥' (गौ. का. ३-४८)
- Page 67-1** 'अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।  
अन्विष्टः स्यात् प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥' (सू. भा. १-१-४)
- Page 68-1** 'विद्यासंयुक्तं नित्यमग्निहोत्रादि विद्याविहीनं चोभयमपि मुमुक्षुणा  
मोक्षप्रयोजनोद्देशेन इह जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे च प्राग्ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः कृतं यत्  
तद् यथासामर्थ्यं ब्रह्माधिगमप्रतिबन्धकारणोपात्तदुरितक्षयहेतुत्वद्वा-  
रेण ब्रह्माधिगमकारणत्वं प्रतिपद्यमानं श्रवणमननश्रद्धातात्पर्याद्यन्त-  
रङ्गकारणापेक्षं ब्रह्मविद्यया सहैककार्यं भवति ॥' (सू. भा. ४-१-१८)
- 2 'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन  
तपसाऽनाशकेन ।' (बृ. ४-४-२२)
- 3 'विविदिषासंयोगाच्चैषाम् उत्पत्तिसाधनभावोऽवसीयते ।' (सू. भा. ३-४-२६)
- 4 'स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ।' (गी. १८-४६)

Page 68-5 'निःसंगतया द्वन्द्वप्रहाणपूर्वकमीश्वराराधनार्थं कर्मयोगे ।'

(गी. भा. २-३९)

6 'योगिनः कर्म कुर्वन्ति सङ्गं त्यक्त्वाऽऽत्मशुद्धये ।' (गी. ५-११)

7 'रैक्ववाचक्रवीप्रभृतीनामेवंभूतानामपि ब्रह्मवित्त्वश्रुत्युपलब्धेः ।'

(सू. भा. ३-४-३६)

8 'सर्वतप्रभृतीनां नग्नचर्यादियोगादनपेक्षिताश्रमकर्मणामपि महायोगित्वं स्मर्यत इतिहासे ।'

(सू. भा. ३-४-३७)

Page 69-1 'पुरुषमात्रसंबन्धिभिर्जपोपवासदेवताराधनादिभिर्धर्मविशेषैरनुग्रहो विद्यायाः संभवति ।'

(सू. भा. ३-४-३८)

2 'अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धः ततो याति परां गतिम्' (गी. ६-४५)

3 " 'तथा च स्मृतिः 'अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम्' इति जन्मान्तरसंचितानामपि संस्कारविशेषाननुगृहीतृन् विद्याया दर्शयति ॥"

(सू. भा. ३-४-३८)

4 'येषां पुनः पूर्वकृतसंस्कारवशाद् विदुरधर्मव्याधप्रभृतीनां ज्ञानोत्पत्तिस्तेषां न शक्यते फलप्राप्तिः प्रतिषेद्धम् । ज्ञानस्यैकान्तिकफलत्वात् ॥'

(सू. भा. १-३-३८)

5 'श्रावयेच्चतुरो वर्णान् (भा. शां. ३२७-४९) इति चेतिहासपुराणाधिगमे चातुर्वर्ण्यस्याधिकारस्मरणात् ।'

(सू. भा. १-३-३८)

6 'न ह्यग्निहोत्रादीन्येव कर्माणि । ब्रह्मचर्यं तपः सत्यवदनं शमो दमोऽहिंसेत्येवमादीन्यपि कर्माणीतराश्रमप्रसिद्धानि विद्यौत्पत्तौ साधकतमान्यसंकीर्णानि विद्यन्ते ध्यानधारणादिलक्षणानि च ॥'

(तै. भा. १-११)

7 'तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वाऽत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति'

(बृ. ४-४-२३)

Page 70-1 'एतावदरे खल्वमृतत्वम्'

(बृ. ४-५-१५)

2 'अग्नीन्धनाद्याश्रमकर्माणि विद्यया स्वार्थसिद्धौ नापेक्षितव्यानि'

(सू. भा. ३-४-२५)

3 'ऊर्ध्वरेतःसु चाश्रमेषु विद्या श्रूयते । न च तत्र कर्माङ्गत्वं विद्यायाः संभवति । कर्माभावात् ॥'

(सू. भा. ३-४-१७)

4 'एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति ।'

(बृ. ४-४-२२)

5 'ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति ।'

(छां. २-२३-१)

- Page 71-1** 'ब्रह्मसंस्थ इति हि ब्रह्मणि परिसमाप्तिरनन्यव्यापारतारूपं तन्निष्ठ-  
त्वमभिधीयते । तच्च त्रयाणामाश्रमाणां न संभवति । स्वाश्रमविहि-  
तकर्मानुष्ठाने प्रत्यवायश्रवणात् । परित्राजकस्य तु  
सर्वकर्मसंन्यासात् प्रत्यवायो न संभवति अननुष्ठाननिमित्तः । शमा-  
दिस्तु तदीयो धर्मो ब्रह्मसंस्थताया उपोद्बलको न विरोधी । ब्रह्मनि-  
ष्ठत्वमेव हि तस्य शमदमाद्युपबृंहितं स्वाश्रमविहितं कर्म । यज्ञादीनि  
चेतरेषाम् तद्व्यतिक्रमे च तस्य प्रत्यवायः । (सू. भा. ३-४-२०)
- 2 'तस्मात्परित्राजकस्याऽऽश्रममात्रादमृतत्वप्राप्तेर्ज्ञानार्थक्यप्रसङ्ग  
इत्येषोऽपि दोषो नावतरति' (सू. भा. ३-४-२०)
- 3 'ब्रह्मज्ञानपरिपाकाङ्गत्वाच्च पारित्राज्यस्य' (सू. भा. ३-४-२०)
- 4 'योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते' (गी. ६-३)

- Page 72-1** 'अतो विदुषस्तावत् पारित्राज्यं सिद्धं संप्रदानादिकर्मकारकजात्या-  
दिशून्याविक्रियब्रह्मात्मदृढप्रतिपत्तिमात्रेण वचनमन्तरेणाऽपि'  
(बृ. भा. ४-५-१५)
- 2 'स कुतश्चिन्मितात् कर्मपरित्यागासंभवे सति कर्मणि तत्फले च  
सङ्गरहिततया स्वप्रयोजनाभावाल्लोकसंग्रहार्थं पूर्ववत् कर्मणि  
प्रवृत्तोऽपि नैव किञ्चित् करोति । ज्ञानाग्निदग्धकर्मत्वात्तदीयं कर्मा-  
कर्मेव संपद्यते ॥' (गी. भा. ४-२०)
- 3 'तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् । बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं  
च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः ॥'  
(बृ. ३-५-१)

- Page 73-1** 'दृष्टार्था च विद्या प्रतिषेधाभावमात्रेणाऽप्यर्थिनमधिकरोति श्रवणा-  
दिषु । तस्माद्विधुरादीनामप्यधिकारो न विरुध्यते'  
(सू. भा. ३-४-३८)
- 2 'यदा प्रकान्तस्य विद्यासाधनस्य कश्चित् प्रतिबन्धो न क्रियत उपस्थि-  
तविपाकेन कर्मान्तरेण तदा इहैव विद्या उत्पद्यते । यदा तु खलु  
तत्प्रतिबन्धः क्रियते तदाऽमुत्र ॥' (सू. भा. ३-४-५१)
- 3 'गर्भ एवैतच्छयानो वामदेव एवमुवाच' (ऐ. २-५)
- Page 74-1** 'न च पुनरावर्तते' (छां. ८-१५-१)
- 2 'इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते' (छां. ४-१५-५)

Page 74-3 'तेषामिह न पुनरावृत्तिरस्ति'

(बृ. मा. ६-१-१८)

4 'अत इमम् इहेति च विशेषणार्थवत्त्वाय अन्यत्राऽऽवृत्तिः कल्पनीया ॥'

(छां. भा. ५-१०-२)

5 'विद्यासाधनं स्ववीर्यविशेषात् स्वफल एव विद्यायां कश्चिदतिशय-मासञ्जयेत् न विद्याफले मुक्तौ । तद्ध्यसाध्यं नित्यसिद्धस्वभावमेव विद्यायाऽधिगम्यत इत्यसकृदवादिष्य । न च तस्यामपि उत्कर्षापक-र्षात्मकोऽतिशय उपपद्यते । निकृष्टाया विद्यात्वाभावात् । उत्कृष्टैव हि विद्या भवति । तस्मात् तस्यां चिराच्चिरोत्पत्तिरूपोऽतिशयो भवन् भवेत् । न तु मुक्तौ कश्चिदतिशयसंभवोऽस्ति ॥'

(सू. भा. ३-४-५२)

6 'ब्रह्मैव हि मुक्त्यवस्था'

(सू. भा. ३-४-५२)

Page 75-1 "न हि तत्त्वमसि इत्यस्य वाक्यस्यार्थस्तत्त्वं मृतो भविष्यसीत्येवं परिणेतुं शक्यः । 'तद्धैतत् पश्यन्नृषिर्वाग्देवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च' (बृ. १-४-१०) इति च सम्यग्दर्शनकालमेव तत्फलं सर्वात्मत्वं दर्शयति । तस्मादैकान्तिकी विदुषः कैवल्यसिद्धिः ॥"

(सू. भा. ३-३-३२)

2 ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति'

(बृ. ४-४-६)

3 'यस्मात् न हि तस्याब्रह्मत्वपरिच्छेदे हेतवः कामाः सन्ति तस्मात् इहैव ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति न शरीरपातोत्तरकालम् । न हि विदुषो मृतस्य भावान्तरापत्तिः, जीवतोऽन्यो भावः । देहान्तरप्रतिसन्धानाभावमात्रेणैव तु ब्रह्माप्येतीत्युच्यते ॥'

(बृ. भा. ४-४-६)

Page 76-1 'तद्यथाऽहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदं शरीरं शेतेऽथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव ॥'

(बृ. ४-४-७)

2 'अथाऽयमितरः सर्पस्थानीयो मुक्तः सर्वात्मभूतः सर्पवत् तत्रैव वर्तमानोऽप्यशरीर एव, न पूर्ववत् पुनः सशरीरो भवति ॥'

(बृ. भा. ४-४-७)

3 'कामकर्मप्रयुक्तशरीरात्मभावेन हि पूर्वं सशरीरो मर्त्यश्च । तद्वियोगादथेदानीम् अशरीरः । अत एव च अमृतः ॥'

(बृ. भा. ४-४-७)

**Page 77-1** 'इदं वेदान्तवाक्यानामैदंपर्यं निरूपयितुं शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तं न तर्कशास्त्रवत् केवलाभिर्युक्तिभिः कञ्चित् सिद्धान्तं साधयितुं दूषयितुं वा प्रवृत्तम् ॥' (सू. भा. २-२-१)

2 'परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतं भवति' (सू. भा. २-४-१२)

3 'साङ्ख्ययोगौ हि परमपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्यातौ, शिष्टैश्च परिगृहीतौ, लिङ्गेन च श्रौतेनोपबृंहितौ ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-३)

4 'तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाभिपन्नं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः'

(श्वे. ६-१३)

**Page 78-1** 'निराकरणं तु न साङ्ख्यज्ञानेन वेदनिरपेक्षेण योगमार्गेण वा निःश्रेयसमधिगम्यत इति ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-३)

2 "यत्तु दर्शनमुक्तं 'तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाभिपन्नम्' इति वैदिकमेव तत्र ज्ञानं ध्यानं च सांख्ययोगशब्दाभ्यामभिलप्यते प्रत्यासत्तेरित्यवगन्तव्यम्। येन त्वंशेन न विरुध्येते तेनेष्टमेव सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योः सावकाशत्वम् ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-३)

3 'तान्यपि तर्कोपपत्तिभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानायोपकुर्वन्तीति चेदुपकुर्वन्तु नाम। तत्त्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव भवति ॥' (सू. भा. २-१-३)

4 ज्ञानज्ञेयज्ञातृभेदरहितं परमार्थतत्त्वमद्वयमेतन्न बुद्धेन भाषितम्। यद्यपि बाह्यार्थनिराकरणं ज्ञानमात्रकल्पना चाद्वयवस्तुसामीप्यमुक्तम्। इदं तु परमार्थतत्त्वम् अद्वैतं वेदान्तेष्वेव विज्ञेयम् ॥'

(गौ. का. भा. ४-१९)

5 दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम्।

बुद्ध्वा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथाबलम् ॥'

(गौ. का. ४-१००)

ॐ तत् सत्